Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA943
2009-11-02 19:43:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #0943/01 3061943
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O 021943Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9881
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5171
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2348
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1353
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6544
S E C R E T GENEVA 000943 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-002, U.S. PROPOSAL FOR COUNTING HEAVY
BOMBER (HB) NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000943

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE-002, U.S. PROPOSAL FOR COUNTING HEAVY
BOMBER (HB) NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-044.-- Request for Guidance-002.

--------------
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------


2. (S) The Russian side continues to resist the U.S. concept
for counting Heavy Bomber (HB) Nuclear Armaments. Russia's
concern is based on 1) the mode of storing Long-Range
Nuclear-Armed Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (LRNA),2)
permitting U.S. inspectors into its sensitive weapons storage
areas and 3) the issue of U.S. upload potential. Background
and analysis are in paragraphs 3-5. Recommendations are in
paragraphs 6-8. Guidance requested is in paragraph 9.

--------------
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
--------------


3. (S) For several reasons, the Russian side continues to
struggle with the U.S. approach for counting heavy bomber
nuclear armaments, which includes a provision calling for
counting LRNA and nuclear gravity bombs that are not loaded
on deployed heavy bombers in the nuclear armament weapons
storage areas that are associated with the deployed HB bases.
First, the Russian LRNA storage procedure is to de-mate the
nuclear warhead from each LRNA and to store the warheads in
special nuclear weapons storage sites located 5-15 km outside
the HB bases. Cruise missile airframes are stored in
separate weapons storage areas located on the heavy bomber
bases. The U.S. argues that since the LRNA warhead can only
reach its target if carried in an LRNA, the accountable item
for heavy bomber nuclear armaments should be the LRNA in
which a warhead can be loaded. Second, the Russian side has
not embraced the idea of having inspectors look inside their

weapons storage bunkers in light of their desire to not
reveal their classified information. Third, the Russian side
has expressed the view that there is nothing in the U.S.
approach for them. Russian delegates argue the U.S. could
simply transport additional LRNA to its bomber bases and then
upload them whether they are stored nearby or hundreds of
miles away from the HB base. Concerns regarding U.S. upload
capability are a central theme of the Russians, but
addressing them has not been a U.S. key negotiating objective
in this treaty.


4. (S) The delegation sees a possible scenario in which LRNA
airframes would be counted as a means to confirm declared
numbers of Russian nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. This
concept has been presented to the Russian delegation, but has
not received a positive reception.


5. (S) In order to increase chances of reaching agreement on
counting heavy bomber nuclear armaments in nuclear armaments
weapons storage facilities and to begin to address the issue
of weapons upload capability, the delegation seeks to
introduce a proposal to create the category of non-deployed
LRNA and to store these non-deployed LRNA in a central
storage facility that are located far from the bases for
deployed heavy bombers. Delegation believes this approach


may help convince the Russian side to agree to count and
inspect deployed LRNA in weapons storage areas at HB bases
and to similarly treat non-deployed LRNA located at the
central storage facility. This approach would also aid both
parties in monitoring LRNA upload capability.

--------------
RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


6. (S) Delegation recommends Washington consider a proposal
consisting of the generic elements described in paragraphs
7-8 below.


7. (S) Excess LRNA airframes would be removed from heavy
bombers bases and stored as non-deployed LRNA at declared
storage facilities which would be subject to inspection.
LRNA airframes located at declared storage facilities would
be reported in the Memorandum of Understanding as
non-deployed LRNA. Using procedures developed within the
Inspection Protocol for inspections of non-deployed SOA, the
Parties would confirm the declared number of non-deployed
LRNA stored in these storage facilities.


8. (S) Heavy bomber nuclear armaments loaded on deployed
heavy bombers and in nuclear armaments weapons storage areas
associated with air bases where deployed heavy bombers are
based would be counted as the deployed nuclear warheads for
deployed heavy bombers. Their numbers would be confirmed
using inspection procedures as established in the Inspection
Protocol. Under these procedures the U.S. would verify the
number of Russian heavy bomber nuclear armaments in the
nuclear armaments weapons storage area by counting the LRNA
airframes stored there. Each LRNA would be assumed to
contain one nuclear warhead. The Russians would be expected
to move non-deployed LRNA to storage facilities located far
from their HB bases, to report their number in the MOU and
its periodic update and possibly to permit reciprocal
inspection of these storage areas to confirm the number of
declared non-deployed LRNA.

--------------
GUIDANCE REQUESTED
--------------


9. (S) Delegation requests that Washington approve the
recommendations contained in paragraphs 6-8.


10. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS