WHAT USE ARE LIPS AND TEETH? VIETNAM'S AMBIVALENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000215

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD ECON UNSC CH KS KN VM
SUBJECT: WHAT USE ARE LIPS AND TEETH? VIETNAM'S AMBIVALENT
RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA

REF: A. 07 HANOI 1901

B. 08 HANOI 905

C. 08 HANOI 1311

D. HANOI 192

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Classified By: PolCouns Brian Aggeler. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam's foreign policy, normally
pragmatic to a fault, betrays a certain tension when it
comes to North Korea. Influential voices in the Party
speak of ideological affinity and historical bonds, while
others in Vietnam's foreign policy establishment advocate a
more sober assessment of Vietnam's interests. It is
difficult to gauge how much influence Vietnam has with the
DPRK. General Secretary Nong Duc Manh visited Pyongyang in
2007 and there was for a time fevered speculation that Kim
Jong-il would reciprocate. Relations appeared to cool in
2008, and with them optimism that the DPRK was keen to
explore a "Vietnam model." Vietnam strongly supports the
Six-Party process and has expressed an eagerness to
facilitate discussions; however, it is not clear how
useful this would actually be. Hanoi is reluctant to apply
pressure on Pyongyang, rhetorical or otherwise, and is
solicitous of what it views as China's prerogatives. More
to the point, perhaps: though it is not official policy,
some suggest that North Korea's nuclear ambitions must
ultimately be accommodated. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) A note on sources: This report draws on
conversations January 15 - March 2 with a range of Embassy
contacts including the MFA's Directors General for
Northeast Asia and International Organizations, Bui Tong
Van and Le Hoai Trung; Ministry of Industry and Trade
Deputy Director for Asia-Pacific, Chu Thanh Trung; the
Deputy Director for Northeast Asia on the Communist
Party's External Relations Commission, Le Quang Ba, and
the Commission's Director for North America and Europe,
Pham Tien Nhien; Deputy Director General of the Diplomatic
Academy of Vietnam (DAV) Luan Thuy Duong and DAV scholar
Nguyen Hong Son; Director of Korean Studies at the Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences, Ngo Xuan Binh; and the Chief
Foreign Affairs Editor of Hanoi Moi newspaper, Nguyen Quoc
Chinh.

THE DEAR LEADER'S (ABORTED) MAGICAL MYSTERY TOUR
-------------- ---


3. (C) In the months following General Secretary Nong Duc
Manh's October 2007 visit to Pyongyang (ref A),there was
feverish speculation that Kim Jong-il would travel to
Vietnam. The MFA's DG for Northeast Asian Affairs, Bui
Tong Van, confirmed that Vietnam remains keen to host the
North Korean leader and reissued an invitation as recently
as the July 2008 visit of DPRK FM Pak Ui Chun (ref B).
Van's counterpart on the Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV)
External Relations Commission, Le Quang Ba, went a step
further, claiming that the North Korean leader had actually
accepted the offer. In the event, the visit did not take
place, and Ba declined to speculate on possible future
dates. Nor would he or the MFA offer a specific reason why
the visit did not occur. Contacts in the academic and think
tank community pointed to ill health; coordination,
logistics, and security complications connected with
traveling through China by train; and a general retrenchment
in the DPRK's external relations as possible reasons why
Kim may have decided not to come to Hanoi.


4. (C) How likely the visit was in the first place is open
to debate. Regardless, in retrospect, 2007 and early 2008
appear to have marked something of a high-water mark in
DPRK-Vietnam relations. According to the CPV's Ba, the
pace of reciprocal visits accelerated during this time; Ba
himself visited Pyongyang three times in 2007. More
interestingly, DPRK officials, previously mute about
Vietnam's economic success, began to offer praise for the
country's two-decade-long program of "renovation" (doi
moi). Things have cooled considerably over the past year,
however, although relations are nowhere near their 2004
nadir when the DPRK withdrew its ambassador to protest

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Vietnam's decision to permit the resettlement of North
Korean refugees to South Korea. As the Director of
Political and Security Studies at the MFA-affiliated
Diplomatic Academy (DAV),Nguyen Hong Son, explained,
factors external to the Vietnam-DPRK relationship are
largely to blame for the current lull: North Korean pique
toward the more conservative South Korean President Lee
Myung-bak, setbacks in the Six-Party Talks, and, possibly,
leadership uncertainty in Pyongyang. The most recent visit,
a September 2008 trip to Pyongyang by MPS Minister Le Hong
Anh, took place without fanfare or apparent result.

Lips and Teeth...
--------------


5. (C) Ba, a longtime Embassy contact who holds the
position of Deputy Director of the CPV External Relations
Commission's Northeast Asia Division, went to some length
to underscore Vietnam and North Korea's ideological
affinity: as close as "lips and teeth," in the old
Communist argot. Ba insisted that much of the news about
the DPRK is "distorted" and praised Pyongyang's huge
stadium, efficient subway system, and cultural festivals.
In these areas at least, Vietnam lagged ten years behind
North Korea, Ba lamented. (We responded that Vietnam's
ability to feed its people and to reduce poverty was
considerably more impressive.) Most in Vietnam take a more
sober view of North Korea, to be sure. Nevertheless,
Vietnam's leadership is keenly aware that Vietnam and North
Korea are among a very small number of nations in the world
that remain even nominally communist.


6. (C) Whether or not this translates into influence is
another matter. In a separate meeting, the outgoing
Director of the External Relations Commission's North
America and Europe Division, Pham Tien Nhien, bluntly
acknowledged that while Vietnam maintains an embassy in
Pyongyang, its activities and functions are strictly
limited. North Korea remains a "hermit kingdom," even to
its communist brethren, Nhien stated. DG Van likewise
conceded that Vietnam's access to information is modest,
as is its influence.

...or Conflicted Bigamist
--------------


7. (C) Outside the Party and MFA, opinions about North
Korea tend to be more direct. "Vietnam does not want to
lose friends, but it is sometimes really hard to
understand North Korea's actions," commented the Chief
Foreign Affairs Editor of the Party-affiliated newspaper
Hanoi Moi, Nguyen Quoc Chinh. The Director of the state-
sponsored Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences' (VASS) Center
for Korean Studies, Ngo Xuan Binh, was downright caustic in
his assessment. Mixing his metaphors, Binh insisted that
North Korea and Vietnam were no longer allies, though they
remained "friends," and compared Vietnam's approach to North
and South Korea to that of a husband with two wives. One is
old, impoverished, and cranky; the is other young,
beautiful, and rich. Vietnam wants to be faithful to its
first wife, Binh continued, but it is obvious who is the
more attractive.


8. (SBU) Vietnam has practically no trade with North
Korea, apart from a small amount of rice exports given as
assistance, and no investment, while its economic ties with
South Korea are substantial. So small is its trade with
North Korea that Vietnam does not even compile statistics,
according the Deputy Director of Ministry of Trade and
Industry's Asia-Pacific Division, Chu Thang Trung. By
contrast, South Korea is Vietnam's second-largest source of
foreign investment, with over 5.75 billion dollars in
actual (spent) investment; South Korea is also Vietnam's
sixth trade partner, with two-way trade reaching 8.8
billion dollars in 2008.

Doi Moi for North Korea?
--------------


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9. (C) Regardless of their opinions about North Korea
itself, our MFA, Party, and think tank contacts maintained
that Vietnam stood ready to serve as a development model
for North Korea. The benefit of economic reform, it was
generally understood, was to have been the subtext for
Kim's visit, much it was when the North Korean leader
visited southern China in January 2006. Our contacts
offered varied assessments as to whether Pyongyang was
receptive. Some, such as the CPV's Ba, saw continued
interest. Most, however, conceded that North Korea was
even less likely than Burma to pursue Doi Moi-like policies
(ref C). In a recent discussion with the DCM (ref D),the
MFA's Director General for International Organizations Le
Hoai Trung, said that even friends from Cuba had voiced
skepticism about the DPRK's willingness to engage in
reform. As a measure of North Korea's isolation, VASS
scholar Binh said that the DPRK could actually learn from
Burma and its experience joining ASEAN.

Six-Party Talks: Eager to Seem Helpful
--------------


10. (C) Vietnam professes strong support for the Six-Party
Talks, our contacts stressed, and wants to be seen as
helpful. Track II contacts in particular emphasized that
Vietnam enjoys comparatively good relations with the DPRK,
as well as the other Six-Party countries, and could be
useful as a conduit. The Diplomatic Academy's Son
suggested that Vietnam could contribute to the Six-Party
process as ASEAN chair in 2010, perhaps facilitating
contact through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),of which
North Korea is a member. In a separate meeting, Son's
colleague, DAV Deputy DG Luan Thuy Duong, went as far as to
suggest that ASEAN join the Six-Party Talks as an
observer. Several of our contacts pointed to Vietnam's
willingness to host 6PT working group discussions on the
normalization of the DPRK's relations with Japan in March
2007 as an example of the positive role that Vietnam is
prepared to play.

Comment: How Useful is Vietnam when it Comes to the DPRK?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) The 2007 discussions in Vietnam are instructive,
though not necessarily in an encouraging way. The talks
ended in acrimony, as the DPRK refused to even discuss the
issue of abductions. Hanoi could do little to restart the
meetings, and it is unclear how much it tried. This gets
to the heart of it. Even as our contacts emphasize
Vietnam's strong support for the Six-Party Talks, they
consistently dismissed any suggestion that Hanoi could
apply pressure, rhetorical or otherwise, on Pyongyang.
(And to be fair, it is unclear what leverage Vietnam has.)
Vietnam is, moreover, extremely solicitous of China; our
contacts regularly deflected discussion of the need to
present North Korea with a unified front by pointing to
Beijing as the DPRK's patron and benefactor. And finally
-- and more to the point -- Hanoi's commitment to achieving
and enforcing a complete, verifiable disarmament is perhaps
open to doubt. As a matter of official policy, Hanoi
remains absolutely dedicated to fully achieving the Six
-Party Talks' goals. As a practical matter, however,
Vietnam regularly counsels flexibility and patience, and
suggests that it is up to the United States to make
concessions; Neatly, and baldly, summing up what our
official interlocutors may be too diplomatic to articulate
directly, one think tank contact said that, ultimately, the
United States may have to live with a handful of North
Korean nuclear weapons.
MICHALAK