START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) FOURTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP,
SEPTEMBER 28, 2009, P.M. SESSION

REF: JOINT UNDERSTANDING APRIL 6 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-026.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 28, 2009
Time: 3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) At the fourth Treaty Text and Definitions Working
Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties continued
discussion of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for
the treaty Preamble. Agreement was reached on the title,
opening and closing statements and six paragraphs. Brackets
remained on nine paragraphs. Delegation has prepared a
complete U.S.-proposed merged text for the draft
START-Follow-on Treaty, which includes the results of the
final discussion on the Preamble. That U.S.-proposed text
will be sent septel.


4. (S) The Russian side engaged the U.S. side in discussions
on the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and
missile defense systems and on the connection of the
Ukrainian contribution to START and its accession to the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). At the end of the meeting it
was agreed that the heads of the delegations would attempt to
develop agreed language on these issues.

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WHERE WE STAND - THE EASY STUFF
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5. (S) At the fourth meeting of the TTDWG, the Parties began
the meeting by agreeing on the Russian-proposed formulation
of the treaty title and also the phrase "Have agreed as
follows," which appeared at the end of the Preamble. Mr.
Koshelev summarized the current state of play for the
remainder of the Preamble noting the agreed upon text and the
text that remained bracketed. The sides agreed to leave the
paragraph on the "devastating consequences of nuclear war"
bracketed since agreement could not be reached on removing
the reference to nuclear war.

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EQUAL SECURITY FOR THE PARTIES
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6. (S) Moving on to the discussion of the paragraph which
began with "Guided by the principle...," Ambassador Ries
observed the importance of retaining the second part of the
paragraph since it had implications all along the range of
the U.S.-Russian relationship. She asked Koshelev whether
the Russian side preferred "all Parties" or "both Parties"
when formulating the text of the first sentence. Koshelev
stated the Russian side could agree with either formulation,
however, if agreement could be reached on including "equal
security," discussion of the paragraph could be concluded.


The first part of the sentence in the JDT was changed to
"Guided by the principle of equal security for both Parties,"
and that part of the sentence would remain bracketed as
Russian text.

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VERIFICATION MECHANISM
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7. (S) In reference to the paragraph which began with
"Desiring to create a mechanism...," Ries stated that
verification was an important and essential part of this
treaty and as such needed to be mentioned in the Preamble in
order to strengthen its place within the treaty.
Additionally, a robust verification regime required
mentioning in the Preamble. Ries asked Koshelev whether the
Russian concern was simply a matter of wording or was the
concern conceptual. Koshelev stated that the text of this
paragraph had originally been proposed by Russia in response
to treaty text proposed by the last U.S. Administration.
That treaty text had not put forth a verification mechanism
but rather was built on confidence building measures and
transparency. Since the U.S.-proposal had now changed the
Russian delegation saw no need to specify this concept in the
Preamble. It was sufficient that the verification mechanism
was developed inside the treaty and Koshelev did not see the
Russian position on this changing. Further discussion on
this Preamble paragraph could be conducted once the
appropriate working groups made their decisions on
verification mechanisms. It was decided that this paragraph
would remain bracketed, now as U.S. text.

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MISSILE DEFENSE, A RUSSIAN REDLINE
--------------


8. (S) An extremely energetic discussion on missile defense
began with Ries' statement that the U.S.-proposed formulation
for the paragraph on the interrelationship between strategic
offensive and defensive arms was consistent with the Joint
Understanding from the Moscow Summit (Reftel). In fact, with
the exception of "Recognizing," the U.S.-proposed formulation
used the same text from the Joint Understanding. Koshelev
understood that the Joint Understanding included the
requirement for a "Provision" because the two Presidents left
it up to the negotiators to decide on the proper formulation
to describe the interrelationship between strategic offensive
and strategic defensive arms and for the Russian side this
meant finding the correct wording for "strategic defensive
arms." Defensive arms had a very broad meaning of which a
missile defense system and its components was a part. Given
this, the Russian side proceeded from the idea the Presidents
required the negotiators to develop wording describing the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and the
deployment of a missile defense system. Use of the phrase
"defensive arms" did not meet the Russian understanding of
the Joint Understanding and U.S. insistence on its use
crossed a Russian redline. The Russian side could not sign a
treaty without the stated interrelationship between strategic
offensive arms and deployment of missile defense systems.


9. (S) Ries put forth that by placing "Recognizing" ahead of
interrelationship text as the U.S. side had proposed, the


Presidential instructions were being met. When asked by
Koshelev, Mr. Taylor stated that "Recognized" was a stronger
word in the English formulation than use of the phrase
"Taking note of" in the Russian formulation. Koshelev
accepted "Recognizing," since, as Taylor suggested, it showed
a strong history of the issue. As for the interrelationship
language, Ries stated it was worth noting the United States
and Russia were planning and had begun some cooperation on
defenses to common threats. Earlier in the discussion,
Koshelev had stated that he had a formulation that was going
to be provided to Ambassador Antonov. When asked, Koshelev
provided the following formulation: "Recognizing the
inseparable interrelationship between the reduction of
strategic offensive arms and the deployment and build-up of
missile defense systems and their components." Admiral (Ret)
Kuznetsov and General Venevtsev attempted to sidetrack the
discussions by engaging the U.S. side on U.S./Russian
mil-to-mil cooperation in the area of non-strategic defensive
arms and pressing for a definition of strategic defensive
arms, which added little to the cross table discussion.

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INDISSOLUBLE GONE
--------------


10. (S) Koshelev cleared up confusion on the use of the word
"indissoluble" within the paragraph. The Russian side
corrected the English translation by stating it had used the
word "inseparable" which meant unbreakable like a rock, which
was not as strong as "indissoluble." Since the first part of
the paragraph would remain bracketed as a Russian proposal,
the sides agreed to show Russia's preferred word.

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FROM ONE ENERGETIC DISCUSSION TO ANOTHER
--------------


11. (S) In the Russian-proposed formulation of the paragraph
which began with "Highly appreciating the contribution
of...," Ries recommended replacing "Highly" with "Deeply" and
adding "under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of July 1, 1968" to the end of the paragraph. This
suggestion touched off the second extremely energetic
discussion of the meeting. Koshelev stated that proposed
text needed to avoid any connection of Ukraine's contribution
to START with Ukraine's' accession to the NPT, which was a
requirement of becoming a Party to START. In Russia's view,
Ukraine had acceded to the NPT only after receiving security
assurances from the United States and Russia. Russia was
convinced that Ukraine believed that these security
assurances would no longer be in effect once START expired.
As such, any stated connection between START and Ukraine's'
accession to the NPT in the text of the new treaty might lead
Ukraine to assert there was a legal right to ask for
additional security assurances beyond those within the NPT.
Koshelev expressed his concern that highlighting this
connection could lead Ukraine to use its NPT membership as
leverage to demand new security assurances. Koshelev stated
that except for the phrase directly referring to the NPT, the
Russian side had no problems with the U.S.-proposed text.
The proposed text was needed to praise Ukraine on its
contribution to nuclear disarmament, not on its contribution
to non-nuclear proliferation; and specifically to its


adherence to the NPT.

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EQUAL SECURITY
--------------


12. (S) On a less energetic note, the sides agreed to delete
the first sentence in the paragraph on equal security since
the phrase "equal security" had already been added to a prior
paragraph. Koshelev stated that he believed the Russian side
would be agreeable to "for all Parties" but this had to be
decided by Antonov. Ries mentioned that the second thought
in the paragraph beginning with "believing that global
challenges and threats..." was a useful concept. Koshelev
agreed and the sides retained the remaining text but left it
bracketed for further consideration.

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MINDFUL SIGNIFICANCE
--------------


13. (S) Koshelev questioned the reason for using
"significance" in the paragraph regarding strategic ballistic
missiles in a non-nuclear configuration. The Russian side
believed the word did not relay the negative impact of
non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability. Ries
replied that in the U.S. view "significance" did not relay a
positive or negative impact; it just recognized the effect of
a non-nuclear strategic ballistic missile. Koshelev could
not agree with this assessment since further in the treaty,
Russia proposed a ban on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs and the
U.S. proposed not to include them in the limit on strategic
delivery vehicles. These provisions pointed to the negative
impact of these systems. For the Russian side this was the
second most important issue behind missile defense. Without
an understanding of the importance of non-nuclear arms,
treaty signature was impossible.


14. (S) Koshelev attempted a re-attack by suggesting the
formulation, "Agreeing that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration have an impact on strategic stability," to
which Ries replied that this formulation continued to show
that there was agreement that an impact existed. The two
sides agreed that the brackets would remain and left the
formulation of the paragraph to the Heads of the Delegations.

--------------
FINALLY, THE FINAL PROVISIONS
--------------


15. (S) Koshelev believed the differences in the U.S.- and
Russian-proposed texts in paragraph 1 of Russian-proposed
Treaty Article XV/U.S.-proposed Treaty Article XIV on
entry-into-force were mainly editorial. Unfortunately he
handed the discussion of the formulation over to his lawyer
and the word war began. Ms. Kotkova stated she understood
this formulation existed in QART, but recognized each side
had its own procedures for ratifying a treaty. The Russian
side saw only one reason that the U.S.-proposed text included
language on constitutional procedures and that reason was to
please the U.S. Senate. Mr. Dean replied that he was happy
to hear that both sides were not suggesting
non-constitutional language to ratify the treaty. He noted


the language was included in the START and Moscow Treaties
and was standard ratification language. It was unambiguous
and did no harm as part of the treaty. The U.S. Senate
expected to see this language in the treaty and removal could
raise questions in the Senate. The Senate could view
deletion as the Parties ignoring its constitutional role in
the treaty process and jeopardize U.S. ratification.


16. (S) Kotova asked whether the United States had
procedures other than constitutional procedures to ratify an
international agreement. Dean responded in the negative and
a hushed "Touche" was heard coming from the other side of the
table.


17. (S) Ries stated that this language usually was seen in
the formulation of treaty text and leaving it out may impute
questions. Koshelev stated he did not believe that removing
the text would jeopardize the treaty and that the Russian
side saw the new treaty as an opportunity to simplify
procedures. The sides agreed to keep the formulation in the
JDT and leave it for further discussion. Koshelev also
suggested leaving the text on treaty structure bracketed
until this had been decided on in the working groups.

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A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME
--------------


18. (S) Kotkova recognized that each side had its own way of
referring to the Moscow Treaty in paragraph 2. Whereas the
U.S. side referred to it as the Moscow Treaty, the Russian
side used a shorter version of the official name of the
treaty; the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the
United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions of
May 24, 2002. She recommended that since the long title was
used in the Preamble, it should be used again here for
consistency. Ries asked whether there were any negative
connotations to referring to the treaty as the Moscow Treaty,
to which Kotkova responded that Russia officially called the
treaty Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Ries
believed resolution could wait until the issue was resolved
in the Preamble.


19. (U) Documents exchanged:

U.S.:

-- U.S.-proposed JDT of Final Provisions, dated
September 28, 2009 (in English and unofficial Russian)


29. (S) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Connell
Mr. Dean
Mr. Evans
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston


Mr. Taylor
Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Malyugin
Gen Venevtsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


30. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
RICHTER