START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND
NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUPS, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009

REF: A. STATE 99070 AND 99072

B. GENEVA 0812 (SFO-GVA-V-008)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-014.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 25, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The second meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) and Notifications Working Groups was held at the
Russian Mission on September 25, 2009. The U.S. side
explained the U.S. approach used to draft the U.S.-proposed
Elimination Protocol, and explained the document's key
elements (REF A). The Russian Head of Delegation, Ambassador
Antonov, attended the meeting as an observer.


4. (S) The U.S. side indicated that there appeared to be
agreement on the principles that each side should have the
right to decide which procedure(s) would be used to eliminate
specific treaty accountable items, that costs should be
reduced and flexibility maintained in its text and that this
corresponded with Russia's concerns.


5. (S) The Russian Delegation sought clarification on why
the United States had removed the term "conversion" from the
protocol. The Russians also complained about the appearance
of inequality in the U.S. draft, because it left procedures
for elimination of mobile ICBMs and their launchers, as in
START, but proposed new procedures for other items.


6. (S) The Russian Delegation proposed a new concept that
would provide for visits to, and notification of movement of
heavy bombers (HBs) equipped for non-nuclear armaments.
However, the non-nuclear HBs would not be subject to the
central limits of the treaty. The U.S. Delegation said that,
under the U.S. proposal, such HBs would no longer be
accountable and should not be subject to the treaty.

--------------
U.S. CONCEPTS AND
PHILOSOPHY OF ELIMINATION
--------------


7. (S) Elliott opened the Elimination WG meeting and
delivered the following points on the key concept and
elements behind the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol.

Begin points:

- In the U.S. view, elimination is the process of
removing an accountable item from accountability by rendering
it incapable of use for its original purpose. For example,
rendering a SLBM launcher incapable of launching a ballistic
missile.


- However, the U.S. side also believes it is entirely
consistent with this concept that some items may be used for
other purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. For
example, altering an SLBM launcher for another use, so it is
no longer capable of launching a ballistic missile, but is
usable for another purpose, as we have done with the former
Trident I system. We seek this flexibility due to the
enormous cost of building new systems.

- We appreciate that this process must meet two
fundamental criteria: 1) the eliminated item must not be
usable for its original purpose; and 2) it must be visible to
the other party. We differ with the Russian side in one
aspect here, that in order to meet this latter requirement,
national technical means (NTM) of verification may not always
be suitable to confirm the change. We believe this will
become apparent when the possessing side selects its
procedure for elimination.

- Importantly, we agree in principle with the Russian
view that each side should decide for itself the procedures
to be used.

- However, we have proposed an approach that includes
examples; choices from which one might pick. Our view is
that if some of the procedures contained in START are useful
we can include them, but not require them. I would also like
to clarify a point on non-nuclear warheads on ballistic
missiles. We are well aware of the Russian view on this
matter. My question earlier this week was not intended to
speak of this matter, but rather it was intended to address
the issue of altering SLBM launchers to another use--not
inconsistent with this treaty. We will leave the matter of
non-nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles to our respective
political leaders.

- Now, turning to our detailed explanation of this
protocol, I would like to reiterate that the U.S. proposal
for the Elimination Protocol draws on previous language from
the START Treaty, while also offering new, more
cost-effective options.

- I want to emphasize a point made by Colonel Ryzhkov
earlier this week. We want to remove the rigid structure
that can lead to difficulty in carrying out the obligations
of this treaty, while preserving a sense of predictability
for both sides. START's Conversion or Elimination Protocol
has served as a solid foundation to remove items from each
Party's force structure and fulfill the fundamental
obligation of reducing strategic offensive arms. Using
similar language and procedures from the START Protocol,
adapted and simplified, where possible, we hope to reinforce
the U.S.-Russian relationship based on shared knowledge,
understanding and expectations.

- I understand that the Russian approach is based on
concepts drawn from the Moscow Treaty, capitalizing on the
new relationship between the United States and Russia and the
need for simplified, less costly measures. It is prudent
that we, collectively, work to find an appropriate balance
between the U.S. approach with our need for verification and
the Russian approach with your need for less specific
procedures.



- After studying the Russian-proposed Procedures for
Conversion or Elimination, it is clear there are areas where
we agree and areas where we need further clarification. I
want to focus initially on the areas where the U.S. and
Russian approaches agree.

- We note that your treaty Article VII provides language
specifying conversion or elimination procedures that ensure
that strategic offensive arms are rendered inoperable,
precluding their use for their original purpose. The U.S.
agrees with this approach. The key point is that the U.S.
and Russia need to agree on the procedures to get to that
state. Once an SOA is rendered inoperable, we believe there
is no reason for it to be subject to the limitations of the
treaty.

- Russia proposes that verification of elimination or
conversion procedures shall be carried out by national
technical means, notifications and visits. The U.S. agrees
that notifications are an important part of the verification
and transparency measures. However, the concept of NTM
supplemented by undefined visits requires further
clarification.

- Elimination procedures for silo launchers of ICBMs,
mobile launchers of ICBMs, submarines undergoing SLBM
launcher elimination, and heavy bombers shall remain visible
to NTM. The United States agrees with this approach, but
also notes that NTM only brings a certain level of
confidence. Inspections coupled with NTM will raise the
confidence that the procedures have been completed.

- Additionally, it appears there is some inconsistency
with what is written in the U.S. Protocol and the Russian
Annex and our respective Treaty Article VIIs. This will
require our attention to ensure the texts align in meaning
and intent.

- The issue of the requirement for specificity in
conversion or elimination procedures bears comment. I am
sure you have noticed we did not change procedures for
eliminating mobile ballistic missile systems. Our view is
that because we do not possess such systems, we will seek the
Russian view of procedures that might be less difficult and
costly, but that will meet the fundamental criteria specified
by the treaty.

- Colonel Ryzhkov, you stated in our first meeting that
very specific conversion or elimination procedures with many
people involved leads to a confrontational environment. You
brought up examples,such as the issues with SS-25, SS-24 and
Peacekeeper eliminations.

- The U.S. position is that specific procedures to some
extent can also have quite the opposite effect. Specific
procedures provide predictability, a clear understanding of
the procedures, a certain way for confirmation and an
appropriate level of transparency for verification. However,
the United States agrees with Russia that START contained
procedures that were cumbersome and costly and in this new
treaty the United States and Russia can develop procedures
that are more efficient and less costly.



- Moreover, Russia asserts that all conversion or
elimination can be verified through national technical means
of verification. To aid national technical means of
verification for SLBM launchers and heavy bombers, Russia
proposes to have submarine launch tube hatches removed or
destroyed and for heavy bombers to have basic design elements
removed or destroyed.

- Additionally, for conversion of SLBM launchers, Russia
proposes another precondition in that they have external or
functional differences. This speaks to the need to verify
that changes have been made and is consistent with the U.S.
belief that national technical means will not be sufficient
in all cases.

- Since our last session in the beginning of September,
the United States has amended its views on conversion or
elimination. The U.S. proposes to retain the concept of
elimination in the treaty and as such we have proposed an
Elimination Protocol.

- The United States believes that "elimination" is the
process by which a Party alters an accountable item to make
it incapable of being employed for nuclear armaments; i.e.,
its original purpose. Thereafter, it is no longer subject to
the limitations of the treaty--both the numerical limits and
the broader treaty limits.

- Under START, conversion procedures were applied
primarily to heavy bombers and then only as a mechanism to
re-categorize them as a heavy bomber of another category.
There was no provision for a procedure to remove a heavy
bomber from being subject to START's limitations while
maintaining the possibility of its use for purposes not
limited by the treaty.

- The United States proposes that the concept of
"elimination" apply to a procedure to physically alter an
item and the act of removing that item from accountability
under the treaty. An SOA is either destroyed or is altered
in such a way that it no longer can be used for its original
purpose. In both cases, the SOA is eliminated for treaty
purposes.

- Thus, the U.S. recognizes that methods short of
physical destruction are equally advantageous to each Party,
1) as a means of removing an item from accountability under
the Treaty, 2) to retain use of the item for purposes not
inconsistent with the Treaty, and 3) to save costs.

- In this connection, the United States proposes a range
of procedures to eliminate an item, any of which may be used
by a Party for elimination.

- Additionally, the United States acknowledges that in
the future a Party may develop a different procedure that was
previously not considered during negotiations that may
leverage advanced technologies or save time and money. In
this instance, the United States proposes an option to use
these procedures provided there is a sufficient level of
transparency during the process.


- You will note that in several cases the United States
proposes a pre-elimination demonstration. This demonstration
would be an opportunity to provide, in advance, details of
the elimination procedures.

- With this demonstration, the United States intends to
create additional transparency and an opportunity for Russia
to ask questions for U.S. consideration.

- For instance, the recent Minuteman III RVOSI One-Time
Demonstration could be used as a model for success and
cooperation, understanding and awareness.

End points.


8. (S) Ryzhkov asked Elliott to confirm that the United
States proposed to drop the term "conversion" from the new
text. Elliott responded in the affirmative and stated that
the United States planned to only eliminate and not convert
treaty accountable items. Ryzhkov indicated his
understanding and asked Elliott to continue with the
section-by-section description of the U.S.-proposed
Elimination Protocol (REF A).

Begin points:

- Section I covers the Procedures for Elimination of
ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Launch
Canisters. Since the beginning of our talks on the START
Follow-on Treaty, the United States has been clear about its
view that the unique challenges associated with mobile
missiles make it necessary to retain, in the new treaty,
specific provisions for their elimination. The United States
would encourage Russia to propose specific procedures to
simplify mobile ICBM and launcher elimination. Again there
needs to be a balance that will assuage U.S. concerns
regarding their elimination and Russia's need for simpler and
less costly procedures. However, the United States does
propose the following changes. In Paragraph 1 we propose
removing phased elimination (tied to SS-24s in Ukraine). In
Paragraph 3 we changed wording to allow inspection at any
time during elimination versus inspection of the entire
process. In Paragraph 4(b) we removed wash-out and drilling
procedures (tied to SS-24s in Ukraine).

- Section II covers the Procedures for Elimination of
Silo Launchers of ICBMs. Overall, we removed references to
silo training and silo test launchers. Under the U.S.
concept, such launchers will not count as deployed launchers,
so there is no need to subject them to treaty elimination
procedures. In Paragraph 5 we added alternative procedures
for silo elimination. In Paragraphs 7 to 10 the United
States added inspection provisions. I would emphasize that
items 7-10 include NTM for verification. Section III covers
Procedures for Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs,
Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile
ICBMs. Overall we removed specific references to road mobile
and rail mobile launchers.

- Our approach was to capture basic START procedures
and add to them. Section IV, Procedures for Elimination of
SLBM Launchers, has been modified. In Paragraph 7 covering
newly proposed procedures, before the first elimination of an


SLBM launcher of each type, the possessing Party shall also
exhibit an unmodified SLBM launcher of that type. In
Paragraph 8 covering additional newly proposed procedures,
eliminated launchers shall be subject to inspection within a
20-day period beginning on the date of notification of
elimination.

- In Section V we deleted the procedures for soft-site
launcher elimination. The U.S. approach would not subject
soft-site launchers to the treaty.

- In Section VII (Renumbered to Section V),the
procedures for the Elimination of Heavy Bombers have been
modified. We removed references to former heavy bombers.
Our proposed treaty removes the concept of former heavy
bombers. We removed specific procedures for ALCM-equipped
heavy bombers. In paragraph 2, we removed pre-elimination
inspections. Inspection would be allowed within a 20-day
window following completion of the elimination process. In
Paragraph 4 we added alternative procedures for heavy bomber
elimination. In Paragraph 6, for newly-proposed procedures,
before the first elimination of a heavy bomber of each type,
the possessing Party shall also exhibit an unmodified heavy
bomber of that type. Our objective is to create clarity in
the process, not to create difficult or cumbersome procedures.

- Section VII (Renumbered to Section VI) covers the
procedures for Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for
Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or
Static Testing. We removed references to the first stage
rule which is tied to Peacekeeper and which is no longer an
existing type.

- Section VIII (Renumbered to Section VII) covers other
Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability. We
removed references to silo training launchers, silo test
launchers, soft-site launchers, and former heavy bombers. In
paragraph 6 we removed the requirement to eliminate an item
in accordance with elimination procedures when removed from
static display (i.e., it is eliminated when it is placed on
static display). Russia seems to have a similar view about
static displays.

- In Section IX, renumbered to Section VIII, we cover
the procedures for Elimination of Facilities. In Paragraph 1
we deleted the right to inspect completion of elimination of
facilities. Paragraph two includes a description of "support
equipment" from the START Supplemental Documents.

- If and when we agree on the concept, the United
States will propose a relevant definition that elimination
includes removing an accountable item from accountability by
physical alteration, short of physical destruction, of the
accountable item such that it can no longer be used for its
original purpose. Let me make clear, this is not the entire
definition. We propose to add this to the definition of
elimination, which also involves destruction.

End points.


9. (S) Elliott again reiterated the U.S. concept of
elimination after the Russian side asked a second time to
clarify. Ryzhkov proposed a short break so that his side


could prepare additional questions.

--------------
WHEAT IN SILOS AND ROAD-MOBILES
TO RECREATIONAL VEHICLES
--------------


10. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the U.S. proposal not only
changed procedures, but also fundamentally changed the
overall concept of elimination. He took particular issue
with the statement that items could be eliminated but be
utilized for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.
Using this logic, Ryzhkov jokingly asked whether Russia could
store wheat in its eliminated silos rather than destroying
them by explosion. Elliott responded that the U.S. proposal
provided a selection of elimination options, but that some
eliminated items would not have any other useful purpose. As
long as the new use was not inconsistent with the treaty then
it would be possible, although not very practical.


11. (S) When asked by Smirnov about how Russian mobile
launchers could be eliminated under the new U.S. concept,
Elliott responded that while the launcher/erector mechanism
had to be altered, the chassis of the vehicle could be used
for another purpose. Ryzhkov then asked whether their
Iskander SS-26 missile (Begin comment: The Iskander is short
range ballistic missile, not an ICBM. End comment.) would be
allowed to be deployed on an eliminated mobile launcher
platform's chassis. Elliott responded that he would have to
take this issue back to U.S. technical experts, but that on
its face, it sounded reasonable if it was not inconsistent
with the treaty.

--------------
SUBMARINES ARE MORE
DANGEROUS THAN ROAD-MOBILES
--------------


12. (S) Ryzhkov brought up the issue of conversion of U.S.
SSBNs and opined that SSBNs were more dangerous than Russia's
road-mobile launchers. A mobile launcher carried only one
missile and traveled only within an area in Russia, while
SSBNs carried a group of missiles and moved throughout the
world's oceans. He asked Elliott to explain why the
elimination procedures for Russian mobile launchers were more
stringent than the procedures for SSBNs. Elliott responded
that the simple answer was that the platforms were different
and that nothing was unequal--both sides would have to show
that its choice of elimination procedure fulfilled the new
treaty's requirements.


13. (S) Adm Kuznetsov stated that the United States had
created a new category of Strategic Offensive Arm (SOA). The
Russians did not create any new categories in its proposal.
Both sides were subject to the same procedures, and he felt
the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol focused on the Russian
systems and not the U.S. systems.


14. (S) Elliott responded that the United States was open to
suggestions from the Russian side on elimination procedures
for mobile missile launchers. He noted, however, that when
new procedures were proposed, for example, elimination of
U.S. SLBM launchers, a demonstration would have to take place


so the other side could understand the scope of the proposed
elimination procedure. Elliott offered that Russia could do
this for their mobile ICBMs and launchers.

--------------
YOU HAVE YOUR PROCESS,
WE HAVE OURS
--------------


15. (S) Ryzhkov turned to the elimination of ICBMS,
specifically how the Russian process of burning missile
propellant differed from the U.S. procedure of washing-out
the missile's propellant. Since burning made the stages
unusable, it was excessive to require further cutting. He
opined that there were easier procedures, such as drilling
holes in the sides of ICBMs, and that the current inspection
procedures related to missile elimination were excessive and
costly. Elliott asked Ryzhkov whether Russia could propose
procedures with more specificity, perhaps in a short paper,
the United States would consider them, as long as the
procedures rendered the item unusable for its original
purpose and that it was verifiable by the other Party.
Elliott made the point that burning rocket propellant might
be verifiable by NTM but that drilling holes in the sides of
ICBMs was not.

--------------
ELIMINATION OF HEAVY
BOMBERS AND CONTINUED VISITS
--------------


16. (S) Col Zaitsev brought up the issue of eliminating
heavy bombers. He said that it would not be difficult to
restore a nuclear armaments capability to an HB that had been
eliminated using U.S. logic. He said if the new U.S.
Administration was exploring a more rigorous verification
process, this seemed to be counter to that.


17. (S) Elliott responded by using the U.S. B-1 heavy bomber
as an example of a heavy bomber that was converted, under
START, from nuclear capable to non-nuclear capable. He noted
further that the Russian side was well aware that the B-1 has
not been used in a nuclear role since the early 1990s. He
agreed that, if given enough time and money, anything is
reversible. Elliott clarified the fact that the
U.S.-proposed text did not use the term "irreversible",
because it was an impossible concept to verify. Elliott
concluded that both sides needed to get past the thinking
that all actions are meant to circumvent the treaty.


18. (S) Ryzhkov reminded the group that the new treaty was a
bilateral undertaking and that both sides would be held to
the same standards. He submitted that, in the new treaty,
excessive and costly procedures should be eliminated all the
while ensuring the verifiability of the limits.


19. (S) Colonel Ilin added that there were some common
threads between the Elimination WG and the Inspection
Protocol (IPWG). The new elimination concept presented by
the United States was important and further study by the
Russian side was required.


20. (S) Ryzhkov informed the group that the Russian side had


completed its previous homework assignment on heavy bomber
eliminations and Colonel Novikov would present the Russian
views. Novikov provided the following comments.

Begin Novikov comments:

- In Russia's view, both nuclear and non-nuclear heavy
bombers must be considered to be strategic heavy bombers

- Nuclear capable heavy bombers should be stationed
separately from non-nuclear capable heavy bombers. Nuclear
weapons should be not be stored at the same air base where
non-nuclear heavy bombers are based.

- Even though non-nuclear capable heavy bombers would
not be accountable under the central limits of the treaty for
deployed heavy bombers, notifications on the location(s) and
numbers of the heavy bombers should be recorded in the
baseline MOU and its six-month updates.

- Photos and technical data should be exchanged, as
these are tools inspectors use to confirm.

- Russia proposed visits to the non-nuclear capable
heavy bombers to confirm the MOU data received.

- During these visits, the inspecting party would have
the right to confirm that nuclear arms do not exist on the
heavy bombers, the base(s) itself, and in their weapons
storage areas.

- This approach corresponds to the U.S. provided
approach.

End Novikov comments.


21. (S) Elliott asked whether visits to bases for
non-nuclear heavy bombers would continue through the life of
the treaty, to which Novikov responded that the visits would
be conducted for the duration of the treaty. Russia's
current proposed text would allow five visits per year.
Elliott asked whether the reason for this new proposal was a
confidence-building measure, since these procedures were not
conducted under START. Ryzhkov replied that Elliott was
correct and that the visits would be conducted to confirm
that the non-nuclear heavy bombers had not been re-converted
and that nuclear armaments were not being stored in the
weapons storage area. Ryzhkov and Elliott both agreed that
there were currently inconsistencies with language concerning
visits and inspections in the respective protocols and
annexes being discussed. Elliott stated that he felt the
issues would become clearer as we moved through the process.

--------------
A FINAL NOTE ON NOTIFICATIONS
BEFORE CONCLUDING
--------------


22. (S) Concerning notifications, Siemon stated that he had
reviewed an initial English translation of the Russian
proposal on notifications and that he had seen both
similarities and differences in his initial reading. In some
instances, the similarities were striking. Siemon's view was


to start with the similarities and work from there. Ryzhkov
suggested that, at the right time, the notifications working
group should break off from the elimination group. Siemon
agreed that this made sense, but that it would come much
later in the process.


23. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Siemon
LCDR Brons
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dwyer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
Lt Col Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Strauss
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Amb Antonov
Col Ilin
Mr. Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Venevtsev
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS