START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000955

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) MOU WORKING GROUP CHAIRS' MEETING, OCTOBER 23, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0923 (SFO-GVA-VI-017)

B. GENEVA 0925 (SFO-GVA-VI-018)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-025.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 23, 2009
Time: 4:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. RUSSIA

Mr. Trout Gen Orlov
LT Lobner Gen Poznihir
TSgt Bennett (Int) Mr. Pischulov
Mr..Voloskov

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) On October 23, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) Working Group chairs met at the U.S.
Mission. Participants were Mr. Trout and LT Lobner on the
U.S. side, and Gen Orlov, Gen Poznihir, and Mr. Pischulov on
the Russian side. At this meeting, Orlov provided Trout a
Russian-proposed joint draft text (JDT) for the MOU. The
sides also discussed, with no movement on either side, U.S.
and Russian approaches to counting warheads associated with
heavy bombers. The sides also discussed warhead data and
whether notification of, and changes in, such data would be
required under the treaty.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: MOU Structure; Warheads and
Notifications; Submarine Nomenclature; Drawings and Heavy
Bombers; and, Let's Do This Again.

--------------
MOU STRUCTURE
--------------


5. (S) Orlov began the meeting explaining that the
Russian-proposed JDT that he was providing today had four
categories of information: proposals by the U.S. side,
proposals by the U.S. side which are unacceptable for the
Russian side, proposals by the U.S. side which the Russian
side concurs and, proposals by the Russian side. He noted
that some issues were still being worked internally within
the Russian Delegation and, consequently, they were not
reflected in this version. Trout asked whether the
Russian-proposed JDT took into account the U.S. proposal that
had been provided to the Russian Delegation the previous day
on the U.S. vision of how the U.S. MOU format would convert
to the Russian MOU format. Orlov said that it did. (Begin
comment: See paragraph 25 for the text of this document. End
comment.)

--------------
WARHEADS AND NOTIFICATIONS
--------------


6. (S) Trout noted that the U.S. proposal of listing warhead
data for each launcher was not shown in the text of the
Russian-proposed JDT. Orlov replied that Russia had
envisioned only providing aggregate warhead numbers for each
base, not warhead numbers for individual launchers. Trout
asked whether providing this level of openness was
unacceptable to Russia. Orlov provided a lengthy
dissertation on the relationship between the MOU data,
notifications, the ability to move missiles from and between
launchers, and individual warhead data. Trout said that, in
the U.S. view, there should be no requirement to provide
notification of the movement of warheads.


7. (S) Poznihir asked Trout to explain the U.S. concept for
notifications for warhead data. Trout explained that the
U.S. concept was that, every six months, each side would
provide a "snapshot" of the number of warheads on deployed
ICBMs and SLBMs at each facility. This concept did not
require individual notifications when warhead data at
specific locations changed. Both Orlov and Poznihir
questioned the point of listing such data, since it would
never be correct at the time of inspection. Trout pointed
out that this was a transparency measure and the U.S. side
realized that the data may be different from the data
reported at the time of an inspection.


8. (S) Poznihir questioned the "inconsistent" U.S. logic in
that an ICBM or SLBM launcher is "considered to contain" a
missile from the time the launcher is created until it is
eliminated. However, this U.S. concept did not apply to
warheads. Trout suggested that this question be taken up in
a different working group.


9. (S) Trout further clarified that this sort of information
would be more advantageous to the Russians than to the United
States since the United States is the only Party that is
changing the warhead loadout. Poznihir smiled and said it
was for that exact reason that they would consider this idea.



10. (S) Orlov asked again about notifications regarding
warheads, asking whether there would be notifications, for
example, if a missile were to break and the warheads would
not be on that missile for some period of time. Trout again
replied that the United States did not envision providing
notifications for warheads. Poznihir countered by claiming
that, logically, if the data changed, a notification should
result. Trout responded that the United States wanted to
ensure that the treaty language requiring notifications for
MOU data would not apply to warhead data.


11. (S) Orlov made the point that inspections were
structured to determine that there were no more missiles and
warheads at the base than declared. However, the warhead
data in the MOU would be different than that presented during
the inspection. Trout acknowledged that there would be some
differences in the data. But the MOU data would be useful in
preparing inspection teams for the inspection. It also was
logical that inspection teams probably would be more
interested in data that changed than data that remained the
same. Trout pointed out that there also was the long-term
perspective. President Obama wanted the United States and
Russia to move to even lower nuclear warhead numbers than
those under negotiation now. The provision of warhead
numbers for each launcher would promote a higher level of

confidence in each Party's understanding of the other Party's
strategic forces. He added that this increased confidence
would be necessary at lower levels of nuclear weapons.


12. (S) Orlov asked whether the United States envisioned
this treaty as the first in a series, to which Trout replied
yes. Orlov joked that, at this rate, the MOU would get very
large with all the U.S. "openness" proposals.


13. (S) Poznihir asked about U.S. intentions with respect to
de-MIRVing ICBMs. Trout responded that the United States was
indeed moving to single warhead ICBMs. During the seven-year
reduction period, inspectors would continue to see
differences, but after that period they would always see
single warhead ICBMs. Orlov again questioned that if the MOU
listed all the same number, what was the point of even
declaring the data in the MOU. Trout explained that the
point of declaring this information was to increase openness
and stability between the Parties.

--------------
SUBMARINE NOMENCLATURE
--------------


14. (S) Pischulov asked whether the United States sought to
provide UIDs for submarine hulls. Lobner replied that no,
that was not the U.S. proposal. The United States envisioned
an alphabetical name would be provided for each SSBN, such as
"Alpha." Poznihir asked the U.S. side to clarify that the
U.S. proposal would list the warheads on each deployed SLBM,
by SSBN, every six months. Lobner confirmed this was the
case.


15. (S) Pischulov then sought clarification between the
listed submarine in the MOU and the name given at the time of
inspection. He asked how inspectors could confirm that hull
Alpha in the MOU was hull Alpha at the submarine base.
Lobner clarified that the U.S. proposal was designed to
increase transparency and stability. He noted that Pischulov
was correct in understanding that there was no mechanism that
could confirm that the submarine listed in the MOU was the
same submarine chosen at the submarine base. Trout added
that Russia would have to trust us that it was the same boat.
He pointed out the warhead loadout would probably stay
fairly consistent and Russia could use the warhead count on
each deployed SLBM to gain confidence that the MOU submarine
with the same alphabetic name as that reported during an
inspection was the same submarine.

--------------
DRAWINGS AND HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


16. (S) Poznihir switched topics to address the empty PK
silos. He asked where the United States intended to declare
this data in the MOU. Trout replied that right now, nowhere.
Poznihir asked about the B-1B, to which Trout responded that
nuclear B-1Bs will be listed in the MOU, but no conventional
B-1Bs would appear in the MOU. Both sides agreed this issue
still had to be resolved.


17. (S) Poznihir turned to the counting of heavy bomber
nuclear armaments, asking whether the U.S. position was to
count the warheads by counting the number of warheads at the

storage location. Trout answered that, yes, the United
States had envisioned going to the warhead storage area to
count, but we were now considering just counting the ALCMs,
and using an attribution type approach so that one ALCM would
equal one warhead. Trout also noted the different practices
of the two Parties as the United States stored ALCMs with
warheads in them while Russia did not have warheads in their
ALCMs.


18. (S) Poznihir questioned what he called "virtual
counting," and began a lengthy explanation using drawings to
illustrate the problems the Russian Federation faced with the
U.S. concept.


19. (S) Trout, throughout the various sketches, reiterated
that the time or distance between the base and the storage
area did not matter. The Party simply had to ask whether the
storage areas supported the heavy bombers at the airbase. If
a Party was to conduct a mission, from where would the
bombers get the nuclear weapons?


20. (S) Both Orlov and Pischulov made their own drawings,
illustrating cases where, or near the base, a storage area
may only have limited, say 50, ALCMs, but that also
relatively nearby, there could be a storage facility that
could have considerably more, say 200, ALCMs. They also made
the point that even though there might be only 100 ALCMs near
the base, there could be 500 ALCMs at a central storage
facility. Therefore, within a couple of weeks the heavy
bomber base could have 600 ALCMs instead of the 100 declared
for the base. They emphasized that Russia could not envision
counting all of these weapons under the warhead limit.


21. (S) Orlov and Pischulov also made numerous cases
regarding the capability of the bomber, similar to the
attribution rules in START. Lobner reiterated that, under
the U.S. concept, the capability of the bomber or, in other
words, how many weapons it could carry was not the important
factor and was not required to be declared in the MOU.
Rather, the number of weapons at the base, regardless of
types of bombers or numbers of bombers located at the
airbase, was what should be declared.


22. (S) Trout added that, under the Russian concept, nothing
counted. He further explained that it was important for the
Russian Federation to understand that the concept of not
counting any bomber warheads would be a show stopper in the
U.S. Senate. Poznihir offered an attribution rule of one
warhead per bomber.

--------------
LET'S DO THIS AGAIN
--------------


23. (S) Orlov concluded the meeting noting that this was a
very useful and open discussion, and that he looked forward
to smaller group meetings in the future. Trout and Orlov
also agreed that working groups should get together twice the
following week, starting on Tuesday, if possible.


24. (S) Trout thanked Orlov for the Russian proposal and
said that the United States was eager to read through it and
that, perhaps, it could be discussed at the next meeting.


25. (S) Begin text ( U.S. Paper outlining the structure of
the MOU):

SFO-VI
MOU Working Group
U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text
October 21, 2009

Structure of the Memorandum of Understanding


I. AGGREGATE NUMBERS


1. FOR EACH PARTY, THE DATA ON AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

((2. FOR EACH PARTY, THE DATA ON THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS AS
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(I) ICBMS AND ICBM LAUNCHERS

(II) SLBMS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

(III) HEAVY BOMBERS))1

((3. FOR EACH PARTY, ADDITIONAL AGGREGATE NUMBERS RELATED
TO THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE TREATY ARE AS
FOLLOWS:))1

II. ICBMS, ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON ICBMS

III. SLBMS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON SLBMS

IV. HEAVY BOMBERS AND ((NUCLEAR))1 WARHEADS ON ((HEAVY
BOMBERS))1 ((THEM))2

((IV. STATIC DISPLAYS OF ICBMS, SLBMS, ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM
LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS))2

((V. SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES))1

((VI. ELIMINATED FACILITIES))1

ANNEXES TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

ANNEX A ICBM AND SLBM TECHNICAL DATA

ANNEX B HEAVY BOMBER TECHNICAL DATA

ANNEX C ((HEAVY BOMBER NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS))1 ((LONG-
RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM))2 TECHNICAL DATA

ANNEX D OTHER DATA REQUIRED BY THE TREATY

((ANNEX E OTHER REQUIREMENTS))1

(( ))1 Proposed by the United States.
(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation.

End text.


26. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text: Structure of the MOU,
dated October 21, 2009.

- Russia:

-- Section II - Database in Relation to Strategic
Offensive Arms, (MOU),dated Oct 23, 2009.


27. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS