START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000957

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-004 - REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ICBMS
AND SLBMS INSPECTED TO DETERMINE THEIR REENRTY VEHICLE
LOADING DURING NUCLEAR WARHEAD INSPECTIONS OR INSPECTIONS
OF SOA AT OPERATIONAL BASES, INCLUDING THE DEPLOYED NUCLEAR
WARHEADS FOR THEM

REF: A. STATE 091093

B. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-049 -- Request for Guidance-004.

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SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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2. (S) The Russian side has strongly resisted the U.S.
proposal to designate two ICBMs or two SLBMs for RV
inspection during each nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) under
START Follow-on (SFO). The delegation believes that offering
to designate only one launcher that contains a deployed
missile during such inspections would facilitate completion
of SFO negotiations by December 5. Background and analysis
are in paragraphs 2-8. Recommendation is in paragraph 10.
Guidance requested is in paragraph 11.

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BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
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3. (U) During inspections under START, inspectors identified
one ICBM or SLBM in a designated launcher for reentry vehicle
(RV) inspection. Additionally, inspectors could designate
for inspection one launcher that did not contain or was not
considered to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM from among
those declared not to contain a missile when the inspection
team arrived at the base.


4. (S) The current U.S.-proposed SFO Inspection Protocol
calls for the designation of two ICBM or SLBM launchers
during nuclear warhead inspections for the purpose of
confirming the number of nuclear-armed reentry vehicles on
the ICBMs or SLBMs in or on those launchers (REF A). The
U.S. proposal provides for inspecting any launcher not
containing an ICBM or SLBM to be counted as one of the two
allowed designated launchers subject to inspections.


5. (S) The designation of two launchers containing a missile
with a missile vice one launcher was based on Intelligence
Community (IC) analysis which concluded that the designation
of two as opposed to one launcher/missile combination during
each NWI would produce a greater degree of confidence
regarding the other side's actual numbers of deployed
warheads across its ICBM and SLBM forces. The random
designation of two launchers/missiles during each inspection
(20 launchers/missiles annually, with 2 launchers/missiles
inspected at each of 10 anticipated inspections in a given
year) would provide better than a 90-percent chance of
detecting at least one missile with an RV load-out different
from what was declared if 10 percent of the deployed
ICBM/SLBM force were actually equipped with a different
payload. The designation of only one launcher/missile during
each inspection (10 launchers/missiles annually) would
require more than 20 percent of the entire ICBM/SLBM force to





be deployed with a larger-than-authorized number of warheads
to have a 90-percent chance or better of detecting at least
one missile with a different load-out than declared.


6. (S) The Russian-proposed SFO Inspection Annex 5 (REF B)
follows a methodology similar to START by allowing the
designation of one launcher containing a missile loaded with
RVs/warheads and one launcher considered empty or loaded with
zero warheads.


7. (S) In a separate RFG, the delegation proposes to combine
what used to be the Data Update Inspection with Nuclear
Warhead Inspections into a new combined inspection (Begin
note: The combined inspection is referred to as a Type 1
inspection. End Note.) that will be conducted at ICBM, SLBM
and heavy bomber bases. This approach would add complexity
as well as time to complete the new Type 1 combined
inspection at an ICBM or SLBM base. The inspection of the
warheads deployed on the missiles in or on two rather than
one launcher during such a combined inspection would greatly
increase the level of effort required and time needed to
conduct a combined inspection to the point where it would be
unacceptable for an operational base to deal with. Moreover,
independent of the idea of creating a combined inspection,
the Russian delegation has made it very clear that it will
strongly resist any requirement to open up two ICBMs or SLBMs
for RV inspection during an NWI.


8. (S) Negotiations with the Russian delegation have reached
an impasse over this issue, and the Russian delegation has
made it clear that it is strongly opposed to conducting an RV
inspection on more than one ICBM or SLBM during an NWI or the
new combined inspection.


9. (S) The delegation believes that there is an opportunity
to break this impasse and move forward, if it is given the
flexibility to offer that only one ICBM or SLBM launcher with
a deployed ICBM or SLBM be designated for RV inspection
during an NWI or the new combined inspection. Such an offer
would be premised on retaining the Russian proposal to allow
as well the designation of one empty launcher for inspection,
if any such launchers exist at the base. In addition, this
concession should be linked to Russian agreement on an
adequate number of such inspections each year. Further, the
offer to inspect the number of RVs deployed on only one ICBM
or SLBM during a combined inspection will facilitate gaining
Russian acceptance of the idea of conducting combined
inspections at operational ICBM and SLBM bases.

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RECOMMENDATION
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10. (S) The delegation recommends Washington grant
authorization to offer designation of one rather than two
launchers that contain deployed ICBMs or SLBMs with warheads
for an NWI provided inspectors are also granted the right to
designate and inspect one ICBM or SLBM launcher that is
empty, without a front section, or which contains zero
warheads on it and that the Russians accept the U.S. position





that at least 10 such inspections are allowed each year.

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GUIDANCE REQUESTED
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11. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the
recommendations contained in paragraph 9. Delegation
requests guidance be provided on this issue no later than
OOB, Geneva time, on Monday, November 9, 2009.


12. (U) Ries sends.
GRIFFITHS