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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 30,
2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-042.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 30, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the October 30 Inspection Protocol Working Group
(IPWG) meeting, Dr. Warner led a review of the first seven
paragraphs of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of Section
VI of the Inspection Protocol (IP): "Inspections of Deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs and the Nuclear Warheads on Them," dated
October 27, 2009. Warner introduced the possibility of
combining nuclear warhead inspections with data update
inspections for deployed strategic offensive arms (SOA). The
Russian Delegation was receptive, but noncommittal, to the
idea. Both sides agreed that further study was needed. The
Russian Delegation maintained its objection to the term
"nuclear warhead" in the name and purpose of inspections.
The two sides also disagreed on the total number of
inspections and the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs that would be
inspected.


4. (U) Subject summary: Inspection Types; Paragraph One -
Purpose; Paragraph Two - Rights; Paragraph Three - Number of
Missiles; Paragraph Four - Pre-Inspection Restrictions;
Paragraph Five - Duration of PIMRs; Paragraph Six - Arrival
at Inspection Site; and, Paragraph Seven - Completion of
Pre-Inspection.

--------------
INSPECTION TYPES
--------------


5. (S) Warner opened the review of the U.S.-proposed Joint
Draft Text of Section VI of the IP, "Inspections of Deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs and the Nuclear Warheads on Them," dated
October 27, 2009, with a short discussion of what he called
the substance of inspection types, explaining that the
Parties were contemplating different constructions of
inspection activities. Warner said that, for convenience, he
would call one set of inspections under this new construct
simply as Type 1 inspections. These would be inspections of
deployed SOAs and the nuclear warheads on them. Warner
explained that this section of the IP was devoted to ICBMs
and SLBMs, but not to heavy bombers. There was a sufficient
difference in the character of those inspections to divide
Type 1 inspections into two parts. Technically, all Type 1
inspection procedures could be combined into one section of
the IP, but it would be a very large section that would have
to be sub-divided in any case. Therefore, it was reasonable
to have separate sections for strategic ballistic missiles
and for heavy bombers. In this section there would be no
inspection activity or information provided on non-deployed
elements, this type of inspection focused on deployed
elements and counting warheads on ballistic missiles.



6. (S) Col Ilin responded that, in principle, he agreed with
Warner's statement. The inspection activities regarding
strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers could be in
different portions of the text. He added that the Russian
Federation would likely accept the U.S.-proposed title for
Section VI of the IP except for the term "Nuclear Warhead."
The Russian side had not yet agreed to use that term and
that, until it did, the term "nuclear" must be bracketed. He
suggested that we simply delete the term and have an agreed
text, taking into account the recent U.S. package proposal.
Warner commented that the Russian side had not yet accepted
the package and, therefore, the term "nuclear" had to remain
in U.S. brackets. Warner asked Ilin to confirm that he
agreed to have separate sections of the IP on missiles and
bombers. Ilin confirmed agreement on that point but stressed
that all ICBMs, both silo-based and mobile, should be treated
the same. Warner pointed out that there were times when one
must distinguish the inspection activities for mobile
launchers of ICBMs from silo launchers of ICBMs. Ilin agreed
that there would have to be some differences, but noted that
at this point they were discussing only the title of this
section.

--------------
PARAGRAPH ONE - PURPOSE
--------------


7. (S) Warner explained that the United States had reversed
the order of paragraphs one and two from the Russian text so
that the section first established the right to conduct the
inspection and then described the nature of the inspection.
Warner said that, in light of Russia's position, the United
States would continue to bracket "nuclear" in the phrase
"nuclear warhead." He then explained that the United States
had added a sentence at the end of the paragraph that stated
the specific purpose of this section. Ilin said that he had
some flexibility on the order of the first two paragraphs
but, since Article XI of the treaty already specified the
purpose of the inspection activity, there was no need to
repeat it in the IP. Warner replied that, while Article XI
described the purpose of inspections in broad terms, the
individual sections of the IP would need to describe the
specific purpose of each type of inspection. In this case,
Section VI is a sub-category of Type 1 inspections. Warner
added that the United States was exploring the concept of
combining Type 1 inspections with the provisions of data
update inspections that apply to deployed SOA and that such a
combination would have to have its purpose described in the
first paragraph of this section of the IP. He added that the
U.S.-proposed heavy bomber inspections were already similar
in character to a combined inspection. If the sides agreed
to combine the nuclear warhead and data update types of
inspections at operational bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy
bombers, then Section VI would certainly need to be more
explicit regarding its purpose.


8. (S) Ilin said that he understood Warner's point and that
"nuclear warhead" would have to remain bracketed. For the
moment, he would agree to keep the purpose of the inspection
in paragraph one, but he failed to see how it would be
different from the text in Article XI of the treaty. In his
opinion, the purpose of the inspection should be in the
treaty text, but if there were differences that need to be


further described within certain types of inspection
activities, those differences could be identified in the IP.
Nevertheless, the overall purpose should not be simply
repeated in the IP. Warner said that we would keep the
purpose of the section bracketed and, as the sides proceeded
with the review of Section VI, would have to recognize that
changes will be needed if the sides agree to combine the
types of inspections.

--------------
PARAGRAPH TWO - RIGHTS
--------------


9. (S) Warner noted that the two sides agreed to a
substantial portion of the text in paragraph two. After
noting the continued bracketing of the term "nuclear
warhead," he said that the United States believed it was
necessary to specify the number of days after the treaty
enters into force (EIF) before the inspection rights
applicable for each section. Warner said that the Russian
proposal for a simpler formulation in the treaty text would
not account for differences in the types of inspections. For
instance, while both sides have already exhibited long-range
nuclear armed air-launched cruise missiles under START, they
have not done so for gravity bombs. If the sides agree to
inspect heavy bomber nuclear armaments under the START
Follow-on Treaty, then the United States would need to
exhibit gravity bombs associated with the B-2A bomber so that
Russian inspectors would know what to look for to confirm the
number of nuclear bombs for that heavy bomber. Warner stated
that a single statement for when inspection activities would
begin would not work. Ilin asked whether Warner intended for
each section of the IP to have its own reference to the
number of days after EIF for inspection activity to occur.
Warner responded in the affirmative, adding that the Parties
will have to agree on the appropriate number of days. For
example, the U.S. Delegation believed that the number of days
should be 45 days for certain inspections, while the
Russian-proposed text on this matter in Article XI is left
blank.


10. (S) Ilin asked whether the United States proposed to use
45 days as the period prior to the commencement of
inspections for all inspections or for just this one type.
Warner responded that 45 days would be appropriate for all
inspections as long as the heavy bomber armament exhibitions
occurred during that 45-day period. Ilin said that it was
apparent that U.S. clarifications were more developed than
Russian instructions, and he suggested, as a preliminary
thought, that the number of days be retained in the treaty
text but that he understood the U.S. position. Ilin added
that the Russian Delegation would take for homework the first
portion of paragraph two, but for now, it would remain in
brackets, including the number of inspections at each
facility. Warner agreed that the number of inspections would
remain bracketed. Ilin asked Warner to clarify that this
paragraph was only addressing deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and
that another would be for their warheads. Warner said this
type of inspection applied to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs as
well as their warheads, but if we agreed to combine this type
of inspection with the data update inspection, then it would
still be a Type 1 inspection. There would still be Type 2
inspections, but not at deployed bases. Type 2 inspections


would take place at storage facilities, etc. (Begin comment:
Under the combined approach, "Type 1" inspections would
include nuclear warhead inspections plus data update-like
provisions for deployed items of inspection. Type 1
inspections would only be conducted at ICBM bases, submarine
bases, and airbases. Type 2 inspections would only be
conducted at facilities containing non-deployed items. End
comment.) Ilin replied that, for now, this paragraph would
have to stay bracketed.

--------------
PARAGRAPH THREE -
NUMBER OF MISSILES
--------------


11. (S) Warner highlighted the difference in the U.S. and
Russian views on the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and
the missiles they contain that would be inspected during each
inspection in Section VI. For the United States, the number
is two; for the Russian Federation the number is one. This
is a significant difference in the two sides' positions that
must be resolved in the coming days. Warner noted that both
sides agreed to the provision for inspections of empty ICBM
or SLBM launchers. Ilin said that the provision for empty
silo launchers should be specified in a reference to which
Warner responded that it would be better to make this
provision more explicit. Ilin said that he preferred a
reference. Warner agreed to consider ways to simplify the
text and asked Ilin to confirm Russia's position on the
number of ICBM or SLBM launcher-missile combinations to be
inspected during a single nuclear warhead inspection. Ilin
said that the Russian position was clear. Russia desired to
reduce the inspection mechanism without making verification
less efficient; Russia considered one such RV inspection as
sufficient during an inspection of deployed SOA at an ICBM or
SLBM base. Warner explained that U.S. analysts strongly
argued that conducting two warhead inspections each time
provided a better statistical chance of monitoring each
side's compliance with the aggregate limit on deployed
strategic nuclear warheads. Two as opposed to one RVOSI
during a given inspection provided a better picture of the
overall situation.


12. (S) Ilin, after consultation with Col Novikov, asked how
conducting two RV inspections would impact the duration of
the inspection. Warner responded that there was no doubt
that inspecting two missiles would take more time than one.
Ilin noted that there is a limited time for such inspections.
Warner pointed out that, for these types of inspections, the
time limit is listed as "as needed." For instance, there are
uncertainties associated with moving submarines and getting
to silos and there are additional safety considerations
relating to opening a missile that contains one or more
nuclear weapons. Warner said that he hoped the Russian side
would accept the validity of the U.S. statistical analysis
and agree to two warhead inspections. Ilin said that he was
aware of statistical methods, but the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) Working Group was working on the number
of facilities subject to inspection, nevertheless, he would
challenge his colleagues to do their own math. Warner said
that the U.S. side would try to clarify the later part of the
sentence and that the number of missiles to be inspected
during a single nuclear warhead inspection would remain


bracketed.

--------------
PARAGRAPH FOUR -
PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS
--------------


13. (S) Warner said that the time of site designation stated
in the existing START Format 116 notification provided a
fixed start time for several obligations including the
beginning of pre-inspection movement restrictions (PIMRs).
He also said that the United States believed that the
specific PIMRs listed in sub-paragraphs (a) through (h) could
be moved to Annex 6 of the IP, but that the text of these
provisions would have to be agreed before treaty signing.
Ilin agreed with the proposal to move these PIMRs to the
"third tier" and said that the references in paragraph four
regarding what was "specified in the Notification Protocol"
were not needed and that only the reference to the coastline
and waters diagram needed to be retained. Warner asked Ilin
whether he proposed to delete the reference to the
Notification Protocol. Ilin responded that it was
unnecessary to include this reference in the IP because the
content of the notification was already contained in the
notifications section and that the start time for inspections
was clearly specified in the text. Mr. Rust interjected that
there could be confusion regarding the time an inspection
site is designated. He said that it was common practice for
an inspection team to designate the site 15 minutes to a half
hour before the time indicated in the Format 116
notification. The U.S.-added phrase makes it clear when the
clock would start. Ilin said the phrase would have to remain
bracketed. Warner said that veteran inspectors tell us that
since the time that the inspection site was actually declared
was often different from the time specified in the
notification, it was important to make the official start
time clear, but for now, the brackets would remain.


14. (S) Ilin said that he proposed to move sub-paragraphs
(a),(b),(c),and (g) to tier three; to merge (d) and (e),
so that it referred to all types of ICBMs; and that in (f),
the Russian side prefers the term "basing area" vice "re
stricted area" when discussing mobile ICBMs. Warner said
that term would have to be bracketed, since the two sides
have major differences regarding the elements of a mobile
ICBM base. Ilin replied that PIMRs should apply only to
mobile launchers that were located at the basing area as of
the time of implementation of the pre-inspection procedures.
"Everything that is there, should stay there," he said.
Warner noted that this was constructive and that the U.S.
side would take this under consideration, but asked that Ilin
provide a revised text in writing. On a broader issue,
Warner reminded Ilin that the United States proposed that the
sides agree to specific text on selected tier three annexes
and that, once agreed, we would not return to those annexes
before treaty signing. This was the reason that the United
States wants to finalize the text for the sub-paragraphs
associated with Annex 6 at this time.


15. (S) Ilin said that sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) could be
merged by specifying that PIMRs applied to all missile
launchers and that separate paragraphs for mobile launchers
were not needed. Warner agreed and asked for Russia's


position on sub-paragraph (h). Ilin said that the term "re
stricted area" would have to be bracketed, although it seemed
to Ilin that the position of the two sides was the same on
the substance. Warner then asked Ilin to explain Russia's
position on the term "basing area," adding that the United
States will have to look carefully at how this is handled in
the Definitions Subgroup. If it was essentially the same as
the old "re stricted area" with the same type of site
diagram, then the sides could agree to the new "basing area"
term. He added that a similar situation will apply to
maintenance areas and specially allocated sites used during
reentry vehicle inspections. Warner acknowledged that there
was a known difference in views regarding deployment areas
and that this issue will be settled in the Treaty Text
Working Group. As for the procedure for agreeing to tier
three text, Warner said that the sides should examine
appropriate tier three material at the end of each section.
We should carefully review the material we were sending down
to tier three, in the manner we have just done and that the
U.S. Delegation would develop a joint draft text for Annexes
6, 8, 9 and 10. Ilin asked why paragraph four included a
reference to paragraph 17 of Annex J to the MOU, noting that
if that paragraph was going to be sent to the third tier,
that was acceptable to him. Warner said that the added
phrase clarified the type of diagram being referred to, but
that the United States would review whether it was required.

--------------
PARAGRAPH FIVE -
DURATION OF PIMRS
--------------


16. (S) Warner suggested moving the qualifications on PIMRs
in sub-paragraph 5(a) to the third tier and subparagraph 5(b)
to paragraph 4. Ilin said that he was not against any of the
provisions in subparagraphs 5(a) or 5(b) except for the term
"re stricted area." However, he thought both subparagraphs
could be moved to Annex 6, which would constitute a logical
conclusion with respect to all pre-inspection activities.
Warner noted that both sides essentially agreed on the
substance, but we had to find the right place to put the two
sub-paragraphs. The two chairmen agreed on merging
sub-paragraph 5(b) into the end of paragraph four.

--------------
PARAGRAPH SIX - ARRIVAL
AT INSPECTION SITE
--------------


17. (S) Warner returned to the evolving U.S. concept on
combining nuclear weapons and data update inspections. He
emphasized that arrival at an inspection site is a crucial
stage, because that was when the inspection team was informed
by the in-country escort of deployed SOA for the designated
base. Warner asked for Ilin's view regarding the information
that should be provided to inspectors. Ilin replied that, in
the interests of simplification, the in-country escort should
provide, for ICBM bases, a designation of the location of
each launcher and the type of each launcher, and the number
of warheads contained on each launcher. Ilin could not agree
to the term "re stricted area" on the simplified site diagram
or to the use of a unique identifier on mobile ICBMs, which
he noted "at this point had not been agreed by the Russian


side." Warner said the U.S.-proposed text will include
appropriate brackets and he understood that the Russian
-proposed text did not make a distinction between silo-based
and mobile ICBM bases. Warner added that the U.S. Delegation
was looking to combine sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii).


18. (S) Warner explained that the in-country escort should
provide information on the number of deployed ICBMs and
deployed launchers of ICBMs for each type of ICBM based
there; the number of ICBM launchers in which deployed ICBMs
are contained; and a copy of the simplified site diagram for
each re stricted area within a mobile ICBM base, annotated to
show the location of each of the deployed launchers. In
addition, the in-country escort shall provide the inspection
team leader information, in writing, on the aggregate number
of deployed ICBMs, deployed ICBM launchers, nuclear-armed
reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs, and the specific number
of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM
located on the inspected base. Warner noted that the
U.S.-proposed text was very similar to the Russian-proposed
text except for the term "nuclear-armed" and that if more
than one type of ICBM was specified for that base, such
information shall be provided for each type of ICBM. The
unique identifier for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall also be
specified on the site diagram. Warner added that, with a
couple of exceptions, most of the differences in the U.S. and
Russian texts are stylistic and that the sides should
exchange revised texts. Warner confirmed that the United
States would combine sub-paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) and
that sub-paragraph (b) applied to submarine bases.


19. (S) Regarding submarine bases, Warner said that we
should combine the information from what used to be two
different inspections, both focused on deployed SOA and
warheads, and provide the aggregate number of launchers,
SLBMs, and the aggregate number of deployed nuclear warheads
associated with the base. This would give the big picture of
the overall numbers of SLBM launchers and nuclear warheads
associated with the base. For submarine bases, the U.S.
proposal would call for specifying the number of RVs/warheads
on individual SLBM launch tubes only for those submarines in
port, and those subject to inspection during the specific
inspection. Ilin asked whether an inspection team at a
submarine base would be provided the number of warheads for
each individual launch tube, and the total number on each
submarine. Warner replied that the number of warheads on
each tube would be provided for those submarines in port and
that the total number of deployed RVs/warheads associated
with the base would be provided as an aggregate, including
both the number of warheads on SSBNs at sea and the number on
the SSBNs at the base. The difference would be that for the
submarines in port, the inspection team would also get the
number of warheads on each missile in each launch tube. Ilin
said that this would be similar to the information provided
on mobile launchers of ICBMs at a mobile ICBM base. Warner
said that was another issue, but that he took note of his
point.


20. (S) Returning to ICBMs, Ilin asked whether the
procedures for silo launchers and mobile launchers could be
combined into a single section. Warner replied that, in most
cases, he favored combining sections on silo and mobile
ICBMs, but there are cases where mobile ICBMs present their


own challenges and require separate treatment. Warner said
that both sides should provide revisions of this section.

--------------
PARAGRAPH SEVEN - COMPLETION
OF PRE-INSPECTION
--------------


21. (S) Ilin said that the Russian side agreed with the U.S.
text for paragraph seven, except for the number of launchers
to be inspected during each inspection. Warner noted that
there was a small grammatical change needed to the
U.S.-proposed text and suggested continuing their review with
paragraph eight at the next meeting of the IPWG. Warner
asked Ilin to think through the utility of combining warhead
and data update inspections for deployed SOA and the impact
such a combination could have on the number of inspections
needed each year. Ilin responded that he would spend his
time in Moscow developing a response to the package proposal
delivered recently in Moscow by National Security Advisor
Jones.


22. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


23. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Dr. Fraley
Maj Johnson
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Dr. Tarrasch
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Melikbekian
Col Novikov
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Zharkih
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


24. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS