Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA683
2009-11-10 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE IN CUBA

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV CU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000683 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE IN CUBA

REF: HAVANA 639 (A SPLENDID LITTLE VISIT )

HAVANA 00000683 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000683

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU
SUBJECT: SPAIN ON THE LOOKOUT FOR SIGNS OF CHANGE IN CUBA

REF: HAVANA 639 (A SPLENDID LITTLE VISIT )

HAVANA 00000683 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary. The Spanish Mission in Cuba is looking
for signs of change that will help them move along EU-Cuba
relations, and sway their EU partners. Featuring prominently
in their case for normalization is progress on U.S. - Cuba
relations. Our Spanish counterparts note that U.S.
willingness to free the five Cuban spies from U.S. jails
would likely result in the freeing of political prisoners in
Cuba, and mention the possibility of the GOC offering a token
gesture during our next Migration Talks, especially if it
coincides with Human Rights Day. At the working level,
Spanish diplomats understand that they are unlikely to turn
up much to convince their EU colleagues -- they claim that
the GOC is ill-equipped to change or make significant
gestures, and they completely dismiss the ability of the
Cuba's opposition to be agents of change. End Summary.

SPAIN ON A MISSION
--------------


2. (C/NF) In a two-hour meeting with USINT's Polchief on
November 5, the Spanish Political Counselor spoke at length
about the frustrating task that lies ahead for Spain, as it
searches for evidence of change in Cuba to use in building a
case for normalization of EU-Cuba relations. The Spanish
diplomat, who has served two tours in Cuba, restated that
Spain would try to change the current EU course on Cuba
during its Presidency starting this January. The EU Common
Position on Cuba is "too in your face" and counterproductive
in getting the Government of Cuba (GOC) to open up
politically, he said.

ODDS AGAINST THE SPANISH
--------------


3. (C/NF) The Spanish know that the odds are stacked against
them. The Polcouns said his country has no realistic hopes
for changing the Common Position during Spain's term, "but
perhaps we could tee it up enough to change during the
following Presidency" (Belgium's). (He had no doubt that,
Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding, the Spanish would speak for
the EU in Cuba during the first half of 2010.) He also
acknowledged that the Spanish lobbying efforts may have

started on the wrong foot, with Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos voicing his intentions too publicly (Reftel) and
when he met with the wives of two of the Cuban spies jailed
in the United States after refusing to meet with dissidents
or their families while in Cuba. However, the biggest
obstacle to the Spanish may be the GOC itself.

A PARTNER THAT WON'T PLAY ALONG
--------------


4. (C/NF) The Spanish diplomat complained that, despite
Spain,s engagement with the GOC, "there is no political will
to change." He said that if their efforts to move the GOC
come to naught, they would have to wait for the so-called
biological solution. He claims that former president Fidel
Castro continues to meddle in the running of the government,
and on issues like prisoner releases entirely calls the
shots. He said that even getting the release of a gravely
sick prisoner from a hospital --the GOC's concession to
Moratinos-- had to be justified to the former Cuban
president. He said that Spanish officials had told the GOC
that, unless they do something significant over the next few
months (release prisoners foremost),"nothing will happen" in
the EU.

U.S. - CUBA RELATIONS AND CUBAN CONCESSIONS
--------------


5. (C/NF) The Spanish are also looking at improvements in
U.S. - Cuba relations to justify subordinating the EU's human
rights agenda to the goal of normalizing relations. The
Spanish Polcouns asked whether the United States had
considered freeing the five Cuban spies, adding that such a
move would result in the release of political prisoners here.
He also inquired about whether we had considered the

HAVANA 00000683 002.2 OF 002


possibility of the GOC making a gesture during the Migration
Talks in Havana, which may coincide with the December 10
United Nations Human Rights Day. USINT's Polchief replied
that all goodwill gestures would be well received but that
the impact of a piecemeal symbolic gesture would be limited.

DISMISSING THE DISSIDENTS
--------------


6. (C/NF) The Spanish diplomat added that in the wake of
Moratinos' departure, he had met with most of the dissidents
who criticized harshly the visit. He said that he had told
them that if Moratinos had met with dissidents, he would have
been frozen out, "and what good would that have done?" Like
most diplomats who don't engage with dissidents and some who
do but would like to downgrade (Holland and Canada, to name
two) he dismissed the intentions and/or the influence of most
of them.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C/NF) The Spanish have their work cut out for them. Over
the short term, Spain gains little but the hostility of some
of its EU partners and of Cuba's civil society. Cuba's
intransigence doesn't help -- and the detention and roughing
up of Cuba's best-known bloggers (Septel) on November 6 dents
further the hopes that the GOC will play along nicely to
Spanish efforts on its behalf. Although there are commercial
interests at stake, what Spain really wants is to maintain a
presence that will outlive the current regime and be able to
match the U.S.'s interests and influence on the Island.
Thus, they want to remain engaged with the GOC at any cost,
to ensure that whatever administration emerges is
Spain-friendly. They, and all others, are watching closely
to see how we balance our priorities as we continue to engage
with the GOC on specific issues.
FARRAR