Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA963
2009-11-04 14:28:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9937
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2397
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6593
S E C R E T GENEVA 000963 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 27, 2009

REF: A. STATE 98566 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-004)

B. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000963

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 27, 2009

REF: A. STATE 98566 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-004)

B. STATE 108618 (SFO-VI GUIDANCE-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-030.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 27, 2009
Time: 10:00 - 11:20 A.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) U.S. Negotiator Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller and
Russian Nnegotiator Ambassador Antonov continued START
Follow-on (SFO) Treaty negotiations during a plenary meeting
on October 27 largely taken up by a U.S. presentation on its
position and proposals regarding mobile missiles and their
launchers (REFS A and B). The U.S. presentation was composed
of three parts, concentrating in turn on: explaining the
rationale behind the U.S. position; delivering a formal
package proposal regarding replacing the perimeter portal
continuous monitoring (PPCM) activity at the Votkinsk mobile
ICBM final assembly plant; and detailing relevant key U.S.
limits and constraints associated with the operational
"lifetime" of mobile ICBMs and their launchers. The Russian
side offered no substantive response, but pledged to consider
the proposal and presentations and to respond at a later date.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Opening Comments; U.S. Presentation
on its Position and Proposals Regarding Mobile ICBMs and
their Launchers; and, Deafening Silence.

--------------
OPENING COMMENTS
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller opened the U.S.-requested plenary
meeting and explained that the U.S. side would deliver its
presentation on mobile ICBMs and their launchers in three
parts. Mr. Siemon would speak first and lay out the

rationale behind U.S. SFO proposals for mobile ICBMs.
Second, Mr. Trout would deliver a formal offer to the Russian
side regarding a new form of continuous monitoring at
Votkinsk. The U.S. side would also hand over a formal paper
containing the details of the proposal. Third, Dr. Warner
would discuss limits and constraints on mobile ICBM systems
during their operational "lifetime."

--------------
U.S. PRESENTATION ON ITS POSITION
AND PROPOSALS REGARDING MOBILE
ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS
--------------


6. (S) Siemon delivered the following points:

- A principal objective of this treaty, which has been
emphasized by both sides, is to ensure stability and
predictability in the strategic relations between the two
Parties.


- The Russian-proposed treaty text of September 16 called for
"strengthening strategic stability" and for "establishing new
relations in the strategic domain, based on mutual trust,
openness, predictability, and cooperation."

- During our sessions here in Geneva, the Russian side
eloquently described the virtues of stabilizing postures in a
Treaty Text Working Group meeting.

- The U.S. focus, and resulting proposals for continuing with
many of START's provisions for mobile ICBMs, stems directly
from this same desire for stability and predictability. The
U.S. side is concerned, as both Parties were during START
negotiations, that the production, deployment, and
elimination of mobile ICBMs cannot be adequately monitored
and the number of mobile ICBMs verified in the absence of
provisions for this purpose. The United States is concerned
about the impact this may have on stability and
predictability over time as we continue to reduce strategic
offensive arms.

- We continue to be concerned regarding the unique potential
mobile ICBMs pose for covert augmentation of strategic forces
using non-deployed assets. Because of the difficulties of
monitoring and verifying numbers of mobile ICBMs in the
absence of sufficient provisions, one of the Parties could,
in a relatively short period of time, deploy a significantly
increased number of mobile missiles that could result in a
sudden change in the strategic relationship.

- Mobile ICBMs, especially modernized and MIRVed mobile
ICBMs, are of particular concern because of their exceptional
effectiveness and survivability.

- These factors, absent verification and transparency
measures necessary to improve predictability, would undermine
fundamental principles of our strategic arms control
relationship, including confidence in the equivalence of our
forces under treaty limitations. In such an event,
uncertainty and perceptions of advantage would be of
significant concern, in turn raising the potential for
instability in strategic relations. The avoidance of such
scenarios has been a central purpose of our arms control
relationship.

- Of course we acknowledge that the Russian side may have no
desire to exercise such a capability, but, as the Russian
side has eloquently expressed in the context of strategic
weapons in a non-nuclear configuration, the two Parties must
pay attention to capabilities rather than intentions.

- The Russian side's non-paper of July 22, 2009, entitled "On
Strategic Missile Systems in a Non-Nuclear Configuration"
states "We have noted repeatedly that when dealing with
military issues, one takes into account, first and foremost,
the Parties' actual potentials rather than their intentions,
which can change over time, inter alia, based on existing
military capabilities."

- The provisions codified in START for mobile launchers and
their associated missiles were created for this reason, both
to reflect U.S. concerns about Soviet developments as well as
Russian concerns regarding the U.S. MX mobile missile

program. These provisions have served to manage our
concerns. This is why we have imported them into our
proposed follow-on treaty.

- The Russian side has also asked why, if mobile missiles
cause such anxiety, other mobile platforms, such as SSBNs,
should not be similarly subject to certain specific
provisions.

- Ballistic missile submarines, while sharing many of the
operational characteristics of mobile ICBMs, including
mobility and survivability, are different in that they do not
readily lead to the creation of a covert force. These
submarines cannot realistically be developed and deployed
without the other Party knowing well in advance, and thus do
not pose the threat of sudden deployment of a significant
number of additional modern and effective launchers.

- I would like to emphasize that the U.S. concern involves
determining the number of mobile ICBM numbers, not
determining the field locations of their launchers. Our
concern is principally driven by the desire to avoid the
possibility of destabilizing shifts in the strategic balance,
not the desire to undermine the survivability of Russian
systems.

End points.


7. (S) Trout delivered the following points relating to the
U.S. offer on a new form of continuous monitoring of the
production of Russian mobile ICBMs and their launchers:

- U.S. concerns and objectives with regard to verification
and transparency for mobile ICBMs notwithstanding, the
Russian side has made it very clear that it is not prepared
to extend the START provision of perimeter portal continuous
monitoring under a new treaty, particularly since there is no
analogous facility in the United States for Russia to monitor
in the same fashion.

- We, therefore, have been giving thought as to what
alternative measures could give the United States an adequate
level of confidence regarding the number of mobile ICBMs
Russia possesses.

- We are prepared to explore, instead of PPCM, a set of less
intrusive measures that would assist our ability to
effectively monitor mobile ICBMs.

- Specifically, we propose, in lieu of PPCM, the following
package of measures:

- Continuation of the Russian practice of permanently
applying a unique identifier to each mobile ICBM and
continuing the START reporting practices for unique
identifiers;

- Pre-notification to the United States at least 60
hours in advance of the exit from the facility of a mobile
ICBM subject to the limitations of the treaty, to include
information about the type and variant of the missile, the
scheduled time of departure of the mobile ICBM, and its
unique identifier number; and

- Installation and operation of a closed circuit TV
camera at the rail exit of the facility that would be
connected via satellite feed to a remote U.S. monitoring
facility to track the entry and exit of railcars from the
final missile assembly facility.

- If the Russian side were to agree to this proposal, the
United States would be prepared, as a gesture of reciprocity,
to provide pre-notification of the exits of missiles or first
stages from a similar United States facility and to install a
closed circuit TV camera there.

- Moreover, in addition to the requirement to exchange unique
identifiers for mobile ICBMs, the United States could agree,
as a matter of reciprocity, to a requirement to exchange
unique identifiers for heavy bombers (which would be the
existing aircraft tail numbers). Specifically, aircraft tail
numbers could be provided as part of the MOU data for each
heavy bomber base, and could be included in the movement
notifications of deployed heavy bombers.

- In making this proposal, the United States has come a long
way in the direction of Russia's position. We trust,
therefore, that you will give serious consideration to our
proposal and our underlying objective, which is to ensure the
United States will be able to verify with confidence the
number of Russian mobile ICBMs, in order to maintain and
sustain confidence and predictability necessary for long-term
strategic stability.

End points.


8. (S) Warner delivered the following points relating to the
U.S. position on limits, constraints and monitoring
approaches during the operational lifetime of deployed and
non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers:

- The United States is reviewing the collection of limits and
other constraints on mobile ICBMs and their launchers, which
are combined with the use of both cooperative measures and
various inspection activities during the period of the
operational lifetime of such missiles, that is, during the
period between the production and eventual elimination of
such mobile ICBMs.

- We have heard and understand Russia's concern that its
mobile ICBMs and their launchers not be objects of excessive
constraint.

- The United States is, however, determined to maintain a
package of treaty limits and constraints that are sufficient
to enable it to have high confidence regarding the total
numbers of Russian mobile ICBMs and their launchers in both
deployed and non-deployed status.

- Many of the provisions we propose for mobile ICBMs and
their launchers are the same as those that apply to
silo-based ICBMs. These include, for example, the fact that
mobile ICBMs and the warheads on them count against the
strategic delivery vehicle and nuclear warhead limits like
all other strategic offensive arms, and the nuclear warhead
inspections for mobile ICBMs are the same as those applied to
other ICBMs and to SLBMs.

- Some of the key provisions we propose be applied to
deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and their launchers
during their operational "lifetime" include:

- Requiring that deployed mobile ICBMs and their
launchers be based only within designated Restricted Areas
(RAs) and that each mobile ICBM base be located in a separate
Deployment Area. This is needed in order to improve the
effectiveness of national technical means and inspections.

- Providing for cooperative measures that require a
Party periodically to display mobile ICBM launchers in the
open in order to enhance the effectiveness of national
technical means in monitoring the size of the mobile ICBM
force.

- Imposing limits of 80 each for non-deployed mobile
ICBMs and non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers.

- Restricting where non-deployed mobile ICBM launchers
may be located as measures aimed at limiting the possibility
of creating a covert mobile ICBM force.

- Developing notifications that provide an insight into
the transits of mobile ICBMs.

- Establishing the right of inspectors to confirm unique
identifiers on mobile ICBMs during data update inspections,
and during eliminations.

- Establishing specific procedures for the conduct of
inspections of deployed and non-deployed mobile ICBMs and
their launchers at mobile ICBM bases.

- With regard to the elimination of mobile ICBMs and mobile
ICBM launchers, Mr. Elliott is working closely with Colonel
Ryzhkov, as I am working with Colonel Ilin, to reach
agreement on a set of procedures and inspection activities
associated with such eliminations.

End points.

--------------
DEAFENING SILENCE
--------------


9. (S) Gottemoeller thanked the presenters and stated that
she looked forward to the Russian side's comments and
questions and passed the floor to Antonov.


10. (S) Antonov said the Russian side would study the formal
proposal closely and would prepare a response to the
presentation. He then solicited questions or comments from
his colleagues. Despite a considerable amount of off-line
conversation among Russian Delegation members during the U.S.
presentation, no Russian participant volunteered to offer any
questions or comments. The chairs thereupon concluded the
meeting.


11. (S) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Non-paper on Transparency Measures for Mobile

ICBMs, dated October 27, 2009.


12. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dean
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Johnston
Mr. McConnell
Mr. Siemon
Dr. Tarrasch
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Dr. Hopkins (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artem'yev
Mr. Avdeev
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Col Ilin
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Ms. Melikbekian
Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
Mr. Novohatskiy
MGen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venetsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Zharkih
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


13. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS