START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) CORE WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-039.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:20 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The fifth Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working
Group meeting, chaired by Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov,
focused on the discussion of "Other Procedures for Removal
from Accountability," and "General Provisions" in the draft
CorE Protocol. The Russians stated that, since a facility
encompassed fixed structures, it was not necessary to specify
procedures to eliminate fixed structures on a facility being
eliminated. Fixed structures would be eliminated as part of
the procedures for elimination of facilities. All of the
remaining subsection on "Other Procedures for Removal from
Accountability" was agreed and brackets removed.


4. (S) In discussing each side's draft "General Procedures,"
the Russian chair emphasized the importance of two paragraphs
in the Russian-proposed text. The first one dealt with what
the result of conversion must be, and the other dealt with
CorE procedures developed by a Party that were other than
those listed in the CorE Section. They stated that the two
paragraphs could not be considered separately and it was
important to the Russian side that both be included in the
section on General Provisions.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Section VI: Other Procedures for
Removal from Accountability; Original Purpose; Section VI
Text Agreed; Section I: General Provisions; Location Chosen
by the Party; and, A Russian Point of Emphasis.

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SECTION VI: OTHER PROCEDURES
FOR REMOVAL FROM ACCOUNTABILITY
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6. (S) Elliott began the meeting by addressing Subsection
VI, "Other Procedures for Removal from Accountability." The
United States proposed a general paragraph specifying that an
item ceased to be subject to the limitations provided for in
the treaty after completion of the procedures listed in the
subsection. The Russian-proposed text did not have a
comparable paragraph. Ryzhkov agreed with the need for this
paragraph; however, he suggested that the list of items to
which these provisions could apply be amended to include
ICBMs for silo launchers, and SLBMs. (Begin comment: These
two items were unintentionally omitted in the U.S.-proposed
text. End commente.) He also stated that the procedures of
this subsection would not apply to fixed structures for
mobile launchers of ICBMs. Fixed structures would not be
accidentally lost or disabled beyond repair, since they were
constructed in sections that would be replaced if an accident
inside the structure damaged part of the structure. The
procedures applicable to fixed structures were included in
the last subsection, "Procedures for the Elimination of

Facilities." This was appropriate, since a fixed structure
was located in and linked to a facility and would not be
eliminated separately from the facility.


7. (S) Ryzhkov continued that the term "mobile training
launchers" could also be deleted, since this type of item did
not exist. A mobile launcher was either deployed or
non-deployed, and mobile launchers used for training were
non-deployed launchers that were located at training
facilities. The sides also agreed to remove "launch
canisters" from the list at Ryzhkov's suggestion, since they
are not, in and of themselves, an accountable item. The
formulation agreed was, "ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to the
limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion
of the procedures provided for below, as applicable."

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ORIGINAL PURPOSE
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8. (S) Elliott read, and Ryzhkov agreed on, the wording for
the paragraphs on accidental loss and disablement beyond
repair. Regarding the paragraph on static displays, Elliott
noted that the United States had concern with the
Russian-proposed phrase "for their original purpose" after
the phrase "shall be rendered inoperable," because the phrase
raised the question of what was the original purpose of a
strategic offensive arm (SOA). (Begin comment: The U.S.
Delegation had in mind that the original purpose of U.S.
heavy bombers was dual-use. End comment.) Ryzhkov said that
the Russian formulation was more precise and had the meaning
that the item could not be used as a weapon or as a component
of a weapon. Mr. Smirnov added that the formulation meant
that a launcher could not be used as a launcher--that was its
original purpose.


9. (S) The formulation agreed for the static display
paragraph was "Prior to being placed on static display,
strategic offensive arms ((limited by this treaty))2 shall be
rendered inoperable. Notification thereof shall be provided
in accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section
XXX of this Annex." Ryzhkov said Russia's proposed phrase
"limited by this treaty" would remain in brackets pending a
legal review of whether it was necessary. Elliott and
Ryzhkov agreed to use analogous wording in paragraph 5 on
ground trainers. The formulation agreed was "Prior to being
used as a ground trainer, a heavy bomber shall be rendered
inoperable. Notification thereof shall be provided in
accordance with paragraph XXX of subsection XXX of Section
XXX of this Annex."

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SECTION VI TEXT AGREED
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10. (S) Elliott noted that, although the new U.S.-proposed
paragraph that addressed when an item ceased to be subject to
the limitations of the treaty, the last sentence of the
paragraph on flight tests and static tests was still required
since it addressed the date when the item ceased to be
subject to the treaty. Ryzhkov agreed, adding that START
Format 3 and Format 78 noted these dates and would both be
applicable in this case under the new treaty. Regarding

static testing, Elliott clarified that there were two types
of static testing; testing which included dissection and
testing that included firing, and both needed to be covered.
The formulation agreed for the paragraph was "Prior to a
flight test, static testing, or static firing of an ICBM or
SLBM, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance
with paragraph XXX of subsections XXX and XXX of Section XXX
of this Annex. The ICBM or SLBM shall cease to be subject to
the limitations provided for in the Treaty on the date of the
flight test, static testing, or static firing as specified in
the notification provided in accordance with paragraph XXX of
subsection XXX of Section XXX of this Annex." With this, the
entire subsection was agreed.

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SECTION I: GENERAL PROVISIONS
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11. (S) Elliott and Ryzhkov discussed whether it was
appropriate for the CorE section to have its own chapeau, or
whether the chapeau at the beginning of the overall protocol
or annex would be sufficient. Elliott proposed moving the
phrase "limited by this Treaty" into the chapeau, in some
manner so as not to repeat it in Subsection I on "General
Provisions." Ryzhkov said the phrase needed to be either
included in the chapeau or repeated in each paragraph of
Subsection I; it was better to leave the text bracketed and
leave the decision to the lawyers in the next session.

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LOCATION CHOSEN BY THE PARTY
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12. (S) In reference to the Russian-proposed text in the
paragraph of the subsection on "General Provisions," Elliott
asked whether the location chosen by the Party conducting the
CorE would be a "declared" facility and listed in the
Memorandum of Understanding. Elliott said he understood that
each Party had the right to choose the location, but wanted
clarification that any facility chosen would be declared.
Ryzhkov said the location would have to be declared, since
SOA can only be located at declared facilities as was stated
in Article VII of the new treaty, and he stated that he had
no objection to using the term "declared facility." He noted
that what he was also trying to capture in this paragraph was
a situation in which a missile might be eliminated by
exploding it in a field: in such a case, though, the
location would be declared an elimination facility. Ryzhkov
noted that, since the provisions for verification by national
technical means within paragraph 2 were also in Treaty
Article VII, the text could be deleted. Elliott agreed and
noted that the text of the U.S.-proposed paragraph 3 was also
repeated in Treaty Article VII. Ryzhkov noted that there
could be a situation in which neither national technical
means of verification nor an inspection was possible.
Ryzhkov then gave an example of the loss of a bomber at sea.
In this example, only notification would be practical.

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A RUSSIAN POINT OF EMPHASIS
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13. (S) Ryzhkov asked the U.S. side to look very closely at
the texts in the Russian-proposed paragraphs 3 and 4, on CorE

procedures and associated obligations within the BCC
framework. These texts were important to the Russian side
and had to be considered together. These paragraphs
addressed conversion and elimination, precluding an item's
use for its original purpose, and the "wild card" procedures.
He explained that these paragraphs described how a Party
would provide information about new procedures and would
conduct a demonstration in the BCC framework if the other
Party had concerns. The procedures in the two paragraphs
would allow the United States to save large amounts of money
by permitting conversion of SOA into items that were not SOA.
Elliott said the U.S. side would study the Russian texts of
those paragraphs during the break and be prepared for further
discussion during the next session.


14. (S) Ryzhkov also said that he would work with Smirnov,
during the upcoming break to develop some new ideas
concerning mobile launcher elimination to address some of the
concerns of the United States. He asked the United States to
reconsider CorE procedures for solid-propellant missiles.
Since Russia was helping the United States save money by
converting SOA, the United States should accommodate Russia's
need to economize and not spend excessive amounts of money on
unnecessary measures.


15. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


16. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
LCDR Brons
Mr. Brown
Mr. Dwyer
Lt Col Goodman
Mr. Hanchett
Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Strauss
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Zharkih
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


17. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS