Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA919
2009-10-27 20:26:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #0919/01 3002026
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O 272026Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9800
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 5116
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2293
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1298
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6489
S E C R E T GENEVA 000919 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
OCTOBER 20, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000919

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
(U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
OCTOBER 20, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-008.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 20, 2009
Time: 4:00 - 6:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG) for Session VI was held at the Russian Mission
on October 20, 2009. The U.S. Delegation presented a course
of action for the remainder of the Inspection Protocol (IP)
sections. Key points were the movement of language currently
in the U.S.-proposed IP into third-tier documents, comparison
of the Russian Federation's naming convention for inspection
activities (inspections, visits, and exhibitions) as compared
to the U.S. Delegation's view, and the possibility that some
third-level material could be worked out under the oversight
of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) after the
signing of the treaty, but prior to ratification and entry
into force of the treaty. The U.S. Delegation presented the
Russians with an index listing the proposed third-tier
annexes to the IP and a chart comparing the U.S.-proposed
inspection naming convention with the Russian-proposed naming
system. These items would be discussed further at the next
working group meeting. The U.S. side began discussion of
joint draft text of Section IV of the U.S.-proposed IP:
Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry. The
process moved fairly quickly during which text was agreed
where concepts were similar. By the end of the meeting, the
working group had reviewed about one-third of Section IV.


4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Three Concepts to Consider for Next

Meeting; Inspection Protocol Section IV; and Wrapping Things
Up.

--------------
THREE CONCEPTS TO
CONSIDER FOR NEXT MEETING
--------------


5. (S) Dr. Warner began the meeting by presenting the
Russians with three points and two hand-outs that could be
used for future discussions. He stated that the U.S.
Delegation had made significant progress moving selected
language from the U.S.-proposed IP into third-tier documents,
which the United States calls "annexes." He explained the
approach the U.S. Delegation took when creating the
third-tier documents, emphasizing that it was to ensure that
the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty and IP contained all the
rights and obligations, while the third-tier
documents/annexes focused on specific processes associated
with implementing the SFO Treaty. In some cases, critical
concepts were actually brought back up from the existing
third-tier documents into the second-tier IP.


6. (S) To illustrate, Warner handed the Russian Delegation
an index of the 14 draft third-tier annexes, listed by name


and number, and indicated how each annex corresponded to a
related section of the IP. He noted that, under START, there
was a three-level approach to the Treaty -- Treaty articles,
protocols, and annexes. The U.S. intent was to approach SFO
in the same manner. Warner opined that, even though the
United States was intent on ratifying all three levels at the
same time, it was possible that a number of the third-tier
annexes could be remanded to discussions following treaty
signature but, prior to ratification and entry into force, in
a similar fashion to the Russian proposal. The U.S. position
was still firm in the view that the documents at all three
levels would be considered together in the U.S. ratification
process.


7. (S) Colonel Ilin requested clarification on the movement
of text from the IP into the third-tier documents. He asked
whether the United States had moved the material into
existing annexes. Warner replied that some of the text was
moved into existing annexes but, in some cases, new annexes
had been produced. Additionally, some annexes were
re-numbered and re-named to better follow the sequence of the
sections in the IP. Ilin asked whether the United States
could present the previous meetings agreed-upon text in IP
Section Three that was to be moved to a third annex. Warner
replied that the annex could be provided during the next
meeting as an example of how the text had been moved down to
the third tier.


8. (S) Ilin asked again whether the United States considered
the third-tier documents necessary for ratification. Warner
replied that the U.S. position was that it would be required
for U.S. ratification, but each side would have to ratify the
elements of the SFO Treaty package in accordance with their
own constitutional process, as called for within the treaty
itself. Ilin replied that the United States and Russia needed
to agree on the number of sections and the size of the
treaty. Ilin asked what the working group would do if time
ran out before all tier two and three sections/annexes were
reviewed. Warner replied that the working group would have
to adjust the approach as the deadline got closer. Ilin
stated that the Russian Delegation would review the material
presented, compare it with the Russian draft text and, at the
next working group meeting, the United States and Russia
could discuss prioritizing the work.


9. (S) Warner's next discussion area was the naming
convention for the various types of inspections and
exhibitions. He presented the Russian Delegation with a
hand-out that listed the U.S.-proposed names for inspection
activities, the Russian-proposed names, the purpose of each
activity, a newly-proposed name for each activity, and
whether that activity would be limited by an annual quota for
the number of inspections each year. Warner explained that,
in approaching the new naming convention, the United States
incorporated the Russian concept that "inspections""would be
focused on deployed items, "inspection-visits" would focus on
non-deployed items, and exhibitions would be for those
remaining activities such as conversion or elimination
verification, technical exhibitions, and distinguishability
exhibitions. Warner stated that the U.S. side could accept
the Russian concept for the term "inspection" that focuses on
deployed strategic offensive arms (SOAs) and the warheads
they carry. He continued that, although Washington had by no


means agreed to use the term "inspection-visit," the chart
showed that this type of activity was focused on non-deployed
SOA and on new facilities. Warner also reiterated that the
U.S. proposed to retain the formerly-declared facility
inspection from START. Warner asked that the Russians
consider the naming conventions so that they could be
discussed later. Warner pointed out that, while the United
States and the Russian Federation appeared to agree on the
concepts of exhibitions, the United States still needed
clarification on how the Russians viewed the two conversion
or elimination activities; the demonstration of procedures to
be used for conversions prior to their implementation and the
confirmation of the results of conversion or elimination
procedures. Warner asked whether the Russians considered
these two activities to be set against an annual quota. Ilin
replied that the Russians considered both to be exhibition
activities, that they would be conducted as needed, and not
be subject to any quota.


10. (S) Ilin inquired why the United States had combined the
characteristics of the data update inspection (DUI) and the
nuclear warhead inspection (NWI) for "Inspection" activities
focused on deployed SOAs. He stated that the two types of
inspections had different goals; one was to count warheads
and the other was to verify data. Warner replied that in
order to fit the Russian-proposed concept of inspecting SOA
as either deployed or non-deployed, the United States had to
restructure the inspection activities, but that they could be
returned to the originally-proposed format if that proved
more effective. Warner stated that for heavy bombers, due to
the manner in which the inspection would take place, it made
sense to combine aspects of DUI and NWI and create one
inspection instead of two at heavy bomber bases. Where
road-mobile ICBM systems were concerned, things were a bit
more complicated, since the DUI at mobile ICBM bases involved
confirming data on both deployed and non-deployed mobile
ICBMs and their launchers.


11. (S) Looking at the last column in the chart, Ilin stated
that it was still necessary to agree on quotas for the
inspections and inspection-visits. Warner agreed and stated
that working on the naming conventions and the annual quotas
of inspection activities would be important to the Treaty
Text and Definitions Working Group, particularly when that
working group met to discuss Treaty Article XI.

--------------
INSPECTION PROTOCOL SECTION IV
--------------


12. (S) Warner distributed to the Russian Delegation a
Russian language version of the U.S.-proposed joint draft
text of Section IV of the IP, "Procedures Beginning Upon
Arrival at the Point of Entry" and suggested proceeding with
a line-by-line review. Ilin stated that the Russian
Delegation had created its own version of a joint draft text
of Section IV of the IP but, since they had not produced an
English version or produced hand-outs, he could agree to work
from the U.S.-proposed joint draft text. The Russian
Delegation noted in paragraph one that inspectors would be
exempt from customs duties on their baggage and equipment and
they also wanted to add that inspectors would not be
responsible for paying taxes on baggage and equipment. This


concept had also been brought up during discussion of Section
II of the IP. Warner said that this issue would need to be
researched further and discussed later to be considered for
inclusion in both sections.


13. (S) Warner then began the discussion of paragraphs three
and four which concerned Russian inspection teams arriving at
Travis Air Force Base (AFB) and stated that, while the
information was important, the United States recommended
moving it to the third-tier document, that is, to the annex
on "Transportation." Ilin questioned whether there was a
need for these provisions at all. Mr. Smith interjected that
the processes outlined in those paragraphs were unique to the
POE at Travis and important in order to allow a Russian
Embassy representative access to the POE facility located on
Travis AFB. Ilin reiterated that he believed it could be
deleted. Warner countered that, since this issue was
contained in one of the annexes about which it was less
urgent to reach conclusion, perhaps it could be pushed back
to further discussion later in the negotiations.


14. (S) The language for paragraph six concerning clothing
and badges for inspectors was agreed upon, and it was also
agreed to push paragraph six to the third-tier document. The
information from paragraph seven was deleted as it was
already stated in paragraph one of this section. The
paragraph that followed dealt with continuous monitoring and
it was agreed to simply double bracket any continuous
monitoring-related topics until a decision was made
concerning the status of that activity in SFO. The Russian
Delegation agreed to study paragraph five on equipment and
supplies and revisit it at the next working group meeting.
With regard to paragraphs ten, eleven, twelve and thirteen,
the possible impounding of equipment, the Russian Delegation
wanted to delete or push these paragraphs to the BCC; the
United States wanted it retained in the tier three annex
document. Warner suggested revisiting these paragraphs and
addressing them later.

--------------
WRAPPING THINGS UP
--------------


15. (S) Warner stated that the revised draft texts for the
future IP sections were being translated and that they would
be sent to the Russians for study in advance of the joint
review of these sections at future IPWG meetings.


16. (S) Ilin asked for clarification on the numbers the U.S.
proposed for the annual quotas of various inspection
activities. Warner replied that the current U.S.-proposed
numbers for annual inspection activities were 14 for deployed
SOA inspections, 12 for non-deployed SOA inspections or
inspection-visits, 2 for formerly-declared facility
inspections, and exhibitions were to take place "as required"
with no annual quota. Warner stated that the annual quota
under START was for 28 inspections each year overall and that
the United States proposed to maintain that number under SFO.
Ilin replied that the Russian position still called for no
more than five inspections of deployed SOA per year, five
inspections of non-deployed SOA per year, and that
exhibitions would be held as needed without an annual quota.



17. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Proposed index list of tier three documents/annexes;

-- Proposed naming convention for inspection activities;
and

-- Proposed merged draft text of the Inspection Protocol,
Section IV.


18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Coussa
Mr. DeNinno
Maj Johnson
LTC LaGraffe
Ms. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Tarrasch
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Ms. Fuzhenkova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Ivanov
Ms. Kotkova
Col Novikov
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Zharkih
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS