START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000976

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 29, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0953 (SFO-GVA-VI-030)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-037.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009
Time: 10:00 - 11:00 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) In the absence of the U.S. Head of Delegation (HOD),
Deputy HOD Ries and Russian Deputy HOD Koshelev co-chaired a
plenary meeting at the U.S. Mission on October 29. The main
purpose of the meeting was for the U.S. Delegation to present
to the Russian Delegation points on the package deal that had
been proposed on October 28 by U.S. National Security Advisor
Jones and his party in Moscow. The key aspects of that
proposal were the numerical treaty limits; treatment of
non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs; treatment of abandoned
Peacekeeper and Minuteman III silo launchers, B-52Gs, B-1Bs
converted to non-nuclear use and SSBNs converted to SSGNs;
the offense/defense relationship, and aspects of the
verification regime, including special treatment of mobile
missiles, a ban on encryption, and the number of annual
inspections.


4. (S) Following the presentation, the Russian side asked
for clarification on the concept of a package deal in
addition to several questions regarding the verification
portion of the package. The Russian side agreed to review
the package deal, once a written copy was received, and to
provide a Russian response as was customary in the
negotiation process.


5. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments; U.S. Presentation
on its Proposed Package Solution for Core Issues in the New
START Treaty; Russian Questions for Clarification; and,
Closing Comments.

--------------
OPENING COMMENTS
--------------


6. (S) Ambassador Ries explained that Jones was in Moscow
with senior members of his staff, Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller, and Department of Defense representative Jim
Miller. The program included a working dinner, as well as
meetings with key counterparts the next day.


7. (S) Mr. Koshelev stated that the U.S. and Russian
positions were moving closer, and that the meetings in Moscow
provided good reason for each of the delegations to believe
that the work of the negotiations would be completed in a
timely fashion. He said the Russian side had not received
any information regarding the outcome of the meetings in
Moscow and he hoped that the U.S. Delegation could provide
that to them. Ries stated the U.S. side shared the Russians'
optimism and desire to work hard.

--------------
U.S. PRESENTATION ON ITS PROPOSED
PACKAGE SOLUTION FOR CORE ISSUES
IN THE NEW STAR TREATY
--------------


8. (S) Dr. Warner delivered the same points that had been
provided in Moscow the previous evening by Jones, as follows:

- Regarding the numerical treaty limits:

-- Limit on warheads: 1600

-- Limit on strategic delivery vehicles: 800

-- No additional treaty limit on the total number of
deployed and non-deployed launchers.

-- U.S. delivery vehicles currently counted in START, but
no longer part of the U.S. strategic forces will be excluded
from the limits on strategic delivery vehicles as follows:

--- Abandoned Peacekeeper and MMIII silos and
non-operational B-52Gs will be eliminated during the
seven-year reduction period using the treaty's simplified
procedures.

--- All remaining operational B1-Bs will be rendered
incapable of deploying nuclear armaments using conversion
methods already used for some B1-Bs and will be exhibited to
demonstrate the conversion. B1-B operating bases will be
subject to yearly inspection to confirm they have not been
reconverted. Non-operational B1-Bs will be eliminated during
the seven-year reduction period using the treaty's simplified
procedures.

--- The four SSGNs converted from SSBNs will each be
exhibited one time to demonstrate that the launch tubes have
been converted to render them incapable of launching an SLBM
and that the changes cannot be reversed without major work
done in a shipyard.

- Regarding non-nuclear Armed ICBMs and SLBMs:

-- Non-nuclear warheads deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs will
count toward the treaty warhead limit both for existing types
of ICBMs and SLBMs and for any new type of ICBM or SLBM
deployed during the life of the new START Treaty. Existing
or new types of ICBM or SLBM armed with non-nuclear warheads
will count toward the overall limit on strategic delivery
vehicles.

-- Verification provisions of the treaty will apply equally
to nuclear and non-nuclear deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads.

End points.


9. (S) Ries continued with the U.S. package proposal by
delivering the following points:

- Regarding the offense/defense relationship:

-- The treaty preamble will contain a statement that there
is a relationship between offensive and defensive strategic

arms and that this relationship will become more important as
strategic nuclear arms are reduced.

-- The United States is willing to agree to a joint
statement that contains a commitment not to convert ICBM or
SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and
vice versa during the life of the treaty.

-- The United States is willing to take note of a
unilateral Russian statement noting that Russia undertakes
the obligations in the new treaty based on the existing
levels of missile defenses and reserves the right to withdraw
from the treaty based on a qualitative and quantitative
buildup on the capabilities of strategic missile defenses.

- Regarding the verification regime:

-- In addition to the types of verification measures
already agreed, the treaty will include:

--- The treaty preamble will contain a statement that
there is a relationship between offensive and defensive
strategic arms and that this relationship will become more
important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced.

--- The United States is willing to agree to a joint
statement that contains a commitment not to convert ICBM or
SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and
vice versa during the life of the treaty.

--- The United States is willing to take note of a
unilateral Russian statement noting that Russia undertakes
the obligations in the new treaty based on the existing
levels of missile defenses and reserves the right to withdraw
from the treaty based on a qualitative and quantitative
buildup on the capabilities of strategic missile defenses.

End points.

--------------
RUSSIAN QUESTIONS
FOR CLARIFICATION
--------------


10. (S) Ries concluded, stating that the delivered points
were a package and should be considered in their entirety.
She asked whether the Russian Delegation had any questions.
Koshelev asked whether the package was an introduction to
dialogue or if it was "take it or leave it." Warner
responded that it was a bit of "both." He elaborated by
stating that dialogue on the issues is welcome, but the
interrelated components of the proposal were offered as a
package. Dialogue on those components would certainly be
expected.


11. (S) Gen Orlov interjected that Russia had not yet
"touched" the package in writing. He asked whether the
package should be considered general direction or as a
specific proposal and whether the details on such things as
verification procedures would be similar to
previously-proposed procedures. Warner replied that
ceilings, elimination of "phantoms," treatment of ICBMs and
SLBMs in a non-nuclear configuration, and the offense/defense
relationship were all very detailed. He noted that the


statements in the verification section were broader and that
detailed guidance had not yet been received regarding these
elements. That guidance would come from Gottemoeller and
Washington. He concluded that the package built on previous
U.S. proposals, as well as discussions with the Russian side.
Ries added that verification was an important subject to the
United States and that we understood the Russian message
calling for simpler and less costly procedures. In that
regard, she encouraged the Russian side to seriously consider
Mr. Trout's offer regarding perimeter portal continuous
monitoring (PPCM) provided earlier in the week (REFTEL).


12. (S) Col Ryzhkov questioned the U.S. statement regarding
mobile missile verification procedures. He was troubled
that, just as the United States and Russia were coming closer
to agreement on verification, the United States now proposed
additional elements. Warner replied that the "package" did
not in fact refer to additional requirements -- those
referred to in the package had already been proposed by the
U.S. side. He agreed the verification components of the
package did require additional discussion and negotiation,
but the other parts of the package provided very clear
solutions.


13. (S) Koshelev asked Warner's opinion regarding how this
package would affect the broader negotiations. Warner stated
the answer depended on the acceptability of the package to
the Russian side. He said that the issues covered were
recognized as critical issues, since the first SFO meeting
took place in the spring and. in many cases, proposals were
already presented by both sides. He reiterated that the U.S.
sought to build a package that contained compromises on
numerical limits, non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the
offense/defense relationship. In the case of the
offense-defense relationship, all Russian proposals, although
not in their exact form, were touched upon in the package.
Regarding verification, this package offered general
direction, but the specifics under that general direction
would be developed further by the delegations. He concluded
that acceptance of the package would successfully address
several critical issues, but many more would still have to be
discussed and agreed in order for the delegations to meet the
deadline set by the Presidents.

--------------
CLOSING COMMENTS
--------------


14. (S) Koshelev concluded, saying the Russian Delegation
would review the package as soon as they received it in
written form and that their analysis would be shared with the
United States. He reminded the U.S. side that the nature of
conducting negotiations was such that both sides submit
proposals for consideration. Therefore, the U.S. view on how
to achieve successful talks had been received. The Russian
side would shortly provide its formula for how to overcome
major differences and achieve success.


15. (S) Warner stated that the U.S. Delegation had no
instructions regarding the release of the package document,
but we would seek clearance to provide an English version as
soon as possible. Koshelev asked if the document was
provided to the Russian side in Moscow, and Warner replied he
believed it was. Ries closed stating we would also check for

an official Russian translation. (Begin comment: Papers
containing the points made above were provided to the Russian
Delegation in Geneva on Thursday, October 29, 2009, in both
English and Russian. End comment.)


16. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


17. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fraley
Mr. Johnston
LT Sicks
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artem'yev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Col Novikov
MGen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Zharkih
Mr. Gayduk (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


18. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS