Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA86
2009-02-10 21:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
how-toVZCZCXYZ0012 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUB #0086 0412103 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 102103Z FEB 09 FM USINT HAVANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4112 INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0034 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0152 RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000086
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PREL CU JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN SEEKS U.S. ENGAGEMENT ON CUBA
Classified By: Chief of Mission Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (d) and
(b)
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000086
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PREL CU JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN SEEKS U.S. ENGAGEMENT ON CUBA
Classified By: Chief of Mission Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (d) and
(b)
1. (C) Japanese Ambassador Akira Takamatsu invited the COM to
lunch on February 9, COM's first day in Havana following
consultations. Takamatsu's main discussion point was to urge
the USG to pursue a policy of "engagement" with the GOC,
which he said Japan believed would be in the interest of the
entire region. Cuban President Raul Castro and other GOC
leaders had expressed publicly their willingness to enter
into a dialogue with the United States, and Takamatsu said
that both Vice President Carlos Lage and National Assembly
President Ricardo Alarcon privately had expressed their views
to him that the ball is in the U.S.'s court to respond.
2. (C) Takamatsu noted that Japan, Canada, Spain, and others
in recent years have pursued policies of engagement with the
GOC. COM asked what results had Japan seen from its
dialogue. Takamatsu cited Cuba's acceptance of selected
bilateral offers of disaster assistance following last year's
hurricanes, which had reversed Cuba's longstanding tendency
to decline such aid. COM observed that this was a small
opening for a longstanding dialogue. Takamatsu responded
that the GOC leadership is old, heavily military, and
conservative, and thus slow to change. He hastened to add
that dialogue nonetheless was useful.
3. (C) COM asked whether countries such as Japan, Canada, and
Spain, which pursue such engagement policies, take the
opportunity to consult and coordinate with one another.
Takamatsu said no, but that such coordination could be
useful. COM asked about regional powers such as Brazil,
which also seek to engage the GOC but from a different
perspective. Takamatsu said the interests of Brazil were
sufficiently distinct (i.e., focused on trade and investment)
that including Brazil in such consultations would not be
productive.
4.(SBU) Takamatsu noted that Cuban Foreign Minister Perez
Roque is scheduled to visit Japan March 7-10 for the next
round of the GOJ-GOC political dialogue. He added that Japan
did not expect to sign any major bilateral agreements during
Perez Roque's stay. Takamatsu expects to depart Cuba for
reassignment in Japan's Foreign Ministry following the visit.
5. (C) Comment: USINT believes that the time to test the
GOC's willingness to engage on issues of interest to us would
be upon the announcement or implementation of USG policy
initiatives toward Cuba, such as those to be considered on
family travel and remittances. We also believe that such a
time would be right to reach out to our democratic friends to
bring their policies and ours more closely in line. Contrary
to the advice of our Japanese colleague, we believe that
Brazil and others in the hemisphere could be approached
usefully as part of such an effort. End Comment.
FARRAR
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PREL CU JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN SEEKS U.S. ENGAGEMENT ON CUBA
Classified By: Chief of Mission Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (d) and
(b)
1. (C) Japanese Ambassador Akira Takamatsu invited the COM to
lunch on February 9, COM's first day in Havana following
consultations. Takamatsu's main discussion point was to urge
the USG to pursue a policy of "engagement" with the GOC,
which he said Japan believed would be in the interest of the
entire region. Cuban President Raul Castro and other GOC
leaders had expressed publicly their willingness to enter
into a dialogue with the United States, and Takamatsu said
that both Vice President Carlos Lage and National Assembly
President Ricardo Alarcon privately had expressed their views
to him that the ball is in the U.S.'s court to respond.
2. (C) Takamatsu noted that Japan, Canada, Spain, and others
in recent years have pursued policies of engagement with the
GOC. COM asked what results had Japan seen from its
dialogue. Takamatsu cited Cuba's acceptance of selected
bilateral offers of disaster assistance following last year's
hurricanes, which had reversed Cuba's longstanding tendency
to decline such aid. COM observed that this was a small
opening for a longstanding dialogue. Takamatsu responded
that the GOC leadership is old, heavily military, and
conservative, and thus slow to change. He hastened to add
that dialogue nonetheless was useful.
3. (C) COM asked whether countries such as Japan, Canada, and
Spain, which pursue such engagement policies, take the
opportunity to consult and coordinate with one another.
Takamatsu said no, but that such coordination could be
useful. COM asked about regional powers such as Brazil,
which also seek to engage the GOC but from a different
perspective. Takamatsu said the interests of Brazil were
sufficiently distinct (i.e., focused on trade and investment)
that including Brazil in such consultations would not be
productive.
4.(SBU) Takamatsu noted that Cuban Foreign Minister Perez
Roque is scheduled to visit Japan March 7-10 for the next
round of the GOJ-GOC political dialogue. He added that Japan
did not expect to sign any major bilateral agreements during
Perez Roque's stay. Takamatsu expects to depart Cuba for
reassignment in Japan's Foreign Ministry following the visit.
5. (C) Comment: USINT believes that the time to test the
GOC's willingness to engage on issues of interest to us would
be upon the announcement or implementation of USG policy
initiatives toward Cuba, such as those to be considered on
family travel and remittances. We also believe that such a
time would be right to reach out to our democratic friends to
bring their policies and ours more closely in line. Contrary
to the advice of our Japanese colleague, we believe that
Brazil and others in the hemisphere could be approached
usefully as part of such an effort. End Comment.
FARRAR