Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA962
2009-11-04 14:03:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0962/01 3081403
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041403Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9935
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5218
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2395
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1402
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6591
S E C R E T GENEVA 000962 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-006, ARTICLE XIV TRANSFERS OF SOA
TO THIRD PARTIES

REF: STATE 97474 (SF0-V GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000962

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-006, ARTICLE XIV TRANSFERS OF SOA
TO THIRD PARTIES

REF: STATE 97474 (SF0-V GUIDANCE-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-051 -- Request for Guidance-006.

--------------
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------


2. (S) The delegation requests Washington's perspective on
the scope of the proposed treaty language in U.S.-proposed
Treaty Article XIV. The U.S. draft provides that the Parties
agree not to transfer strategic offensive arms (SOA) subject
to the treaty limitations to "third States." The Russian
proposal would expand that prohibition by extending the ban
to "third Parties." Background and analysis are in
paragraphs 3-7. Recommendation is in paragraph 8. Guidance
requested is in paragraph 9.

--------------
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
--------------


3. (S) In accordance with the U.S. position detailed in
REFTEL, the U.S. Delegation sought agreement on Article XIV
of the draft START Follow-on Treaty concerning existing
patterns of cooperation and the prohibition on transfers of
SOA. The Russian Delegation proposed modifying the text to
say the Parties agree not to transfer SOA subject to the
limitations of the treaty to third "Parties" vice the
U.S.-proposed word "States." The Russian Delegation argued
that the treaty text should be broadened beyond the language
in START to preclude transfer of SOA not only to another
State but to any other Party, thus also including any
organization or other entity that is not a State. One
Russian team member (Admiral Kuznetsov) explained that the
intention was to preclude transfer of SOA to organizations
such as NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization

(CSTO). The delegation assesses that the current text in the
U.S.-proposed text is adequate, but has examined the
possibility of accepting the Russian proposal.


4. (S) The present U.S.-proposed draft text takes language
directly from Article XIV of the START Treaty proscribing
entry into international obligations or undertakings that
would conflict with the treaty provisions. It adds
additional language taken from the First Agreed Statement
which describes agreement not to transfer SOA. This article
is virtually identical in wording and usage from the START
language. The Russians propose to alter the description of
potential recipients of the prohibition on transfer of SOA
from "third States" to "third Parties."


5. (S) When asked to explain the rationale for their
position, Russian Delegation members said the purpose was to
prevent proliferation of SOA to non-State entities. When
pressed to say what they meant (after some non-serious
discussion of the United Nations or Osama bin Laden),
Kuznetsov discussed U.S. and Russian military cooperation
within military alliances and asserted that, without the
broadened language, it might be possible for the United


States to transfer SOA to NATO or Russia to its partner,
CSTO. Russian Delegation members noted transfer of AWACs
aircraft to NATO command and control as an example of a
transfer of military equipment to a "Party" i.e., NATO. They
want to ensure there are no transfers of SOA to non-State
actors in the future.


6. (S) Delegation believes there might be some advantages to
the United States of broadening the scope of this article, so
long as it does not encumber the United States in a
circumstance such as the United States wanting to use an item
of SOA on behalf of a non-State "Party," e.g., sending a
missile to an international organization for space launch
purposes. Delegation view is that this specific scenario
would probably not involve a "transfer" for purposes of the
treaty, but notes that the term "transfer" is not defined in
the treaty. Delegation also notes that an exhaustive
examination of whether acceptance of the term "Party" would
preclude cooperation that might be desirable for the United
States is beyond the Delegation's competence. Delegation,
therefore, requests that Washington examine this aspect.
Delegation notes further that while the NPT prohibits the
transfer of nuclear weapons or explosive devices to any
recipients, the START transfer ban is, however, a prohibition
focused on the transfer of SOA subject to the limitation of
the treaty. Transfer of missile technology is also addressed
in the context of the MTCR, which does not establish
legally-binding prohibitions on transfer.


7. (S) The Russian delegation has otherwise accepted the
remaining text in Article XIV, and this article can be agreed
once decision is reached as to whether or not to use the word
"State" or "Party." In addition, when asked, the Russian
Delegation has stated they have no existing patterns of
cooperation to declare and would be willing to make a
statement to that effect.

--------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


8. (S) Delegation recommends that we accept the
Russian-proposed term "third parties" as long as there are no
negative consequences to accepting such a term.

--------------
GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------


9. (S) Delegation requests that Washington examine the
advantages and disadvantages of expanding the scope of the
U.S.-proposed Treaty Article XIV by using the term "third
Party" with respect to transfers and provide guidance on
whether or not the United States can accept the change.


10. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS