Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09HANOI497
2009-06-01 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Hanoi
Cable title:  

WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM

Tags:  KPKO MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM 
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VZCZCXRO7200
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #0497/01 1521001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011001Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9684
INFO RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH PRIORITY 5885
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0305
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000497 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM/RSAT, PM/WRA, PM/PPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: KPKO MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM

HANOI 00000497 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Michalak, Reasons 1.4 (b and d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000497

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, PM/RSAT, PM/WRA, PM/PPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2019
TAGS: KPKO MARR MASS MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: WAY FORWARD ON DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH VIETNAM

HANOI 00000497 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Michael W. Michalak, Reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary: The United States and Vietnam are moving to a
new level of defense cooperation not previously seen in our
bilateral relationship. While progress in some areas is
slower than we would like, we have now expanded our
engagement to the point where setting priorities will be key
to our continued success. We are focusing on building
relationships that are bearing fruit particularly in the
areas of maritime security, search and rescue, peacekeeping,
medical exchanges, and humanitarian assistance, while IMET
training is slowly expanding the number of Vietnamese defense
officials with English language capability and exposure to
the U.S. defense establishment. Our first-ever U.S.-Vietnam
Security Dialogue in October 2008 laid the groundwork for
further progress. Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials
agree that we need more concrete progress in the upcoming
second round, but they have not yet provided specifics.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials note that they
wanted early talks (only eigh
t months after the first round) to consult with the U.S.
before the ASEAN Regional Forum meetings in July, the final
ARF gathering before Vietnam assumes the chair of ASEAN at
the beginning of 2010. End summary.

The U.S.-Vietnam Relationship
--------------


2. (C) Our bilateral relations with Vietnam continue to
broaden and mature, spurring economic, social and
technological development that has eased the path for a
limited expansion of personal freedom for the people of
Vietnam. Vietnam is taking a greater role in international
and regional affairs, as reflected in its current
non-permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council and its
upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN in 2010. GVN leaders

understand that the United States plays a direct role in
creating the conditions for their nation's success and are
committed to advancing the bilateral relationship. MFA and
MFA-affiliated track-two scholars have voiced an interest in
consulting with the United States in advance of Vietnam's
assuming the ASEAN Chair in the beginning of 2010; according
to the MFA, this is a primary reason why the GVN pushed to
have the second round of security talks before the ASEAN
Regional Forum meets in July.


3. (C) Our strengthening relations are also due to Vietnam's
realization that the United States is an important force in
maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even
"small" countries like Vietnam are assured their independence
and freedom of action. As such, Vietnam's leaders speak
positively and optimistically about the future of
U.S.-Vietnam ties. Differences over human rights remain,
however, and lingering fears that the United States supports
the overthrow of the current regime continue to complicate
the relationship. The Ministries of Defense and Public
Security, both of which participate in the dialogue, are
particularly suspicious of the United States and of our
deepening bilateral ties. Fear of a Chinese counter-reaction
also colors Hanoi's reactions to our proposals in the
security realm.

Growth of U.S.-GVN Defense Cooperation
--------------


4. (C) The GVN is in the midst of a shift of its defense
posture from inward to outward looking. Historically, the
primary missions of People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) were
defense of the homeland, regime, and revolution, essentially
a continuation of its posture from the conflicts with the
French and the United States. With increasing international
engagement, the MOD and PAVN are now slowly changing their
perspective to include security cooperation with others - a
shift that only recently started and is still ongoing. As a
result, our defense relations have advanced at a measured
pace, but reflect the overall positive shift in the
relationship. We conduct professional military exchanges
with the PAVN in a limited but growing range of areas
including military law, military nursing, medical readiness
exercises, public affairs, search and rescue, meteorological/
oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster preparedness.
PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra Gold
for the past four years an
d routinely attend U.S. Pacific Command-sponsored
multilateral conferences. Since 1997, over sixty GVN

HANOI 00000497 002.2 OF 004


officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have
attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for
Security Studies (APCSS). PAVN also now sends observers to
the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)
exercises.


5. (C) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits
to Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18, 2007
visit by two mine countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and
the USS Patriot, at Haiphong port. In June 2008, Vietnam
participated in the Pacific Partnership mission of the USNS
Mercy. In 2005, Vietnam agreed to participate in the
International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).
In 2007, we accelerated the pace of IMET and provided a
language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds. In 2008, IMET
expanded mil-mil contacts through a U.S. mobile training team
visit for military medical techniques training. The GVN also
continues to send well-qualified candidates to English
language training and English language instructor training to
the Defense Language Institute (DLI).


6. (C) This nascent but multi-faceted defense and security
relationship has matured into an important aspect of our
overall relationship. Closer cooperation in defense
activities is attainable but will require persistence and
patience. The second U.S.-Vietnam Security Dialogue is
another opportunity to deepen this relationship and expand
our cooperation.

Building on Progress Since the First Dialogue
--------------


7. (C) Prioritizing our security engagement will get results.
Pressing forward full steam ahead in too many areas is more
likely to result in GVN interlocutors who are confused,
distrustful of our intentions, and more apt to drag their
feet on any engagement. At present, the most promising area
of our cooperation is maritime security and search and
rescue. Our engagement on this is growing rapidly and offers
spillover into a number of other areas - humanitarian
assistance, UXO clearance, defense academy exchanges, to name
a few. EXBS too is an area where our engagement has paid off
with a GVN commitment to move forward. Progress on
implementing Vietnam's declared intention to participate in
the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) has been slower
and the GVN still lacks a clear understanding of how FMF
works.

Search and Rescue: Progress and Promise
--------------


8. (C) Search and Rescue (SAR) cooperation has taken off,
with a senior GVN delegation observing a U.S. SAR exercise in
Hawaii and visiting U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters in
Washington and the a U.S. Coast Guard training facility in
Yorktown next month. Based on the steps towards a joint
exercise laid out by the GVN at the October 2008 dialogue, we
should seek GVN invitation to observe a Vietnamese SAR
exercise with a view to begin SAR exercise planning before
the end of 2009. We can express appreciation for their open
discussions with the PACOM SAR team that visited in April and
encourage the GVN to continue discussions with the U.S. on
ways we can further our cooperation.

GVN Ready to Engage on EXBS and Megaports
--------------


9. (C) The GVN has shown a remarkable willingness to
cooperate on the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS)
program. Prime Minister Dung also recently gave the go ahead
to begin negotiations on an agreement with DOE on Megaports.
We should express appreciation for the open and frank
discussions the MOD and Vietnam Marine Police shared with the
U.S. Coast Guard Assessment team in March and encourage the
GVN to continue to develop and expand its relationship with
the U.S. Coast Guard. We should also express appreciation
for the hospitality shown to the Department of Energy team
that conducted the Megaports assessment visit and encourage
Vietnam to begin negotiations with DOE immediately.

Pushing for Progress on Peacekeeping
--------------


10. (C) In March, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies held a successful peacekeeping workshop with

HANOI 00000497 003.2 OF 004


participants from MFA, MOD, and MPS, leading to a greater
understanding at the working level of peacekeeping and what
participation might mean for Vietnam. We should brief the
GVN on the benefits and challenges associated with becoming a
troop-contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations to
continue to expand their knowledge of overall international
peacekeeping concepts and processes, stressing the
longstanding participation of other ASEAN nations.


11. (C) At our invitation, MOD will send Major General
(select) Do Van Tac, Deputy Director for the Operations
Department, General Staff to the GPOI Capstone
exercise--Garuda Shield in June 2009. Having a senior officer
directly responsible for the development of Vietnam's PKO
capabilities observing the exercise will help to build
confidence in Vietnam's future role in peacekeeping
operations and GPOI activities. We should congratulate
Vietnam for accepting the invitation and encourage Vietnam to
continue planning for real participation in peacekeeping and
GPOI. Further, we should seek Vietnam's commitment to send
active participants (vice observers) to the 2010 GPOI
exercise. While the GVN is unlikely to commit on this
occasion, we should raise the issue of their participation
early and often.

Getting the Most Out of Ship Visits
--------------


12. (C) In June 2009, the GVN issued a national guideline
that enabled a team from the Joint POW-MIA Accounting Command
(JPAC) aboard the USNS BRUCE HEEZEN to conduct at-sea search
operations for Missing in Action (MIA) remains within
Vietnam's territorial seas, a major step we should note with
appreciation.
In April, the GVN agreed for the first time to accept our
invitation to fly-out to a visiting U.S. aircraft carrier off
the coast of Vietnam. The visit resulted in pages of
positive publicity and was a resounding success, paving the
way for future visits of this nature. We should note the
benefits of such visits for both sides and seek GVN support
for a follow-up visit when possible.


13. (C) In the past we have pushed Vietnam to allow more U.S.
ship visits as a tool to increase out engagement, but with
our GVN interlocutors citing the need for changes in law to
allow more than one visit per year we do not believe this is
likely to happen in the short or medium term. Instead, we
should press for more substantive activities during the ship
visits we do have - not only more joint community outreach
activities, but more mil-mil activities and increased
operational engagement. We should also seek GVN views on the
possibility of a Vietnamese Navy ship visit to a U.S. port.

Pacific Partnership and Health Diplomacy
--------------


14. (C) Meanwhile, we continue to build on the success of
past Pacific Partnership missions and expect to host Pacific
Angel later in 2009. We should seek GVN commitment to begin
planning for Pacific Partnership 2010.


15. (C) Health diplomacy via medical exchange also continues
to be a key factor in our engagement. We should preview the
U.S. Navy Surgeon General's proposed visit (tentatively
scheduled for July) to engage in a dialogue with the MOH and
MOD regarding medical cooperation opportunities on offer from
Navy medicine. Vietnam Military Medical Department also
plans to send a senior-level military delegation comprised of
three regional commanders (Lieutenant Generals) and senior
representatives from the Military Medical Department to
Hawaii in November 2009 to observe U.S. screening procedures
for soldiers deploying overseas. The exchange will be funded
by DOD PEPFAR and special emphasis will be on HIV/AIDS
prevention. We should welcome Vietnam's initiative in
seeking out these engagement opportunities and encourage them
to continue these efforts.

Humanitarian Mine Action/UXO Clearance
--------------


16. (C) The GVN has made strides in cooperation and
coordination with the establishment of the Vietnam Bomb and
Mine Action Center (VBMAC) in February. The Center is now
the civilian coordinating authority for UXO clearance, mine
risk education and assistance to victims nation-wide.

HANOI 00000497 004.2 OF 004


However, much work remains to be done - a national strategy
would assist Vietnam in gaining much needed donor funds, the
data from the USG-funded Landmine Impact Survey is still not
accessible, and VBMAC does not yet have the capacity to live
up to its mandate. We should applaud the creation of VBMAC,
ask for its priorities for assistance and capacity building,
and encourage the GVN to develop a national strategy for mine
action. We should also seek simple, transparent USG and NGO
access to the Landmine Impact Survey data. Finally, and in
response to past GVN requests for assistance with underwater
clearance, we should preview potential cooperation between
the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and MOD on underwater
explosive ordnan
ce disposal and mine countermeasures and seek GVN agreement
to receive a PACFLT assessment team to discuss potential
cooperation in more detail.

Security Assistance: FMF
--------------


17. (C) MOD's leadership is still hesitant to accept its
first $500K in FY09 FMF and has expressed a policy of not
accepting military related funding to purchase military
equipment from any country. We have informed them about the
potential of using FMF like IMET for training (English
language instructors, medical, military-related skills
training, etc.),to purchase more language labs, or to hire a
certified U.S. English instructor to come to Vietnam to
teach. The MOD still does not yet have a clear understanding
of how FMF works. We need to better educate the leadership
and explain FMF in such a way that it is understood as a
credit or value amount of military equipment that the U.S.
will give to Vietnam, rather than a lump sum of cash to be
handed over for military purchases.

Defense Academy Exchanges
--------------


18. (C) A number of senior MOD officers have expressed their
desire for an increased number of academic exchanges between
our two militaries. We should press the GVN to begin
discussing the establishment of an official exchange program
between the U.S. and GVN service academies and senior staff
colleges. Given our growing cooperation on maritime
security, an exchange with the U.S. Coast Guard Academy would
be an ideal starting point. We should highlight that for the
upcoming academic year at U.S. military academies, Vietnam is
a priority country and could send a cadet to each of our
military academies, provided they put forward competitive
candidates. While Vietnamese candidates must compete with
other countries for a slot, Vietnam's chances of having a
cadet accepted are better than ever. DAO Hanoi will be
working with ERD to determine the best way forward.

A Word of Caution: Priorities and Patience
--------------


19. (C) We are regularly reminded by our GVN counterparts
about the measured pace that they wish to take when we seek
to expand our defense cooperation, and we must take this into
account and seek avenues and areas of cooperation where the
GVN and MOD are most enthusiastic while pressing forward on
issues of key interest. Overall, we see a positive long-term
future in our continued engagement with Vietnam on defense
and security issues. The upcoming Security Dialogue is
another key event to move our cooperation forward and
continue the process of turning a former enemy into a valued
partner.
MICHALAK