Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA858
2009-10-08 14:28:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0858/01 2811428
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081428Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9603
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4991
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RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GEIMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
HMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHT/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2176
RUEHKV/AEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1178
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6374
S E C R E T GENEVA 000858 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SIXTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, P.M. SESSION

REF: GENEVA 0857 (SFO-GVA-V-042) U.S.-PROPOSED JDT OF
THE BCC PROTOCOL

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000858

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SIXTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING
SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, P.M. SESSION

REF: GENEVA 0857 (SFO-GVA-V-042) U.S.-PROPOSED JDT OF
THE BCC PROTOCOL

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-035.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 30, 2009
Time: 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the sixth Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties revisited
some items from the fifth meeting. The U.S. delegation
provided the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for the
Protocol on the Bilateral Consultative CommisQn (BQ)
(Reftel).


4. (S) The delegations differed on whether the withdrawal
notification period should be 3 or 6 months, what term,Q"withdraw from" or "terminate") was appropriate for pulling
out of the treaty, and the need for a meeting to discuss
extending the treaty. The U.S. delegation also explained its
positions on the BCC Protocol JDT, including the need to
allow for provisional application.

--------------
AGREEMENT ON TREATY ARTICLE XVII
--------------


5. (S) Before the working group turned to the U.S.-proposed
JDT of the BCC Protocol, Ms. Kotkova clarified one item in
Article XV of the treaty regarding its registration.
Specifically, she explained the use of the words "shall" and
"will," which should be "shall" in the English text and
"will" in the Russian text. "Will" was the Russian word that
corresponded to the English "shall" in Russian treaty
practice. Ambassador Ries had no objection.

-------------- --
THREE- OR SIX-MONTH NOTIFICATION FOR WITHDRAWAL

-------------- --


6. (S) Koshelev focused on another paragraph in Article XV
which stated that the Parties would provide 6 months
notification prior to withdrawing from the treaty. Koshelev
stated that the Russian version had a 3-month notice citing
the Moscow Treaty as precedence. Ries replied that in
recognition of the significance of this arms control treaty
and since START, which had worked so well, had the same
timeframe, 6 months was an appropriate interval.
Additionally, Ries pointed out that 6 months gave both
parties a moderate period to adjust to such a major event.
Koshelev responded by noting the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty had a 6-month withdrawal clause and when the United
States exercised its withdrawal right, it had made a
"national" decision. As the U.S. demonstrated, once such a
decision was made it was too serious to be reconsidered.


Koshelev's second point was that the rationale for the
6-month clause in START, and in the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, was to provide an adequate
interval for the Parties to remove their continuous
monitoring equipment and supporting teams. However, in this
treaty, the technical aspects did not require such a lengthy
period. Koshelev concluded by stating the Russian delegation
was not "insisting" on a 3-month period but that it was
requesting the U.S delegation to give the reasons for its
position.


7. (S) Ries complimented the Russian delegation for its
thorough analysis but noted that verification measures were
still in negotiations and the U.S. position was still that
continuous monitoring should carry over into the new treaty.
Again, Ries emphasized the value of utilizing the 15 years
experience gained from START and that the decision to
withdraw was a very weighty one which merited a longer
withdrawal period. Dr. Fraley reminded Koshelev that the INF
Treaty had already incorporated the 6-month withdrawal clause
before it was decided to include continuous monitoring into
its verification regime. Koshelev agreed with Fraley and
contended that the Russian delegation was still trying to
better understand the rationale for the 6-month clause; even
some of his own delegation members had made the same
arguments as the U.S. delegation. Koshelev jokingly offered
a compromise solution of meeting each other halfway; such as
a 4 and one half-month period.

--------------
"WITHDRAW" VERSUS "TERMINATE"
--------------


8. (S) Continuing with Article XV, Koshelev stated that at
the previous meeting he had requested that the U.S.
delegation think about substituting "terminate" for "withdraw
from" in the phrase "each party shall have the right to
withdraw from this treaty..." Mr. Dean responded that
"withdrawal from" was a more precise legal term. Mr. Taylor
pointed out that the same term was used in the previous
bilateral treaties negotiated between the United States and
the Soviet Union. Ms. Kotkova agreed that "withdrawal from"
had been used in the INF, START and the Moscow Treaties but
implied that after the first time this term was used, it was
carried over into subsequent treaties without adequate
analysis. Ms. Kotkova offered to submit a new proposal at a
later time for the U.S. delegation to consider. Ries
concurred.

--------------
IS A TREATY EXTENSION MEETING NECESSARY?
--------------


9. (S) Koshelev questioned the need for the Article XV
statement, "No later than 1 year before the expiration of the
10-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether
this Treaty will be extended." He stated that the treaty
could only be extended if both Parties agreed. If one party
wanted to extend the treaty, it could make the proposal and
then there would be such a meeting. Otherwise, the meeting
was superfluous. Ries countered that this meeting was
intended to have both sides jointly consider the issue and
noted that it was hardly an onerous obligation. Koshelev


stated that such a decision of this nature would only be made
at the highest level of the national governments and that if
it was decided not to extend, having a meeting between the
Parties would not change anything. Koshelev referenced the
recent START situation where both the United States and the
Russian Federation separately made the "national" decision
not to extend START; therefore, the obligatory meeting had
served no purpose. Ries stated she understood that this
meeting could not undo a national-level decision but that it
provided the forum for both sides to jointly consider the
effects of such a decision. Mr. Dunn also noted that this
meeting added to the predictability and stability of this
arms control regime. Koshelev recapped that representatives
at such a meeting had no authority to decide, they could only
inform. Kotkova proposed the following "as an idea" for
consideration:

"Each of the Parties shall have the right to address the
other party with the proposal to extend this Treaty, in such
a case, the Parties shall jointly consider the possibility of
extending this Treaty."

Ries said that the U.S. delegation would consider it and also
Koshelev's explanation.

--------------
BCC SESSIONS
--------------


10. (S) Ries turned to the BCC Protocol. Koshelev stated
the Russian delegation had just received the Russian

translation of the JDT at the beginning of this meeting and
so had not had the opportunity to study it. As a follow-up
to the previous day's discussion, Koshelev referred back to
the treaty Article XIII (BCC) and questioned what
"activities" come under the BCC. Should the BCC have other
meetings besides the "sessions" called for in the protocol?
Noting that at yesterday's meeting, Taylor had mentioned
exhibitions. Koshelev stated that exhibitions were not
sessions. Referencing START's Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC),Koshelev declared that this
body had no other activities except sessions. The JCIC could
make decisions at such sessions but the event itself, e.g.,
an exhibition, came under the purview of another organization
such as a military unit. Taylor countered that sessions were
held in Geneva under the JCIC but that the framework of the
JCIC also included notifications, agendas, and
communications. Also, decisions on demonstrations such as
Russia's 2005 proposal on supplemental radiation detection
equipment (RDE),the U.S. proposal on Trident reentry vehicle
on-site inspection (RVOSI),and the Minuteman III front
section demonstration were all made within the framework of
the JCIC. Admiral Kuznetsov responded that the JCIC practice
was to only conduct sessions. Kuznetsov proposed that if
both delegations intended for the BCC to go outside of the
JCIC construct, then this should be discussed now. Ries and
Koshelev agreed.


11. (S) Kuznetsov stated that he had carefully reviewed the
BCC Protocol that had been provided by the U.S. side and
observed that it only referenced "sessions." (Begin comment:
Document had been handed over only ten minutes earlier. End
Comment.) There was no mention of any other activities such


as "meetings." Koshelev stated that Kuznetsov's observations
had gained the attention of the Russian Prime Minister's
Legal Department. They discerned that the terms "meetings"
and "sessions" were typically used in discussions but that
the BCC Protocol contained only the term "sessions."
Koshelev put forward that if the two terms were to be used,
they must be defined within the framework of the BCC. (Begin
comment: The term "meeting" was in the U.S.- and
Russian-proposed BCC protocols, Paragraph 3 and 6
respectively. End comment.)

--------------
THE BCC PROTOCOL
--------------


12. (S) Ries stated that as with other treaties, there were
always some unresolved items and details at the time of
signature. Experience showed having an agreed channel made
for easier resolution of such issues. After START was
signed, the JCIC began meeting shortly afterwards and it
accomplished a good deal of useful work. For these reasons,
the U.S. delegation advocated for a provisional application
for launching the BCC. With that, Ries proposed going through
the document, highlighting the differences between the U.S.
and Russian versions and providing rationale for the U.S.
text. Koshelev asked if there was anything different from
START. Dean replied that it was substantially the same.
Kuznetsov noted that in developing the Russian version, the
writers removed clauses that were seldom or never used such
as the special session. The objective was to make it shorter
and clearer.


13. (S) Ries asked for the Russian view on provisional
application. Kotkova replied that this would be solved when
the other working groups finished their work. For example,
the Inspection Protocol Working Group was considering putting
the development of some inspection procedures under the BCC.
If this happened, there would be a need for a provisional
application but if everything was resolved by the working
groups, there would be no need for one.


14. (S) Starting in Section I, Composition of the
Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries stated that the United States
favored having the names of the BCC commissioners exchanged
30 days after "signature" vice after "entry into force"
because of the possibility of provisional application. Also
in Paragraph 1, Ries concurred with the Russian version of
the Parties communicating "through diplomatic channels"
because the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center was viewed as a
diplomatic channel. In Paragraph 3, Ries explained that the
term "head representative" provided for more flexibility than
"commissioner," since in the U.S. proposal a session of the
Commission may be convened without the participation of the
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner. In such a case,
each Party could be represented by their alternates, members,
advisors or experts.


15. (S) In Section II, Convening a Session of the
Commission, Paragraph 1, Ries asked why the Russian version
proposed two obligatory BCC sessions per year. Koshelev
replied that in the last 2 years, as the head of the Russian
delegation to the JCIC, he had experienced difficulties in
calling together a JCIC meeting. However, Koshelev agreed to


reconsider the Russian position. In the same paragraph,
regarding the agenda, Ries noted the Russian version stated
that in regard to the reply to a request for a BCC session,
the other Party "may express its consent to the proposals
received." Did that mean that a Party had a right to object?
Koshelev replied that every one of a Party's concerns should
be discussed; the BCC should address all questions. In
Paragraph 3, Ries explained the U.S version "...the
Commission shall remain in session..." was more precise than
the Russian version "shall last no longer than..." Continuing
with Paragraph 4, referring to the phrase "The
Commissioner...may communicate with the Commissioner of the
other Party..." Ries explained that the U.S. version "may"
was preferable to the Russian version "shall." Koshelev
replied that the Russian Ambassador to the United States
wanted all communications to go through the Russian Embassy
in Washington. For that reason, Koshelev preferred the U.S.
version that allowed the BCC Commissioners to communicate
with each other at their discretion. Lastly in this
paragraph, the Russian version had the phrase "concerning
questions that are related to the competency of the
Commission." Ries queried on the use of the term
"competency." The delegations ascertained that it was a
translation issue; Koshelev said a better word in English may
be "authority."


16. (S) The Russian version had deleted Section III,
Convening a Special Session of the Commission. Ries stated
that that U.S. version kept it because it allowed for a
quicker convening of a BCC session to address an urgent
issue. Koshelev noted that a special session had never been
called for in the 15 years of START. Kotkova offered that
for such scenarios, the BCC commissioners were already
empowered to communicate directly.


17. (S) Lastly, in Section V, Work of the Commission, the
Russian version proposed to dispense with the provision for
the authenticity of the BCC documents. Kotkova argued that
since this was already common legal practice and appeared in
each of the Commission's documents, it did not need restating
in the protocol. Dean countered that the authenticity
statement needed to be retained to ensure the practice
continued. Ries suggested resolving this at the next
meeting.


18. (S) Documents exchanged:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of the Bilateral Consultative
Commission, dated September 30, 2009 (English and unofficial
Russian)


19. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Mr. Sims
Mr. Taylor


Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Adm. Kuznetsov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER