STATE/VCI PDAS LOOK'S MEETINGS WITH CANADIAN,

S E C R E T GENEVA 000884

SIPDIS

NSC FOR LOOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: STATE/VCI PDAS LOOK'S MEETINGS WITH CANADIAN,
FRENCH, BRITISH, AND PAKASTANI CD AMBASSADORS

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Karin L. Look,
used the opportunity of being in Geneva to meet bilaterally
with the Canadian, French, British, and Pakistani Ambassadors
to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on September 30, 2009.
Her conversations with the Canadian, French, and British
Representatives were wide-ranging, but focused on the current
issue of the CD Program of Work (POW) and our collective
desire to move ahead on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) negotiations. Look's meeting with Pakistani
Ambassador Akram was solely on the matter of Pakistan
blocking consensus on the CD's POW regarding negotiation of
the FMCT. Look opened the meeting by expressing the view
that Pakistan would better serve its interests by shaping
FMCT negotiations in the CD through its participation instead
of blocking CD work on this important initiative. Amb Akram
reacted with a lengthy description of Pakistan's national
security concerns related to the POW and the FMCT, in
particular, the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Agreement with India
and the asymmetry of Pakistani and Indian fissile material
stockpiles. He also reiterated Pakistan's view that the CD
POW should include a balanced approach to all four of the
CD's core issues: the FMCT, prevention of an arms race in
outer space, nuclear disarmament, and negative security
assurances.

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Meeting with the Canadian Ambassador
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2. (U) The meeting took place at the Canadian Mission in
Geneva at 10:30 A.M. on September 30, 2009. Canadian
participants were: Marius Grinius, Canadian Ambassador and
Permanent Representative to the Office of the United Nations
and to the Conference on Disarmament; and Geoff Gartshore,
Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Canada. U.S. participants
were: Karin L. Look, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; Neil
Couch, Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Issues; and Duke
Lokka, U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.


3. (C) Regarding Pakistan's decision to block consensus on
the CD's POW, Grinius offered his opinion that Akram did not
personally support this decision but was merely implementing
instructions from Islamabad. He added that resolving this
problem would require work in capitals. Look responded that,
in her view, resolving this impasse with Pakistan and
negotiating an FMCT could be the CD's last chance to prove
its value. Grinius agreed, adding that it was time to look
at the entire UN disarmament machinery. Grinius used the CFE
(not a CD issue) as an example in explaining his view that it
was important to continue to engage with the Russian military
and that there has been no change in the Russian "psyche"
since the end of the Cold War. Shifting to bio-security and
the BWC, Grinius said that bio-security is a huge issue for
governments and that this is one area that has not been
politicized. The military decided years ago that biological
weapons had no real value, however, terrorist have probably
not reached the same conclusion. In Grinius' view, the next
BWC Review Conference (in 2 years) will be important to
continue progress on this critical issue.


4. (C) The discussion turned to the President Obama's Prague
vision, including the President's commitment to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal so long as
nuclear weapons exist, maintain deterrence for ourselves and
our Allies, and pursue ratification of the CTBT. Look noted

that the Administration hopes that it will be able to get the
Senate to consider the treaty on its merits. Grinius agreed
with Look's assessment and noted that progress on CTBT will
contribute to a successful NPT Review Conference. Grinius
also noted that now would be a good time to reconsider the
need for the NATO nuclear deterrent in Europe.


5. (C) Grinius said that he had recently met with Assistant
Secretary of State for Population, Refuges and Migration,
Eric Schwartz, and that they had concluded that many issues,
such as refugees, contribute to an environment that will
allow for implementation of the President's vision. In
Grinius' view there is one degree of separation among all
these issues. Grinius closed by noting that he would be in
Washington on October 22 and 23 to meet with Ambassador Susan
Burk on NPT issues and with the Office of Chemical and
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction (ISN/CB).

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Meeting with the French Ambassador
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6. (U) The meeting took place at the French Mission in
Geneva at 2:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. French
participants were: Eric Danon, French Ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament; and Sophie Maol-Makame, Deputy
Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of France. U.S.
participants were: PDAS Look, Couch, and Alan Carlson, U.S.
Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.


7. (C) Look opened by asking Danon for his perspective on
the CD. He replied that "the CD was the only place where you
don't have negotiations on disarmament." He added that this
is a big problem in that the CD does not reflect the state of
play in New York. In his view, if the P-5 have agreed to
negotiate an FMCT, a "small country" such as Pakistan should
not be able to block progress. Danon said that he believes a
breakthrough will happen and that it will be a bad signal to
the world if nothing is done on the FMCT prior to next year's
NPT Review Conference. We should not add to Pakistan's
problems and we should not disrupt their fight on terrorism,
but Pakistan needs the help of the international community.
In Danon's view, there are probably three or four people in
Islamabad who are making the decisions to block the FMCT and
that a possible solution might be to conclude a Civilian
Nuclear Fuel Agreement with Pakistan, similar to the one
recently concluded with India. He added that, since each of
the P-5 has separate military assistance agreements with
Pakistan, the P-5 should coordinate those programs to enhance
Pakistan's security. Maol-Makame offered that China could
play a key role in helping Pakistan. Danon responded that
China and Pakistan both want more nuclear weapons and that
China was only supporting the FMCT because they believed it
would take at least ten years to negotiate the treaty and
that, by then, China would have a sufficient stock of fissile
material to meet its military needs.


8. (C) Look expressed the view that Pakistan should work to
shape the FMCT negotiations not block them. She also said
that if the CD cannot even begin work on FMCT then perhaps it
cannot do anything. Danon responded that the CD was a "black
hole of disarmament," but that Paris was not ready to abandon
it. He added that, in his view, non-proliferation was a more
serious problem than disarmament and that diplomats can
finish the "disarmament job," implying that disarmament was
all but done. Look asked Danon if he had received any
feedback on last month's P-5 meeting in London, noting that
it was a vigorous discussion and that even the Chinese
delegation played an active role. Danon said that China is
learning and beginning to talk. He closed by noting that
while the P-3 has a strong relationship, China needs to find
its place.

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Meeting with the British Ambassador
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9. (U) The meeting took place at the British Mission in
Geneva at 3:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. British
participants were: John Duncan, UK Ambassador for
Multilateral Arms Control and Disarmament; and Jo Adamson,
Deputy Permanent Representative, UK Permanent Representation
to the Conference on Disarmament. U.S. participants were:
PDAS Look, Couch, and Carlson.


10. (C) During this relatively brief and low-key meeting,
Look and Duncan focused on the impasse in the CD on the POW,
but also spoke in general terms about the President's nuclear
agenda. Duncan said that, in his view, it will take
high-level work in capitals to fix the FMCT problem in the
CD. He noted that the CD was a "coalition of consent" and
that we would have to make "common cause" with non-P-5
countries. As a former colonial power, the UK does not have
much influence over Pakistan: Pakistan will not listen to the
UK, so it is up to Washington to influence Islamabad. Look
took his point, but added that the United States cannot be
the only voice urging Pakistan to allow work to proceed on
the FMCT in the CD. Look asked Duncan if he had any feedback
on last month's UK-sponsored P-5 NPT meeting in London,
noting that it was a vigorous and useful discussion and that
even the Chinese delegation had played an active role.
Duncan replied that China should start acting as part of the
P-5 and stop protec

ting the Pakistanis.

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Meeting with the Pakistani Ambassador
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11. (U) The meeting took place at the United Nations complex
in Geneva at 4:00 P.M. on September 30, 2009. Pakistani
participants were: Zamir Akram, Pakistani Ambassador and
Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament;
and Aftab Khokher, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent
Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva. U.S.
participants were: PDAS Look, Couch, and Carlson.


12. (C) Look began by expressing her pleasure that she and
the Ambassador were able to meet on such short notice. She
said that the United States wanted to reach out to Pakistan
as we prepare the way for negotiations on an FMCT in the CD.
The United States believes that the CD can be the right place
for the negotiation and that Pakistan's recent decision to
impede that effort undercuts Pakistan's ability to shape the
FMCT conversation. Look remarked that the best way for
Pakistan to influence the content of this treaty is for us to
begin negotiations on it in the CD very soon.


13. (S) Akram responded with a long and well articulated,
albeit one-sided, description of Pakistan's position on the
FMCT, its process for developing that position, and other
factors that influence Pakistan's security. Akram stated
that Pakistan has a robust and interactive interagency
process to decide nuclear and strategic issues. Once those
decisions were made, it was his job to implement his
government's instructions in Geneva. He said pointedly that
Pakistan made decisions based on its own national security
interests. Acknowledging Look's mention of the President's
Prague speech, Akram said that Islamabad was confused by its
message and that prior to agreeing to the 2009 POW in the CD,
Pakistan had received positive messages from Washington.
Akram claimed that Pakistan had believed that work in the CD
would proceed on all four of the CD's core issues: the FMCT,
prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear
disarmament, and negative security assurances. This was a
comprehensive process that would benefit Pakistan. With the
current "FMCT-only" approach, the United States has caused

Pakistan more problems than before, especially regarding the
Civilian Nuclear Fuel Agreement (the 123 Agreement) with
India and in dealing with the International Atomic Energy
Agency. According to Akram, there is an asymmetry in
Pakistani and Indian fissile material stockpiles and this
asymmetry will become worse even if India does not cheat on
the 123 agreement because India can divert existing civilian
stocks of fissile material to military programs. Pakistan
believes that it will take five to seven years before Indian
reactors come under international safeguards and that, by
then, the situation will be much worse.


14. (S) Akram also argued that in addition to the fissile
material problem, Pakistan believes that the United States
has been engaging with India to develop strategic
capabilities, including an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
program. He said that India already has an operational, if
rudimentary, submarine-launched nuclear missile system and
that India is receiving additional cooperation from Russia
and Israel on its ABM program. He added that Israel was
transferring U.S.-origin ABM technology to India and that a
recent visit to India by the U.S. Secretary of State had
produced agreements on cooperation in space and on
conventional weapons. Akram said that Pakistan had studied
India's strategic doctrine and that India believed it could
fight and win a short and limited war with Pakistan.
Pakistan believes that its security environment has
deteriorated and that the U.S. view that the Taliban threat
in the west is more significant than the Indian threat in the
east concerns Pakistan. The Indian threat has not receded
and the situation in Kashmir is real and has not gone away.
Akram added that Pakistan has evidence that India is
promoting terrorism in the west. It is not just the Taliban
there, Pakistan has captured Indian citizens and weapons in
Pakistan but the United States will not focus on this.


15. (S) In wrapping up his discourse, Akram said that all of
these issues provide the context for its decisions regarding
the CD. For the sake of Pakistani security, the CD must make
progress on all four of the CD's core issues, but Akram
claimed it faced resistance from the United States. Negative
security assurances do not impact Pakistan because it has
already committed not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear weapons states and Pakistan wants all nuclear
weapons states to make the same assurances. Pakistan is also
concerned with India's space program and, according to Akram,
India's lunar and martian programs are ruses for its
anti-satellite program. Pakistan wants an FMCT that is a
disarmament measure that actually eliminates excess stocks of
fissile material and not simply a non-proliferation measure
that legalizes the current state of affairs.


16. (S) Look concurred with Akram's point that every country
must consider and act in accordance with its national
interests. In this context, she said, Pakistan should
consider influencing the content of an FMCT negotiation
rather than blocking it. In that way, Pakistan can shape the
conversation--and the outcome. The United States wants to
find a way to get agreement on the POW so negotiations can
begin early in 2010. Akram said that Pakistan looks forward
to working with the United States in the CD but that it has a
different perspective. He added that they were only one word
away from agreement on the POW, which was that the POW must
be "balanced." (Begin note from Carlson: During the 2009 CD
session, Pakistan had insisted that the POW "ensure balanced
outcomes," not merely be "balanced." Most CD member states
expressed the view that the 2009 POW was, in fact, balanced.
End note.) In his view, Akram said, political will was
needed to move forward on all four of the CD's core issues.
Pakistan had agreed to the 2009 POW and would reconsider the
2010 POW.


17. (S) In a parting message, Akram recounted that Pakistan
had passed a warning to the United States in March 1998 that

its intelligence service was aware that India was about to
conduct its first underground nuclear weapons test. Akram
stated that the United States ignored Pakistan's warning and
then was "surprised" by the test. Following this statement,
Akram said that he believed that India may be preparing for
another underground nuclear weapons test, referring to recent
media statements by Dr. Santhanam, coordinator of the 1998
Indian nuclear test. He offered no further information
regarding such a new test.


18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER