Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA969
2009-11-05 08:26:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #0969/01 3090826
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 050826Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9958
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5236
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2413
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1421
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6609
S E C R E T GENEVA 000969 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) FOURTH MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS
WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000969

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) FOURTH MEETING OF THE TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS
WORKING GROUP, OCTOBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-033.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The fourth meeting this session of the Treaty Text
and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) was held at the U.S.
Mission on October 27, 2009. The U.S. Delegation walked
through new U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) of treaty
Article VIII (data base requirements),dated October 26,

2009. The working group attempted to remove brackets in the
JDT and reach consensus on agreed language.


4. (S) The sides made progress in resolving differences in
the JDT, despite a Russian complaint about the short time for
study. The most important issue to emerge from the
discussion was the Russian desire not to publicly release any
data exchanged under the aegis of the new treaty. The U.S.
side agreed to provide a revised draft that would clean up
the text and incorporate Russian-proposed reformulations of
text from the paragraphs dealing with use of the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers and public release of memorandum of
understanding data.


5. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: The Russian Delegation Needs More
Time to Study; and, U.S.-Proposed JDT of Article VIII.

--------------
THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION
EEEDS MORE TIME TO STUDY
--------------


6. (S) Mr. Koshelev opened the meeting and noted that the
revised U.S.-proposed JDT, dated October 26, 2009, was
delivered the night before the TTDWG meeting and requested
that the U.S. Delegation provide documents well in advance of

these meetings to allow ample time to prepare.

--------------
U.S.-PROPOSED JDT
OF ARTICLE VIII
--------------


7. (S) Mr. Siemon explained that the revised U.S.-proposed
formulation for the structural aspects of the JDT covered
common ground between the sides and would set precedential
language for the rest of the treaty text. He walked through
Article VIII beginning with the paragraph on the requirement
to maintain a data base on items subject to treaty
limitations and made the following points:

- The differences in Paragraph 1 are structural only and
will be resolved when the structure for the treaty and its
supporting elements are determined.


- We should consider developing a common approach to the
title and structure of the second tier document currently
referred to as the "protocols" in the U.S.-proposed text and
referred to as "sections of the Annex" in the
Russian-proposed text. This would remove a significant
number of brackets throughout the draft text. We plan to
give you a proposal to do that by the end of the week to use
for referring to this difference throughout the treaty text.


8. (S) Siemon moved to the paragraph on the requirement for
each Party to notify of changes in data and made the
following points:

- The United States prefers "its" over "their" in the
Russian Federation's formulation because, in English, it is
better when referring to "each Party."

- The United States proposes its formulation for the
reference to subparagraph 3(a) because it is more concise and
much simpler. This can also be resolved in conforming as
well, so that the approach used throughout the treaty is
consistent.

- The United States, instead of using "required by"
accepts the Russian formulation "provided for in..." This is
consistent with the formulation used in START.

- The last set of brackets reflects the difference in
structure for the treaty, and will be resolved later. This
could be used in second tier documents.


9. (S) Koshelev said there was no difference in the Russian
language and the bracketed text had no impact. He offered
the floor to Ms. Kotkova, who suggested that the brackets in
the first part of the paragraph should be removed. Siemon
agreed that the brackets could be removed and commented that
the change was similar to a conforming issue.


10. (S) Moving on to the paragraph that specifies which data
to notify, Siemon made the following points:

- The United States has adopted the Russian sentence
structure for the first sentence of paragraph 3, which
eliminates the need to refer to "notifications" at the
beginning of each subparagraph.

- We also believe it is necessary to stipulate that the
notifications required under paragraph 3 will be tied to the
requirements specified in the Notifications Protocol, Section
IV to the Annex.

- We noted that we do not have parallel construction and
the United States could accept the addition of bracketed
Russian text to reflect the differing reference positions.
The revised text would read "... in accordance with the
((Notification Protocol))1, keep U.S. brackets and add
Russian Federation brackets ((Sections IV and V of the Annex
to this Treaty))2 regarding:"


11. (S) Regarding paragraph 3, subparagraph (a) on MOU data,
Siemon made the following points:

- This paragraph provides a guide to the location of


notifications in the second tier document.

- It is important to specify at the beginning of the
sentence that the data referred to in subparagraph (a) is the
data associated with the treaty, rather than toward the end
of the sentence as proposed by Russia. It is the same
language, but in different places.

- The next set of brackets reflects the differences in
structure that will be resolved later.

- Regarding the last part of the paragraph, we have no
objection to the concept for only exchanging warhead data
twice each year, but believe that should be described in the
Protocol or Annex, whichever we will call it.


12. (S) Koshelev, after a short break to study the U.S.
proposal for Paragraph 3, sub-paragraph (a),said that the
Russian side could accept the U.S.-proposed language.


13. (S) Siemon continued on with the paragraph on movement
of items and made the following points:

- First, we have a question. What is the Russian
rationale for including "between declared facilities" at the
end of the first sentence? This formulation is different
from the U.S. formulation as well as similar language from
START, and could raise questions as to its meaning. You
don't have to answer now but it will help to remove the
brackets.

- The United States believes that the timeline for
movements should be included in the tier two document instead
of in Article VIII. We also propose including this provision
in Article IV of the treaty with the time limit on "transits."


14. (S) Koshelev had no objection to the U.S.-proposed
formulation. Ryzhkov agreed and commented that the second
part of the paragraph regarding movement of SOAs between
facilities could be moved to Article IV. Koshelev was
pleased to note that there were no brackets remaining in
subparagraph (b).


15. (S) Combining subparagraphs (c) and (d) on ballistic
missile flight tests and telemetry, Siemon made the following
points:

- We both agree that including flight tests as a
category of information for notifications is appropriate, but
we do not agree on what to do about telemetry notifications.
We moved telemetry notifications to a separate bracketed
subparagraph (d) as a U.S. position until the telemetry issue
is resolved.


16. (S) Siemon made the following points about subparagraph
(e) on conversion or elimination:

- The first difference is that we should use the
formulation "provided for in," which is the same text used in
paragraph 2, which the United States has agreed to.

- The United States can accept the Russian formulation
"as well as" instead of the original U.S. proposal of "or,"


and can drop "subject to this treaty" at the end of the
subparagraph.


17. (S) Koshelev responded that the differences were
linguistic and offered to make the text shorter and make it
read "((e))1 ((d))2 conversion or elimination of items
subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or
elimination of facilities...." Siemon noted that the sides
had agreed to subparagraph (e).


18. (S) Regarding subparagraph (f) (cooperative measures
(CM) enhancing NTM),Siemon highlighted that the text was
consistent with the U.S. proposal to retain the use of
cooperative measures in the new treaty. Ryzhkov said that
the Russian Federation had problems with retaining this
concept. He argued that CMs were of little benefit to the
Russian Federation because they did not give an accurate
picture of the location of U.S. heavy bombers. The Russian
Federation did not gain any insight from CMs into the
location of heavy bombers that were not at the base. He
further described the difficulties Russia had with the
requirement to ready the mobile launchers for display during
the CM period. Ryzhkov opined that the United States could
gain the same information from space system surveillance
without the need for CMs, thereby not disrupting the
operations of the affected facilities. He noted that there
would be enough transparency of Russian SOA through the use
of movement notifications and inspections in addition to NTM
surveillance.


19. (S) Siemon noted that subparagraph (f) should stay as
bracketed U.S. text and moved on to subparagraphs (g) and (h)
(new types and new kinds of SOA). He made the point that it
was important to provide notifications concerning any new
kinds of strategic offensive arms, in addition to
notifications for new types. He noted that the text proposed
by the Russian side did not include a provision for
notifications for new kinds and new types of SOA.


20. (S) Koshelev asked Siemon to clarify what the U.S. side
meant by "new kinds and new types." Siemon explained that
new types of SOA would be new ICBMs, SLBMs or heavy bombers.
He said that new kinds would be a new SOA that did not
currently exist, such as a directed energy weapon.


21. (S) Siemon said the "new type, new kind" concepts
existed in START and the United States wanted to approach the
proposed text in a manner that could be agreed upon by both
Parties. Adm Kuznetzov pointed out that there was no
definition for new kinds of SOA in the draft treaty. He
said, if the sides used the term, the definition should be
included in the Terms and Definitions. Siemon said that the
U.S. side would consider the need for a definition of "new
kind."


22. (S) Koshelev admitted that the "new type, new kind"
concepts existed under START, but noted that the Parties
never had new kinds of SOA. He asked a rhetorical question
about whether it was practical to specify the "new kind"
concept into a 10-year document. Koshelev noted that this
language had already been introduced within the BCC article
and that it would be up to the commission to identify what
would be a new kind of SOA. He said that placing such


language into Article VIII would be redundant.


23. (S) Siemon said that the U.S. side would look into
Koshelev's comments and then moved on to subparagraph (i) on
inspections, visits and continuous monitoring. He said that
the subparagraph should begin with "inspections" and the
brackets could be removed. Koshelev clarified that only the
first set of brackets could be removed, not the last two.
Koshelev said Russia intended to keep the brackets around the
phrases "visits, and exhibitions" as well as "and continuous
monitoring activities."


24. (S) Siemon noted that the U.S. side accepted the
Russian-proposed paragraph on providing additional
notifications on a voluntary basis and moved the discussion
to the U.S.-proposed paragraph on using the NRRCs to provide
and receive notifications, and provided the following points:

- The United States can accept the Russian formulation
for the beginning of the first sentence in Paragraph 5;
however, we prefer the U.S. formulation for the remainder of
the sentence.

- The United States does not believe it is necessary to
refer to the agreement that established the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers (NRRCs). The United States proposes this
reference be provided in the tier two document, either the
Annex or Protocol. The U.S. formulation provides for the key
elements of the NRRCs Agreement, including the requirement to
acknowledge receipt within one hour, without bringing in the
Agreement itself, which is not necessary and could be
modified over time, potentially making the reference
outdated. The formulation proposed here is similar to that
used in START.


25. (S) Ryzhkov said that the Russian side agreed that the
NRRC language was redundant since it was already provided in
the NRRC Agreement. He made the point that continuous
satellite communication used by the NRRCs was very expensive
and that internet technologies were cheaper and would meet
the new treaty's communication requirements. He proposed to
delete most of the text in Paragraph 5 and revise it to read
"In order to provide and receive notifications, each Party
shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers ((, which
provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to
provide and receive notifications in accordance with the
Notification Protocol,))1 unless otherwise provided for in
this Treaty ((, and to acknowledge receipt of such
notifications no later than one hour after receipt))1."


26. (S) Mr. Dean questioned the Russian side's
characterization of the Paragraph 5 text being redundant. He
stated the need to have an affirmation of message receipt
within one hour and that the NRRC would be used for this
purpose. Dean noted that if the one-hour requirement were
removed, it would omit an important obligation of the Parties.


27. (S) Koshelev agreed with Dean's point and suggested the
sides should move the text and timing of the notification to
the Notifications Protocol.


28. (S) After a short break to study Ryzhkov's proposed
change to Paragraph 5, Siemon said the U.S. side proposed to


move the notification timing details to tier two and would
respond soon with suggestions to resolve this issue.


29. (S) Siemon noted that the sides were already in
agreement with the inclusion of text regarding the
releasability of data to the public in this Article by making
the following points:

- The United States agrees with Russia on including this
paragraph in the text, but recommends that it be augmented to
include key elements from Annex J on the releasability of
information. This is something that the Chairmen of the MOU
Working Group have discussed moving to the body of the treaty.

- A brief point on the paragraph; we prefer to retain
the basic formulation used in the START Treaty.


30. (S) Siemon noted that the paragraph incorporated new
language and said there was discussion in the MOU Working
Group to move all of Annex J material into other areas of the
treaty, for example, to the Inspection Protocol.


31. (S) Koshelev believed that the sides agreed that
detailed issues should be moved elsewhere in the treaty. He
proposed revised language to read "The Parties shall not
release to the public in any form the data which became known
within the implementation of this Treaty unless otherwise
agreed."


32. (S) Ryzhkov reinforced the point that the requirement
not to release sensitive data was important. He used the
timing of the release of information requirements under the
JCIC as an example of the significance of the issue.


33. (S) The Russian formulation needed further review. He
noted that the United States had many statutes about the
release of certain information to the public and the Senate
would want to know what information could and could not be
released.


34. (S) Ries emphasized that the U.S. side fully understood
the Russian side's point on the importance of protecting
sensitive information, but the United States had an
obligation to release information that was not sensitive.


35. (S) Siemon noted that it was clear that the sides did
not desire to release sensitive information to the public,
but certain things should be released. He said the U.S. side
would study the Russian-proposed language to see if it had an
adequate degree of protection. Ries commented that it would
be helpful if the Russian side would provide its formulation
for clarity. Koshelev offered to do so.


36. (S) Siemon moved to the final paragraph in Article VIII
on releasability of aggregate numbers of nuclear warheads and
made the following points:

- The United States proposes the inclusion of paragraph

7. This language was originally proposed in the
U.S.-proposed Annex J to the MOU, which the MOU Working Group
Chairmen discussed moving into the treaty text.

- This paragraph authorizes release to the public the


six-month updates on the aggregate levels of warheads. The
United States believes this level of information is important
to release to the public to help demonstrate activity
associated with implementing obligations relating to Article
VI of the NPT.


37. (S) Siemon noted that the information proposed by this
paragraph for release to the public twice each year was
already exercised by the United States under the auspices of
the Moscow Treaty. He reminded the Russian side that the
aggregate warhead levels was unclassified by the United
States but remained classified by the Russian Federation. He
said the United States asked the Russian side to consider
release of this information to the public.


38. (S) Koshelev requested clarification on whether the
United States intended to release the information every six
months for just the United States or for both Parties.
Siemon said the U.S. side believed that both Parties should
release the information. Koshelev noted that the phrase "may
be released" did not constitute an obligation and the Russian
Federation maintained the requirement to classify this
information, but did not object to the United States
releasing its own information. Koshelev went on to clarify
that Article VI of the NPT did not have an obligation to
provide the information to the international community.


39. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


40. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Dr. Dreicer
Mr. Dunn
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Vogel
Mrs. Zdravecky
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Adm Kuznetsov
Mr. Melikbekian
Col Novikov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


41. (U) Ries sends.


GRIFFITHS