Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA80
2009-02-06 15:08:00
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

OPPOSITION GROUPS JOSTLE FOR POSITION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000080 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GROUPS JOSTLE FOR POSITION

REF: A. 08 HAVANA 969

B. HAVANA 35

C. HAVANA 77

Classified By: Charge James L. Williams for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000080

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION GROUPS JOSTLE FOR POSITION

REF: A. 08 HAVANA 969

B. HAVANA 35

C. HAVANA 77

Classified By: Charge James L. Williams for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition leaders are beginning to stir
after months of relative inactivity. As they attempt to
organize their supporters, splits among them, and between
the opposition on the island and the Cuban exile community
are becoming more evident. The issue of the management of
Radio Marti is a subtext that runs throughout discussions
with the opposition. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Opponents of the Castro regime are beginning to
become more active as questions about the leadership of
Raul Castro grow (ref C). In the immediate aftermath of
the GOC's campaign against USINT and dissident groups in
May and June 2008, most of those groups cut back on their
activity. Just when they were beginning to feel
comfortable again, the devastating series of fall
hurricanes hit. The GOC's post-hurricanes crackdown on
"illegal" activities, which was aimed more broadly at all
of Cuban society, caused the opposition to retreat once
again. Moreover, some dissident leaders complained that
their inability to assist rank and file opponents who
suffered damage in the hurricanes cost them needed
credibility, especially in rural areas.


3. (C) The lack of a credible reform proposal from the
GOC, epitomized by Raul Castro's year end (and 50th
anniversary) speech in Santiago de Cuba (ref A) and the
still-mysterious long absence of comments from Fidel Castro
(ref B),seem to have given the opposition new life. The
umbrella group Agenda para la Transicion and one of its
major sub-components, the Unidad Liberal, have been meeting
more frequently and producing declarations on the direction
Cuba should take to reach full democracy. So far, these
are short on detail and focus mostly on the need to obtain
resources and build networks of supporters, and insisting
that the democratizing movement must come from the island.
In the midst of this, prominent dissident Oswaldo Paya
launched a new initiative he is calling the National
Dialogue. In doing so he sent letters to all other major
dissident leaders, including those in the Agenda para la

Transicion, inviting them to join with him. Paya's
National Dialogue does not yet have an agenda but is rather
a mechanism through which he hopes to bring the various
opposition groups together to draft an agenda for change.
In a February 4 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Paya said that
the National Dialogue did not replace the Varela Project,
but that the two could be complementary. Notably, Paya had
formed a board of directors for the National Dialogue that
includes many of the most notable dissidents who are not
part of the Agenda para la Transicion including Juan Carlos
Gonzalez Leiva and Oscar Espinosa Chepe.


4. (S) The Agenda para la Transicion leadership initially
seemed open to working with Paya even though, as they
point out insistently, he refused to join the Agenda when
it was formed. However, a meeting between Paya and
Vladimiro Roca of the Agenda apparently went very badly.
Agenda leader Martha Beatriz Roque (MBR) told us that the
Agenda now had no interest in working with Paya on his
terms only and she disparaged Paya's board as representing
his entire following. Likewise, Paya, in the February 4
meeting said he saw nothing to gain from working with MBR
and the Agenda, which he described as riddled with state
security plants. (Note: Ironically, MBR frequently accuses
other opposition groups as fronts for state security. End
Note)


5. (C) A subtext of the discussion with all parties is the
management of Radio Marti. In December, MBR and Vladimiro
Roca launched a very public boycott of Radio Marti saying
they will no longer do interviews with the station. Almost
all other members of the opposition, including the other
Agenda para la Transicion members who contributed to
drafting the letter sent to the State Department regarding
Radio Marti that was signed by MBR and Roca, say they
oppose the boycott. Nevertheless, all also say they agree
fully with the reasons for it. There seems to be a
universal feeling that Radio Marti does not speak to Cubans
on the island and is instead a mouthpiece for the exile
community in Miami and elsewhere. But all members of the

HAVANA 00000080 002 OF 002


opposition we speak to say that Radio Marti performs a
critical function and that it just needs to be reformed.
MBR's boycott campaign, they believe, provides ammunition
to those in the GOC and elsewhere who want to shut the
station down.


6. (C) COMMENT: The renewed divisions among the
opposition groups are not surprising. As opportunities
arise for greater participation by civil society in Cuba,
the divisions will likely become even more pronounced as
the island returns to the more freewheeling politics of the
first half of the 20th century. The issue of Radio Marti's
content is emblematic of the fear among all of the
opposition groups that the Cuban exile community will try
to exert undue influence on the process of change on the
island. That divide also has historical precedents in
earlier Cuban history, but will have greater impact now
given the size and power of the exile community. END
COMMENT.
WILLIAMS