Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GEORGETOWN157
2009-03-20 19:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Georgetown
Cable title:  

JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST,

Tags:  PGOV PREL SNAR GY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7108
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVV/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 4163
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000157 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR GY
SUBJECT: JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST,
BUT SEEKS COLLABORATION

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 124

B. GEORGETOWN 149

Classified By: Ambassador John M. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L GEORGETOWN 000157

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR GY
SUBJECT: JAGDEO UNREPENTANT AFTER LATEST ANTI-US OUTBURST,
BUT SEEKS COLLABORATION

REF: A. GEORGETOWN 124

B. GEORGETOWN 149

Classified By: Ambassador John M. Jones, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A day after another set of searing public
criticisms of the U.S. Government and its "condescending
lectures" on fighting drug trafficking and other issues
through its annual reports, an entirely unrepentant President
Jagdeo asserted to the Ambassador on March 19 that the tone
of these reports should change in the future if the U.S.
expected countries to cooperate on such issues. He reiterated
privately what he had expressed publicly and vociferously the
day before: that he had been asking the U.S. "for years" for
greater counternarcotics collaboration, including the opening
of a DEA office in Guyana, but had been "met with silence."
He nonetheless claimed an interest in developing a framework
for law enforcement cooperation -- which would involve
enhanced investigations and prosecutions of drug trafficking,
weapons smuggling, money laundering, and extraditions to the
U.S. He reiterated his intention to write to President Obama
regarding the State Department's "unfair and biased" annual
reporting on drugs, human rights, and trafficking in persons.
"It's a different world now," Jagdeo declared to the
Ambassador. "We're not going to be lectured anymore." End
Summary.


2. (SBU) At the annual Police Officers Conference in
Georgetown on March 18, President Jagdeo rnewed his scathing
public attacks on the U.S. Goernment for what he perceives
as its double-talkon fighting drug trafficking. Restating
many of he charges he levied during a public presentation on
February 27 (reftel A),Jagdeo asserted that hewas "tired of
the lectures" contained in the Stae Department's annual
reports on narcotics (the NCSR): "If the U.S. is serious
about working wit us then this will change." As he has often
done in the past, Jagdeo used the opportunity to counterunch
on what he perceived to be the United State' own weaknesses,
stating that in the fight agaist drugs and crime, "...they
have the biggest falure of law enforcement and they are the
largest source of money laundering." Jagdeo criticized publc
recriminations on the issue, then proceeded toengage in that

very act by noting: "We can tradetit for tat and the drug
traffickers would be hapy. I am interested in serious
collaboration wher there is real assistance, real
commitment, and esources to match what we say."


3. (C) At the Abassador's request, Jagdeo met with
Ambassador ad PolOff on March 19 to discuss these latest
remrks, the government's last-minute cancellation ofparticipation in a regional drug enforcement confeence, and
the President's views about how to mov forward. Ambassador
began by asking "How can weput things back together again?"
on the counternrcotics front. Jagdeo responded by saying it
had o start with "changing the tone of these unfair, iased
reports from the State Department," particularly the INCSR.
He alleged: "These reports don't reflect the positive steps
we have taken," referring specifically to the dismissal of
nine Customs Anti-Narcotic Unit (CANU) Officers last year,
including the Head, after they had failed polygraph tests.
When PolOff noted that this CANU transition had indeed been
described and even praised in this year's INCSR, the
President responded that it had received only "one tiny
mention" in the report. (Note: not true. It was cited in the
summary and again in the narrative. End Note.) Jagdeo also
highlighted the passage of several new laws last year that
enabled wiretapping, plea bargaining, and other useful law
enforcement tools. PolOff replied that this also had been
mentioned and lauded in this year's INCSR, in two different
sections.


4. (C) Jagdeo expressed particular exasperation at what he
perceived as a complete lack of progress on establishing a
permanent DEA office in Guyana. "This is not a recent thing;
I've been asking for this for years!" he exclaimed. Referring
to the March 2008 visit of WHA A/S Tom Shannon, Jagdeo
averred: "There's a long history to this: we've written,
we've asked, we even mentioned it when Mr. Shannon was here,
and nothing has happened." Ambassador inquired what exactly
the President sought regarding law enforcement collaboration;
Jagdeo replied that he was interested in a "framework by
which we can define our exact cooperation. How are we going
to collaborate, in broad terms? That is what we must
establish." Taking care to delineate the difference between
broader policy issues and the operational details of actual
investigations, Jagdeo claimed he was only interested in the

former: he wanted to clarify the framework, and then let the
actual enforcement work happen. In response to the
Ambassador's inquiry about who would be the principal POCs
for the GoG on such discussions, Jagdeo identified four:
Cabinet and Defense Board Secretary Dr. Roger Luncheon;
Minister of Home Affairs Clement Rohee; Guyana Defense Force
Chief of Staff Gary Best; and Guyana Police Force
Commissioner Henry Greene. He affirmed: "These are the people
I trust on this issue."


5. (C) PolOff raised the question of the GoG's own
counternarcotics commitment after a debacle the previous
weekend regarding a U.S. invitation for CANU Director James
Singh to attend the regional Drug Commanders Conference in
St. Kitts the week of March 16-20, with all expenses covered.
(Note: After belatedly accepting the invite on March 13,
Minister Rohee rescinded permission for Mr. Singh to travel
on March 14, with no explanation. End Note.) PolOff asked
what message the President thought this action sent in the
context of his pleas for assistance and collaboration. Jagdeo
evaded that question, and in fact expressed frustration with
Rohee for having granted the initial permission without the
Cabinet's consent. (Note: official travel by all GoG
employees -- at any level of the bureaucracy and even if a
sponsor is covering all costs -- must be approved by the
Cabinet in advance before permission to travel is granted.
End Note.)


6. (C) Jagdeo circled back at several points during the
30-minute meeting to the annual reports that grate on him
"and many other countries around the world, who feel the same
way I do." Referring at various points to the Human Rights
Report and the Trafficking in Persons Report, in addition to
the INCSR, Jagdeo complained that they were "unbalanced" and
did not include the government's point of view. PolOff noted
that he was the principal author of each, and clarified that
the government's perspective had very much been part of the
information-gathering process, although numerous GoG agencies
had failed to respond to multiple requests for even basic,
non-controversial statistics. (Note: in response to the
latter point, Jagdeo nearly apologized, asserting that he had
ordered his ministers to comply with all such requests in
order to help establish an accurate picture. Jagdeo then
offered: "If that happens again in the future, drop me a line
about it." End Note.) PolOff asked if the President
understood that each of the cited reports were required by --
and written for -- the U.S. Congress, and by their very
nature and structure would not necessarily reflect any
particular government's perspective. Jagdeo contradicted
himself impressively within the same response: "I understand
that. I don't have any problem with you identifying
deficiencies that exist." Moments later he avowed: "If you're
going to say bad things about us, we have the right to say
things about you. The only difference between what I have
said publicly about you and what you have written about us is
simply that I did not take the time to put my remarks in a
report."


7. (C) Ambassador noted that post would relay the President's
interest in a framework for cooperation to Washington, and
would work to get something together. Jagdeo expressed hope
that something could be arranged, and looked forward to
future discussions after his return in early April from an
18-day trip to the Middle East (reftel B).


8. (C) Comment: In President Jagdeo's world, Guyana has met
the full measure of external expectations regarding its
commitment to fighting drug trafficking and other crimes, and
demonstrated its competence and diligence as a partner in
these areas. This could hardly be further from the truth. The
individuals he identified to work with on this "framework" --
Luncheon, Rohee, Best, and Greene -- are the Four Horsemen of
Inertia. All have been in their positions for at least 18
months, and none have shown a proclivity for meaningful
actions that would truly address Guyana's numerous law
enforcement shortcomings. Luncheon in particular, as the
source of virtually all government power outside of the
President, has repeatedly sought to disembowel the most
critical reform components of the British-funded Security
Sector Reform Program. End Comment.
Jones