Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HANOI861
2009-10-07 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

Vietnam's "Track II" Engagement with Burma - U.S. Urged to

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM PINR ECON ASEAN BM VM 
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VZCZCXRO0993
OO RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0861/01 2800959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 070959Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0282
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0019
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0085
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000861 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/07
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR ECON ASEAN BM VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam's "Track II" Engagement with Burma - U.S. Urged to
Participate

REF: EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE: AMEMBASSY HANOI - AMEMBASSY RANGOON

HANOI 00000861 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000861

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/07
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR ECON ASEAN BM VM
SUBJECT: Vietnam's "Track II" Engagement with Burma - U.S. Urged to
Participate

REF: EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE: AMEMBASSY HANOI - AMEMBASSY RANGOON

HANOI 00000861 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam sees 2010 as a promising year to engage
with Burma but is nervous that election-related unrest there could
derail efforts to host a successful ASEAN summit, according to Dang
Dinh Quy, Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
(DAV). Quy, who recently met with Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister
and other senior MOFA officials as well as "track II" academics as
part of a weeklong visit to Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw, assessed that
the Burmese regime was prepared to countenance "significant"
opposition participation, but not an opposition victory. Vietnam
continued to tout its experience emerging from international
isolation, Quy said, and had urged Burma to view ASEAN as a
"window" to the outside world, a message Vietnam's leadership would
stress when Burma's third-ranking general, Defense Services Chief
of General Staff Thura Shwe Mann, visits Hanoi later this fall.
Following Thura Shwe Mann's visit, the DAV plans to invite official
and quasi-official Burmese counterparts for a conference. Quy
asked for U.S. support (including funding),stressing that his
institution would be happy to facilitate contact with the Burmese
participants, but provided no concrete details. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Meeting October 2, the Vice President of the MFA-affiliated
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV),Dang Dinh Quy, and the Deputy
DG of the DAV's Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies,
Nguyen Vu Tung, briefed poloff on their September 18-25 visit to
Rangoon and Nay Pyi Taw. The trip, organized by the Vietnamese
embassy in Burma, featured what Quy described as frank and in-depth
exchange with Burma's Deputy Foreign Minister Maung Myint and the
Deputy DG for Political Affairs, Hau Do Swan. Quy and Tung also
met with the Directors General of MOFA's departments of

International Cooperation and Economic Affairs; Research,
Languages, and Training; ASEAN Affairs; and Personnel. Quy
described his official meetings as the primary focus of his trip,
but said that he and Tung also met with university scholars and the
head of the MOFA-affiliated Myanmar Institute for International and
Strategic Studies, Daw Than Than Htay.

"Complicated Beyond Expectation"
--------------


3. (C) Quy and Tung said their first task was to assess the
situation on the ground in Burma as the government lays the
groundwork for elections and as Vietnam prepares to take over as
ASEAN Chair in 2010. The two DAV scholars, who are not Burma
experts, confessed they were struck by the complexity of the
political situation. While the military's personnel and
intelligence networks were pervasive and stretched down to the
grassroots, they perceived considerable difference of opinion among
civilian officials. The majority, Quy claimed, were surprisingly
frank in saying that they wanted democracy; the problem, they
acknowledged, was they had little clout. A smaller number of
civilian officials with close ties to the military, including DFM
Maung Myint, himself a former brigadier general, were much more
cautious. Maung Myint bluntly told the DAV delegation that while
Burma had two foreign policy goals -- development and security --
his government was prepared to sacrifice the former to ensure the
latter. Quy said that his Burmese contacts were candid in
describing their military rulers as an insular and isolated cadre
(a "dictatorship," in Quy's words) with limited access to
information.


4. (SBU) Quy said that he and Tung encountered among the civilian
officials they met deeper support for elections than they had
anticipated. Their interlocutors, he said, expected that the
"opposition" would not only participate but be permitted
significant representation in the legislature. Nevertheless, there
was no chance that the opposition would be allowed to win outright.
Asked if by "opposition" the Burmese meant the NLD and whether Aung
San Suu Kyi would be permitted to campaign for office, Quy said
that these remained open questions, which he was told depended as
much on the NLD's position as the government's. (Embassy Rangoon
notes the NLD has yet to decide whether the party will contest the
election. In its April 2009 Shwegondaing Declaration, the NLD
stated it would consider participation if the GOB frees all
political prisoners, amends portions of the 2008 constitution and
holds internationally supervised free and fair elections. It is
highly unlikely the GOB will agree to the first two conditions.
End note.) Tung stressed that the Burmese military was extremely
nervous about the elections and viewed the "large-scale chaos" that
erupted in Iran with particular trepidation.

HANOI 00000861 002.2 OF 003


Vietnam Also Anxious about 2010
--------------


5. (SBU) Burma's leaders were not alone in expressing anxiety
about the elections, which Quy said he was told would most likely
take place in October or November 2010. (Note: Burma's government
has yet to specify a specific election date or promulgate electoral
legislation. End note.) Vietnam's leadership, Quy said, worried
that election-related strife could hijack Hanoi's efforts to host a
successful ASEAN Summit. Quy said that the best outcome, from
Vietnam's perspective, would be for the opposition to be
"realistic" in its expectations, to accept a voice in Burma's
post-election affairs and not push for outright victory. Tung
insisted that even if elections were "distorted," it would be a
mistake for the NLD to boycott. He noted, deadpan, that a
significant voice in the national legislature was much more than
Vietnam's political system currently allows its opposition.
(Embassy Rangoon notes that NLD leaders told Senator Webb during
his visit to Burma, and have repeated since, that they do not
aspire for Burma to be like Vietnam, i.e. a one-party state. They
are seeking political change, not only economic liberalization.
End note.)

Burmese Reactions to U.S. Policy
--------------


6. (SBU) Quy and Tung said that his Burmese counterparts welcomed
the results of the U.S. policy review. If anything, expectations
had to be tempered. Quy said that it was significant that Senator
Webb had met Senior General Than Shwe. The United States too must
be modest in its expectations, Quy insisted, arguing that the
elections should be judged as a "moment of transition" rather than
as a final goal. Tung said that it was difficult to overstate the
degree of paranoia toward the United States that persists in the
senior military, arguing that the leadership still needed to be
assured that the United States does not plan to overthrow the
regime.

Doi Moi for Burma?
--------------


7. (SBU) Quy and Tung agreed that Vietnam offered a potentially
attractive model for Burma and insisted that that was, in fact, the
second main task of their visit. In all their meetings, they
reportedly encouraged Burma to break out of its international
isolation. They urged Burma's leaders not simply to wait for U.S.
overtures, but to be proactive -- for example, by having staff at
the Burmese Embassy in Washington reach out more effectively to the
State Department and to members of Congress. They also made a
pitch for ASEAN, explaining how Vietnam had used the association as
a "window" to the outside world. These messages would be strongly
reinforced when Burma's Burma's third-ranking general, Chief of
General Staff Thura Shwe Mann, visits Hanoi later this fall.

Invitation to a Conference
--------------


8. (SBU) Following the Mann visit, the DAV planned to organize a
track II conference with Burmese officials and semi-official
contacts. Quy said that the conference was still in its early
planning stages, but urged the United States to participate in it
(and to fund it, he added, if possible). Quy said that the DAV
would be happy to facilitate contact at whatever level and with
whatever degree of formality the United States decides is
appropriate.

COMMENT
--------------


2. (C) We should seriously consider the DAV offer, assuming its
objectives are consistent with overall U.S. policy. Quy, a savvy
MFA insider, would not have put forward the proposal without
explicit approval. The track II format offers advantages: Vietnam
and (we presume) Burma's participants will not stray from official
positions; however, they may be more candid and forthcoming in a
less formal setting. In general, Vietnam's turn as ASEAN Chair
affords the United States leverage we do not ordinarily have:
Vietnam might not give a fig about democracy in Burma, but it wants
a smooth summit -- we should not necessarily be too eager to help
Vietnam ease this tension. At the same time, however, Vietnam has
expressed enthusiasm for the results of our policy review and is
keen to be seen as an honest broker. As we look for productive

HANOI 00000861 003.2 OF 003


ways to reengage with Burma, there is, we suspect, much to be
learned from Vietnam's experience and contacts. Unless the
Department objects, Post will engage Quy and others to ascertain
more details about the conference as they develop and relay the
information to the Department for consideration.
Palmer