START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

S E C R E T GENEVA 000830

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) THIRD MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

B. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151
(U.S.-PROPOSED INSPECTION PROTOCOL)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-017.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The third meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group (IPWG) was held at the Russian Mission on September 25,
2009, to continue discussion of the similarities and
differences between the U.S. and Russian approaches under the
Inspection Protocol (IP). The Russian Delegation conveyed
its vision of the inspection activities presented in the
Russian-proposed draft of Section V of the Treaty Annex,
which addresses "Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions" (REF
A). The U.S. Delegation provided the Russian Delegation a
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for Sections I and II of
the IP, which incorporated appropriate provisions from
Section V of the Russian-proposed Treaty Annex. Several
similarities between the draft versions were identified and
discussed, with a few agreements reached where the two
Party's texts had originally differed. Both sides agreed to
study the two proposals, as well as the U.S.-proposed merged
JDT, to determine whether additional text could be agreed and
whether some details could be relocated elsewhere, such as
into a "third level" document below the level of the
U.S.-proposed IP and the Russian-proposed Annex.

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COMPARING U.S. AND
RUSSIAN DRAFT TEXTS
--------------


4. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting by stating that the
purpose of the day's meeting was to work through the first
two sections of the Russian-proposed Section V of the Treaty
Annex that discusses "Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions"
and the U.S.-proposed IP, both of which address "General
Obligations" and "Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of
Inspectors, (Monitors for the United States),and Aircrew
Members." Ilin referred to a Russian side-by-side comparison
document that analyzed and compared the proposed Russian text
with the U.S.-proposed text. This document had been sent to
the U.S. Mission the previous day, and handouts were given to
the U.S. delegates at this meeting.


5. (S) Dr. Warner provided a U.S. informal JDT, both in
English and in an un-official Russian translation that merged
the first two sections of the U.S.- and Russian-proposed
drafts. In addition to the differences between the sides
being reflected in footnoted brackets, the U.S. JDT was
color-coded with plain text reflecting original U.S.-proposed
text, magenta indicating agreed text, green for


Russian-proposed text, and yellow for text that the U.S.
proposed and believed was important to keep, but could be
moved into a "third level" document, which the U.S. proposed
to call an "annex." The U.S. idea was to have a similar
structure as exists under START, where the concepts in the
treaty text drove what was in the IP which, in turn, drove
what was in the various annexes to the IP.


6. (S) Warner handed over to the Russian Delegation the
U.S.-proposed JDT in two additional documents; one with the
yellow text removed from the overall joint draft document,
and the second representing the "third level"/annex document
that was created by pulling together the "yellow" text that
had been removed from the JDT. Warner explained that, in
creating the JDT, the United States believed it was important
to work from the U.S.-proposed draft text rather than the
Russian draft, because the U.S. version included a
substantial amount of text that was missing from the Russian
version.


7. (S) Ilin thanked Warner for the documents, which
increased the visibility of each side's approach through the
highlighted text. Ilin commented that, by looking at the
JDT, he could see that the U.S. Delegation kept pushing for a
more extensive document, but promised that the Russian
Delegation would study the JDT to see if it was acceptable.
He noted that the day's work would be easier for the U.S.
Delegation than it would be for the Russian Delegation, since
the U.S. had been handed the Russian document the previous
day and the Russian Delegation had just received the U.S.
documents.


8. (S) Warner pointed out that, in Section I of both texts
concerning General Obligations, the United States and Russia
agreed on everything except the inclusion of continuous
monitoring in START Follow-on (SFO). Warner then proposed to
move forward to Section II leaving the reference to
continuous monitoring as bracketed U.S.-proposed text until a
decision was made at higher levels regarding resolution of
the issue on continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production
within SFO.

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A QUESTION OF CONCEPTION
--------------


9. (S) Ilin stated that the Russian proposal for the new
treaty was one that only has two levels; the Treaty Articles
and an Annex, and asked whether it was the intent of the
United States to have all three levels, treaty articles,
protocols, and annexes, all subject to national ratification.
Mr. Brown stated that, in START, documents at all three
levels were concluded prior to the end of negotiations and
all were submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. He
noted as well that some annexes--third level documents--were
added later by agreement between the sides, which was reached
through negotiations within the Joint Compliance and
Implementation Commission (JCIC) and, thus, these additional
annexes were not ratified by either side. In fact, portions
of both the second/protocol and third/annex levels were
changed by subsequent agreements concluded within the JCIC
during the course of START implementation well after
ratification by both sides.




10. (S) Warner noted that the U.S. position was to take
advantage of the agreed procedural details regarding
inspections that were already contained in START's IP and
various IP Annexes. These procedures have been used in
practice over the past 15 years of successful START
implementation, and the United States did not want to discard
that experience by renegotiating these procedures from
scratch via the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) as
called for in the Russian draft IP. Ilin countered that the
Russian side believed new processes should be developed and
that was why the Russians proposed deferring the negotiation
of specific inspection procedures to the BCC after
ratification was complete. In the Russian vision, the BCC
would certainly take into account the insights gained from
inspections from the START experience.


11. (S) Warner reiterated his concern that he did not
believe the U.S. Senate would ratify a treaty that provided
for inspections without actually describing critical
inspection procedures in documents subject to ratification.
Warner also added that if the procedures had been worked out
and agreed to in the past, why would the Russians want to
back away from them now? Since these procedures had worked
well or been adapted via the JCIC, the United States wanted
to maintain them.

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A QUESTION OF LEGALITY
--------------


12. (S) Ilin asked whether an annex, or third level
document, could be a non-legally-binding document. Warner
answered that he believed that was not possible, but it would
require further study. Brown asked Ilin whether he meant
that this material would not be a part of the treaty or
whether it might only represent a political commitment. Ilin
said he could not answer such a legal question, but his
personal view was that, in START, procedural decisions were
made in the JCIC, so such decisions also could be made under
SFO by the comparable BCC.


13. (S) Warner again reiterated that, in his view, the U.S.
President could not present a treaty to the Senate for
ratification that did not contain the key details of the
verification procedures needed to verify compliance with that
treaty. Ilin countered that the Russian Delegation's
direction from Moscow was not to create a new treaty that was
a copy of START in either size or content. Warner then
proposed to agree on the fact that the new treaty would have
a third level document where the more detailed processes
could be moved and, by doing so, the sides could jointly
draft a new, stream-lined IP that would be closer to the size
of the proposed Russian draft of the IP contained in Section
V of its Annex.

--------------
CALL 'EM LIKE YOU SEE 'EM
--------------


14. (S) Warner moved the discussion to the actual names for
the various types of inspections, pointing out that both
sides had agreed to exhibitions. He reiterated the U.S.


desire not to use the word "visit" in the new treaty. The
word "visit" implied a less rigorous activity and would be
perceived negatively in the United States. Contrary to the
Russian approach that characterizes inspections as tougher,
more "strict," and rigorous than "visits," which are
inspection activities focused on non-deployed strategic
offensive arms, Warner asserted that, in the U.S. view, both
what the Russians label as "inspections" and "visits" should
have the same degree of rigor, accuracy in confirming
declared data and importance.


15. (S) Ilin suggested the possibility of changing the name
of "visit" to "inspection-visit"; a term proposed by Colonel
Ryzhkov. That would raise its status; it had a verification
purpose of confirming the data contained in the Memorandum of
Understanding, but it would continue to be different than an
inspection. Warner stressed the U.S. preference not to use
the term "visit" and noted that describing certain inspection
activities as "softer" or less strict than others did not
appear supportable. He stated that this misunderstanding
could be a matter of translation, but the United States
wanted to have the names of the inspections reflect the
actual type of inspection being undertaken. For example, for
inspections focused on confirming data regarding deployed
Strategic Offensive Arms (SOAs),a proposed name could be a
"Deployed SOA and Warhead Inspection," which would include
inspections of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers,
deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed
heavy bombers as well as the warheads/armaments deployed on
these systems. The term "visit" could be changed to
"Non-Deployed SOA Inspection-Visits". The non-deployed
inspection-visits would not involve inspection activity that
was any less rigorous than that involved in an inspection of
the deployed SOA.


16. (S) Ilin asked whether these new terms would be added to
the definitions section. Warner replied they would. Ilin
asked whether a "Deployed SOA and Warhead Inspection" would
include delivery vehicles, warheads, missiles, and bombers.
Warner replied they would, but the details could be worked
out later. Ilin explained that it was important that
agreement was reached that identified which inspection
activities were to be focused on deployed SOA and which were
focused on non-deployed systems. Warner stated that was the
whole reason for suggesting the more detailed names for the
inspections and visits. Ilin said that the Russians would
discuss this among themselves and get back to the U.S.
Delegation.

--------------
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
--------------


17. (S) Ilin asked whether the U.S. proposal included the
possible use of commercial aircraft and Open Skies aircraft
with regard to the types of aircraft that the inspecting
Party could use for transportation of inspection teams to the
point of entry (POE). Warner stated that the use of
commercial aircraft was acceptable and the U.S. Delegation
would add it to Section II, but that the U.S. side would have
to study the possible use of Open Skies aircraft for this
purpose and then get back to the Russians on this matter.
For the time being, use of Open Skies aircraft to transport


inspection teams would be included in the text, but bracketed
as a Russian proposal. Warner asked Ilin where he believed
the identification of aircraft used for this purpose should
be located, and Ilin responded within the text of the second
level material, that is the protocol/Russian Section V.


18. (S) Warner asked the Russian side why it had decreased
the maximum number of inspectors on the inspector list from
400 to 200. Ilin stated that, since the number of
inspections conducted annually had been reduced substantially
in the proposed Russian draft IP, they had lowered the
proposed number of inspectors on the list accordingly. Ilin
asked why the United States had not lowered the number of
inspectors on the list at all. Warner responded that the
U.S. side proposed to lower the annual quota for certain
types of inspections but had raised others, consequently, it
has maintained about the same number of annual inspections
and, therefore, saw no reason to lower the number of
inspectors on the inspector list. Ilin countered that the
number of Russian inspectable facilities had dropped since
START negotiations, so why not lower the number of inspectors
on the treaty list for SFO? Warner said the United States
would consider that point, but noted that the number of
inspections was not directly related to the number of
inspectors on the list and the United States wanted to
maintain flexibility with regard to the inspector list.


19. (S) Ilin added that the number of inspectors on the list
was also a matter of cost to the Russians. Russia could not
afford to keep large numbers of inspectors who would be idle
most of the time. Russia also did not understand why the
United States wanted to update the list of inspectors every
21 days as opposed to the Russian proposal to revise the list
once every three months. It would mean that the inspector
pool would turn over completely twice a year. Warner stated
that once again the United States wanted to maintain
flexibility in the list and preferred the 21-day update
approach.

--------------
FINDING SOME COMMON GROUND
--------------


20. (S) During the discussion of the IP text, both sides
agreed that the number of individuals on the aircrew list
would be determined at the discretion of each Party, and that
the number of aircrew allowed on an inspection airplane
during each inspection would not exceed ten. Additionally,
Warner asked about the provisions for inspector visas, which
the Russians had not addressed. Ilin explained that this
matter was covered in the Russian-proposed Section on
Notifications contained in Section IV of the Annex, but that
it could be moved back into Section V on Inspections, if the
U.S. side desired this shift.


21. (S) Warner pointed out that, under START, a proposed
inspector for the treaty list could be rejected by the other
side only for his having committed a criminal act, but for
aircrew and monitors, individuals could be rejected without
any reason being identified. Under the Russian proposal, the
START reason for rejection due to criminal activity had been
dropped for inspectors, making the rejection of both
inspectors and aircrew totally subjective. Warner questioned


the Russians' reason for this change. Ilin commented that it
often happened that Russians were refused a U.S. visa for no
reason. He later backtracked that he had no specific
complaint, but Russia was simply protecting its own
interests. There was no reason to accord someone a special
status before that person had even become an inspector. He
concluded by agreeing to move these details to the third
level document, and stating that the Russian legal advisor
would explain Russia's rationale during a subsequent session
of the IPWG.


22. (S) Following a brief discussion among the U.S.
Delegation, Warner suggested to Ilin that Russia's proposed
reduction in the number of inspectors for an exhibition from
20 to 10 was acceptable to the United States. Warner pointed
out that the Russians had dropped the number of inspectors on
an inspection team from 10 to 9 for an inspection and from 10
to 7 for a visit. It was the U.S. view that the level of
effort during an inspection and during a visit would be
roughly the same as we had experienced under START, and it
was better to have an even number of inspectors to simplify
the process of setting up subgroups that could be used to
simultaneously inspect large facilities. Ilin replied that,
since the number of inspectable sites was going to go down
under SFO, the number of inspectors per team could drop as
well. Warner countered that the logic did not follow and
reiterated that the level of effort at each inspection site
was not likely to be reduced from what it was under START.
Ryzhkov added that the Russian site diagrams would be
shrinking and, therefore, the number of inspectors needed to
conduct an inspection should also drop. Warner stated that
the United States would not agree to redrawing boundaries on
a site diagram to create a smaller inspection site simply to
meet the reduced capabilities of smaller inspection teams.


23. (S) Warner suggested that both sides agree to ten
inspectors for inspections of both deployed and non-deployed
items. Ilin suggested that, for the time being, the sides
agree to disagree on the number of inspectors per inspection
and visit team. Ilin closed by suggesting that the United
States review the Russian Notification portion of the Annex,
Section IV, to see if anything else should be brought back
into Subsection II of the Inspections Section.


24. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- Proposed merged Draft of Inspection Protocol Sections
I and II.

- Russia:

-- Russian side-by-side analysis of proposed Russian
Draft of Annex Section V and the corresponding U.S. draft
sections.


25. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Ms. Bosco


Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Fortier
Maj Johnson
Mrs. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Vorontsov
Mr. Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


26. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS