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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 26,
2009, P.M. SESSION

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-028.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 26, 2009
Time: 4:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The third meeting of the U.S. and Russian Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG) was held at the U.S. Mission on
October 26, 2009. The IPWG continued its review of Section V
of the Inspection Protocol (IP) (General Rules for the
Conduct of Activities). Key issues were the U.S. and Russian
views on the time limit to transport the inspection team from
the point of entry (POE) to the inspection site, the need for
sequential inspections, and the rules for photography at the
inspection site. Other important issues discussed were items
of inspection (IOI),the rights of inspectors to possess and
use documents and equipment at the inspection site,
requesting clarifications during inspections, and the process
for documenting ambiguities. Unresolved issues included the
separate treatment for mobile ICBMs, inspection nomenclature,
and whether the second tier of the treaty will be designated
a "protocol" or an "annex."


4. (U) Subject Summary: Introduction to Review of Section
Five; Transfer Time to the Inspection Site; Sequential
Inspections; Continuing Paragraph-By-Paragraph Review;
Clarifications and Ambiguities; and, Wrap Up.

--------------
INTRODUCTION TO REVIEW
OF SECTION FIVE
--------------


5. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting by proposing to
continue work on Section V (General Rules for the Conduct of
Inspection Activities). Col Ilin agreed and handed the U.S.
Delegation the Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) of
Sections I (General Obligations) and II (Provisions
Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors and
Aircrew Members). Ilin noted two things: (1) in lieu of
referring to inspection types, the documents used the generic
term "inspection activities;" and (2) pending final
resolution regarding whether the second tier document will be
called a "protocol" or an "annex," the document will remain
officially unnamed. (Begin comment: The U.S. Delegation
continued to speak of the tier 2 "protocol" and the tier 3
"annexes." End comment.)


6. (S) Warner thanked Ilin and provided the Russian
Delegation a U.S.-proposed short draft text (text follows
below) combining U.S. paragraphs 7 and 8 and Russian
paragraph 5, which addressed the composition of the
in-country escort contingent and communications for the
inspecting Party.

Begin text:




At a site for inspection activities, representatives of
the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country
escort. The inspected Party shall ensure that a member of
the in-country escort at the facility is continuously
available to inspectors either in person or by telephone.
((Throughout the period of stay at the point of entry, or at
the inspection site, the inspected Party shall ensure that
the inspectors can be in communication with the embassy of
the inspecting Party located on the territory of the
inspected Party using telephonic communications provided by
the inspected Party. The inspected Party shall also provide
means of communication between inspection team subgroups.
Such means of communication shall be under the control of the
inspected Party))1.

End text.


7. (S) Warner stated that this covered three issues: (1)
representatives of the inspected facility being included
among the in-country escort team; (2) the availability of the
in-country escort to the inspection Party; and, (3) the
availability of communications between the inspection team,
and its embassy on the inspected territory, as well as
between subgroups of the inspection team. Ilin agreed that
the text was logical and that his delegation would review it.

--------------
TRANSFER TIME TO
THE INSPECTION SITE
--------------


8. (S) Warner explained that paragraph ((9))1((6))2 in the
U.S.-proposed JDT (Begin comment: "1" represents a U.S.
proposal and "2" represents a Russian proposal. End
comment.) provided time limits for transporting the
inspecting team from the POE to the inspection site. Warner
noted that the U.S. proposal listed 9 hours and the Russian
proposal 18 hours. He also noted that both sides differed in
describing the time of site designation. Mr. Smith added
background by explaining that the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) Notification Format 116 was provided typically
16 to 24 hours in advance of an inspection Party's arrival at
the POE. The time referenced in paragraph 9 was the time
stated for site declaration in the Format 116. Smith noted
that this time started the clock for transporting the
inspection team to the inspection site. Ilin countered that
the Russian version was easier because it simply stated that
the inspecting Party designated the inspection site after
arriving at the POE. Col Ryzhkov added that the Russian
version provided more flexibility. Warner steered the
discussion back to the 9 versus 18 hours prescribed for
transporting the inspection team to the inspection site.
Ryzhkov stated that Russia's figure of 18 hours was based on
START experience. As an example, the flight from the POE to
Orsk takes 4 hours, and then 4 more hours were needed to
transport the team to the inspection site. Ryzhkov gave
other examples and argued that inspectors such as Mr. Rust
and Smith would agree with his point. Warner replied that
the U.S. 9-hour limit was also based on START experience and
in most cases, 9 hours was sufficient. However, he would
consider raising the limit to 12 hours. Ilin said that he
would review this, but, for now, 12 hours was acceptable.




9. (S) On the same paragraph, Ilin stated that he had an
issue with the mobile ICBM concentration time (24 hours).
(Begin comment: This was a carry-over from STAR, which
required mobile ICBMs deployed in the field to return to
their base within 24 hours after an inspection of their base
was declared so that they could be inspected and, therefore,
was the basis for the 24-hour limit for transporting the
inspecting Party to the site for inspections of mobile
launchers of ICBMs. End comment.) Warner replied that he
recognized that the mobile ICBM issue was controversial so
this phrase could be re-written as a separate sentence. It
would basically read: "With respect to inspections at bases
for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall
transport the inspecting team to the inspection site no later
than 24 hours after that time." Warner stated that he would
provide the Russians this proposal in writing.

--------------
SEQUENTIAL INSPECTIONS
--------------


10. (S) Warner turned the discussion to sequential
inspections which were also covered by paragraph 9. He noted
that the Russian side had no interest in sequential
inspections due to the small maximum number of annual
inspections called for in the Russian proposal. Warner
pointed out that the ultimately agreed annual quota for the
two major types of inspections will likely be higher, thereby
making sequential inspections a relevant consideration for
both sides. He offered to highlight this section and return
to it when the agreed annual quotas of inspections were
resolved.


11. (S) Ilin declared that the Russian approach was to unify
the treatment of all types of ICBMs. Therefore, making
special provisions for mobile ICBMs during inspections would
not be consistent with this philosophy. He noted that, since
the transportation window for ICBM inspections varied from 9
to 24 hours, he proposed a middle figure of 18 hours.
Regarding sequential inspections, Ilin agreed with Warner's
analysis but stated that, even if the quotas were increased,
it would still not be sufficient reason for the Russian side
to favor sequential inspections.


12. (S) Warner summarized that the JDT will highlight this
section and that the final quota will inform both sides'
decisions whether sequential inspections will be useful.
Likewise, the sentence addressing mobile ICBMs will also be
bracketed. Warner stated that the U.S. side understood the
Russian desire to treat all ICBMs, both silo-based and
mobile, the same, but that the Russian side should recognize
that this was not the U.S. approach. The treatment of mobile
ICBMs was one of the principal issues that divided the two
delegations and its appearance in this section was just one
example. Warner also noted that the unique features of
mobile ICBMs should not be the dominant factor in determining
inspection time limits for ICBMs in general. Warner
recommended that this issue be set aside for now.

--------------
CONTINUING PARAGRAPH-
BY-PARAGRAPH REVIEW


--------------


13. (S) The detailed paragraph-by-paragraph review of
Section V continued. Decisions were made as follows:


14. (S) Right of inspectors to bring material to the
inspection site (paragraph ((10))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT):
Warner advocated keeping only the first few lines of this
paragraph and placing the rest in the General Rules annex.
He emphasized that the issue was the right of the inspection
team to bring documents and equipment to the inspection site
in accordance with Annex 3, General Rules for Conduct of
Inspection Activities. This right was important and thus
should stay at the protocol level. Ilin noted that the
Russian version of the previous paragraph (((9))1((6))2 of
the U.S.-proposed JDT) stated that the inspected Party must
transport the inspecting Party and equipment to the
inspection site. Therefore, the legal right to have the
equipment at the site was implied. He suggested adding the
word "documents" to this paragraph which would then cover
paragraph 10. Warner stated that the U.S. side would
consider this, but that the rest of the text should go to the
annex.


15. (S) Right of monitors at continuous monitoring
facilities (paragraph ((11))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT):
Warner noted that both parties had agreed to defer addressing
paragraphs on continuous monitoring pending final decision
regarding this issue.


16. (S) List of inspection equipment (paragraph ((12))1 of
the U.S.-proposed JDT): Warner stated that this paragraph
had been considerably shortened and that the remainder should
go in Annex 3. Ilin replied that, upon reading the treaty
text and other sections of this protocol, he noted that
inspectors may need to bring equipment that was not agreed to
in advance. In such cases, the Parties must decide whether
to allow such equipment to be brought to the inspection site
and how it would be used. Therefore, this portion of
paragraph 12 should be retained in the protocol. Ilin had no
objections to deleting sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).


17. (S) Right of inspectors to use equipment and rules for
photography (second paragraph ((12))1 of the U.S.-proposed
JDT): Warner noted that this paragraph addressed the right
of inspectors to use equipment, especially cameras, and
reflected the technology shift from Polaroid to digital
photography. Ilin noted that the Russian version did not
contain this provision, but agreed it should be part of the
protocol. However, only the right to obtain photographs
should be retained here. Specific procedures for obtaining
them should be shifted into the annex. Ilin continued that
this paragraph should outline the right of the Party to
obtain such photographs. For example, each side would be
allowed to keep one hard copy. Warner noted that the opening
sentence is broader than just photography. It conferred to
the inspectors the right to use authorized equipment and then
went on to address cameras in particular. Ilin responded
that this section addressed "inspection activities" which
included exhibitions. Were the rules on photography the same
for them as well? Warner replied that Annex J of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had other provisions for
photographs associated with technical exhibitions. Ryzhkov


agreed that paragraph 12 was acceptable. Ilin added that the
right of each Party to keep one photograph should be retained
in the protocol.


18. (S) Requesting clarification and making linear
measurements (paragraph ((13))1((7))2 of the U.S.-proposed
JDT): Warner stated that the U.S. side had adopted both
parts of paragraph 7 in the Russian version, specifically:
(1) requesting clarification; and (2) viewing and making
linear measurements. They were moved to paragraphs 21 and 13
of the U.S.-proposed JDT,respectively. Warner explained that
moving the linear measurements portion to paragraph 13 was
useful because this paragraph addressed the certification of
such measurements. Warner continued that paragraph 13
addressed two important items: (1) the process of
certification; and (2) the "three percent rule." Ilin asked
if the "three percent rule" was found anywhere else in the
treaty. Warner agreed to have his staff research this.
There was additional discussion concerning whether it was
necessary to include weight as a means of confirming the
identity of an ICBM or SLBM. (Begin comment: The final
sentence of paragraph ((13))1((7))2 referred to weight as
well as other dimensions in the context of the "three percent
rule." End comment.) Ilin acknowledged and agreed that the
certification portion at a minimum should be kept in the
protocol.


19. (S) Items of Inspection (IOIs) (paragraph ((14))1 of
the U.S.-proposed JDT): Warner stated that the U.S. side
believed that establishing IOIs were fundamental to
inspections and therefore very important; he noted that the
Russian version omitted them. Was this intentional? Ilin
replied that they could not discuss IOIs because there had
been no agreement on the names of inspection activities.
After further prompting, Ilin stated that IOIs could be
addressed at the first or second levels but with less detail.


20. (S) Items of continuous monitoring (paragraph ((15))1 of
the U.S.-proposed JDT): As above, both sides had agreed to
defer addressing continuous monitoring pending final decision
on this issue.


21. (S) Items "large enough to contain" IOIs (paragraph
((16))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT) and reference cylinders
(paragraph ((17))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT): Warner stated
that paragraph 16 addressed inspector access to structures,
containers, covered objects, etc., and paragraph 17 addressed
reference cylinders. He noted that reference cylinders had
been used throughout the START regime. Warner recognized
that the two sides had not yet reached agreement on naming
the inspections discussed in paragraph 17(a) (data update,
formerly declared facility) and 17(c) (nuclear warhead) but
hoped to obtain agreement later this week. Ilin replied that
paragraph 16 should go to the annex, but paragraph 17 could
stay in the protocol with the exception of the portion
pertaining to mobile ICBMs. He also disagreed with
sub-paragraph 17(b),which discussed nuclear armaments
weapons storage areas. Ilin concluded that the first
sentence in paragraph 17 (discussing reference cylinders) was
acceptable, in principle, and diameters and lengths could be
decided later. Warner agreed and requested that Ilin examine
sub-paragraphs 17(a),(i) through (iii),noting that these
subsections treated mobile ICBMs as a separate case.




22. (S) Reference cylinders for items of continuous
monitoring (paragraph ((18))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT) and
size criteria (paragraph ((19))1 of the U.S.-proposed JDT):
As above, both sides had agreed to defer addressing
continuous monitoring-related material pending final decision
on this issue.


23. (S) For inspectors unable to perform duties through no
fault of the inspected Party (paragraph ((20))1 of the
U.S.-proposed JDT): Both sides agreed to delete this
paragraph as it was deemed unnecessary.

--------------
CLARIFICATIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
--------------


24. (S) Paragraph ((21))1((7))2 of the U.S.-proposed JDT
addressed requests for clarifications and the process for
documenting ambiguities. Warner read the first line and
noted that it was taken from paragraph 7 of the Russian
proposal. He stated that the U.S. proposal added "such
requests (for clarification) shall be made promptly" and
stressed the importance of "promptly." Ilin preferred that
the phrase just allow for inspectors to request clarification
and leave it at that. Warner agreed.


25. (S) Moving on to ambiguities, Warner said the U.S. side
considered this a serious issue and, therefore, necessary for
inclusion in the protocol. The procedures to address an
ambiguity that might arise during an inspection applied to
all types of inspections and were essentially the core of the
inspection process. It was in the interest of both sides to
ensure that ambiguities were properly documented with
appropriate photographs. Ilin queried, that since both sides
had already decided that photography was permissible, why did
it need to be readdressed here? Ilin wondered if the
verbiage on photography vis-a-vis ambiguities was related to
the treaty ratification process. Warner replied that
photographs were addressed in other sections but in the
context of record keeping, whereas this section addressed
their use in the narrow scope of ambiguity documentation for
future resolution. Ilin stated that this issue was already
covered in "Inspection Reports" of Section 10 of the Russian
version and 16 in the U.S. version. Warner replied that the
U.S. Delegation would review these sections and emphasized
that it was not the resolution of ambiguities but the process
by which they are documented.

--------------
WRAP UP
--------------


26. (S) Warner concluded the meeting and stated that the
next meeting of the IPWG would finish the last part of this
section (Section V) and continue on with Section VI
(Inspections of Deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and the Nuclear
Warheads on Them). As a lead-in to the next session, Warner
declared that it was important to consider how inspections
(e.g., nuclear warhead inspections on ICBMs and SLBMs) are
grouped and that,,as both sides examine such inspections,
delivery vehicles and launchers must also be considered.



27. (U) Documents exchanged.

-.U.S.:

-- Draft language for IP, Section V, U.S. paragraphs 7, 8
and Russian paragraph 5 combined.

- Russia:

-- Draft language for IP Sections I and II.


28. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. Coussa
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Johnson
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Dr. Tarrasch
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Col Izrazov
Ms. Melikbekian
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontosov
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


29. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS