A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK AT VIETNAM'S UPR

C O N F I D E N T I A L HANOI 000520


STATE FOR EAP/MLS, IO AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL VM
SUBJECT: A BEHIND-THE-SCENES LOOK AT VIETNAM'S UPR

Classified By: Political Counselor Brian Aggeler for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam's recent Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva was a
lesson in the manipulation of process, according to the
Canadian lead for the "troika" that coordinated Vietnam's
UPR. The GVN clearly understood that only 60 countries would
be able to speak in the dedicated timeframe and more than
four hours in advance began to line up countries that it had
asked to give friendly interventions. The GVN also chose to
manipulate the format of the final report to list twice those
recommendations it accepted while limiting mention of
recommendations it rejected. The end result was a report
that appeared largely favorable to the GVN but included some
recommendations, including from the United States, that it
rejected. Not surprisingly, when reporting to the diplomatic
community Vietnam's human rights successes, DFM Pham Binh
Minh chose to echo the positive comments and recommendations
that lauded Vietnam's economic achievements over the past 20
years. END SUMMARY.

GVN Outlines Success in UPR Process
--------------


2. (SBU) On June 4, 2009, Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh
Minh hosted a Discussion on the Results of Vietnam's
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights
Council in Geneva with the international diplomatic
community, including the Ambassador, and select guests from
NGOs. DFM Minh said the GVN took the entire UPR process
seriously and insisted -- only partly in jest -- that the
day's discussion should not be a "second review" of Vietnam's
human rights conditions. He outlined the efforts the GVN had
gone through to produce an "objective" country report by
soliciting input from Communist Party-affiliated
organizations, and even distributed books that contained
these observations and recommendations. DFM Minh noted that
there were 29 people in the GVN delegation in Geneva -- 22
traveling from Hanoi from 11 different ministries -- and that
he had stayed the entire five days of the process.


3. (SBU) DFM Minh emphasized the many positive remarks made
by many countries that spoke at Vietnam's UPR and highlighted
in particular those that paid tribute to Vietnam's struggle
for national independence; focused on Vietnam's economic
development, including "heroic" efforts to reduce poverty;
lauded achievements in the areas of healthcare, education and
infant mortality; and cited Vietnam as a model for the
developing world. He stressed that Vietnam had accepted 93
of 123 recommendations offered and only chose to reject
around 20 recommendations (four of which were from the United
States). DFM Minh justified these rejections by stating that
some were based on incorrect information, such as allegations
of detention camps that do not exist and torture that does
not occur, and others were rejected because "some countries
were not flexible" in the wording of their recommendations.
Turning his attention to media freedom, which was a focus of
many Western countries at the UPR, DFM Minh stated that the
GVN would continue to abide by international norms and
enforce Vietnam's constitution. He did, however, state that
specific "limitations" on the Internet were justified to
protect Vietnamese culture and values.

Canada Reveals What Really Happened
--------------


4. (C) Poloff met separately with Canadian Political
Counselor Robert Burley, who attended Vietnam's recent UPR in
Geneva. Burley acted as one of the leads of the Canadian
delegation in its role as a member of Vietnam's UPR Troika
and gave the Canadian intervention in Geneva. He noted that
while countries are chosen at random to participate on UPR
Troikas, Canada has a history of serving on Troika's for
countries with human rights problems -- like China and now
Vietnam. Burley's first observation was how prepared Vietnam
was for their UPR. The GVN had clearly talked with China and
reviewed the UPRs of countries with similar human rights
conditions. Burley commented that the GVN knew that given
the time constraints, only around 60 countries would be
allowed to give interventions and attempted to stack the deck
in their favor: in the end, about 45 of the 60 who made it
in the final lineup made interventions friendly to Vietnam.
He noted that four hours before Vietnam's UPR session began
Vietnam's delegation had already begun escorting friendly
countries -- Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Laos, Cuba, China, Burma,
Russia, Iran, Syria, Belarus and others -- to line up to give
interventions. The GVN delegation went as far as to station
an official next to the queue to check off speakers from a
list of countries that had, Burley surmised, agreed in
advance to give friendly interventions on behalf of the GVN.
Once the line reached about 45, the GVN pushed hard to get
the last few on their list to line up to make sure they were
part of the core 60.


5. (C) Vietnam also took the lead in lobbying all countries
that made interventions to water down recommendations they
didn't like under threat of rejection. Some countries budged
(Burley mentioned Australia and Switzerland),while others
(Canada and the United States) did not. Burley described the
level of direct lobbying by the GVN as "unprecedented,"
adding that some countries were so frustrated with Vietnam's
actions that they complained to the HR Council Secretariat.
Traditionally, the Troika acts as an intermediary to reach
agreement on recommendations, Burley explained, but Vietnam's
delegation chose to all but ignore Troika members Japan and
Burkina Faso. The Japanese, according to Burley, were so
angry that they walked out of the UPR and considered refusing
to participate further. Eventually, the Canadians were able
to talk them back in and the Japanese eventually presided
over the reading of the final country report.


6. (C) In an effort to intimidate countries into altering
their recommendations, some heads of delegation were called
in and criticized during the review process. According to
Burley, New Zealand, Finland, and Canada were castigated by
DFM Minh for not being "objective." The Swedes were called
into the MFA in Hanoi twice to account for their critically
worded advance questions and for their intervention. After
the U.S. intervention, DFM Minh groused to the Canadians
that, after Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the United States had
no right to criticize Vietnam's human rights situation.


7. (C) Burley also observed that the GVN made a concerted
effort to make the final country report look as positive as
possible. The GVN deliberately chose a format for the report
that in essence listed twice each recommendation that the GVN
chose to accept and limited references to recommendations,
such as some made by the United States, they chose to reject.
This had the effect of making the report 1/3 longer than
other UPR country reports and also resulted in the report not
being translated.


8. (C) Perhaps the only setback for the Vietnamese, format
wise at least, concerned the U.S.-led effort to include
specific names of prisoners of concern in the final country
report, which Burley said was a first for any country.
Vietnam's delegation argued that the inclusion of the names
of Father Nguyen Van Ly, Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan
was not allowed under previous precedent and tried to involve
the HR Council Secretariat. In the end, Vietnam lost this
fight, partially due to the format of the report that they
had chosen, and the names were included.


9. (C) COMMENT: From the Geneva accords to negotiations over
our HCMC consular district -- no one should be surprised when
the Vietnamese play diplomatic hardball. But while not
entirely unexpected, Vietnam's shrewd manipulation of the UPR
process was nevertheless noteworthy for its single-minded
intensity. Frustrating, to be sure, but in a way, Vietnam's
defensiveness suggests that the MFA (at least) pays attention
to what the rest of the world thinks about its human rights
practices.

PALMER