START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 09 GENEVA 000971

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) U.S.-HOSTED RECEPTION, OCTOBER 29, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-023.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 29, 2009
Time: 7:00 - 9:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The U.S. Delegation hosted a reception for the
Russian Delegation at the U.S. Mission in Geneva on October
29, 2009. Two Russian Delegation members from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) indicated they had received
instructions to complete the treaty during the November
session. Several Russians provided insights on the dynamics
within their delegation. Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD)
delegates argued their positions on heavy bomber counting
rules, unique identifiers, the impacts of inspections on
readiness and other mobile missile issues, deployed versus
non-deployed missiles and launchers, and inspection of
warhead storage areas. Votkinsk closure costs and payments
were also raised. Gen Maj Poznihir commented on Russian and
Soviet nuclear doctrines and their continued impact on arms
control. Mr. Leontiev commented on budget cuts and personnel
shifts in the MFA. Admiral Kuznetsov expounded on
Russian-American cooperation, Russia-China relations, and
North Korea. Biographical information on several members of
the Russian Delegation was also obtained.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: START Follow-on: "Git 'er Done";
Dynamics Within the Russian Delegation; Inspection Issues;
Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility Closure; Russian and
Soviet Doctrines and Arms Contrl Today; Changes Underway in
the MFA; The World According to Kuznetsov; and, Biographical
Information.

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START FOLLOW-ON:
"GIT 'ER DONE"
--------------


5. (S) Mr. Ivanov told Mr. Strauss he had planned to marry
in November but was told by his superiors he would likely
have to postpone the marriage, as they were not sure SFO
negotiations would finish on schedule. Ivanov said his
delegation had grown to 40 people, and they were going to
bring in more for the November session. The orders from
above were to "get this done." Ivanov considered his role
here in Geneva as calming down the hardliners on the
delegation. Leontiev told Ms. Purcell that, when the Russian
Delegation returned to Geneva in November, the plan was to
continue through December 4th. Leontiev noted, however, that
the treaty text should be completed in November, to allow
time to prepare it for signature.

--------------
DYMANICS WITHIN THE
RUSSIAN DELEGATION
--------------


GENEVA 00000971 002 OF 009



6. (S) Colonel Pischulov commented to Lt Lobner that he had
been up until 2:00 A.M. the day prior reviewing text for one
of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group
meetings. Pischulov added that many of the Russians had
worked long hours preparing texts and notes for their bosses.
He pointed out that a break would be welcomed by many of his
colleagues. Pischulov also told Lobner he had been on the
General Staff for some time, but was only recently directed
to support the SFO negotiations. He added it was frustrating
that, although he was very familiar with Russian and U.S.
force structures, some of the more senior Russian personnel
in the negotiations were not.


7. (S) Ms. Melikbekian told Mrs. Zdravecky she was nervous
about assuming the responsibility as sole lawyer for the
Russian Delegation because Ms. Kotkova planned to stay in
Moscow during the next round of talks in November.
Melikbekian said she would be in regular mobile phone
communication with Kotkova to ask what she should do about
issues that arise in the negotiations.


8. (S) Mr. Artem'yev talked to Brown about the organization
of the conforming group, recalling that, during the START
negotiations, he had been a working group chair rather than a
member of the conforming group, and had forgotten whether
working group chairs participated in the conforming group
meetings when the conforming group discussed the articles
negotiated by that working group. Brown stated that the
working group chairs did not normally participate because the
conforming group was not empowered to make substantive
changes in the texts, but that issues could be taken back to
the working groups for further discussion, noting that this
had occurred not infrequently during START. Artem'yev asked
how much time would be devoted to conforming. Brown
responded that it took a considerable amount of time after
all the major issues had been resolved in START to finish
conforming and that the two sides should begin to conform
texts as soon as they were available, noting that there was
already some text coming from the Conversion or Elimination
Working Group. Artem'yev recalled that there had been a
number of conforming changes that had been necessary to make
several weeks after signature of the START Treaty--Brown
confirmed that he had been part of that process and that this
was not an experience that he wanted to repeat.

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INSPECTION ISSUES
--------------


9. (S) Pischulov discussed the Russian rationale behind
retaining the START categories of heavy bombers with Lobner.
He explained that, fundamentally, both Parties always seemed
to want more restrictions on systems that the other Party did
not possess. In this manner, he argued, Russia wanted to
stay informed about the various locations and movements of
each type of heavy bomber. He continued that it was similar
to the U.S. concept with respect to mobile ICBM launcher
restrictions and unique bases for them. Pischulov noted
that, to his surprise, the United States had accepted much of
the Russian proposal regarding the structure of the MOU.


10. (S) Mr. Connell asked Col Kamenskiy a question
concerning Russian issues with Treaty Article VIII, and the
differences in legislation concerning release of information

GENEVA 00000971 003 OF 009


that existed at the time of the signature of START versus
those presently in effect. Kamenskiy related that, to the
best of his knowledge, there were no substantive differences.
However, he recognized international treaties trumped
national legislation, and the Russian Federation was not
anxious to involve itself in another situation in which a new
treaty would put them in a position where their internal laws
would be rendered moot.


11. (S) Switching topics, Kamenskiy complained to Connell
about the U.S.-proposed text in paragraph 4 of Article IX
concerning the need for UIDs for ICBMs for mobile launchers
of missiles. Becoming rather animated on the topic, he
appeared intent on driving home the point that it was not
necessary to have a UID to facilitate national technical
means (NTM) of verification. Connell explained that the UID
served as an important nexus between NTM, notifications, and
inspections in tracking a system throughout its lifecycle, to
which Kamenskiy argued that, in that case, the paragraph
should be relocated to another treaty article to allow for
the remaining questions of the NTM article to be resolved.
Alluding to the Russian side's basic position on UIDs,
Kamenskiy questioned the overall need for a UID, and
suggested the concept be dropped from the treaty altogether.


12. (S) Col Zaitsev complained to Purcell that Russia had
tried to simplify START provisions in accordance with
official U.S. statements that this was the goal. Russia had
been very disappointed to find that the United States
proposed a follow-on treaty that carried over START's complex
and burdensome details, but the Russian Delegation had made
extensive compromises to move toward the U.S. approach.


13. (S) Zaitsev vehemently argued Russia's positions on
mobile ICBM forces and counting rules during discussions with
Purcell and Mr. DeNinno. Among the key reasons why the
Russian military decided against extending START was to halt
portal monitoring at Votkinsk, which was not reciprocal, and
to relieve the mobile ICBM forces from the frequent
disruptions to their combat training schedule caused by
inspections and cooperative measures. According to Zaitsev,
inspection activities at mobile ICBM bases were very
detrimental to military training plans.


14. (S) Referring to concerns posed by several Russian
Delegation members that road mobiles had to be taken off
alert during cooperative measures inspections, DeNinno asked
Zaitsev how such inspections affected readiness. Zaitsev
hesitated, but then responded that when a launcher was pulled
out of its fixed structure, its accuracy was degraded and it
took some time to bring the launcher back to readiness.
DeNinno asked whether a missile unit was affected more during
an RVOSI or the much shorter cooperative measures. Zaitsev
replied that technical preparation, such as disconnecting and
reconnecting the mobile launchers, took more time than the
United States thought.


15. (S) According to Zaitsev, if the measures were
reciprocal--he used the example of being applicable to U.S.
SSBN forces--then they would be tolerable. The most unfair
U.S. proposal in the SFO was numerical limits on non-deployed
mobile launchers and mobile ICBMs. Such limits also were
inconsistent with the commitment to give each Party the
flexibility to determine its force structure. Zaitsev

GENEVA 00000971 004 OF 009


challenged the United States to propose numerical limits on
all non-deployed missiles and all non-deployed launchers,
saying Russia could accept any limits that also applied to
the United States.


16. (S) When DeNinno pointed out to Zaitsev and Col Voloskov
that each missile system required its own set of specific
inspection and verification procedures, and that procedures
that work for mobile missiles are not adaptable for SLBM or
even silo ICBM bases, both nodded their heads in agreement
but said nothing. DeNinno then commented that, if Russia
believed inspections at road-mobile facilities were seriously
detrimental to training or readiness, then Russia should
propose workable alternative inspection procedures that would
still allow U.S. inspectors to verify the required data.


17. (S) Zaitsev also argued that the U.S. concept that
launchers would be considered deployed throughout their
lifetime made no sense. Russia had a number of silo
launchers that had not been combat ready for years, and
should not be considered deployed. The silos were awaiting a
new missile type that had not yet been built. Poznihir
interjected with the example of a newly-produced submarine
and argued it should not be considered deployed before it
completed sea trials and had missiles loaded into it.


18. (S) Zaitsev then brought up Russia's proposal for a
single numerical limit on all launchers, both deployed and
non-deployed. He did not understand why the U.S. side had
rejected that useful concept. He claimed the limit could be
made higher if it was too low for the U.S. side. If the
United States wanted to avoid sending an excessive number of
notifications, Zaitsev said Russia could agree that
notifications of a change from deployed to non-deployed and
back again would not be needed when a missile in a launcher
was simply replaced.


19. (S) Zaitsev reacted negatively to DeNinno's questions as
to whether Russia might permit inspections inside its weapons
storage areas. According to Zaitsev, it would be necessary
to shroud everything and not permit inspection of items not
subject to the treaty, so inspections would do nothing to
alleviate suspicions or concerns. Moreover, reentry vehicles
were not actually visible or inspectable, since all were in
containers. Zaitsev saw no value in inspecting warhead
containers. He had been on an inspection at the Silverdale
Weapons Storage Area; there were many weapons bunkers there,
but his team was only allowed inside one of them. Zaitsev
concluded that the only way to count heavy bomber warheads
was to attribute an arbitrary number to each heavy bomber.
The U.S. side could choose whether that number should be one,
two, or three, etc.


20. (S) DeNinno commented to Poznihir and Zaitsev that, if
Russia disagreed with a U.S. proposal, Russia could offer
alternatives rather than merely questioning the U.S. logic.
Poznihir agreed that Russia has expressed disagreement with
many aspects of U.S. proposals just as the United States
disagreed with certain aspects of Russian proposals.
Poznihir said he was ready to answer any questions we had.
When DeNinno asked why Russia did not consider restrictions
on the number of non-deployed missiles in SFO, Poznihir
responded that there was no need for such limitations.
Poznihir pointed out that the United States offered a limit

GENEVA 00000971 005 OF 009


of 800 total SDVs but the United States knew well that Russia
would have less than 500 and asked whether DeNinno thought
that was fair. DeNinno commented that Russia had yet to make
a complete presentation on its implementation concepts.
Poznihir responded that he would be prepared to give a
presentation as soon as the United States requested.


21. (S) Poznihir also discussed the topic of mobile systems
with Mr. Colby, repeating the standard Russian position that
opposed singling out such systems for special treatment. He
challenged Colby to defend the rationale behind the U.S.
position. Colby responded that the United States was not
seeking to impact the survivability of Russian mobile systems
with its proposals but, instead, was seeking to develop a
regime that would provide sufficient confidence regarding
numbers of treaty-limited items; confidence that would, in
turn, undergird and enable the treaty's ceilings and other
provisions.


22. (S) Given this focus on verifying numbers, rather than
on operational characteristics, Colby challenged Poznihir to
propose a satisfactory verification regime for mobile
systems. Poznihir rejected the idea and, instead, said
somewhat jocularly that the Russian side might choose to
propose a 150 launcher limit on SSBNs during the next
session, and asked what the United States would think about
that. Colby responded he was sure Poznihir could anticipate
the reaction to such a proposal. Poznihir provided this same
anecdote in response to a similar question from DeNinno.

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VOTKINSK PORTAL MONITORING
FACILITY CLOSURE
--------------


23. (S) Mr. Smirnov spoke with Mr. Smith regarding payment
for the cost of services requested by the United States
related to the closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring
Facility. In accordance with the cost settlement document
recently signed, normal cost settlement practices would be
followed to pay for such services as packing material,
cranes, and trucks for the transport of materials to the
local dump, for example. Specifically, the local Votkinsk
facility would pay for those services in advance and then
bill the United States after the fact. Smirnov stated that
this would be a problem for the Votkinsk facility because,
when the bill is paid by the United States, the money goes to
the Russian MOD and Votkinsk never gets reimbursed. Smirnov
asked if the Defense Threat Reduction Agency could pay
Votkinsk directly, based upon informal procedures so that no
additional documents would have to be negotiated. Smith
asked what would happen when the monitors asked for services
at Votkinsk that the Russian Government had already agreed to
provide. Smirnov emphasized that the services would be
provided and the work would get done but it would be a
tremendous burden on the Votkinsk facility as there was no
additional money for Votkinsk closure in the budget. Smith
asked Smirnov if he had tried to resolve this issue with the
Russian MOD. Smirnov replied that he had been working on it
for a year and it was impossible to resolve. Smith told
Smirnov that he would convey the situation back to
Washington. Smirnov thanked him for such consideration.


24. ( S) In a separate conversation with Mr. Elliott,

GENEVA 00000971 006 OF 009


Smirnov briefly discussed the U.S. proposal on ICBMs for
mobile launchers and, in doing so, indicated that Russia
would probably agree to notifications related to missile
exits, but would never agree to placing cameras at Votkinsk.
He commented that a camera would be watching all of the time,
unlike a human being that watched only when something was
coming or going.

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RUSSIAN AND SOVIET NUCLEAR
DOCTRINES AND ARMS CONTROL TODAY
--------------


25. (S) Colby spoke at some length with Poznihir about
Russian and Soviet nuclear doctrine, policy, and command and
control. Colby asked for Poznihir's understanding of
Soviet-era doctrine regarding responses to U.S. policy on
limited nuclear strikes in light of recently declassified
interviews with influential Soviet officials (e.g., the
Schlesinger Doctrine). Poznihir responded that Soviet policy
was always to respond strongly to even limited attacks
because of the vulnerability of Soviet command and control
capabilities, and emphasized that this remained Russia's
policy. (Begin comment: It was not clear whether such a
response would necessarily be total, or could take a more
limited form, although it seemed that the latter was
possible. End comment.)


26. (S) Poznihir then directed the discussion toward
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. He argued that
strikes with such weapons would be seriously dangerous
because Russia would be forced, because of the
vulnerabilities of its command and control systems, to assume
that such missiles were directed against it, regardless of
the stated intentions of the United States. Further, because
such weapons were supposed to strike fleeting targets, there
would be a limited time period to make any notification.
These factors would leave only a few minutes for a decision
about response. Colby retorted that, in addition to the
notifications and clear statements of benign intentions the
United States would clearly work to provide and which would
be subject to discussion between the Parties in other
contexts, Poznihir's argument would logically be best
addressed by Russia developing capabilities that would allow
discrimination among different types of missile launches and
which would allow Moscow, regardless of the stated intentions
of the United States, to deliberate judiciously about
appropriate responses. A central point of arms control was,
Colby contended, to encourage stabilizing postures. Further
technical solutions could be the subject of productive
discussion. Colby also pointed out that the logic of
Poznihir's argument that any usage, however limited, of
strategic forces would require a worst-case response would
seem clearly to call into question the new Russian security
doctrine calling for limited strategic strikes. Poznihir did
not take the bait, but seemed to acknowledge the problem.

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CHANGES UNDERWAY IN THE MFA
--------------


27. (S) Leontiev told Zdravecky, Mr. Couch, and Mr. Coussa
that the Russian Administration had mandated a 20 percent cut
across the board in ministry budgets for 2010. Leontiev

GENEVA 00000971 007 OF 009


hoped the SFO talks would not continue into January as there
would be less money for delegation members.


28. (S) Leontiev also commented to Purcell about personnel
changes in the Russian MFA. North American Department
Director Neverov had been named Russian Ambassador to Sweden,
and had already left or would shortly. Neverov's deputy,
Burmistrov, was temporarily acting as Department Director,
but Darchiyev, currently posted at the Russian Embassy in
Washington, would replace Neverov. Burmistrov would then
return to serving as deputy. Yermakov was director of a
strategic affairs office in the Department of Security and
Disarmament Issues (DVBR),that was responsible for START,
INF, missile defense, and military uses of space. Yermakov
was supposed to participate in the SFO negotiations, but was
said to be suffering from health problems (NFI),which kept
him in Moscow. Leontiev noted he himself had been posted to
Washington a few years ago. He had worked on international
issues, while Yermakov had worked on political-military
issues.

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THE WORLD ACCORDING TO KUZNETSOV
--------------


29. (S) Kuznetsov talked to Mr. Brown and Dr. Fraley about
his efforts to increase military cooperation with NATO and in
particular with the United States while serving as senior
Russian military representative to NATO. Kuznetsov said that
when he first raised the idea of military cooperation as an
alternative to continuing military competition and the arms
race with his military superiors in Moscow, they thought that
he was crazy, but it seemed now to Kuznetsov that he had been
proven correct. Kuznetsov said he had even advanced the idea
that Russia let all nuclear arms control agreements with the
United States lapse and then make decisions on nuclear policy
based solely on national interest and capability, much as
France, England, and China do, although this idea had also
been dismissed by his superiors.


30. (S) Kuznetsov observed that the U.S. Navy had
historically been the most reluctant to engage in training
opportunities with the Russian Navy. He could never
understand the U.S. Navy's reluctance, noting that he had not
seen the same reluctance with the other Services in the U.S.
armed forces where there was a history of cooperation and
joint training with Russian forces. He mentioned, in
particular, the opportunity for U.S.-Russian naval
cooperation in the area of counterterrorism in the
Mediterranean, citing NATO Operation Active Endeavor. Brown
remarked that, while his son was serving on a U.S. naval
vessel several years ago, his son's ship had a very positive
interaction with the Russian destroyer Admiral Chabanenko
while in the Mediterranean, including a visit to the Russian
ship, and that this seemed to be a good example of how the
situation was changing in terms of such opportunities for
U.S.-Russian naval cooperation. Kuznetsov agreed, noting
that this was what he had been talking about--such
cooperation was a better alternative to military competition
and would ultimately be in the security interests of Russia.


31. (S) Colby also spoke with Kuznetsov for some time.
Kuznetsov spent the bulk of the conversation expounding on
his views on a variety of issues, ranging from the position

GENEVA 00000971 008 OF 009


of the United States in the world to arms control. Of
particular interest, he stated, in response to Colby's
question about how Russia and Kuznetsov personally perceived
the rise of China, that he had been involved with the Chinese
for some 15 to 20 years, and noted their deliberate, careful
approach. Kuznetsov said that he had also been involved for
some time in the Sino-Russian military-to-military
relationship, and that for many years the Russians had not
been able to determine how the relationship would develop.
However, in recent years, cooperation had taken a more
concrete form, especially in the counterterrorism field.
Kuznetsov said that this relationship could be broadened to
more significant areas of strategic cooperation, but it
seemed from his appraisal that this was unclear and perhaps
unlikely. He also said that, more broadly, Russia did not
think that China posed any serious threat to Russia in the
next 15 to 20 years, but beyond then he could not say. He
also noted that Russian arms sales to China would enmesh the
two countries for upwards of the next 20 years.


32. (S) Kuznetsov also stated that North Korea would be
willing to come to an agreement with the United States if the
United States would engage with Pyongyang bilaterally, but it
was not clear from the discussion whether that would
realistically include a verifiable disarmament deal.
Kuznetsov's bottom line, however, was that North Korea could
be "bought" in some metaphorical sense.

--------------
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
--------------


33. (S) The following biographical information on Russian
Delegation members Col Ilin, Gen Maj Orlov, Poznihir and
Zaitsev was obtained during conversations between these
individuals and Dr. Warner. Ilin said he worked directly for
Mr. Gorbunov in the MOD. Ilin described Gorbunov as the lead
deputy defense minister for policy matters, similar to the
post held by USD/P Flournoy. (Begin comment: Aleksandr
Gorbunov attended the initial SFO negotiating session in
Moscow in May 2009. End Comment.) Orlov, who had earlier
been a Lieutenant General and deputy head of the Air Forces
Main Staff, was demoted as the Russian MOD drastically
reduced its cadre of general officers. Orlov was now the
deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate in the General
Staff. Contrary to recent finished biographical intelligence
reports, Orlov was observed smoking cigarettes at this
reception and on other occasions. Poznihir said he was a
veteran Strategic Rocket Forces officer and headed a
subordinate directorate in the Main Operations Directorate of
the General Staff, falling under Orlov's direction. Colonel
Zaitsev, a graduate of Bauman Technical Institute, had been
working arms control matters in the General Staff since 1989.
He was apparently on the brink of retirement from the
military, but would likely stay in the MOD, or possibly in
the General Staff, as a civilian.


34. (S) Melikbekian, the new Russian legal advisor, told
Purcell this was the first time she had worked on development
of a treaty, although she often read existing treaties. She
was not used to military terminology. Melikbekian told
Zdravecky that she had been working for the MFA as a lawyer
for just a few months. In that time, she had traveled to
Bern, Switzerland, with President Medvedev in September 2009,

GENEVA 00000971 009.2 OF 009


and had just returned from a 10-day business trip to Beijing,
China the week before coming to Geneva for the SFO talks.
Melikbekian worked for Kotkova in the MFA legal department.
This was her first visit to Geneva, but she had not been able
to see the city at all since arriving. She was staying at
the Mission hotel. Melikbekian claimed she had also studied
Arabic and spent six weeks in Syria as part of her language
studies (Begin comment: Presumably a civilian school program.
End Comment.),but had forgotten much of the Arabic she
learned due to lack of use. Melikbekian was apparently not
married. When asked about missing her family during her
travels, she said only that she had not been able to call her
mother. She also mentioned having fielded numerous overly
personal questions in China about her "boyfriends." She
appeared to be approximately 25 to 30 years old.


35. (S) Ivanov told Strauss he was a graduate of Moscow
State Institute of Foreign Relations and had spent the last
nine years in the MFA. He had been stationed in Ottawa and
had traveled to both New York and Washington, DC, during his
tour in Canada. Prior to joining the MFA, Ivanov was in
politics and had worked for Yegor Gaidar. Ivanov said he was
32 years old and was born in Morocco where his father, a
career diplomat, was stationed. Ivanov said he was fluent in
French and English, having learned French while living in
Casablanca and Paris, where his father had been posted for
two tours.


36. (S) Mr. Dwyer spoke with Ms. Zharkih and learned this
was her first time working START Treaty issues and that she
would return to Geneva to participate in the next round of
negotiations scheduled to begin November 9. Zharkih
mentioned she had worked on the newly established
U.S.-Russian Federation Energy and Nonproliferation Working
Group and had met Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chu
and DOE Deputy Secretary Poneman at a recent meeting between
Sergey Kiriyenko (Rosatom Director) and Chu. Zharkih said
she was a graduate of Moscow State Institute of International
Studies. She queried Dwyer as to where and why he learned
Russian and if he had focused on Russian studies or
nonproliferation studies in his graduate program.


37. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS