START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTATIONS, MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-034.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group (WG) for this session was held at the
Russian Mission on October 27, 2009. This was the fifth
meeting of the MOU WG overall. U.S WG Chair, Mr. Trout,
provided the U.S.-proposed MOU joint draft text (JDT),
Sections I through VI, with copies both in English and
Russian. Russian WG chair, General Orlov, provided a
Russian-proposed JDT of Annexes D through I.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation clarified several issues in
the U.S.-proposed MOU text provided early last week. They
questioned why the United States did not provide non-deployed
launcher data, why the United States wanted to include
warhead data, why the United States specifically referred to
the warheads as "nuclear" warheads, and queried how much MOU
data would reside in the first tier and what data could be
moved to the third tier.


5. (S) The sides reviewed the MOU JDT, Sections I through
III, and were able to establish agreement in several areas.
Much of the meeting, however, was consumed by the Russians
arguing against special treatment of mobile ICBMs and mobile
launchers in the U.S. proposals.


6. (U) Subject Summary: Perceived Discrepancies; Levels
Upon Levels of Data; The U.S. Has Already Covered That;
Mobiles Again; The Returned Missile; What TMOM?; and,
Houston...We Have Agreement.

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PERCEIVED DISCREPANCIES
--------------


7. (S) General Poznihir opened the meeting and noted that
the Russian Delegation had discovered a few discrepancies in
the U.S. MOU JDT text that raised many questions which they
would elaborate upon in a presentation. Poznihir stated that
the proposed U.S. text duplicated much information in the
ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber (HB) sections that already
existed in Section I of the MOU, adding that these duplicate
sections provided no benefit except to lengthen the document.


8. (S) Poznihir described the second issue that the U.S.
proposal did not include, the Russian-proposed category of
"non-deployed launchers," except for mobile launchers. In
addition to the fact that the U.S. provision would single out
mobile launchers, the Russian side was concerned that only
one specific missile is attributed to one specific launcher,
even when that missile is removed from its respective
launcher. Poznihir argued that the concern should be the


number of missiles actually in, or on, launchers rather than
the association of a given missile and a given launcher. If
a launcher contains a missile, the Russian side argued, it is
deployed. If it does not, then it is non-deployed. With
reference to the data reported in the MOU six-month update,
it would contain actual data, not virtual data and,
therefore, would be of more use to each Party.


9. (S) Poznihir turned to the issue of providing warhead
data in the MOU. First, this was an issue for HBs because
the Russians stored their long-range nuclear ALCMs
differently from the United States. He also contended that
the U.S. proposal poses verification issues. Principally,
there is no way to determine if more weapons are stored at
another facility that is not associated with a base, because
such a facility would not be inspectable, yet warheads from
such a facility could still be used to upload HBs quickly.
Second, Poznihir argued that reporting warhead load-out data
for ICBMs and SLBMs would pose problems because the load-out
on these missiles could change between six-month updates,
resulting in differences between load-outs given to
inspectors upon arrival at facilities and the load-outs
listed in the MOU. Under the Russian proposal, individual
warhead data would not be reported in the MOU; only at the
ICBM and SLBM base level would the aggregate number of
deployed warheads be declared for ICBMs and SLBMs at that
base.


10. (S) Poznihir turned to the treatment of mobile systems
in Section II of the U.S.-proposed MOU and stated that such
"unilateral restrictions are not acceptable" and U.S.
arguments on the topic had not been "convincing." Following
this statement, Poznihir pointed out several areas within the
draft text where the United States had singled out mobile
ICBMs and launchers.


11. (S) On the issue of identifying submarine "names" in the
data exchange, Poznihir acknowledged that the Russian side
understood that this data had been offered by the U.S. side
to increase transparency. He also agreed with the U.S.
analysis that there might be a different number of SLBMs and
warheads on each SLBM for each submarine. Poznihir did not,
however, express a Russian position on the proposal.


12. (S) Poznihir, on the display of data in MOU Section I,
acknowledged that the two sides have agreed to record the
aggregate number of deployed delivery vehicles and deployed
warheads, while continuing to differ with respect to limits
and the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers. He proposed the title of "Aggregate Number of
Strategic Offensive Arms Limited Under the Treaty" as the
title for Section I of the MOU, while Section II could be
titled "Additional Aggregate Numbers Not Limited by the
Treaty."

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LEVELS UPON LEVELS OF DATA
--------------


13. (S) Poznihir concluded his presentation by proposing
that the aggregate limits declared in Article III, as well as
the aggregate numbers for ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs should be
placed in tier two, while the rest of the data (i.e., START


Annexes D-J) were merely technical data and could be placed
in tier three, as that level would not be subject to
ratification. Trout pointed out that tier three would be
submitted for ratification by the U.S. Senate and the
Inspection Protocol Working Group was considering which tiers
were appropriate for such information. Orlov questioned why
ratification of the third tier was necessary as it was just
technical data. He expressed concern in particular over the
release and review of sensitive data by the U.S. Senate
during the course of ratification. Trout responded that the
U.S. Senate would require ratification of all levels of
documents and all classified data would be appropriately
protected.

--------------
THE U.S. HAS ALREADY
COVERED THAT
--------------


14. (S) Trout pointed out that many of Poznihir's questions
had already been answered by the U.S.-proposed JDT, at which
point he passed the U.S.-proposed JDT to Orlov. Trout then
proceeded to go over the JDT with the Russian Delegation.
Trout explained that Section I, paragraph 1, should only
contain Article III central limits, while Section I,
paragraph 2 should contain all of the other limits and data.


15. (S) Trout asked why the Russian Delegation had omitted
the category of test and training launchers for ICBMs, ICBM
launchers, and warheads on ICBMs from Section II. Colonel
Pischulov responded that this was deleted because it
contained special limits on mobile launchers. He further
stated that Russia had not yet made a decision on the Article
IV provisions, but opposed unique limits and restrictions on
mobile systems. Pischulov asked why the United States
proposed a limit of 15 test launchers in Article IV. Trout
responded that the question was a counting rules issue to be
decided elsewhere. He added that the current discussion
should focus only on the headings of data within the MOU.


16. (S) Orlov questioned Trout why mobile test and training
launchers were listed separately and why fixed launchers of
these types were not mentioned. Trout responded by asking
whether Russia would propose listing both fixed and mobile
categories. Orlov pushed Trout to remove all references to
mobiles and to include mobile test and training launcher
numbers under headings for test launchers and training
launchers for each respective sub-section. Trout reminded
Orlov that U.S. Article IV referred to this data in this way
and that the MOU should reflect what is in the articles.
Unable to reach agreement, both sides agreed the text would
remain bracketed.


17. (S) Orlov asked Trout why it was necessary for both
sides to list warhead data for each ICBM base and quipped
"...and in your answer please don't talk about transparency."
Orlov referred to Poznihir's presentation reinforcing the
analysis that the data listed in the MOU would almost never
match what would be given to inspectors at the beginning of
an inspection. He also noted that this data was very
sensitive, again expressing concern that the data would show
up on the internet. Trout reminded Orlov that all data would
be classified properly and that the United States had similar


concerns, but was willing to provide the data in the interest
of openness. Orlov noted that warhead load-out data had
nothing to do with the treaty's central limits and,
therefore, doubted the need for such details. He joked that,
while Russia did not agree with placing this information into
the MOU, they would not object if the United States wanted to
declare this information unilaterally. Trout reminded Orlov
that under the Russian proposal there would only be five U.S.
inspections per year allowed. Since both Parties possessed
more than five bases subject to inspection, this data would
be the only insight into a particular base for possibly over
a year. Both sides agreed to keep the text bracketed.

--------------
MOBILES AGAIN
--------------


18. (S) As Trout began reviewing the MOU section on mobile
systems, Orlov announced that all data exchange elements
concerning mobiles was unacceptable. Trout noted the
comment, but asked for a clarification between the former
term of "re stricted area" and the new Russian-proposed term
"basing area." After some initial information that was
somewhat contradictory, Orlov responded that the Russian side
would provide a briefing on this topic at the next WG meeting.


19. (S) Orlov asked the U.S. side why fixed structures were
specifically identified in the MOU. He stated the subject of
the treaty was launchers and warheads and not structures.
Since data on the number of bases, launchers, and warheads
was already known, he asked what was the purpose of declaring
a structure on that particular base. Trout explained that
inspectors required this information when inspecting mobile
launchers. Also, under the current U.S. Conversion or
Elimination (CorE) provisions, fixed structures were
accountable items and, as such, were required to be
eliminated. Therefore, these items needed to be listed in
the MOU. Poznihir heatedly replied that buildings at an
eliminated base should be able to be used for other things
not inconsistent with the limits of the treaty.


20. (S) Poznihir reviewed U.S.-proposed text on SLBMs and
ICBMs and asked why the United States did not request a
unique identifier (UID) for each SLBM on every submarine.
Trout mentioned that Mr. Siemon had made a presentation that
same day, during the Plenary, explaining why submarines were
different. Trout also reiterated that both sides began using
UIDs 15 years ago and that the United States and Russia
agreed at the time there were unique measures associated with
mobiles. He concluded by stating that the importance of
tracking mobile missiles was no less important today. Orlov
stated he was well aware of the history and said two-thirds
of the treaty was associated with mobiles and, yes, Siemon
had an interesting presentation, but he could prepare an even
more interesting presentation on submarines. Orlov said he
was more concerned with the present, as "...every day I read
reports...there are three submarines in the Atlantic, and the
(launch) preparation time is minimal." He stated that
Russia is unable to track U.S. submarines and is
uncomfortable with the idea that there are 1300 warheads
floating around just outside Russia. He added that if a
Russian submarine was able to track a U.S. submarine for even
three minutes, it was a great victory. He surmised that




SLBMs should then contain UIDs and be tracked, since they
were a much greater threat than Russian road-mobile ICBMs.
He concluded the discussion by saying the Russian Delegation
would clarify their position on UIDs at the next meeting.

--------------
THE RETURNED MISSILE
--------------


21. (S) Trout asked why Russia had not included any data
under production facilities. Pischulov responded that Russia
would not have treaty-accountable missiles at a production
facility, since the missiles would not become deployed until
after they had left the facility. Trout asked the Russian
side how it planned to deal with missiles returned to the
production facility for maintenance. Orlov replied that his
side had not given consideration to this issue. Trout then
emphasized that, under the U.S. proposal, once the United
States had been given the 60-hour notification prior to a
missile departing a production facility, the missile would
become non-deployed at that time and, therefore, would become
a non-deployed missile. Orlov agreed to look at the issue,
but stated provisionally that he believed they would have no
problems adding this category for both "production
facilities" and "production facilities for mobile launchers
of ICBMs."

--------------
WHAT TMOM?
--------------


22. (S) Trout asked why, under several of the ICBM and SLBM
areas, Russia had deleted references to the category of
Training Models of Missiles (TMOMs). Pischulov responded
that Russia had no TMOMs at production facilities and,
therefore, would declare none. Trout noted that the Russians
had removed the TMOM data category from the test range and
training facility sections, where the United States knows
Russia currently locates TMOMs today. Orlov responded that
if Russia had TMOMs, they would declare them at the time of
inspection, but cautioned the Russian side still needed to
discuss the category. He said they would have a full answer
for the U.S. side at the next meeting.

--------------
HOUSTON...WE HAVE AGREEMENT
--------------


23. (S) The two sides reached agreement on text for storage
facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, production
facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test
ranges; however, some bracketed text remains in the actual
data to be listed under the listed facilities. Both sides
agreed not to address the HB section of the U.S. JDT until
the next meeting.


24. (S) Trout, citing the U.S.-proposed Annex J, reconfirmed
that sensitive information would not be released to the
public, adding that two paragraphs of Annex J had been moved
to the treaty text and were being discussed at the Treaty
Text and Definitions Working Group. Colonel Ilin raised
concern as to what Trout meant by his use of the term "the
public." Trout explained the term meant the news media.


Ilin said that Russian law forbids the release of aggregate
numbers and that further discussion was needed.


25. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text, dated October 27, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text for Annexes D-I,
dated October 27, 2009.


26. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Lt Col Blevins
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Mr. Coussa
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
LT Lobner
Mr. Bennett (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Col Ilin
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Col Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


27. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS