START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000852

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) FOURTH MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) (RUSSIAN
FEDERATION-PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX TEXT)

B. GENEVA 0850 (SFO-GVA-V-029)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-032.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 30, 2009
Time: 10:00 a.m. - 12:50 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The fourth meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group completed a review of the U.S.
side-by-side comparison of the categories of data in, and
structures of, the U.S.-proposed MOU and the Russian-proposed
Annex Section II (Ref A). The Russian delegation also
completed its presentation on the main composition and
structure of the Russian-proposed MOU database.


4. (S) The sides exchanged opposing views on whether or not
to include listings of support equipment, existing types, and
space launch facilities in the MOU. While the Russian
delegation debated that support equipment listings were no
longer needed in the MOU, the U.S. side defended its
inclusion to support the inspection regime. The Russian side
probed the U.S. rationale for not considering the Peacekeeper
ICBM and Trident I SLBM to be existing types in the new
treaty. Lastly, the sides discussed the Russian proposal to
merge space launch facilities and test ranges into one
category of facility in the MOU.

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A FEW LEFT OVER ISSUES FROM BEFORE
--------------


5. (S) Quickly summarizing the previous meeting's work,
General Orlov invited Mr. Trout to complete his presentation
of the U.S. side-by-side comparison of the two approaches to
structuring the MOU (Ref B).


6. (S) Trout opened by seeking clarification on whether
Russia intended to retain both loading facilities and static
displays as categories of data in the MOU. Orlov agreed to
retain loading facilities and agreed in principle to removing
static displays. Trout asked whether Orlov could agree to
list space launch facilities and eliminated facilities in
their respective sections of the MOU. Orlov stated that his
delegation would think about space launch facilities and
questioned the need for the eliminated facility section.
Trout explained that a listing of eliminated facilities was
needed to support formerly declared facility inspections
proposed by the United States. Orlov said Russia would
consider it, but did not see any major problem with it.

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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
--------------




7. (S) Trout and Orlov agreed with retaining a section
containing technical data on ICBMs and SLBMs except for the
proposed addition of throw-weight by the U.S side. Orlov
urged that it be left out as it was no longer needed in the
new treaty.


8. (S) Seeking clarification on Russia's decision to remove
fixed structures and support equipment from the MOU, Trout
asked Orlov how inspectors would be able to recognize support
equipment. Citing the U.S.-proposed ban on support equipment
at eliminated facilities, Trout described the dilemma for
inspectors of trying to confirm the absence of items that had
never been declared or identified in the first place. Orlov
agreed to think about the issue before Colonel Ryzhkov firmly
reminded the U.S. delegation that only strategic offensive
arms (SOA) would have to be removed from a facility in order
for it to be considered eliminated. As such there was no
need to list additional items.


9. (S) Using training model of missiles (TMOM) as an example
of support equipment, Trout asked how inspectors would know
the TMOM was not an SOA if the TMOM was never declared in the
MOU. Ryzhkov declared that the focus of inspectors at an
eliminated facility should be on the absence of SOA and not
support equipment. He affirmed that the Russian side did not
consider support equipment accountable under the new treaty.
Trout explained that the United States envisioned retaining
some of the same MOU data and structure from the START Treaty
to facilitate verification, and related how TMOMs could be
confused for actual ICBMs and SLBMs.


10. (S) Attempting to shift the focus of the discussion,
Orlov asked the U.S. delegation what other types of support
equipment would be of concern. After reading the definition
of support equipment from the U.S.-proposed Definitions
Annex, Trout asked if launch-associated support vehicles
(LASV),a type of support equipment associated with
road-mobile launchers, could remain at an eliminated ICBM
base. Orlov said that the LASVs would not be located at such
a closed-out facility but could be relocated to an
operational base.


11. (S) Asking whether the U.S. side was prepared to accept
similar procedures, Colonel Novikov related how the United
States had declared support equipment associated with heavy
bombers and had provided an MOU photograph of the equipment,
but subsequently refused to allow inspectors to search for
such items during the close-out inspections of certain air
bases. Trout stated that support equipment, by definition,
was not applicable to heavy bombers and reminded the Russian
delegation that information on the heavy bomber equipment in
question was provided in START simply as transparency.

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BACK TO THE MOU ANNEXES
--------------


12. (S) Trout compared the last three sections of the U.S.-
and Russian-proposed MOU, which showed that the Russian side
was in agreement with the U.S.-proposed MOU structure, but
not necessarily content, for heavy bomber technical data
(U.S. MOU Annex G),heavy bomber nuclear armament technical


data (U.S. MOU Annex H) and other data (U.S. MOU Annex I).
Russian had not considered the U.S. proposal to reorganize
the section on heavy bomber technical data. Both sides
agreed to discuss MOU Annex J during a later meeting.

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COMBINING SPACE LAUNCH
FACILITIES AND TEST RANGES
--------------


13. (S) Referring to a proposal provided by the Russian side
during the previous meeting of the MOU Working Group, Orlov
asked whether the two sides could agree to combine space
launch facilities (SLF) and test ranges into a single type of
facility. Trout stated that the United States was still
evaluating the concept but had some concerns with the
implementation of the Russian proposal. Later, Mr. DeNinno
requested further clarification citing potential
inconsistencies between the Russian proposal and the
Russian-proposed treaty text. He reminded the members of the
working group that the U.S.-proposed treaty prohibits test
launchers from being located at SLFs and imposes different
verification measures on SLFs and test ranges. Specifically,
test ranges are subject to inspection while SLFs are not.


14. (S) Ryzhkov asked whether the United States believed
that this merge would increase transparency. Trout replied
that it would be difficult to determine that if the United
States does not completely understand the details of the
Russian proposal. Ryzhkov then asked how the situation at
Leninsk would be different from the U.S. SLF at Meck Island.
Trout explained that Meck Island was an SLF declared under
START, but that under the U.S.-proposal, Trident I was no
longer an accountable missile. There would be no prohibition
against its location there.


15. (S) Referring to patterns of cooperation, DeNinno asked
how Russia planned to treat transfers of SOA to Kazakhstan if
SOA was not being transferred to a third Party. Since an
item being delivered to Leninsk remained under Russian
control, Ryzhkov stated that they did not plan on
transferring such an item to a third party. He continued by
assuring the U.S. delegation that an appropriate notification
(analogous to a START Format 144) would be sent reporting the
movement of any such item and that the item would remain
accountable under the treaty until launched. Such items
would only be in Kazakhstan for a short time. Referring to
an ICBM or SLBM being relocated to Leninsk, Trout asked where
the accountable item would be listed in the MOU. General
Poznihir said that the location would be designated in the
MOU to the assigned base or storage facility, but provided no
further details.

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PEACEKEEPER AND TRIDENT I
--------------


16. (S) In response to Orlov's inquiry as to where the
United States planned on listing the 50 Peacekeeper ICBM
silos, Trout declared the silos were non-functional and,
under the U.S. proposal, would not be subject to the new
treaty. Referring to a U.S.-proposed silo elimination
method, Orlov asked whether the United States intended to


fill the 50 silos with gravel before signature of the new
treaty. Trout indicated that the United States had made no
decision on eliminating these launchers and that acceptance
of the simplified elimination procedures could affect whether
the silos ended up in the MOU.


17. (S) Following a similar inquiry concerning Trident I
launchers on the four U.S. modified SSBNs, Trout explained
that the Trident I launchers in question would not be
included in the MOU data as they were not existing types
under the U.S. approach to the new treaty. Orlov asked twice
how the Russians would be able to confirm this, to which
Trout replied that is a matter for the Inspection Protocol
Working Group.


18. (S) After a quick break, Mr. Buttrick clarified the U.S.
position regarding Peacekeeper and Trident I by reminding the
Russian delegation that only the existing types of strategic
offensive arms listed in paragraph 9 of Article III to the
U.S.-proposed treaty would be considered accountable. He
emphasized that neither Peacekeeper nor Trident I would be
listed as existing types. He continued by declaring that the
Peacekeeper ICBM was no longer deployed and that the silos
did not contain ICBMs or warheads. Similarly, he stated that
the tubes on the four modified SSBNs did not contain SLBMs or
warheads and could no longer be used as SLBM launchers. He
referred any additional questions about existing types to the
Treaty Text and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG).


19. (S) Orlov stressed that the launchers remained in
existence and should remain declared as non-deployed items in
these cases. Mr. Luchaninov asserted that it was the job of
the MOU Working Group to provide an initial listing of MOU
data to the TTDWG. Nevertheless, Trout cautioned the Russian
delegation to not get ahead of the TTDWG since that group had
not yet discussed what the existing types would be.


20. (S) Orlov also asked whether the United States intended
to provide data on B-1s that had been converted to
non-nuclear heavy bombers and those B-1s that remained
unconverted. Trout assured him that data would be provided
in both cases but reminded Orlov that the U.S. proposal
considered any nuclear-capable heavy bomber converted to
non-nuclear status as eliminated from accountability.

--------------
WE ARE CLOSER THAN YOU THINK
--------------


21. (S) Orlov quickly completed his review of the Russian
summary of items to be included in the MOU emphasizing two
points. He sought agreement on the proposed listing of types
of bases and the type of data to be exchanged for such bases.
Noting that most of the information corresponded to the U.S.
approach, Trout stated that the United States saw no need to
list silo launch control centers or other launch control
centers as proposed by the Russians.


22. (S) Orlov opined that the sides' approaches to
structuring the MOU were actually very similar and proposed
looking beyond the differences in the titles of sections.
Trout and Orlov agreed to have separate sections for ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers similar to the START structure.


Additionally, Orlov proposed placing aggregate numbers up
front in these sections followed by the lists of bases and
other facilities. He then agreed to consider the U.S.
approach for including space launch facilities and eliminated
facilities.


23. (S) The two sides agreed to each prepare joint draft
texts of the MOU before the next negotiation session.


24. (U) Documents exchanged:

U.S.

- U.S.-Proposed Inspection Protocol Annexes 1-14, dated
September 15, 2009; and

- U.S.-Proposed Elimination Protocol, dated September
24, 2009.


25. (U) Participants:

U.S.:

Mr. Trout
LtCol Blevins
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
LT Lobner
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Amb Antonov
Mr. Kostyuchenko
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Col Novikov
Mr. Pishchulov
Gen Poznikhir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER