Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA341
2009-06-09 19:53:00
SECRET
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO

Tags:  SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC 
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0341/01 1601953
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091953Z JUN 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4471
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/COMCOGARD SECTOR KEY WEST FL PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0138
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ BICE INTEL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/NAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUWDHDP/OBLA LOS ANGELES CA PRIORITY
RUEHKG/USDAO KINGSTON JM PRIORITY
S E C R E T HAVANA 000341 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
US-CU MIGRATION TALKS

REF: (A) HAVANA 172 (B) HAVANA 187

Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

S E C R E T HAVANA 000341

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2029
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: FROM THE MOUTH OF MINREX: POSSIBLE INSIGHT INTO
US-CU MIGRATION TALKS

REF: (A) HAVANA 172 (B) HAVANA 187

Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (S//NF) Summary: On 5 June, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Drug
Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the United States
Interests Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a
repatriation of sixteen Cuban migrants at Bahia de Cabanas.
During the transit to and from the pier, a Cuban Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MINREX) official offered subtle insights on
the possible GOC approach to the upcoming migration talks
between the USG and GOC, and reiterated past statements
regarding issues that he believes are of mutual concern
between both nations. The conversation occurred immediately
following 2 incidents involving the commandeering of a Cuban
Border Guard (CBG) go-fast (gf) by 2 CBG recruits, and the
appearance of 7 migrants in a raft in front of the USINT
building. End Summary.


2. (S//NF) The 5 June repatriation was the second in a
week, with the first taking place on 30 May. Armando Bencomo
(Bencomo),the MINREX official in attendance, was
uncharacteristically quiet on 30 May, choosing not to
initiate conversation regarding policy issues as he normally
does. On 30 May, DIS mentioned to Bencomo the prospect for
re-initiation of migrant talks, to which Bencomo responded
that his government was mulling over the offer. Bencomo, in
typical fashion, made a point to reiterate that the former
Bush administration had quashed the talks in 2004, and stated
that the talks had previously been one of the only forms of
productive candor between both parties.


3. (S//NF) Conversely, on 5 June, immediately upon
embarking on the short gf trip to the migrant receiving pier
at Cabanas, the conversation between DIS and Bencomo turned
to the subject of the migration talks. However, the topic
was brushed over, and Bencomo reiterated his past message
that the GOC is also interested in engaging in talks on 3
additional topics: counterdrug, counterterrorism, and natural
disaster response and preparation. These 3 items are common
themes in conversations with Bencomo, and DIS believes, based
on his repeated statements, and their recent offer to include

these three topics as a way ahead between both sides, that
the GOC's interest in these three items may be greater than
migration-related issues.


4. (S//NF) Immediately following the repatriation, DIS and
Bencomo boarded the gf for the ten minute trip back to the
parking lot in the town of Cabanas. While boarding, in
nonchalant fashion, Bencomo asked about the status of 2 CBG
recruits who commandeered a CBG gf on the evening of 31 May.
The 2 were ultimately rescued by the USCG when the gf they
commandeered was located broken down fifty nautical miles
northwest of Cuba. DIS informed Bencomo that the 2 were
being treated per normal migrant processing protocols, and at
the time of the conversation, disposition had not been
determined- the issue was dropped immediately thereafter.


5. (S//NF) A more detailed conversation regarding the
migrant talks ensued during the gf ride back to the parking
area at Cabanas. Adding the disclaimer "in my opinion,"
Bencomo said he thought the talks will be a positive thing.
DIS asked why, and Bencomo continued that the venue would be
a good opportunity to discuss why Cubans choose to leave
Cuba; specifically, Bencomo stated he believes the talks will
help identify which factors motivate Cubans to depart the
island to pursue a life in the United States. Bencomo,
without naming the policy, alluded to the "wet-foot,
dry-foot" policy currently in place that permits Cubans who
reach U.S. soil to remain there legally; Bencomo expressed
rather subtly his disapproval of this policy. Further, he
asserted that the talks would be a good venue where both
sides might develop or agree to joint measures that would

help curtail a mass migration scenario from Cuba. In
addition, he stated that the talks would help both sides to
develop a response to a potential mass migration scenario.
Finally, Bencomo alluded to the Cuban mass migration events
in 1980 and 1994, and stated that in 1994 the U.S. encouraged
the behavior of Cubans who chose to steal boats and depart
the island by not returning those boats or treating said
Cubans as criminals.


6. (S//NF) Recollecting an earlier conversation in which he
stated that, although the U.S. had made some recent overtures
towards the GOC, Bencomo stated that the U.S. could take
"heavier" steps to change the nature of the relationship. DIS
asked Bencomo why he believed migration talks and the other
three topics mentioned above were so important if the GOC was
so interested in seeing "heavier" changes. He stated that
the aforementioned forums for engagement are a launching
point, or segue, to further talks on larger issues, which we
believe include the embargo, Guantanamo Bay, and the five
Cuban spies. Bencomo summed up the Cuban outlook on the
current USG-GOC relationship when he stated that "everything
is in your (U.S.) hands." Note: This is a consistent theme
heard from all of the DIS's Cuban contacts; GOC
representatives persistently reiterate in their dialogue that
the status of the USG-GOC is the fault of the U.S., and the
road ahead lies entirely in the hands of the U.S. This line
of conversation is usually accompanied by an unsolicited
statement by the representatives that eschews the notion of
human rights and pre-conditions asserted by the U.S. in any
dealings with the GOC; both of these issues are so far beyond
the consideration of GOC officials that merely mentioning
them normally turns off a conversation in its entirety.


7. (S//NF) Summary: DIS assesses that the GOC will attempt
to place the wet-foot, dry-foot issue at the center of the
upcoming migrant talks, and perhaps hammer the policy as the
prime reason for illicit Cuban migration departures from
Cuba. The mention of a mass migration scenario by a Cuban
official, especially one at the relatively high level that
Bencomo currently holds, is unusual.


8. (S//NF) Further Summary: While the DIS has significant,
regular contact during repatriations with Bencomo, DIS also
has significant contact with Ministry of Interior (MININT)
officials while carrying out counternarcotic and
countermigration duties. As such, DIS has and continues to
gather unique insight into the demeanor and consistent party
line of these elements of the GOC. GOC officials tend to tow
the same line; however, DIS has noticed a recent up-tick in
anti-U.S. policy candor from the various GOC officials. DIS
estimates this is a sign that Cuban officials are
uncomfortable with the shifting U.S. approach to dealing with
Cuba demonstrated in recent months. In short, GOC is
developing a defensive posture, and is utilizing their
relationship with the DIS as one of an interlocutor to
verbally state their interest in discussing issues of mutual
cooperation; however, their actions, or lack thereof in some
cases, suggest otherwise. For instance, in the aftermath of
a large drug bust facilitated by US-Cuban-Bahamian
information exchange, wherein the CBG recovered a large
amount of marijuana and 3 traffickers, the Cuban
representative from the Anti Drug Directorate utilized a
follow-up meeting with the DIS to chastise U.S. authorities
in the U.S. for not detecting trace amounts of marijuana
concealed in ink markers and carried onto the island by Cuban
American visitors. The GOC mentality that they are never in
the wrong, and the U.S. has fostered the current poor state
of relations between the two states, is more prevalent now
than in the past year the DIS has spent on the island. End
Summary.
FARRAR