Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HAVANA226
2009-04-17 20:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

REACTION IN CUBA TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM CU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000226 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU
SUBJECT: REACTION IN CUBA TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN
U.S. POLICY

REF: HAVANA 207 (NOTAL)

HAVANA 00000226 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000226

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CU
SUBJECT: REACTION IN CUBA TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF CHANGES IN
U.S. POLICY

REF: HAVANA 207 (NOTAL)

HAVANA 00000226 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: COM Jonathan Farrar for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Reaction in Cuba to the April 13
announcement of changes to U.S. policy regarding travel,
remittances and telecommunications activity has been
generally very positive. The government of Cuba itself has
been officially silent, though former President Fidel Castro
has published several articles on the subject with no clear
line of thought evident. Ordinary Cubans we have spoken to
are very enthusiastic about the announcements and see them as
a fulfillment of statements made by the President during his
campaign. Our diplomatic corps colleagues are also very
positive, but tend to focus immediately on what next steps
the U.S. government may take. End Summary.


2. (C) Based on discussions we have had with ordinary Cubans
and a number of our diplomatic colleagues, the changes in
U.S. policy announced on April 13 are viewed as a very
positive step. For the diplomatic corps, and to a certain
extent the international press contingent, it tends to be
viewed as just a first step. They quickly shift their
interest to trying to find out the next step the U.S. may
take to improve relations. To date, there has been little
official Cuban government reaction, though Raul Castro
reiterated the offer he made to CODEL Lee (reftel) to put
everything on the table in discussions with the United
States. However, his further comments reveal the offer to be
couched in the usual context of U.S. recognition of Cuban
sovereignty, meaning that human rights discussions should
focus on ending the "criminal and genocidal embargo," and
that discussion of political prisoners means arranging for
the release of the five Cuban "heroes" now in U.S. custody.
Fidel Castro has been a prolific writer since the
announcement, once publishing 3 "Reflexiones" pieces in one
day. However, he has blown hot and cold in his opinions, in
one case saying that Cuba refuses to beg the U.S. for good
relations, and in another reporting in reasonably laudatory
terms on the President's European trip.


3. (C) Response among our Cuban contacts has been very

positive. A constant complaint we had been hearing over the
past year was that remittances and other sources of external
fuding, on which many Cubans depend to get by from day to
day, were insufficient to cover their needs. Like the
Cuban-Americans who reportedly have been queuing up to get
charter airline tickets to visit Cuba, Cubans on the island
are excited about the prospect of seeing relatives, and the
goods they bring, more frequently. Their only note of
caution is to recall that during the last period of free
travel in the late 1970s, the presence of numerous
Cuban-American relatives throughout the island contributed to
social unrest that resulted in the Mariel boatlift. They
fear that the current regime may anticipate a repeat of that
unrest and take some pre-emptive action that will put
bilateral relations back in the deep freeze.


4. (C) Unlike the diplomatic corps and the press, most
ordinary Cubans are not looking past the April 13
announcement and pressing for the immediate lifting of the
embargo. Even those, such as dissident economist Oscar
Espinosa Chepe, who strongly oppose the embargo recognize
that there must be substantive change in the system on the
island before lifting the embargo will have any significant
impact on their standard of living. The travel and
remittance changes, on the other hand, are seen as being
capable of having an immediate positive effect on the lives
of many Cubans. One contact in the cultural community, while
expressing his hope that cultural exchanges will follow
quickly, said that opening up remittances was possibly the
most important step the U.S. could have taken because it
offers Cubans the wherewithal to improve their standard of
living, and then have enough left over to begin to create
civic associations using their own resources. When ordinary
Cubans do look to the future, they wonder how long it will
take to open travel to American tourists as a follow-on step.
They view such a move as a way to force the government to
open up further as it tries to manage the expected large
numbers of Americans who will not (they hope) be as easily

HAVANA 00000226 002.2 OF 002


corralled into specific areas as foreign tourists are now.
The more thoughtful local analysts wonder how such a large
number of tourists would be housed and fed, and how the
government's efforts to cater to tourists could affect their
own standard of living.


5. (C) Dissident doctor Hilda Molina did raise the embargo,
saying she thought the U.S. should lift the restrictions on
exports to Cuba, but should insist on full payment in
advance. "They won't be able to bring in any more goods
under those terms," she said, "but they won't be able to use
the embargo as an excuse either." Even as they welcomed the
policy changes and the benefits they will bring to Cubans,
prominent dissidents Martha Beatriz Roque and Vladimiro Roca
speculated that no matter what the U.S. government does, the
government of Cuba will latch on to another issue to use as
an impediment to improved relations, noting that Fidel Castro
already denounced the "genocidal" Cuban Adjustment Act in one
of his "Reflexiones" articles.


6. (C) COM and P/E chief met over lunch with mixed groups of
diplomats during the week. In both cases, the diplomats
reported how excited they were that there seemed to be
genuine movement in U.S.-Cuban relations for a change. COM
spoke at length over lunch April 15 with French Ambassador
Frederic Dore, Lebanese Ambassador Jean Makaron, and Papal
Nuncio Luigi Bonazzi regarding the U.S. policy announcement
on April 13 and potential reaction from Cuba. Ambassador
Dore was extremely positive, citing especially the lifting of
restrictions on remittances as having the potential to effect
great changes within Cuban society. He said the GOF was very
supportive, and that Special Envoy Jack Lang had issued a
statement hailing the announcement. Lebanese Ambassador
Makaron said the changes were positive, but that Lebanon
hoped the next step by the United States would be to lift the
embargo. COM noted the next steps might come from Cuba,
which had yet to respond beyond editorials attributed to
Fidel Castro. Makaron's response was, "but of course. The
United States can't do it alone."


7. (C) The Papal Nuncio's view was that the United States had
taken three steps, and needed to take six more. He said we
should not expect Cuba to make a gesture in response to
Monday's announcement. COM replied that our policy changes
were made without preconditions, were not contingent upon GOC
actions, and stand on their own. He added that it was
reasonable to expect a GOC response, public or private, and
that there were many areas in which Cuba could take positive
steps were it to choose to do so. The Papal Nuncio then
raised a favorite issue of his, a theoretical trade of the
five Cuban agents in U.S. prisons in return for release of
Cuba's political prisoners. COM noted, as he has before,
that there are substantial differences between the two
groups, and that many of the political prisoners and their
families were against such a swap, especially if it would
imply exile from Cuba.



8. (C) COMMENT: As Washington agencies consider next steps
on Cuba, USINT recommends the interagency focus on actions on
our part which would be in the U.S. national interest
regardless of any GOC response, such as increased travel and
stays by U.S. religious groups and workers, and actions that
may provide an umbrella for future progress, such as the
resumption of bilateral migration talks. End Comment.
FARRAR