GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: SOME POSITIVE TALK,

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000822

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: GG PGOV PHUM PREF PREL RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: SOME POSITIVE TALK,
LITTLE TO SHOW

Classified By: Peter Mulrean, RMA Counselor, Reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) Summary: At the seventh round of Geneva discussions
on Georgia on September 17, all sides were fairly
constructive at the outset, with everyone agreeing that the
Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) were
working better than they had been initially. Discussions on
the main topic, a non-use-of-force agreement (NUF),became
bogged down in political posturing and semantics, however,
and little concrete progress was made. Georgian Deputy
Foreign Minister Bokeria started out with a more
confrontational opening statement than usual, questioning the
success of the Geneva talks in general, but showed
flexibility and practicality as the day progressed. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin was relatively quiet, but
laid down a firm marker on the need for an NUF to be signed
between Georgia on the one hand and the de factos on the
other. EU Special Representative Morel worked hard to find
areas of agreement, at times stretching to exaggerate the
productivity of the session. South Ossetian "presidential"
representative Chochiev was on better-than-average behavior,
generally avoiding emotional language and tirades, though he
showed a bit of the old obstinacy on the IPRM issue. There
was no explicit mention of the Afghanistan battalion
training in the sessions, but Chochiev made vague remarks
about Georgia preparing for renewed aggression, and Karasin
linked the training to the alleged "rearmament of Georgia"
during his press remarks. Parties agreed the next round of
talks would take place November 11. End summary.


2. (C) Basic positions: In his initial, uncharacteristically
forceful statement, Bokeria expressed frustration with the
lack of progress on major issues at Geneva, such as
cease-fire implementation, IDP returns, and continued
limitations on movements across the boundaries. He added
that in general Georgia still feels insecure in the face of
continuing Russian occupation and therefore seeks
arrangements not to recommit to the idea of the non-use of
force, but to ensure the idea,s implementation. He
highlighted a proposal not only giving international monitors
access to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but establishing an
executive police force. Karasin focused on Georgia as the
primary threat in the region, insisting that recovery of the
regions by military means remains a political priority for
Georgia. Drawing a parallel with the so-called
"Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan" between Russia and the EU, in which
Saakashvili supposedly played only a bit part, he portrayed
Russia and the EUMM as equally disinterested third parties
that guarantee security on their respective sides of the
administrative boundaries. He praised the EUMM as having
played a key role in keeping Georgia in check. Without
making any specific allegations, Chochiev said that Georgia
was still re-arming.



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Non-Use-of-Force
--------------


3. (C) As expected, NUF discussions were the highlight of the
7th round in Working Group 1 (WG1). Karasin started in by
asserting that previous "reasonable" Russian proposals
regarding the renewal of OSCE and UN mandates had been
rejected; however, this was in the past, and now the security
situation was noticeably improved with the Russians providing
security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just as EUMM does on
the Georgian side (thus equating the two in a manner the
Georgians later objected to). He even went so far as to
praise the international agencies involved in the IPRM
mechanism. As a consequence, the real need now was for a
political commitment between Georgia and South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. He went over in some detail the provisions of the
paper that the Russians had handed over in a previous
session. His remarks suggested, though they did not say
explicitly, that the Russians might attempt to raise these
issues in other fora (UN and OSCE) in the context of security
discussions in those arenas.


4. (C) DAS Kaidanow urged all sides to set aside status
questions and focus on the substance of what a viable NUF
might contain, rather than the contentious question of who
would sign the document (a theme later echoed by the
Georgians). Verbeke made similar comments, noting that there
were a variety of forms any NUF might take, but it was
important to detail what the content of an NUF might look
like and what implementing measures it would prescribe.
Predictably unhelpful throughout, South Ossetian rep Chochiev
suggested the Georgian refusal to sign an agreement now was a

sign it was committed to aggression. In what became a
repeated effort to link the issues of humanitarian
access/IDPs and refugees with the NUF concept, he proposed
combining WG1 and WG2, which the co-chairs neatly rebuffed.
Bokeria reiterated several times that Georgia already
considers itself to be under a legally binding NUF agreement
(August 12 cease-fire),and pointed out that Georgia would
only consider a NUF agreement with Russia, and it would have
to contain serious and implementable measures to increase
the international presence in the two regions. Morel
observed that a few months earlier, all sides had been close
to agreeing on modalities for renewed UN and OSCE observation
missions, and the implementing measures suggested by the
co-chairs derived from those draft renewals. Karasin and the
two de factos, however, continued to insist that the basic
issue of signatories should be resolved first and would not
agree to settle on the principles elaborated in the
co-chairs, non-paper as a basis for a future framework
document, though the Georgians pushed them on this issue.


5. (C) Morel proposed the co-chairs should consult with all
parties before the next round and prepare some basic
principles for a framework of a draft non-use-of-force
agreement. Karasin insisted the framework focus on existing
drafts, and argued the non-paper circulated just prior to
this 7th round was insufficiently fleshed out to form the
basis of a proper framework, though his real point was that
he would not agree to the specific principles elaborated in
the non-paper (on international monitoring presence,
separation of forces, etc). Bokeria said the non-paper
circulated by the Co-Chairs was a firm foundation, but that
Georgia might propose additions (such as executive policing
power). The Co-Chair agreement to work on this document
became the day,s only deliverable, though the parties could
not even agree on a formal title for the framework, and the
co-chairs agreed to skirt the title issue in their public
comments.

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Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms
--------------


6. (C) As in the 6th round, all sides agreed the IPRMs are
useful and important and noted progress, including more
consistency in meetings. Haber acknowledged South Ossetia,s
removal of preconditions and improvement in cooperation.
Both Karasin and Chochiev helpfully expressed openness to
establishing a new roving OSCE presence, comparable to the
new roving UN presence, that would enable the OSCE to have
people on the ground and therefore be in a better position to
contribute to the work of both the IPRMs and the Geneva
process in general. South Ossetia did raise the chairmanship
issue, proposing three possible variants (all of which
Georgia has rejected in earlier discussions): a rotating
chair between Georgia and South Ossetian de facto
authorities; a rotating chair among all the parties; and a
joint EUMM-Russia chairmanship. With no consensus on the
chairmanship issue, Morel proposed agreeing to disagree.
South Ossetia also expressed interest in minutes of the
meetings, or "protocols," prepared by a chairman, but said it
would not accept minutes prepared by the EUMM. Haber
suggested that the EUMM could prepare a first draft minutes
and then circulate them for comments by all parties.

--------------
Ships
--------------


7. (C) As expected, the Abkhaz condemned Georgian seizure of
ships as "piracy" and called it a serious test of the Geneva
process. Russia referred to the "piracy" issue once as part
of its arguments for non-use of force agreement between
Georgia and the separatists, but otherwise did not harp on
the issue. Georgia said that, in accordance with
international law, it would address the issue with Turkey and
the flag country of the vessels, but not with the Russians or
Abkhaz. Morel said that Turkey and Georgia had established a
working group, and that international best practice would be
to allow that mechanism to work. The issue was not raised
again during the day, nor was it raised in the press
conference afterwards.

--------------
Detentions
--------------


8. (C) Both Georgia and the de facto South Ossetian
authorities expressed concerns on this issue. Haber said
EUMM was ready to continue helping, but noted he did not have

any formal investigation authority. Morel raised the idea of
a second commission to address the issue, though Chochiev
asked why that was necessary since the IPRM had been working.
Morel noted that a separate commission could include groups
outside the Geneva Talks, such as ICRC.

--------------
IDPs and Humanitarian Issues
--------------


9. (C) Working Group 2 (WG2) was side-tracked only briefly by
angry remarks about the UNGA resolution on Georgian IDPs.
Abkhaz Lana Agrba insisted that the resolution did not
provide a context for refugee returns, taking no account of
the "countries" to which displaced persons would return.
She accused the international community of "trying to get
things done unilaterally" and of considering politics, not
people. Russia,s Mikhail Lebedev accused Georgia of
undermining the Geneva discussions through unilateral action
and stated that Russia had been offended by not having been
consulted on the resolution in advance - an accusation the
Georgians easily dismissed.


10. (C)The group turned to a non-paper circulated the day
before the session called "Agreed Undertakings," in which the
Co-chairs had distilled key points of agreement
participants, views in previous rounds on rehabilitation,
water supply, status of displaced persons, facilitation of
returns, and property issues. South Ossetia,s delegation
immediately objected to the opening paragraph stating that
the participants, "based on previously agreed principles,
agree to move forward," and they insisted on the need to
define those principles. The Russian delegation took it
further and disputed that the participants had ever agreed on
principles.


11. (C) Rather than take up the substance of the non-paper,
however, the other WG2 participants focused on what was
missing. The Georgian delegation cited the omission of a
discussion of access (referring to both access of
humanitarian actors to South Ossetia -- which the U.S.
strongly supported -- and access of ethnic Georgians in
Abkhazia to Georgian territory, especially unhindered passage
across the ABL for children attending school in undisputed
Georgia. The Georgians pushed for inclusion of protection of
human rights as an agreed principle, alleging systematic
human rights violations in the Gali region of Abkhazia.
Objecting to press statements from previous working group
sessions that asserted progress not commensurate with the
Georgians, assessment of proceedings, the delegates insisted
that conclusions should not report that the group had made
progress until there was agreement on all elements of the
non-paper. A member of the Georgian delegation told us
privately that inordinately positive statements emanating
from the discussions supported Russian efforts to move more
issues into the Geneva Discussions, where the de facto
authorities had a greater voice than in other international
fora.


12. (C) The Russians and South Ossetians reverted to familiar
arguments that progress on WG2 issues was only possible once
an environment of trust had been created, including resolving
thorny issues being handled by WG1. The South Ossetians
raised again the cases of specific missing persons and unjust
detentions and ignored Georgian offers of an immediate
exchange of all detainees. The Abkhaz were not specific, but
pushed for time to draft comments to the non-paper. U.S.
interventions and side discussions continued to urge
pragmatism, commended the utility of the non-paper, called on
the Georgians to accept incremental progress, and urged all
participants to maintain sight of our objectives: continuing
support for humanitarian activities and working toward
creation of conditions conducive to safe, voluntary, and
dignified returns.


13. (C) The group eventually came to agreement on a redrafted
opening paragraph for the co-chairs, paper, but failed to
reach consensus on priorities, deferring discussion until
they had an opportunity to submit comments on the non-paper
and additional areas for consideration. Even the chairs,
attempts to summarize the accomplishments of WG2 in the
traditional post-session press communique devolved into an
unseemly argument when participants disputed that they agreed
to consider any particular areas or sectors for humanitarian
intervention, either the five original or any additional
ones.


14. (C) COMMENT. Despite the good feelings over the IPRMs,
improved functioning and the improved security environment in

general, the session did not accomplish much. The IPRMs have
helped reduce, although not eliminate, the immediate security
concerns over regular shootings, explosions and other
incidents, so the Geneva talks can begin to move on to some
of the underlying issues. These questions, like
comprehensive arrangements for ensuring security and IDP
returns, are less pressing, but more contentious, and it is
therefore likely to take longer to make concrete progress.
This session saw the first tentative steps toward tackling
those thorny issues, and the circular discussions about such
red herrings as a non-use of force agreement (which is
unlikely ever to be concluded) indicate the difficulty of
making real progress. There are still some areas, especially
in Working Group 2, that offer opportunities for rapid

progress on what should be non-controversial topics, such as
humanitarian access and water distribution. Despite the
stonewalling in WG2, we should continue to reach for what
should be low-hanging fruit in those areas. Nevertheless, as
we prepare for future sessions, we will need to think
carefully about where real progress is actually possible, and
what we will need to do either within or outside Geneva to
enable that progress.
GRIFFITHS