Three Supreme Court Justices Replaced at CICIG's Behest

C O N F I D E N T I A L GUATEMALA 000929

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/09
TAGS: PGOV PINR KCRM KJUS GT
SUBJECT: Three Supreme Court Justices Replaced at CICIG's Behest

REF: GUATEMALA 919

CLASSIFIED BY: Drew G. Blakeney, Political and Economic Counselor,
State, P/E; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

Summary




1. (C) On October 7, the Guatemalan Congress replaced three of the
thirteen justices it had elected September 30 to the new Supreme
Court, which is to be sworn in NLT October 13. The three were the
most problematic of six whom CICIG publicly signaled as unfit to
serve on the Supreme Court. All three enjoyed the strong backing
of First Lady Sandra Torres de Colom. The Ambassador and Emboffs
successfully encouraged leaders of parties aligned with the
governing UNE to support the replacement candidates. The
substitutions should tip the balance of power in the Court in favor
of those supporting the rule of law, resulting in a court with
which we can better cooperate. CICIG's public accusations touched
off a political battle which may be a watershed event. It pitted
CICIG Commissioner Castresana, supported by the international
community, directly against First Lady Sandra Torres, with Torres
coming out the loser. The outcome has implications for UNE unity,
and the First Lady's 2011 political plans. End Summary.



Congress Replaces Three Problematic Justices-Elect




2. (C) On the evening of October 7, the Guatemalan Congress voted
by overwhelming majorities to replace the three most problematic
justices they had elected September 30 to the Supreme Court
(reftel). Congress' decision to reconsider its election of some of
the justices-elect was a response to an October 6 appeal to
Congress by Carlos Castresana, Commissioner of the UN-led
International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG),in
which he provided specific allegations against six of the
justices-elect (who, in turn, were among the eight Supreme Court
finalist candidates he denounced September 29). Congress was also
responding to a public backlash against corruption generated by
Castresana's initial, September 29 denunciation, strongly negative
press reactions, as well as complaints against individual
justices-elect filed by various civil society organizations,
lawyers, and private individuals during October 2-4. Previous
public statements by the Ambassador on the Supreme Court made clear
that the USG firmly supported CICIG's move.




3. (C) The compromise decision to replace the three justices-elect
was the product of an October 7 negotiation among the congressional
leaders of the governing UNE party and its congressional allies,
the GANA, FRG, Guatemala Bench (BG),Unionists, and UCN. Leaders
of the six parties had led the September 29 congressional election
of the Court over CICIG's objections, but under intense
international, press, and public pressure, members of the GANA and
Guatemala Benches (and possibly others) reconsidered. With
encouragement from the Ambassador, Emboffs, and CICIG, leaders of
these parties changed their minds and refused UNE pressure - coming
directly from First Lady Sandra Torres de Colom - to seat the Court
as originally elected. With a Constitutional Court ruling
affording legal cover for GANA, BG, and the opposition LIDER and
Patriot Parties to modify the election, the UNE bench found itself
in the minority. With its position rendered untenable, UNE decided
to eschew further public and international criticism, and instead
go along with modifying the election. Negotiations among leaders
of the six benches produced agreement that the three candidates
against whom CICIG had made the most serious accusations would be
replaced.




4. (U) The three justices-elect who were replaced are:



-- Lesbia Jackeline Espana Samayoa, whom First Lady Sandra Torres
strongly supported. CICIG accused Espana of having failed to
disclose that she is a state contractor, and noted formal
complaints alleging obstruction of justice, questionable rulings,
and that she had received a USD 25,000 bribe to absolve a murderer.

-- Elda Nidia Najera Sagastume, sister of a serving UNE deputy,
supported by the UNE and the First Lady. CICIG accused Najera of
systematically absolving or otherwise providing lenient treatment
to FRG and UNE political figures such as former MinDef Eduardo
Arevalo Lacs, former President Alfonso Portillo, and former
President of Congress Eduardo Meyer (all of whom are implicated in
corruption).



-- Manuel de Jesus Pocasangre, former UNE candidate for deputy in
2007, and father of the current Governor of Guatemala Department.
CICIG noted Pocasangre had been sanctioned USD 500,000 for misuse
of official funds when he occupied a senior position at the
Ministry of Agriculture. Press alleged that Pocasangre is also a
former business associate of notorious narcotrafficker and former
Deputy and Mayor-Elect Manolo Castillo, accused of masterminding
the 2007 PARLACEN murders.




5. (C) Congress elected to replace the three with Luis Arturo
Archila Lerayees, Jose Arturo Sierra Gonzalez, and Luis Alberto
Pineda Roca. Neither the Embassy nor CICIG have derogatory
information about any of the three. However, a CICIG employee told
Pol/Econ Counselor that Archila (who is 71 years old and will face
mandatory retirement at 75, before he is able to complete his
five-year term) has a son who worked as a defense lawyer for
narcotraffickers. CICIG believes his son could represent a
vulnerability.



President Denies Wife's Role




6. (C) President Colom publicly distanced himself from the process
on several occasions, citing separation of powers. He also
asserted that his wife was not involved in the selection process.
(Comment: No one close to the process finds that assertion to be
credible; Sandra Torres de Colom is widely known to have directed
the UNE's role in the process via her sister, Gloria Torres. End
Comment.) In multiple private meetings and phone calls October
4-7, the President and his key advisers were looking for a way to
give in on at least two of the disputed judges. On several
occasions, the President's advisers urged the Ambassador to press
key UNE party allies to vote against justices desired by the First
Lady; the Ambassador in fact carried out an intensive lobbying
effort with government allies and opponents in support of the
successful effort to withdraw the three justices. The Ambassador
privately told President Colom that the selection of the new
Supreme Court was critical to the rule of law, and that the GOG's
credibility was at stake. He also stressed that the USG's ability
to work with this government, and the next more effectively on
security and justice matters depended on having competent,
independent courts.



Stresses Within UNE, Congressional Alliance




7. (C) President of Congress Roberto Alejos (protect) told the
Ambassador that the First Lady's control of UNE's participation in
the courts selection process had further aggravated existing
strains within the party. He added that some party members were
beginning to perceive President Colom as a lame duck given his
wife's waxing influence, even though two years remain in his term.
UNE Deputy Christian Boussinot told EconOff that he and other
centrist deputies were considering leaving the party due to the
First Lady's increasingly assertive efforts to move the party to
the left, and were troubled by the First Lady's handling of the
selection process. GANA Deputy and former President of Congress
Jorge Mendez Herbruger told Pol/Econ Counselor that GANA bench
leaders Jaime Martinez and Manuel Barquin were starting to realize
the public price to be paid for the close association with UNE, and

had told GANA deputies they were considering ending their alliance
with UNE. BG Deputy Rosa Maria de Frade (protect),who is often at
odds with her fellow bench members, dismissed the possibility that
her bench would distance itself from UNE due to lucrative
infrastructure construction contracts that BG Deputies Eduardo
Castillo and Luis Contreras have with the government.



Comment




8. (C) CICIG's direct approach to Congress and confrontation of
the First Lady's interests by demanding a cleaner Supreme Court
appears to have paid off: There are now ten of thirteen Supreme
Court justices-elect for whom neither the Embassy nor CICIG has
derogatory information. Getting a relatively clean court is of
paramount importance for the rule of law in part because
Guatemala's Supreme Court administers the entire court system, in
addition to being the final judicial arbiter. Under the First
Lady's leadership, the governing UNE placed itself in direct
opposition to CICIG and the international community, and lost. The
defeat is aggravating the UNE's internal stresses and placing the
party's key congressional alliances under strain. Civil society
feels boosted in its new activism. Congress is now preparing to
elect 90 appellate court judges; many deputies are actively seeking
CICIG's and the international community's opinions of the
candidates before they cast their votes. Their appears to be
little backlash against CICIG or the Embassy for their roles.
MCFARLAND