START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

REF: STATE 97473

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-015.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The second meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group was held at the U.S. Mission on September
25, 2009. U.S. and Russian Delegations exchanged questions
regarding their respective approaches to organizing and
reporting categories of data in the MOU. Questions were
focused on understanding the objectives behind proposed
categories of data and how each Party expected to use these
categories for verification and transparency. The Russian
Delegation also sought to clarify which limitations the
United States intended to put on non-deployed systems. They
also asked the U.S. side to examine the Russian proposal to
introduce an aggregate limit of 600 on deployed and
non-deployed ICBM/SLBM launchers in order to provide balance
and to limit upload capability. The Russian Delegation
argued against unbalanced restrictions, particularly on
road-mobile systems.


4. (S) The U.S. side clarified the U.S. position not to base
ICBM or SLBM launchers outside U.S. national territory. The
Delegation explained that the space launch facilities at Meck
and Kodiak Islands would be used to launch space launch
vehicles (SLVs) that incorporated the first stage of the
Trident I SLBM and that the Trident I SLBM and Minuteman II
ICBM would not be counted under the START Follow-on (SFO)
Treaty. Russia clarified that, under their proposal, data on
existing types, variants, and versions of systems will
continue to be reported with the exception of support
equipment. The U.S. side also pressed Russia to rethink the
Russian position not to list space launch facilities in
Kazakhstan in the MOU. The Russian Delegation admitted they
may need to be more specific in defining at what point a
missile removed from a launcher for maintenance would be
counted as non-deployed.

--------------
THE THROW-WEIGHT DEBATE
--------------


5. (S) General Orlov began opening remarks and explained
that the Russian Delegation had analyzed the U.S.-proposed
MOU to compare commonalities in each Party's approach. He
said Russia needed clarification on a number of issues to
thoroughly understand U.S. proposed categories of data.
Orlov explained that Russia needed to understand the
objective of the U.S. approach and definitions in order to
find common ground and ultimately develop an MOU. He said
the Russians had prepared 12 questions for discussion.



6. (S) Orlov questioned U.S. intentions to report
throw-weight in the MOU, inquiring why the United States
planned to add a parameter on a subject not limited by the
treaty while also stating that throw-weight provisions which
pertained to heavy ICBMs would no longer apply. Mr. Trout
reminded the Russian Delegation that throw-weight remains a
factor in determining new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in the
U.S. proposal. Trout explained that the U.S. definition of
new type was taken from START and includes throw-weight,
since it is a measure to determine a new type of missile in
comparison to an existing type. Orlov argued that the
Russian treaty proposal does not include provisions on
exchanging telemetry; therefore, there would be no
verification of throw-weight data. Trout acknowledged the
point, but explained that the U.S proposal does include
telemetry exchanges.


7. (S) General Poznihir stated that the Parties are
discussing a treaty based on counting warheads deployed on
delivery vehicles regardless of whether they are existing
types or new types. Therefore, the Russian opinion is that
throw-weight does not play a role. Trout responded that, in
order to add transparency, we need to determine the maximum
number of warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs. Poznihir argued that
the goal is to verify operationally-deployed warheads, not
the maximum number on each missile. Trout agreed that
determining the number of operationally-deployed warheads is
one factor of verification, but the United States had adopted
certain START methodologies to maintain transparency as well.
Providing this data would aid each side in understanding the
other Party's force, while allowing each Party to determine
the composition of its own force. The U.S proposal was not
just to verify the number of deployed warheads, but also to
provide an additional level of transparency. Trout said the
Russian focus was on verifying numbers of limited items but
commented that the item and the number of items to be limited
would be decided at senior levels.


8. (S) Orlov requested clarification to confirm that the
U.S. purpose of listing throw-weight in the MOU was related
to transparency. Trout confirmed. Orlov asked whether the
addition of throw-weight was intended as a provision to
monitor all missiles or just the development of new types.
Trout confirmed that the goal was transparency and to provide
a better understanding of new types.

--------------
AGGREGATE LIMITS AND
UPLOAD CAPABILITY
--------------


9. (S) Poznihir stated that the United States intended to
conduct inspections on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs but did not provide definitions or an aggregate limit
on those systems. He asked which data the United States
planned to use to verify numbers on non-deployed systems.
Trout responded that the United States had definitions for
non-deployed systems in the U.S. proposal. Poznihir inquired
as to whether the United States would be willing to dntroduce
aggregate limits on deployed and non-deployed systems and add
them to the aggregate numbers section of the MOU. Trout
responded that we have such limits for mobile non-deployed
systems, but the United States would consider the suggestion.


Colonel Petrov explained that such data is required under
START to verify the number of non-deployed systems associated
with each facility. Lieutenant Lobner explained that the
United States proposed to include data on non-deployed
systems in the aggregate section for each Party, similar to
START.


10. (S) Colonel Pischulov asked for the U.S. opinion on the
Russian-proposed concept of introducing an aggregate limit of
600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers.
Trout responded that the United States had only recently
received the Russian proposal and the United States still
needed time for review, but it was studying the option in the
context of the on-going Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).


11. (S) Pischulov stated that the proposed aggregate limit
of 600 on ICBM and SLBM launchers would provide transparency
and allow the sides to control upload potential. When asked
to explain, Poznihir stated that it would be unfair if one
side has 600 launchers and the other 2000. He opined that
one side could have non-deployed missiles and warheads in
storage that could be used to upload and, therefore, create
unfair conditions. Poznihir asked whether the United States
envisioned limits on the number of non-deployed launchers.
Trout responded that the United States' concerns over upload
capability were based on warheads and not delivery vehicles.
Orlov responded that warheads cannot fly without a delivery
vehicle. He stated that there was a huge gap in the number
of proposed numerical limits on delivery vehicles, citing the
500-1100 proposed limits on delivery vehicles. Orlov asked
what could be done to narrow the gap. Trout cited that the
United States had spoken to the Russians about proposing
lower limits on delivery vehicles to a range of 700-900 but
Orlov said that Russia did not receive an official proposal
in writing. The reason, Trout responded, was that there were
other conditions that had not been agreed to by Russia.
Orlov agreed.


12. (S) Orlov asked how deployed versus non-deployed SLBMs
would be reported. Trout responded that they would be
reported as they currently were under START. Petrov asked
whether the United States planned to indicate specifically
which SLBMs were deployed and which were non-deployed in
storage bunkers prior to each inspection. Trout answered
that the process for reporting during inspections is a
question for the Inspection Protocol Working Group, but that
information would be included in the MOU for each base
similar to START.

--------------
MOBILE RESTRICTIONS --
AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
--------------


13. (S) Orlov questioned U.S. rationale for continuing to
insist on unique identifiers (UIDs) which were applied only
to mobile ICBMs, and why the general U.S. focus was
specifically on mobile ICBM forces. Orlov asked for
clarification as to why this was necessary. Trout emphasized
the historical background of mobile missiles explaining that,
during original START negotiations, both sides agreed that
the most difficult strategic offensive arms (SOAs) to monitor
were mobile missiles. Therefore, additional procedures were


agreed upon by both Parties to deal with these concerns.
Trout explained that Russia agreed to these measures even
after the United States cancelled its plans for developing
and deploying mobile missiles. Orlov replied that these
restrictions only affected Russia. Trout replied that Russia
still has mobile missiles; therefore, the additional
procedures were still required. Trout concluded that the
discussion was above the level of the MOU WG.


14. (S) Poznihir said that the Russian proposal is to limit
SOAs and did not see a reason to accept restrictions that
only affect Russia. He stated that the covertness of
submarines is more worrisome than that of mobile ICBMs. He
opined that UIDs could therefore be applied to SLBMS.
Poznihir also suggested defining operational zones at sea for
submarines with SLBMs. Trout offered that a captain at sea
might have a hard time dealing with restrictions on
operational zones. After Orlov pressed the U.S side for an
answer, Trout responded by asking whether Russia was
proposing UIDs for SLBMs. Orlov said they would think about
it.


15. (S) Orlov stated again that the U.S. proposal would only
be applied to mobile ICBM systems. Trout repeated that both
countries had already agreed to additional measures under
START, and asked what had changed. Orlov answered that the
people at the table have changed. Mr. Luchaninov said that
the original START negotiations were the first time these
issues were discussed and 15 years have passed. Russia has
had time to correct its position and concluded that
monitoring SLBMs is much more difficult than monitoring
mobile ICBMs. Luchaninov expressed surprise at what he
called an unbalanced and inconsistent U.S. approach to
controlling various types of strategic nuclear arms.


16. (S) Orlov said Russia needed to understand the U.S. goal
behind maintaining the practice of reporting UIDs. He said
that Russia is absolutely opposed to unbalanced restrictions
on mobile systems and added that Russia does not bother U.S.
submarines. Trout replied that the United States was not
intending to control Russian mobiles or impose limitations on
Russian road-mobile systems, but wanted to maintain
transparency. He stated that mobile launchers can be
reloaded more quickly than silo launchers or submarines.
Orlov responded jocularly that maybe the United States should
develop mobiles and see for themselves. Trout said the
concern is related to having more missiles than launchers.
As such, there needed to be an understanding regarding the
total number of missiles in relation to launchers. Orlov
said that such information would be provided in the aggregate
numbers section of the MOU. Trout argued that UIDs are more
helpful in tracking missiles after they leave the production
facility. Poznihir said that Votkinsk would not be part of
SFO. Orlov said that Russia had a secret: portal monitoring
activities would not be continued.


17. (S) After a short break, Luchaninov again asked for
clarification of U.S.-proposed limitations on non-deployed
SLBMs and ICBMs, specifically, locational restrictions in
Article IV of the U.S.-proposed treaty. Trout reminded the
Russian Delegation that the sides had been discussing this
issue since spring. The issue concerned the ability of
mobile forces to rapidly expand. He stated that the U.S.


side was proposing no limits except the 80 for non-deployed
mobile ICBM launchers, 10 for test mobile ICBM launchers, and
10 for mobile training launchers of ICBMs. He stated that
the U.S. side would examine the Russian proposal to limit
both deployed and non-deployed launchers.

--------------
A GUIDE TO U.S. SPACE
LAUNCH RESORTS
--------------


18. (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether the United States would
deploy ICBM/SLBM launchers or ICBMs/SLBMs themselves outside
of national territory, including those used for space launch,
and if there would be notifications for the associated
activities. Lobner explained that the United States had no
plans to base U.S. SLBMs, ICBMs, or launchers for ICBMs or
SLBMs outside the national territory. Petrov asked whether
the United States planned to send notifications regarding
activities at Meck Island, noting that an SLV using the first
stage of a Trident I SLBM had been used to launch a payload
into space. Lobner replied that SLVs that incorporated the
first stage of Trident I missiles could be launched from
Kodiak and Meck Islands, but added that, in the U.S.
proposal, the Trident I SLBM is not accountable and would not
be declared.


19. (S) Petrov asked whether the Trident I and Minuteman II
storage facilities would be accountable under SFO. Trout
responded that they would not be accountable because they
would not be declared as existing types of SLBMs/ICBMs in the
U.S.-proposed treaty language. Therefore, their storage
facilities would not be listed in the MOU.

--------------
LAST QUESTION, HEAVY BOMBERS
--------------


20. (S) Poznihir requested clarification of additional
technical information in Annex F. Trout clarified that
additional information in Annex F was information transferred
from JCIC Agreement 23. Poznihir asked why additional
technical information was being added for ICBMs and SLBMs but
being deleted for heavy bombers. Lobner explained that the
technical data listed under START was needed for verifying
heavy bomber maximum equipage and types. Since the new
treaty would only focus on distinguishing between different
bomber types or variants of a type, but not between
categories of bombers, such as those equipped for Long-Range
Nuclear AlCMs or those equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other
than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, the additional data was no
longer required.


21. (S) The Russians asked what types of ICBMs and SLBMs the
U.S. proposed providing technical data. Trout stated that
data would be provided for types declared under the treaty
and, therefore, in response to further Russian questioning,
technical data would not be provided for Trident I and
Minuteman II, nor would their facilities be subject to
inspections.

--------------
THE U.S. PUTS


RUSSIA ON THE STAND
--------------


22. (S) Trout began the U.S. questions noting that, in
Section III of the Russian proposed MOU, there was a category
of Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers. He noted that, under
Russian-proposed counting rules, nuclear armaments on heavy
bombers would only count when they are actually loaded on the
bomber. Trout asked when this number would be anything other
than zero, given that both Parties do not fly their bombers
with nuclear armaments. Petrov responded that this category
is based on a theoretical situation where a heavy bomber
would be loaded with nuclear armaments on the airfield. He
clarified that in this situation a notification would be sent
or the information would be reported during pre-inspection
procedures. Poznihir agreed that the number for heavy
bombers would always be zero. Trout replied that if we had
anything other than zero, each Party would have other
concerns than complying with treaty provisions. Trout added
that the United States had very significant concerns over
this proposed counting method.


23. (S) Trout asked the Russian Delegation if Russia planned
to list the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) as an accountable item
in the MOU since it was not listed in the Russian-proposed
treaty. Orlov confirmed that Russia was just checking if the
United States was paying attention to detail. When Trout
asked about the RS-24, Orlov responded that, as of yet, there
is no such thing.


24. (S) Mr. DeNinno asked which types of systems Russia
intended to list in the MOU by type, variant, and version.
He specifically asked whether Russia planned to provide
information on fixed structures for mobile launchers. Orlov
stated that the Russian answer would be an incomplete one.
Poznihir responded that all current START information would
be reported including all types and variants, with the
exception of throw-weight and warhead attribution,
emphasizing that Russia would not try to hide. Deployed and
non-deployed ICBMs and launchers, including those designed
for test and static displays, would also be included.
DeNinno asked for confirmation that fixed structures would be
listed. Petrov responded that the Russian-proposed
definition annex does not include the term for support
equipment. Fixed structures will therefore be considered
normal structures and no technical data will be reported on
them.


25. (S) DeNinno referenced Article V, Paragraph 3, of the
Russian treaty text, where the Russian Federation proposed
that "training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located
only at ICBM bases and test ranges." He asked whether the
Russian Federation envisioned declaring the number and
location of training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs or mobile
training launchers of ICBMs in the MOU. Poznihir responded
that training launchers would be included in aggregate
numbers and that Russia would provide aggregates numbers of
deployed and non-deployed for each base.

--------------
WAIT, KAZAKHSTAN
IS NOT IN RUSSIA
--------------




26. (S) Lobner said that in Article VII, Paragraph 3, of the
Russian-proposed treaty, the Russian Federation proposed that
"each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for
placing a payload into space." He asked whether the Russian
Federation envisioned declaring space launch facilities. He
added that if such a facility is not declared, did Russia
intend to locate an ICBM or SLBM at a facility not listed in
the MOU. He asked about the planned status of the Leninsk
Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan and if SLBMs, and their
first stages used for space launch, would be accountable in
the same way as under START. Petrov responded that, under
existing START practices, an existing ICBM or SLBM could be
used to deliver payloads that are not weapons into space. He
said that Russia would provide the corresponding
notifications if such launches occurred from test or space
launch facilities.


27. (S) Lobner asked whether there would be a listing of
these facilities in the MOU, specifically Leninsk.
Shevchenko answered that SFO would not impose limits on
existing patterns of cooperation with third parties,
including activities at Baykonur (Leninsk),Kazakhstan.
However, he continued, Russia had a presence at Leninsk and
leased the facility from Kazakhstan. Trout asked about the
status of treaty-accountable items shipped to Leninsk.
Petrov responded that it would be the same as U.S. Trident II
SLBMs transferred to the United Kingdom (UK) for their use on
their submarines.


28. (S) Petrov and Orlov clarified that Russian missiles
would not be transferred to a third party since the missiles
would always be under Russian control. He repeated that
Leninsk was being leased by Russia. Trout asked again how
this would be notified. Petrov responded that the United
States would be notified just as the United States notifies
Russia of Trident II transfers to the UK. Trout said there
is a difference in these practices. In the U.S. view,
missiles that are transferred to the UK become the property
of the UK, but the missiles Russia locates to Kazakhstan are
still Russian missiles.


29. (S) Shevchenko said accountable items would not be based
at those facilities, only temporarily located. There is no
prohibition against using the missiles for space launch and
they would not be equipped with deployed warheads. DeNinno
asked the Russian Delegation whether they were speaking of
activities at the Leninsk test range or the space launch
facility because different provisions apply to those
facilities. Petrov clarified he was speaking of activities
at the space launch facility. Trout asked how activities
would be notified concerning the test range. Petrov said
they would have to think about it. Petrov said all
appropriate notifications would be sent. DeNinno explained
that if Russia were to transfer a missile to another Russian
facility, then the notification should include the name of
the facility where it was located. Facilities where items
could be located are listed in the MOU so that the sides are
able to monitor and track missile movements. As such, space
launch facilities still needed to be listed. Orlov said they
would need to think about listing it in the MOU.

--------------


WE NEED MORE DETAILS
--------------


30. (S) Lobner noted that, in Annex C of the Russian MOU,
the Russian Federation proposed that long-range nuclear ALCM
technical data would be exchanged. He asked whether the
Russian Federation envisioned exchanging data regarding other
types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, for example,
nuclear bombs, and nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a
range of less than 600 kilometers. Petrov responded that
Russia does not have that problem as all Russian heavy
bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched
cruise missiles (LRNA). Therefore, the problem pertains only
to U.S. systems. Petrov said Russia understood that, without
such information, inspections at certain facilities would be
difficult.


31. (S) DeNinno asked whether Russia planned to list
coordinates for individual silo launchers or re stricted
areas for mobile launchers in the MOU, and added that this
information was necessary to conduct nuclear warhead
inspections. Petrov confirmed this and said that coordinates
for each silo would be listed in Section II of the Russian
proposal. He clarified that information on the aggregate
number of warheads at the base and numbers of warheads
deployed on each ICBM or SLBM would be reported at the base
prior to the inspection.


32. (S) Mr. Sims asked whether Russia planned to list points
of entry in the MOU. Petrov confirmed that Russia planned to
provide all information associated with points of entry as
currently provided under START. Flight routes would be
provided in the Russian-proposed Annex D under additional
data required.

--------------
DEFINE DEPLOYED VS.
NON-DEPLOYED
--------------


33. (S) Sims asked how a missile would be counted if all the
warheads were removed but the missile remained in its
launcher. Poznihir responded that it would count as deployed.


34. (S) Mr. Rust asked how Russia would count a missile that
was only temporarily removed from a launcher for maintenance.
Additionally, he asked if Russia would notify the United
States if a launcher was removed for a short period. Orlov
said a missile removed from a launcher would count as
non-deployed and that Russia would send a notification as a
transparency measure. He agreed, however, that the issue of
time does raise some questions and that a reasonable time
limit would need to be determined.


35. (S) Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify whether
they envisioned sending a notification each time an ICBM or
SLBM was removed from a launcher or the number of warheads on
an ICBM or SLBM was altered. Petrov stated that such a
notification would have to be sent unless it was for a short
period of time. Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify
what was meant by a short period of time. Petrov stated that
they would have to think about that concept and the
corresponding notification requirement some more.




36. (S) Trout, in reference to Article III.4.(e).(ii) of the
Russian-proposed treaty, asked why a mobile launcher that
returned to a production facility would no longer count under
the aggregate limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers.
Orlov responded that if a mobile launcher returns to the
production facility it meant there was a malfunction that
rendered the launcher incapable of completing its mission.
It was Russia's opinion that only operationally-capable
launchers were located at ICBM bases or storage facilities.
Once a mobile launcher left a production facility it would be
accountable again. Colonel Hartford reasoned that, according
to Russia's logic, if a launcher was not capable of
fulfilling its intended purpose, then it would not be
considered deployed. Orlov responded that mobile launchers
would be considered deployed until the moment they reached
the production facility. While at a base, however, mobile
launchers would be considered to be deployed, regardless of
their capability to carry out their mission.


37. (S) Orlov and Trout then discussed the path forward and
the schedule for the next week. Trout noted that the United
States would likely have a few more questions and that the
two sides needed to begin work towards a Joint Draft Text.
Orlov agreed and added that they needed to focus on Annexes A
and B. Trout replied that the United States was still
finalizing those Annexes. Orlov then recommended that the
Parties focus on the organizational structure of the MOU, to
which Trout agreed.


38. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


39. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Trout
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Colby
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Evans
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
LT Lobner
Mr. Rust
Mr. Sims
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Orlov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Luchaninov
Gen Poznihir
Col Petrov
Col Pischulov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)


40. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS