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Created
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09GENEVA977
2009-11-05 16:21:00
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START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000977 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

B. MOSCOW 2600 (SFO-MOS-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000977

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) AD HOC GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0976 (SFO-GVA-VI-037)

B. MOSCOW 2600 (SFO-MOS-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-038.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009

Time: 11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the second Ad Hoc Group meeting chaired by
Secretary of Defense Representative Dr. Warner and Russian
Deputy Head of Delegation Col Ilin, discussion focused on the
application of the two sides' approaches to counting rules
for various scenarios. Col Zaitsev of the Russian side
presented a detailed critique of U.S. counting rules.
Discussion ensued, with the U.S. side explaining the
application of its counting rules logic to varying situations
and the Russian side contending that its approach was simpler
and more appropriate. The discussion focused in particular
on contingencies relating to exhibitions of SSGNs, SSBNs in
overhaul, removal of ICBMs and SLBMs for maintenance or
similar purposes, and the counting rules and procedures for,
and inspections of, the nuclear armaments for heavy bombers.
Mr. Elliott presented the U.S. position on counting rules for
heavy bombers and suggested a new approach to the storage of
deployed and non-deployed nuclear armaments for heavy bombers.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Time is Short and Discussions of the
Package Proposal; SSGNs and Irreversibility; The Russian View
on Counting Rules; Discussion of "considered to contain" and
Non-deployed Status for ICBMs and SLBMs; U.S. Concept for
Treatment of Heavy Bombers; and, Next Time - Mobiles.

--------------
TIME IS SHORT AND DISCUSSIONS

ON THE U.S. PACKAGE PROPOSAL
--------------


5. (S) Warner began the meeting by describing the U.S.
Delegation's recognition of the very difficult challenges the
two Parties face in trying to conclude an agreement by
December 5, 2009. He then briefly touched on the package
proposal laid out in the preceding plenary session (REF A).
The package, he reaffirmed, was composed of specific
provisions on some issues in its first three sections and, in
the fourth section, indications of general direction,
especially with regard to the issue of constraints on mobile
launchers of ICBMs, telemetry and the treaty verification
regime. He pointed out that even if the major issues
addressed in the latest U.S. proposal were resolved, a
massive amount of detailed work remained on developing a text
for the treaty as well as the Tier II protocol and Tier III
supporting documents/annexes.


6. (S) Warner restated the two broad objectives set for the
Ad Hoc Group. The first was to gain improved understanding

of the respective sides' positions and concerns. The second
was to develope "concrete proposed solutions." Dr. Warner
emphasized the need for the group to concentrate also on this
second mission to develop specific proposals for resolving
crucial issues.


7. (S) Ilin agreed with Warner's point regarding the need to
intensify efforts toward completion of the treaty, but said
that the Russian side had not had adequate time to prepare
for this meeting. Regarding the package proposal, the
Russian side had found some of the provisions familiar, but
others were "revelations." Ilin noted that the package
proposal had been presented in two parts, with one part rigid
and the other more flexible. He contended, however, that
both sides needed to be flexible on all issues to allow for
compromise. In light of this, the Russian side would review
the package proposal, compare it with previous proposals, and
search for draft solutions. He emphasized that the search
for such solutions could not take place only in the Ad Hoc
Group, but should also incorporate the working groups,
especially with respect to the Tier II and Tier III documents.


8. (S) Ilin announced that the Russian side would deliver a
presentation on counting rules as a response to Warner's
presentation in Moscow two weeks earlier. The Russian side
had decided to give it in the Ad Hoc Group rather than the
plenary session because some of the information involved was
sensitive.


9. (S) Warner, referring to the package proposal, clarified
that, while the three sections on ceilings,
conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the offense/defense
relationship were precisely drawn, they all represented
movement from initial U.S. positions and reflected the
American side's search for compromise in light of expressed
Russian positions. Even the proposed general direction
components of the package also incorporated the search for
mutually-acceptable positions. That said, Warner underlined
the fact that the three sections were an "interconnected" set
of proposed compromise solutions.

--------------
SSGNS AND IRREVERSIBILITY
--------------


10. (S) Gen Venevtsev asked for clarification regarding the
specific issue of SSGNs. In light of the U.S. proposal to
exhibit each converted SSGN once, what, he asked, was the
suggested U.S. verification regime for ensuring such
submarines are not reconverted to carry and launch
nuclear-armed SLBMs. Warner, noting that he needed to stay
within his guidance, responded that each of the four SSGNs
would be exhibited in order to demonstrate that each had been
converted in such a way that it could not be reconverted back
to a SSBN without "major, extensive" work in a shipyard. The
fuller specifics of this matter would, Warner added, best be
discussed in the Conversion or Elimination Working Group
chaired by Elliott and Col Ryzhkov. Venevtsev countered
that, despite U.S. claims of "irreversibility," he recalled
earlier U.S. statements that, with sufficient money and time,
any launcher could be re-converted. U.S. SSGNs would have to
be in shipyards in any case, therefore, the issue of
reversibility was still topical. Warner, noting that the
Russian point had validity, responded that the United States

did not claim that its conversion process was irreversible,
but only that reconversion would take substantial work that
would have to be done in a shipyard. He also repeated that
review of this matter would best be done in the Conversion or
Elimination Working Group context


11. (S) Ilin stated that the Ad Hoc Group should be able to
address all levels of issues without taboos. Regarding the
package proposal, he stated that the Russian side would need
it in written form in order to study it carefully. Warner
and Ambassador Ries responded that the United States was
working with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to make the document
available as quickly as possible.

--------------
THE RUSSIAN VIEW
ON COUNTING RULES
--------------


12. (S) Ilin then introduced Zaitsev and asked him to
deliver a Russian presentation on counting rules. Zaitsev
began by noting that, though the Russian side was impressed
by the U.S. package proposal, the numbers and inspections
involved would still be controlled by the basic counting
rules. Zaitsev stated that his presentation served as a
response to Warner's "very interesting" presentation
delivered in Moscow earlier in the month (REF B).


13. (S) Zaitsev first addressed the issue of overall
counting rules, noting that the U.S. position was to shift to
a "hybrid" formula in order to develop a more realistic
picture regarding strategic offensive arms (SOA). The
Russian side shared the view that the inclusion of "phantom"
SOAs substantially distorted the overall SOA picture. Yet,
he asked, rhetorically, had the United States managed to
solve properly this serious flaw with its hybrid approach to
counting; he believed not.


14. (S) Zaitsev offered an example. On many occasions, the
United States had emphasized that SSBNs in overhaul would not
be counted in the deployed SOA category. Yet, the draft U.S.
treaty stated that if a deployed SLBM is removed from its
launcher and no other missile is installed, and the SLBM were
located anywhere where non-deployed SLBMs are allowed to be,
then the removed SLBM would still be considered to be
contained in the launcher--in other words, deployed.
Similarly, the SLBM tube would continue to be considered a
deployed launcher. So, under this logic, the SLBM launchers
on an SSBN incapable of performing its functions for a long
period of time would still remain accountable under the
U.S.-proposed treaty. Indeed, Warner had expressed an idea
that had created additional ambiguity when he had stated that
launchers on SSBNs in extended overhaul would be considered
as non-deployed. This raised some questions: What
procedures would be used to count such SSBNs and their
launchers? Would launchers on such SSBNs be "considered to
contain" missiles even if their SLBMs were located far away
at another facility? Would such a picture accurately reflect
the real SOA situation?


15. (S) The Russian position, in contrast, was aimed at a
real count of SOA and verified limitations on them with a
real relationship established between missiles and launchers.
Under the Russian logic, ICBMs and SLBMs would be considered

deployed only when actually installed in a launcher. Here
the Russian side followed the U.S. logic regarding deployed
warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs. Therefore, launchers containing
missiles would be considered deployed launchers, while
launchers not containing missiles would not be considered to
be deployed. Such a counting system would be clear and would
reflect the real combat capabilities of the SOAs of the two
sides at each point in time. Conversely, the U.S. approach
used the "considered to contain" approach, which would mean
that, even if a missile is removed from its launcher, it is
still counted as deployed. Thus, even if a missile is not in
its launcher, not equipped with warheads, and is disassembled
in stages, it would still be considered deployed. From the
Russian point of view, this would not reflect reality.


16. (S) Regarding the U.S. point that the Russian approach
regarding when strategic missiles are deployed as opposed to
non-deployed would necessitate notifications of changes in
the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs deployed, the Russian side did
not see any such technical or organizational problems. If a
missile were to be loaded into a non-deployed launcher, then
a notification would be submitted regarding an increase in
deployed SOA. And, if a deployed missile were to be removed
from its launcher, this would also require a notification.
But, he added, this is not a typical situation. Elliott
interjected; pointing out that this is indeed a common
situation, at least for the U.S. side. Zaitsev noted that
the procedures for these notifications would be provided for
in an annex to the Notifications Protocol.


17. (S) Zaitsev turned to the proposed U.S. limit of 80 for
non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, stating that the
Russian side had not yet heard the rationale for the number
and querying why such a limit should exist only for the
Russian side. It was not clear, he asserted, why no
restrictions were included for non-deployed launchers on the
U.S. side, especially for SLBMs. The Russian position was
that limits on non-deployed launchers should apply equally to
ICBMs and SLBMs, and that each Party should determine what
various types of systems it requires in deployed and
non-deployed status. The Russian side fully agreed with the
U.S. side that each Party should enjoy flexibility regarding
force composition and structure. The limits on deployed and
non-deployed launchers should be equal for both sides, and
the Russian-proposed third limit on launchers protected
against possible future nuclear weapons uploading by a Party.


18. (S) Turning to the heavy bomber issue, Zaitsev stated
the Russian view that if a heavy bomber actually carried
warheads on board then the warheads would be considered
deployed. If it did not, then the warheads would be
non-deployed. The Russian side conceded, he said, that
existing practices would mean that no warheads would be
counted in this category, but he pointed out that the U.S.
side saw no serious difficulties with the situation in which
non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs could be rapidly uploaded with
warheads stored nearby. The logic outlined by Warner, he
argued, produced a distorted portrayal of heavy bomber
capabilities. As a fallback, the Russian side would be
willing to use the START-type rules for heavy bombers and
count each heavy bomber with the maximum number of warheads
with which it was tested. But this would not, of course,
reflect reality. Alternatively, the Russian side could agree
to count each heavy bomber for each side as equipped with one



warhead. This would be a simpler method.


19. (S) Zaitsev then challenged the U.S. position calling
for on-site inspections in the weapons storage areas (WSAs)
associated with heavy bomber air bases. In the Russian view,
this U.S. approach was problematic and could contribute to
mistrust and suspicion. According to the Russian
understanding of the U.S. proposal, the inspected Party would
provide to inspectors the number of warheads stored in each
WSA that could be counted for heavy bombers at a given base.
This would raise more questions, such as: Had all WSAs at
the base been declared? Had all the warheads been shown?
Why were some warheads at the facility counted and others at
the same facility not counted? What criteria would be used
for identifying armaments subject to treaty limitations?
What would serve as the containers for warheads and for
ALCMs?


20. (S) Zaitsev said that the Russian side had been
surprised at Secretary Clinton's recent remark that the
invitation of Russian inspectors to very sensitive sites
would be a unique event. Focusing on this category of
sensitive sites, Zaitsev noted that, when START inspections
first began, Russian inspectors had visited the naval
submarine base at Bangor, WA, where they were granted access
to weapons storage bunkers there because the door size was
such as to render them inspectable. Of course, the U.S. side
then made the doorways smaller and thus was able to block
further inspections. But the point was that the inspections
in the bunkers had actually raised more questions than they
had settled. Why could the inspectors enter some storage
facilities and not others? Was something being hidden? A
similar situation could arise with respect to the WSAs for
heavy bombers. Thus, an illusion of counting warheads could
be created which would not reflect the real situation. The
Russian side was, therefore, asking the U.S. side to provide
a more detailed explanation of its proposed counting and
verification regime for heavy bomber armaments.

--------------
DISCUSSION OF "CONSIDERED
TO CONTAIN" AND NON-DEPLOYED
STATUS FOR ICMS AND SLBMS
--------------


21. (S) After Warner thanked Zaitsev for his presentation,
Ilin noted that, though it had been some time since Warner's
presentation in Moscow, the Russian side had yet to see a
formal paper reflecting changes in the U.S. position. Warner
responded by characterizing Zaitsev's presentation as
focusing on three key issues: the "considered to contain"
approach regarding accountability of ICBMs and SLBMs and its
impact on SSBNs in extended overhaul as well as general
questions regarding the removal of ballistic missiles from
launchers, especially for maintenance; limits on mobile
launchers of ICBMs, especially the limit of 80 on
non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers; counting rules for heavy
bomber armaments and the mode of inspection for WSAs at heavy
bomber bases.


22. (S) Regarding the first issue, Warner explained that the
"considered to contain" rule was designed largely to provide
an effective basis for managing routine maintenance of
ballistic missiles at their bases. Article III, paragraph 3,

subparagraph B of the U.S.-proposed treaty clearly and
consistently provided for this process for ICBMs. Under its
provisions, if an ICBM is removed from a silo or mobile
launcher, not replaced, and kept on the base--usually for
purposes of maintenance--then the launcher would still be
considered to contain/hold a deployed missile. Warner
conceded that the provisions for SLBMs in Article III,
paragraph 3, subparagraph C of the U.S.-proposed treaty did
not, however, track with the treatment of ICBMs in
subparagraph B. The United States now preferred to keep the
treatment of SLBMs the same as for ICBMs, as the U.S.
objective was not to invite complexity during periods of
routine maintenance. It was the U.S. understanding that the
Russian logic sought the same goal.


23. (S) Regarding submarines in extended overhaul, Warner
pointed to Adm Kuznetsov's description in the earlier meeting
in Moscow of a similar process for Russian submarines.
Kuznetsov had agreed that the launchers of submarines
undergoing extended overhaul in a shipyard would be
considered non-deployed. Warner suggested removing
contradictory elements of the Parties' treaty drafts in order
to ensure launchers on such submarines would not be
considered to contain deployed SLBMs and, thus, would be
considered non-deployed SLBM launchers and no deployed
warheads would be attributed to the absent SLBMs.


24. (S) Ryzhkov queried how silo launchers, from which ICBMs
had been removed and transported from the base, would be
treated. Elliott noted that Ryzhkov had touched on a dilemma
not anticipated under START. Elliott stated that the U.S.
intent was to eliminate Peacekeeper and Minuteman III silos,
and that the United States has a long-term desire to use
those missiles as space launch vehicles. In order to achieve
this goal required ensuring these silos would not be counted
as deployed. He emphasized that the Russian side appeared to
share a similar objective. Ryzhkov responded that the
problem could arise under other circumstances not solely
linked to the Peacekeeper issues. Pushed by Warner to
specify such contingencies, Ryzhkov pointed to a scenario in
which a missile had been removed from its silo and base and
moved to a remote plant or facility, leaving no replacement
missile at the base. In the Russian view, such a silo should
become non-deployed, and should be reflected as such in the
Memorandum of Understanding.


25. (S) Warner acknowledged that the Russian side had begun
to establish the logic for a category of non-deployed
launchers for silos that were empty but had not yet been
eliminated. The United States would take this approach into
consideration, he said. Ryzhkov asserted that the Russian
approach was simpler and more understandable, tracking
accurately the lifecycle of a weapon and leaving nothing to
the imagination. Warner agreed that it would be useful to
have a sub-category for missiles removed for maintenance and
stored at a base such that it would not be considered
non-deployed. Perhaps a time limit could be stipulated
before such a missile and its associated launcher would be
considered non-deployed. Warner described a visit to Bangor
during which a submarine was undergoing repair work and
therefore had had its missiles temporarily removed. The
"considered to contain" rule was useful for such situations
in order to prevent the missiles and their associated
launchers from lapsing into non-deployed status. More

generally, the Parties could work through the time and
distance thresholds for such a formulation.


26. (S) Ryzhkov challenged this approach, contending that
the Russian approach reflected the real loadout at a given
time. Missiles removed and under repair are of no importance
at any given moment, he argued and, therefore, should not be
counted as deployed SOA. He urged the United States to
consider the Russian approach and emphasized that its impact
would not actually be significant.


27. (S) Elliott noted differences between U.S. and Russian
maintenance procedures and missile characteristics. The U.S.
practice has been to pull and replace missiles more often
than Russia. Warner's approach sought to minimize the
notification and change-of-status requirements associated
with such changes while acknowledging that longer-term
removal of missiles necessitates a change to non-deployed
status. The U.S. treatment of heavy bombers was an extension
of this logic, he explained.


28. (S) Picking up on this point, Warner turned the
discussion to heavy bombers, suggesting that the Parties
discuss mobile launchers of ICBMs at the next session of the
Group.

--------------
U.S. CONCEPT FOR
TREATMENT OF HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


29. (S) Elliott began his presentation by conceding that the
U.S. position on counting rules for heavy bombers was indeed
not as simple as the Russian position. But, he quipped,
simpler is not always better. The United States regarded its
proposal as better because it took into account the belief
that the unknown is a greater fear than the known.
Therefore, the United States was willing to agree to open its
bomber armament WSAs to show clearly what they contain and
how the United States operates. This proposal was connected
to addressing the very important issue of eventually reducing
the large stockpiles of legacy bomber weapons. Therefore,
the United States believed that the Parties must address not
only deployed, but also non-deployed, warheads. Conversely,
under the Russian proposal, the Parties would be permitted to
retain hundreds of cruise missiles stored on or very near
heavy bomber bases. Although the Russian side was
technically correct that both sides' heavy bombers are not
loaded day-to-day and, thus, heavy bombers should count as
possessing zero deployed nuclear warheads, that approach
ignored the reality that the standard procedure for heavy
bombers required loading them only shortly before takeoff.
He continued that, although a portion of U.S. bombers had
been loaded with nuclear weapons on day-to-day alert for 30
years, that situation was an aberration, not the norm. The
majority of bombers throughout that period were not loaded
with nuclear weapons. The U.S. position was therefore to
separate the large number of non-deployed air-launched
nuclear-armed cruise missiles from heavy bombers and to place
them in a central storage facility that would not provide for
operational readiness. The operational nuclear-armed ALCMs
would be stored in WSAs at the heavy bomber bases.


30. (S) Anticipating the question of why the United States

should even retain such ALCMs in such a posture, Elliott
stated that the Parties are loathe to dismantle such systems
in which they have invested so much. In addition, practical
considerations require retaining a stockpile, including four
cruise missiles for each year's quota of flight tests, as
well as providing contingency for breakage, aging, and
retirement.


31. (S) The broader issues the Parties would have to
address, Elliott said, were that distance equates to time and
time to transparency. The first step would be to declare
where non-deployed ALCMs are located, as the Parties had
already done with regard to non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs that
are stored at declared facilities and are subject to
inspection.


32. (S) Elliott emphasized that this was a conceptual point
and that he had reached the limits of the authorization from
the U.S. Government. But, the point was well worth
considering. He also clarified gravity bombs would be
treated differently from ALCMs because, while cruise missile
warheads can easily be separated from the missiles
themselves, the warheads are an integral part of gravity
bombs. Furthermore, gravity bombs are returned to nuclear
weapons production facilities, to which the United States was
not prepared to provide access.

--------------
NEXT TIME - MOBILES
--------------


33. (S) Elliott noted that the U.S. side had more questions
regarding Zaitsev's discussion of heavy bombers, mostly
relating to the problems of inspections at WSAs. He stated
that the U.S. side would raise these issues at the next
meeting of the Group, noting that there was no doubt that the
heavy bomber counting rules problem was the most challenging
issue not covered by the package proposal. The next session
would also cover limits, constraints, verification, and
activities associated with mobile launchers of ICBMs. The
U.S. side was looking at the minimum requirements necessary
for such SOA.


34. (S) Ilin restated the Russian position that mobile ICBMs
should not be treated as a separate category, but agreed that
the problem should be discussed at the next meeting. He also
proposed that more detailed planning for the agenda should be
done in advance of the next meeting. Warner agreed,
proposing that the group meet early during the next
negotiating session and that it focus on tough issues that
cut across the purview of the various working groups. He
emphasized that the schedule would not permit much time for
philosophical debate and, therefore, the group should focus
on developing practical solutions acceptable to both sides.
Ilin agreed regarding the time pressure and added no
objections to Warner's proposal.


35. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


36. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner

Mr. Elliott
Amb Ries
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Trout
Mr. Colby
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Koshelev
Gen Orlov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Gen Venevtsev
Col Zaitsev
Mr. Gayduk (Int)


37. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS