START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) CLOSING PLENARY, OCTOBER 1, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-036.


2. (U) Meeting Date: October 1, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) U.S. and Russian delegations met at the Russian
Mission to conclude the fifth session of START Follow-on
negotiations in Geneva. Working group chairmen from each
side reported on their activities, and the heads of
delegations reviewed accomplishments and the critical issues
that still required resolution. They also previewed plans
and objectives for meetings in Moscow during the week of
October 12. The working group reports made it clear that key
accomplishments for this session were the establishment of
very positive working relationships between each of the
working group chairmen, and the development of a pattern of
work. It was evident the sides had developed a high level of
mutual respect, which should facilitate resumption and
acceleration of work at the next session. Also clear,
however, was that the working groups had reached the point
where the sides needed to resolve key differences in
principle between U.S. and Russian positions to enable
substantive progress. The working group reports identified
accomplishments across all groups on structural and certain
conceptual issues, but the impact of the critical differences
across the range of issues was very evident.

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TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP
--------------


4. (S) Ambassador Ries provided a summary of the Treaty Text
and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG). The TTDWG had focused
on the treaty's preamble, final articles, and the article and
protocol on the work of the Bilateral Consultative Commission
(BCC),as these provisions provided the framework for the
substance of the treaty. The TTDWG had made good progress on
the preamble, though bracketed text remained associated with
the offense-defense relationship, missiles deployed with
non-nuclear warheads, and the principle of equal security.
For the final articles, the U.S. delegation emphasized the
importance of jointly considering treaty extension, but there
remained bracketed text on this concept, as well as on the
notification time for withdrawal. The U.S. delegation had
presented the U.S.-proposed text for the BCC article and
associated protocol. One of the key issues that remained
concerned the U.S. proposal for provisional application to
allow the BCC to operate upon treaty signature. Ries
requested Russia consider this during the intersession.


5. (S) Mr. Koshelev agreed with the summary presented. He
added that the dialogue and working relationship within the
group was very positive. There were some issues of principle
remaining in the preamble, but he felt that formulations that
would satisfy each Party were possible. On the final
articles and the BCC, the Russian approach was to utilize the

most successful elements of these portions from the START
Treaty, while streamlining the text. The United States had
instead retained as much as possible from START. The sides
needed to find a resolution to these competing approaches as
well to the issues of principle to facilitate work on the
remaining articles, and the work within the other groups.


6. (S) Adding to the summary, Ambassador Antonov said the
TTDWG needed more participation by military and technical
experts to address key issues. Otherwise it would be held
hostage to the other working groups. The working groups and
experts would need to provide input on the relevant portions
of the treaty text, and then the TTDWG would need to merge
the text. Counting rules, for example, should not be
resolved by the TTDWG alone. A/S Gottemoeller agreed to
discuss this further during the week of October 12 in Moscow,
and raised the possibility of establishing special ad hoc
working groups for these types of issues.

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INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP
--------------


7. (S) Col Ilin provided his assessment of the Inspection
Protocol Working Group (IPWG). He characterized the work as
highly professional and constructive. The IPWG had agreed in
concept to two sections of the Inspection Protocol, as well
as the overall approach to work within the IPWG. The
delegations agreed to take as homework the preparation of
their own versions of Joint Draft Text (JDT),reconsidering
their own positions and those of the other side. A key
accomplishment was agreement on a three-tier approach to the
treaty. The first tier would include the treaty text and
procedures. The second would be for the protocol and
annexes. The third would equate to a practical manual for
inspectors that would be adopted at a lower level. The
remaining problems for the group were tied to the key
outstanding issues between the United States and Russia. As
an example, it would be impossible to resolve the types and
numbers of inspections until the sides resolved counting
rules for the new treaty.


8. (S) Dr. Warner agreed with Ilin's assessment. The
working group had established a pattern of work and was
gaining momentum. He noted specifically the progress made on
characterizing the types of inspections under the new treaty:
inspections for deployed strategic offensive arms and
warheads; and inspection-visits for non-deployed strategic
offensive arms and exhibitions, including confirming
conversion or elimination procedures. Remaining differences
included agreement on the annual numbers of inspections and
facilities to be inspected, and agreement, even at the
conceptual level, for nuclear warhead inspections, especially
for nuclear armaments for heavy bombers.


9. (S) Gottemoeller complimented Warner and Ilin on
pioneering the three-tier approach. The U.S. delegation
believed a streamlined treaty based on a three-tier structure
was a good idea, with the understanding that the treaty text
and protocols, which would contain the obligations and rights
of the Parties, must appear in the first and second tier, and
that the third tier would consist of lower-level detailed
procedures. The three tiers would form a legally-binding
package and all three would be ratified by the U.S. Senate.



10. (S) Antonov clarified the Russian concept for the three
tiers. Specifically, the first and second tiers would
require ratification. The third would not. It would be
lower in status, perhaps in the form of an Executive
Agreement. While recognizing that the U.S. delegation
believed all three tiers should be ratified, only ratifying
the first two provided room for maneuver. This was an idea
the sides should consider further. On this point,
Gottemoeller noted that the legislative bodies in each
country would ratify in accordance with their own
constitutional procedures.

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ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP
--------------


11. (S) Mr. Elliott provided a summary of the Elimination
Working Group (EWG). The approach of the EWG had been very
professional. The group stood out in the sense that much of
the work during the session focused on concepts, and the
sides had made significant progress toward understanding the
concepts laid out by the other. As a result, each had been
able to accept certain approaches of the other. Due to the
need to focus so much on concepts, however, there had been
little progress toward developing JDT, though this could now
begin. There were also significant differences regarding the
U.S. approach for eliminating mobile missiles. The sides
would need to spend the next 2 weeks considering larger
issues in order to focus the work of the delegations during
the next session in Geneva.


12. (S) Col Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his assessment, and
noted the U.S. members of the EWG were very professional and
a pleasure to work with. They had made important progress;
for example, it was clear both sides agreed that procedures
should be less expensive and there should be greater
flexibility regarding options for elimination. The sides
also agreed on verification at the conceptual level:
inspection should supplement national technical means of
verification (NTM). Differences were that the United States
sought more inspections, while Russia sought fewer. However,
there were areas where work on text could begin, such as
elimination procedures for silo launchers. Gottemoeller
added that flexibility regarding elimination procedures was
an important concept, but it was also important that the
sides be able to confirm new elimination procedures prior to
eliminations.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP
--------------


13. (S) MGen Orlov thanked the U.S. members of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group for both
listeningQd hearing what Russian members had said. This
helped create a constructive atmosphere for the work from the
start. He was impressed by the younger members of the group,
who posed some of the most challenging questions. The U.S.
and Russian delegations agreed on several elements of the
MOU. However, U.S. and Russian differences on key issues for
the new treaty impacted the ability of the MOU Working Group
to resolve certain essential elements. During the
intersession, the Russian side would finish developing a JDT

for the next session that would take the U.S. view into
account to the maximum extent possible. Final results for
the MOU would depend on work in the other groups.


14. (S) Mr. Trout agreed, noting that the overall structure
did not depend on resolving issues within other groups. The
U.S. delegation had accepted the Russian-proposed structure
for the MOU, including Russia's-proposed sections and
annexes, though it proposed splitting out sections for ICBMs,
SLBMs and heavy bombers. Russia did not initially include
data on space launch and elimination facilities, but would
consider this further during the intersession. Key
outstanding issues affecting the MOU included central limits,
mobile missiles, and the approaches of the sides for counting
heavy bomber nuclear armaments, which under the Russian
approach would only include nuclear ALCMs or gravity bombs
when loaded on heavy bombers.

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SUMMARY OFQEY ISSUES
--------------


15. (S) Summarizing the session, Gottemoeller said her goals
had been met. The delegations agreed to an overall structure
for the treaty (the three-tier structure),established an
active working group schedule, and completed a JDT for the
treaty articles and begun the process of agreeing to text.
The pace for the next session would need to accelerate,
however. For meetings in Moscow the week of October 12, her
goals included reviewing the treaty articles to ensure all
significant issues had been identified. With the issues of
principle clearly reflected in the JDT, the sides could study
them in context. Gottemoeller provided the Russian
delegation with a U.S.-proposed merged text of the treaty
articles. Text will be reported septel.


16. (S) Antonov agreed the sides had a much better
understanding of each other, and the sides had begun to take
each other's views into account. They had conducted the work
during the session in a friendly, business-like manner. He
considered this session training for the real work ahead,
however. He then identified ten problematic issues for
resolution, which he provided in written form.

Begin text of official translation of the Russian paper:

Official Translation

Handed over by the
Russian Side on
October 1, 2009

Problematic Issues


1. Reaching agreement on numerical limits on deployed
delivery vehicles for SOAs.



2. Reaching agreement on numerical limits on deployed and
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and launchers of SLBMs.


3. Removing Peacekeeper and Minuteman II ICBMs and their
launchers from accountability under the new treaty, and
removing converted submarines and heavy bombers from the

verification regime.


4. Inseparable interrelationship between SOAs and MD.


5. Non-nuclear configuration of ICBMs and SLBMs.


6. Retaining the continuous monitoring regime at the
production facility for mobile ICBMs.


7. Special limitations and verification measures for mobile
ICBMs, which are not envisaged for other kinds of mobile SOAs.


8. Retaining in the new treaty the provisions on exchanging
telemetric information.


9. Tightening up verification measures for SOAs (increasing
the number of inspections, while reducing the number of
facilities to be inspected).


10. Removing "new kinds of SOAs" tested for non-nuclear
purposes from coverage under the future agreement.

End text.


17. (S) Gottemoeller noted that she also had a list of ten
items requiring resolution, though two from Antonov's list
were not included: telemetry and continuous monitoring, as
the United States had already advanced these issues in the
previous round and they were a mature part of the U.S.
position. Her list was:

- The Russian-proposed third aggregate ceiling for
deployed and non-deployed launchers.

- Russia's proposal to only count nuclear ALCMs and
bombs that are loaded on heavy bombers.

- The concept of fewer inspections, and the distinction
between inspections and inspection-visits.

- Russia's concept that under the treaty there should
be no difference between road-mobile missiles and any other
"mobile" system, such as submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.

- The U.S. proposal not to count new types of missiles
developed solely for non-nuclear warheads, and not to count
non-nuclear warheads on existing systems.

- Russian objections to the U.S. approach for counting
heavy bomber armaments in heavy bomber weapon storage areas.

- U.S. and Russian differences on incorporating
provisions on strategic defensive arms.

- For the MOU, whether technical characteristics such
as maximum numbers of reentry vehicles flight tested should
be included for missiles as a transparency measure.

- The Russian proposal to merge space launch and test
facilities within the MOU, and the implications of this.

- Russia's concerns regarding "phantom" launchers,
including the Peacekeeper missile silos attributed under

START that would not be captured under the new treaty.

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PLANS FOR MOSCOW
--------------


18. (S) Antonov asked Gottemoeller to describe her
objectives and plans for the proposed meetings in Moscow
during the week of October 12. Supporting the U.S.-proposed
meetings would be difficult due to the planned meetings that
week between Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov, and Under
Secretary Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov.
Further, finding meeting space and interpreters to support
several different meetings of U.S. and Russian working group
chairmen could be problematic. From Russia's perspective, it
would be most useful for the U.S. delegation in Moscow to
present information on two issues. He provided a paper
detailing suggested U.S. briefing topics:

Begin text:

Suggested U.S. Briefing Topics of Interest to the RF


1. Approach to counting, in the new treaty, delivery
vehicles and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs currently
attributed to the U.S. under the START Treaty.


2. The concept of new kind of non-nuclear SOAs and
the U.S. approach to accounting for them in the new agreement.

End text.


19. (S) Gottemoeller recognized the complexity of the
multiple meetings in Moscow, but assured Antonov that the
U.S. delegation would be flexible and prepared to meet during
any available time. The U.S. delegation would bring
additional interpreters to support the meetings. In addition
to specific issues for discussion, she suggested the
delegations discuss the idea of establishing focused working
groups to address certain key issues, such as counting rules
and monitoring of mobile missiles.


20. (S) Antonov indicated he was not excited about having
the U.S. delegation in Moscow during the week of October 12,
and pushed back some on the idea of establishing special
working groups. He was disappointed that the United States
had not accepted Russia's proposal for meetings in Geneva
related to missile defense, as the Russian experts were all
there. He and several of the other Russian representatives
would be involved attending or supporting the Clinton-Lavrov
and Tauscher-Ryabkov meetings, as missile defense issues
would be a principal focus. Further, he had not agreed that
special working groups should be established; rather, his
point on the matter was that he did not want to leave certain
issues to the TTDWG to resolve, such as counting rules, and
transparency for non-deployed ICBMs, including for mobile
ICBMs. These issues would require expertise from the other
working groups.


21. (S) Gottemoeller clarified that the United States had
preferred for missile defense discussions to take place in
Moscow during the week of October 12 because that was when
top U.S. experts such as General O'Reilly would be available
to participate.




22. (U) Documents exchanged:

- U.S.:

-- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text for the Treaty
Articles, dated October 1, 2009.


23. (U) Participants:

U.S.:

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Ms. Bobiak
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dean
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

Russia:

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Col Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
MGen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Rudenko
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Tarasov
Mr. Vasiliev
Mr. Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


24. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER