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09GENEVA946 2009-11-03 10:38:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) RUSSIAN COMMENTARY DOCUMENT, OCTOBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-021.



2. (S) The text in paragraph 3 is the official translation
of a Russian paper that was provided by Amb Antonov to A/S
Gottemoeller at a U.S.-hosted lunch on October 22, 2009. The
paper reflects Russian commentary on their rationale for not
including various prohibitions included under the START
Treaty, but not included in their proposal for the START
Follow-on Treaty.



3. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

Russian document
SFO - VI
Geneva
October 27, 2009

Article V

The following provisions are not included:

Paragraph 4.

a ban on locating deployed ICBM silo launchers outside
of ICBM silo launcher bases.

Commentary. The Russian side, just like the US side,
locates deployed ICBM silo launchers only at ICBM bases.

Moreover, in the Russian draft of the new treaty, it is
stated (paragraph 1 Article V): Each Party shall locate
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty only at:
ICBM bases, submarine bases, air bases, storage facilities,
conversion or elimination facilities, repair facilities,
training facilities, and test ranges.

In this connection, the inclusion of a provision "about
a ban on locating deployed ICBM silo launchers outside of
bases for ICBM silo launchers" in paragraph 4, Article V is
not effective, since it is superfluous.

Paragraph 5.

a ban on conducting flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs,
equipped with reentry vehicles, from Space Launch Facilities

Commentary. The Russian side does not plan to have
"Space Launch Facilities." We proposed uniting into one
concept, a "space launch facility" and "test range," and we
are leaving in the new agreement only "test range," since
these concepts are practically identical. That step by the
Russian side is aimed at simplifying the Treaty and expanding
confidence building, transparency, and verification measures.
Here, we are taking into consideration that a "test range,"
unlike a "space launch facility" is subject to inspections.
Preceding from this premise, it is proposed to put both the
Plesetsk Cosmodrome and the Cape Canaveral Space Launch
Complex in the category of a "test range.

Paragraph 7.

a ban on the production, testing, deployment and the use
of rapid reload assets.

Commentary. The Russian side, in leaving out the given
provision from the new Treaty, first of all, preceded from
the fact that the sides do not have and do not foresee having
such assets in the future. As long as the START Treaty was
in effect, such assets were neither developed nor deployed by
either the Russian or US sides. In this connection, the
given provision is superfluous.

Paragraph 8.

a ban on the production, testing and deployment of:

- Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600
kilometers (launched from waterborne platforms, other than
submarines);

- Ballistic missiles or cruise missiles emplaced on or
tethered to the ocean floor or moving only in contact with
the ocean floor, etc.

- Any kind of WMD for launch into near earth orbit;

- Ballistic missiles of the Class "air-surface" (ASBM);

- Long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with more than one
warhead.

Commentary. Some of the restrictions listed above have
already been reflected in various treaties and agreements.
For example, launching WMDs into near earth orbit is banned
by the "Treaty on Outer Space" of 1968, and the emplacement
of ballistic missiles on the ocean floor is banned by the
1969 "Convention on the Sea Bed."

Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 3, Article VI (sic)
(VII) of the Russian draft of the new treaty "each Party
shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a
payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the
upper atmosphere."

Likewise, the Russian version of the new agreement
(paragraph 3 Article IV (sic)) provides that the question of
all newly developed weapons, which, in the opinion of the
other side, can be SOAs are subject to discussion at the BCC
(for example, just like the JCIC considered issues concerning
the prototype of the RS 24 ICBM.)

Paragraph 9.

The possibility (by agreement) to waive bans on
conducting launches of ICBMs or SLBMs used as space launch
vehicles from waterborne platforms other than submarines, and
from airplanes other than heavy bombers. This is an
exception from paragraph 8 mentioned above.

Comment. This article presumes certain exceptions from
the provisions set forth in paragraph 8 of Article V. Taking
into consideration that the provisions indicated in paragraph
8 of Article V are excluded from the Russian draft of the

treaty, (sic)

Paragraph 10.

a ban on equipping, testing and deploying:

- Nuclear weapons, on aircraft other than airplanes,
but which have a range exceeding 8,000 kilometers;

- Nuclear weapons on airplanes other than heavy
bombers, but which satisfy the requirements for heavy bombers
in terms of size and range;

- Long range nuclear ALCMs located on all aircraft
other than airplanes, or on airplanes other than heavy
bombers, but which satisfy the requirements for heavy bombers
in terms of size and range.

Comment. The Russian version of the new agreement
provides that the question of all newly developed weapons,
which, in the opinion of the other side, can be SOAs are
subject of discussion in the BCC.

Paragraph 12.

a ban on deploying SOAs and support equipment at
eliminated facilities.

Comment. Eliminated facilities may not be used for
purposes inconsistent with the treaty on SOAs.

In this connection it is supposed that all SOAs,
training models of missiles, training launchers, fixed
structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, launch associated
transport support vehicles, and transport vehicles for driver
training will be removed from such a facility.

End text.



4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS