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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN'S
COFFEE, OCTOBER 26, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-027.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 26, 2009
Time: 11:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

Mr. Elliott Col Ryzhkov
Lt Col Goodman Mr. Smirnov
Dr. Hopkins (Int) Ms. Komshilova (Int)

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The U.S. chairman of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) Working Group (WG) hosted a coffee for his Russian
counterpart on October 26, 2009, at the U.S. Mission, to
discuss the Russian-proposed CorE protocol delivered to the
U.S. side on the afternoon of October 23, 2009. The U.S.
chairman requested clarification on specific issues of the
Russian-proposed text. Relations between the two chairmen
remained very cordial, and they discussed a number of issues
frankly.


4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY Clarification of the
Russian-proposed CorE Protocol; Elimination of SLBM
Launchers; Concept of Conversion, Again; Loading Tubes; and,
Closing

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CLARIFICATION OF THE RUSSIAN-
PROPOSED CORE PROTOCOL
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5. (S) Mr. Elliott began the meeting by informing Colonel
Ryzhkov that U.S. translators had finished their work and the
U.S. side was studying the Russian Federation's proposal for
the CorE protocol that was delivered on Friday, October 23,

2009. He opened the floor to Ryzhkov for his comments.
Ryzhkov stated that the document presented was a working
document and not an official Russian proposal. He continued
saying that the Russian side was still working on moving more
common text into their general procedures section. Ryzhkov
said their intent was to provide a new version that would
change the format and structure of the document but would not
contain substantive changes. Elliott stated that he
understood the draft nature of the Russian proposal and
agreed, in principle, to a general procedures section.
Elliott suggested the U.S. side would investigate moving
repetitive text to the general procedures section. Elliott
then asked for clarification on several areas of the
Russian-proposed text.

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ELIMINATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS
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6. (S) Elliott began with Russian Section III, paragraph 1,
"Elimination of SLBM Launchers." He stated that the U.S.
side believed the removal of the launch tube hatches with no
other procedures was not adequate for verification of
elimination of the SLBM launcher. Given that both sides
would cut up the submarine for scrap, the U.S. view was that
the additional procedures the U.S. proposed were not
excessive. The primary issue for the U.S. side was at what
point the launcher or launchers would be removed from
accountability. Elliott stated that the United States could
probably accept the procedures if all launch tube hatches and
the missile section were removed. (Begin comment: The
missile section is the entire area of the submarine where all
launch tubes are contained (24 launchers) and encompasses the
entire area between the bridge and the tail of the submarine.
End comment.)


7. (S) Elliott stated that Ryzhkov should notice that the
time limits set to complete elimination had been removed in
the U.S. proposal. This provided the relief requested by the
Russians in a previous meeting. Elliott stated that, under
the proposed central limits, the Russians would have plenty
of head room to allow the elimination of the launchers to
occur at their own pace. Elliott closed by stating that the
United States would propose new text in this section that
would contain more procedures than proposed by the Russian
Federation but less than presented previously by the U.S.
side.


8. (S) Ryzhkov began with a brief comment on the general
section. He provided the following example of streamlined
language for the general section. "Conversion or elimination
will take place at a place (location) determined by the Party
conducting the conversion or elimination." He stated that
this sentence was repeated in all sections and should be
moved to the general area. Elliott responded that the U.S.
side preferred the term "declared elimination facilities" to
provide for enhanced verification of the activities. Ryzhkov
responded that is not required because the notification
specifies the location and procedures of CorE. Elliott
responded that generally he agreed, however, he stated the
facility must be declared in advance to make preparations for
verification and, given that the Russian Federation did not
change conversion or elimination facilities very often, this
should not be an issue. Ryzhkov reiterated that, in the
Russian-proposed text, notification of intent to eliminate
was given 30 days in advance and included both the location
of the elimination and the procedures to be used. He stated
that this notification would provide ample time to prepare
for the inspection. Elliott said that the United States
would study the Russian proposal.


9. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia would likely eliminate a
larger number of SLBM launchers than the U.S. side, and
specifying rigorous procedures would be costly. He said that
such procedures would likely not gain support from the
Ministry of Defense and the Duma. He said the U.S.-proposed
procedures were very costly to the Russian Federation
despite U.S. support through the Nunn-Lugar Program and,
therefore, Russia selected a key procedure for SLBM
elimination that would provide unambiguous verification of
the elimination. Ryzhkov stated that it is impossible for a
submarine without hatches to go to sea. Russia considered


including the U.S. proposal of eliminating the gas generator
as well as the launch tube hatches, but rejected that concept
since the removal of the gas generator cannot be verified by
national technical means (NTM) and also added unnecessary
cost to the process. Both sides would have the right to
verify eliminations by inspection. He warned that the
inspection quota would be low though, so each side would have
to analyze which inspections were most important. Ryzhkov
said that Russia could study the addition of other procedures
but that verification by NTM would be very difficult.
Elliott agreed that the intent of the procedures was not to
cost either side a significant amount of money, but that the
procedures must be verifiable. He also said he did not
dispute that the hatches were essential to an operational
submarine, but Russia needs to consider additional procedures
for elimination of the SLBM launchers that were irreversible.


10. (S) Elliott asked, "When you eliminate an SLBM launcher,
are you basically turning the submarine into scrap?" Ryzhkov
responded "Yes." Elliott stated, "Given that truth, when
does the SLBM launcher come out of accountability? Time to
complete?" Ryzhkov responded that the time to complete could
be very long, however, the verification of the hatch removal
and the tubes being empty would be quickly verifiable by NTM
and the other procedures that would be performed on the SLBM
launcher would be a lower priority than the production of new
launchers. Elliott clarified his question, "When does the
SLBM launcher come out of accountability?" Ryzhkov
responded, "Upon completion of the hatch removal or
completion of other procedures, whatever they are. However,
adding other procedures are of great cost and adding them are
unnecessary."

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CONCEPT OF CONVERSION, AGAIN
--------------


11. (S) Elliott questioned the concept of conversion from
one type of strategic offensive arm (SOA) to another type of
SOA (i.e., nuclear to nuclear). He stated the U.S. side did
not see a need for specific procedures in the CorE protocol,
given that the treaty article provided for such a
"conversion." Elliott stated that, during the previous
meeting, Ryzhkov said he was going to discuss this concept
with the Russian interagency. Ryzhkov responded that he had
discussed it at a lower level, but he still needed to discuss
it at higher levels within his interagency. Elliott stated
the U.S. side did not see a need for such a section on
conversion, but could probably accept including it if it were
seen as essential to Russia. Ryzhkov responded that some on
his delegation believed Russia would need to include
provisions and rules in the protocol to do such a conversion.
He said that, given the warhead counting rules under START
Follow-on, there would be no need to provide procedures on
how such a conversion would be accomplished, but including
provisions in the protocol would help clarify changes in type
and the timing involved in the change in type. He also
stated that this section would help Russia from a legal
perspective. Elliott asked for clarification regarding when
the change in type would occur. Ryzhkov responded,
"Following the notification and exhibition, if required by
the new type rules." Ryzhkov then clarified that Russia
needed such a legal provision in the protocol to clear any


ambiguities regarding Russia's ability to conduct such a
conversion. He stated, "if not prohibited, it is allowed"
was not strong enough, they wanted a specific legal provision
allowing this type of conversion.

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LOADING TUBES
--------------


12. (S) For his last point, Elliott noted that
Russian-proposed text included SLBM loading tubes in the
section in the CorE Protocol on launch canisters. He
explained the difference and function between a U.S. loading
tube and a Russian launch canister. Following his
explanation, he asked Ryzhkov what he saw a loading tube to
be, and Ryzhkov responded "support equipment."

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CLOSING
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13. (S) Ryzhkov politely stated he had another meeting and
must cut their meeting short. Elliott outlined the U.S "way
ahead"; the U.S. side would develop a joint draft text and
provide it to the Russian side so they could see how the two
documents were merged. He stated that the U.S. side would
work on the general section and discuss it during the CorE WG
meeting on Tuesday (October 27) afternoon. Elliott also
stated that the U.S. side would work on shortening Treaty
Article VII. Ryzhkov laughed, saying that the Russian Treaty
Article VII was very short, only two paragraphs. Elliott
stated the U.S. version of Treaty Article VII was also short,
only three paragraphs.


14. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


15. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS