Vietnam's 2010 ASEAN Chairmanship

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000925

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/11
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ECIN ASEAN SENV KFLU BM KN VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam's 2010 ASEAN Chairmanship

REF: A) HANOI 101; B) HANOI 848; C) HANOI 803; D) STATE 103203
E) HANOI 895; F) HANOI 859; G) HANOI 861; H) HANOI 917

CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam considers its turn as ASEAN chair to be
the leading foreign policy priority for 2010. Substantively,
Vietnam's leadership wants to be seen as a responsible member of
the international community -- professional and well-briefed,
acting as an "honest broker" when possible -- but has no
discernable policy agenda of its own. MFA officials bluntly tell
us that Vietnam will focus on implementing ASEAN's new charter.
Even with limited ambitions, however, Vietnam realizes that Hanoi
cannot afford to be entirely passive. Bracketed by Thailand's
"lost year" and what are anticipated to be weak chairmanships by
Brunei and Cambodia, Vietnam is feeling the pressure of "high
expectations" to deliver on Burma, regional security, and economic
integration. Vietnam's ASEAN year offers an opportunity for the
United States to promote its interests at a time when ASEAN's own
institutions are reforming. Senior officials and influential track
II academics have offered to work with us on issues ranging from
climate change in the Lower Mekong to economic integration to Burma
and North Korea. ASEAN as an institution is not at all nimble and
neither is Vietnam's decision-making; we will miss these
opportunities if our objectives are not articulated early and
often. The GVN continues to press hard to host the U.S.-ASEAN
summit in Hanoi next year, and would consider a POTUS visit the
highlight of its chairmanship. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) Vietnam is approaching its 2010 Chairmanship with a fair
amount of confidence, according to contacts in the MFA and think
tank community. Most Vietnamese observers express satisfaction
with Vietnam's 2008-2009 tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council, noting that Vietnam's representatives acquitted
themselves professionally and weathered difficult votes on Iran,
North Korea, Kosovo, Georgia, and Somalia without alienating any of
Hanoi's major international partners (ref A). Vietnam confronts
its ASEAN chairmanship without the sort of anxiety that preceded
Vietnam's joining the Security Council or its hosting of APEC in
2006, according to the MFA's Deputy DG for ASEAN Affairs, Vu Ho.




3. (C) At the same time, with increased confidence comes
heightened expectations, and Vietnam feels considerable pressure
within ASEAN to demonstrate that it can succeed. Ho characterized
Thailand's term as ASEAN chair as a "disaster." Others view
Thailand's tenure as ASEAN chair as a "lost year" (actually a year
and a half),as the Philippines Embassy's Political Chief Maria
Arugay put it bluntly, adding that Brunei and Cambodia, which will
succeed Vietnam as ASEAN chairs in 2011 and 2012, were not expected
to exercise strong leadership. Arugay's counterpart from the
Singapore Embassy, First Secretary Lee Boon Beng, concurred,
emphasizing that Vietnam would likely be consumed with logistical
arrangements for two ASEAN leaders' summits; foreign and defense
ministerials; ARF, "+3," and "+1" meetings and related bilateral
events; and dozens of other senior official and working-level
meetings throughout the year.




4. (C) While confident, Vietnam is not approaching its ASEAN
chairmanship with specific policy goals in mind. At this stage,
Vietnam appears content to be seen as a responsible steward -- and
an honest broker, when appropriate -- with an emphasis on process
rather than substance. Lee and Arugay both told us that there was
little expectation within ASEAN that Vietnam would push its own
agenda. DG Ho told us openly that Vietnam would focus on
implementing ASEAN's new charter. "Vietnam is not the type of
country that proposes initiatives," the Deputy Director General of
the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies at the
MFA-affiliated Diplomatic Academy, Nguyen Vu Tung, conceded.
Rather, Vietnam will seek to provide a "safe place" for other

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countries (Tung mentioned Indonesia specifically) to put forward
ideas.




5. (C) Vietnam's stated intention to facilitate discussion without
pushing its own policy agenda extends to ASEAN's "+1" dialogue
partners, the United States in particular. Over the past three
months, senior leaders from President Nguyen Minh Triet (refs B,C)
to the Foreign and Defense Ministers (refs D,E) have repeatedly
urged the United States to help make Vietnam's ASEAN chairmanship
"a success" and have offered to work with us to promote U.S.
interests within ASEAN and regionally. We have pushed for
specifics, but our Vietnamese counterparts appear focused mainly on
securing visits from Secretaries Clinton and Gates and, they hope,
the President. A Presidential-level U.S.-ASEAN summit -- hosted by
Hanoi in conjunction with the city's 1,000-year celebrations and
the 15th anniversary of U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic relations -- would
be, as the MFA's DG for Policy Planning Pham Huu Chi put it, the
"single greatest success" of 2010. More darkly, the Vice President
of the Diplomatic Academy, Dang Dinh Quy, noted that the absence of
high-level U.S. engagement would leave the field open to the
Chinese: "a disaster" in Quy's estimation.




6. (C) MFA officials and foreign policy academics welcomed the
U.S. policy review on Burma (ref F). Recognizing the drag that
Burma has had on ASEAN, they have offered to facilitate discussion
with the Burmese regime. Of particular interest is the Diplomatic
Academy's proposal for a track II discussion on how Vietnam's
experience might be applicable to Burma, which we have been invited
to attend (ref G). The MFA also claims to have ramped up its
efforts to pressure the Burmese regime to be more conciliatory to
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD -- not out of any great love for
Burmese democracy but with a cold recognition that Rangoon is
considered the scofflaw of ASEAN, and a bad Burmese election could
jeopardize what Hanoi dearly hopes will be a successful run as
ASEAN chair (ref H). (Comment: This recognition of the importance
of Burma's election to the success -- or just non-disaster -- of
Vietnam's ASEAN chairmanship seems primarily to be an MFA
perspective, not shared by the CPV. During consultations in Hanoi
last week, the UK Ambassador to Burma Andrew Heyn had good meetings
with the MFA but was read the riot act by the CPV External
Relations Commission, according UK Political/Economic Counselor
David Edmondson. End comment.) Eager to appear helpful, DAV
scholars have repeated suggestions made in February that the ASEAN
Regional Forum could serve as a spur to dialogue with North Korea
(ref I). Vietnam has responded positively to our suggestions that
ARF's defense-related meetings be more substantive and has argued
strongly that the ADMM needs a robust partnership with the United
States.




7. (C) Within ASEAN, Vietnam's attention will be primarily be on
institution building. The MFA's Deputy DG for Southeast Asia, Ta
Duy Chinh, offered that Vietnam would be happy to lend its good
offices, for example, to Thailand and Cambodia if they wished to
discuss the Preah Vihear dispute, noting that DPM/FM Pham Gia Khiem
had sent a letter late last to his Thai and Cambodian colleagues
urging restraint in the spirit of ASEAN friendship and solidarity.
Mostly, though, Vietnam will be focused on making the new ASEAN
charter effective and in ensuring that the new institutions
associated with ASEAN's three "pillars" (political/security,
economic, and social/cultural) function as efficiently as possible.
To that end, DDG Ho told us, Vietnam is assigning primary
interagency coordinating responsibility to DPM/FM Khiem, with the
MFA taking the lead on political/security matters, the Ministry of
Industry and Trade responsible for economics, and the Ministry of
Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs handling social and cultural
issues.



Comment: Why We Need to Act Now

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8. (C) ASEAN is not a nimble organization, and its
consensus-driven decision-making favors the lowest common
denominator. Vietnam's own political calendar will only exacerbate
this, as the Party/state apparatus increasingly focuses inward in
anticipation of the January 2011 Party Congress. Essentially,
there are two vectors in play, operating in opposite directions: On
one hand Vietnam wants to give life to ASEAN's new institutions and
is eager to seize 2010 as a chance to be seen as a regional leader.
On the other hand, Vietnam's capacity to absorb new initiatives,
limited in the best of circumstances, will degrade steadily through
2010 as pre-Congress sclerosis sets in. The departing head of the
HCMC External Relations Office, Nguyen Vu Tu, recently told the CG
that the United States has until Tet (October 2010) to accomplish
what it wants in Vietnam. Tu may be overstating things, but not by
much. We have done an excellent job demonstrating our commitment
to the region, a point Vietnam's leadership appreciates. To give
substance to this commitment, to push U.S. objectives on economic
integration, public health, climate change, nonproliferation, and
human rights and democratic governance, we need to articulate our
goals clearly, early on, and forcefully -- and senior visitors will
be key to keep the momentum and the pressure on.
Michalak