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09GENEVA821 2009-10-01 16:41:00 SECRET Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:   KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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					  S E C R E T GENEVA 000821 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 23,
2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0805 (SFO-GVA-V-005)

B. GENEVA 0736 (SFO-GVA-IV-009)

C. GENEVA 0781 (SFO-GVA-V-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).



1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-011.



2. (U) Meeting Date: September 23, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 6:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva



--------------------------


SUMMARY


--------------------------





3. (S) The Treaty and Definitions Working Group held its
second meeting of the session, during which the Parties
continued discussions based on the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft
Text (JDT) for the Treaty Preamble, dated September 22, 2009.



4. (S) The session reviewed most of the language of the
preamble to include a short discussion on the title of the
treaty itself. The Russian side discussed at length the
concepts (and the translation challenges involved) of equal
security, and the principle of enhanced security emphasizing
the importance it attaches to these principles. In a
reversal of position, the Russian Delegation offered to drop
its proposed language in the preamble citing the importance
of verification in the treaty. Finally, the Russian
Delegation wanted to see greater recognition for the
contributions of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the
preamble.



--------------------------


LET'S BEGIN WITH THE TITLE


--------------------------





5. (S) Ambassador Ries opened the meeting by welcoming the
delegates and providing them an extract of wording that had
been developed and agreed on during the first meeting (REF
A). She noted that certain passages might fit better if the
order were changed, but she recommended waiting until the
preamble was complete before making any paragraph moves. Mr.
Koshelev thanked her for the recommendation, then began by
recalling language from the previous session's work (REF B)
that had originally said "U.S. and Russia were no longer
enemies." He related how his staff had searched for the
origin of such language and found it in the Joint Press
Statement from the Bush-Putin Conference in Sochi in 2008.
Having found the source, he declared he was satisfied with
the language as it is now rewritten and did not need to
include the phrase.



6. (S) Koshelev inquired as to whether the United States was
satisfied with the title of the treaty. He sais he thought
it was important to be precise about titles of important
documents, citing as an example the plan to re-label the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to become
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), and he wanted to
know if the new title of the draft documents was acceptable
to both sides. Ries agreed to discuss this with the


Delegation. (Begin note: The title in the U.S.-proposed
treaty text is the same as the Russian-proposed text. End
note.)



--------------------------


REVISITING EQUAL SECURITY


--------------------------





7. (S) Ries offered her reflection on Ms. Kotkova's previous
presentation on equal security (REF C), noting that both the
United States and Russia have equal sovereignty and were
equal members of the global community. Each nation faced its
own unique security challenges that must be weighed in a
global context. She went on to underscore that the analysis
done in determining unique security requirements could not be
expressed as "equal" per se, but would be better described as
resulting in security arrangements that were mutually
beneficial. She sought to avoid the use of a term whose
meaning had not changed from the Cold War period. She
proposed amending text to reflect "enhancing mutual security."



8. (S) Koshelev, acknowledging that the term "equal
security" had generated controversy, noted he had two
concerns. He was not sure of the exact origin of the concept
of "mutual security" and, while there was no doubt mutual
security would be enhanced, equal security also needed to be
addressed as, for the Russian Federation, it was the basis
for any negotiation. He proposed a new formulation of the
term, that originally appeared in one of the final documents
of the "000 NPT Conference, in which the concept of
"Undiminished Security for all" was espoused. The term was
translated "ne-nanacenue uscherba bezopasnosti" (literally,
non-infliction of damage to security). As it sounded stilted
in Russian, Russian interpreters changed it to "Ravnaya
bezopasnost" (equal security). Koshelev said his memory was
jogged when the U.S. interpreter translated undiminished
security in a way different from the term he was used to (the
U.S. interpreter used "neoclablennaya bezopasnoct"). He
offered to accept undiminished security in place of equal
security if the United States was amenable. Ries advised she
would take his proposal for consideration, but warned that
imprecision regarding translations could inadvertently lead
back to the original term and the baggage that came with it.



--------------------------


SO, HOW DO YOU ENHANCE
SECURITY?


--------------------------





9. (S) Koshelev addressed another U.S. proposal in the
preamble which would "enhance the mutual security of the
parties." He did not understand how security could be
enhanced. Ries pointed out that this language was drawn from
the April 2009 Joint Statement, to which Koshelev responded
how the Russian side never really liked the wording of the
Joint Statement and had been rushed into accepting it at the
last minute. If anything, he wanted to avoid repeating the
mistakes in the Joint Statement and possibly even correct
them when writing the treaty. General Venevtsev chimed in
with the question (Begin comment: Probably for his side more
than the U.S. side, as it was not translated. End comment.)
"how do you enhance security? You either have it or you
don't." Discussion on this point concluded with several


variants being suggested, which both sides agreed to re-visit.



10. (S) The challenges of finding wording that worked in
both languages became more apparent as the working group
discussed the Russian-proposed paragraph on the stabilizing
effect verifiable reductions have had. In response to a Ries
proposal to insert the word "positive" in place of
"stabilizing," Koshelev could not understand how the words
positive and stability could be used interchangeably. In the
end, he accepted the U.S. proposal, advising that the Russian
translation would probably use different words, but promising
that the choice of words in Russian would faithfully convey
the sense of the phrase in English. The paragraph would
read, "Taking into account the positive effect on the world
situation which had resulted from radical, verifiable
reduction of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st
century."



--------------------------


FIRST YOU WANTED IT,
NOW WE DO


--------------------------





11. (S) Discussion moved to the paragraph originally
proposed by Russia on creating a mechanism for verifying
compliance. Koshelev said this was an important concept
brought forward from the START Treaty. Ries offered to
accept the language in the Russian proposal. Koshelev
quickly interjected that the Russian Delegation no longer
wished to retain this paragraph but rather wanted to remove
it. He explained that the United States gave the Russian
Federation, in the waning days of 2008, a draft treaty called
the "Treaty on Security and Confidence-Building Measures,"
which lacked verification measures. (Begin comment. This is
probably the October 23, 2008 Draft U.S.-Proposed Treaty
Between the United States and the Russian Federation on
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures Regarding
Strategic Offensive Nuclear Reductions. End comment.) The
Russian Delegation sought to add a verification paragraph in
the preamble to set the tone for the treaty and ensure that
it contained verification provisions. Now that such
provisions were embedded in both side's versions of the
treaty and the annex(es), there was no reason to have such a
provision in the preamble.



12. (S) Ries asserted that it was still important to point
out (to future readers of the treaty) how verification would
be an important element of the treaty, to which Koshelev
quipped "all the public really cared about was the numbers
and not the details." Koshelev argued that the paragraph
would give emphasis to only one aspect of the treaty. To his
mind, reductions and limitations were the goal, but he
reiterated that Russia supports verification in the new
treaty. Koshelev continued to argue how an element of the
treaty need not be repeated in the preamble; based on the
time spent and vigor of the discussion, it was obvious that
the Russians felt strongly about removing the paragraph from
the preamble. Ries noted that the preamble served to set the
political context and, as such, it was important to highlight
the importance of verification, especially since it was one
of the key instructions in the April 2009 Joint Statement.
Both sides agreed to leave the language bracketed but as a
U.S. proposal. Koshelev asserted that, as the Russian


Delegation no longer supported the language and the U.S.
Delegation now supported the language, the bracket should now
reflect the proper ownership.



--------------------------


RUSSIAN TERM DU JOUR -
MULTILATERALIZATION


--------------------------





13. (S) Discussion moved to a paragraph addressing the
step-by-step process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arms
with a view to expanding the process in the future. Koshelev
appreciated the structure of the language, but wanted to
ensure that the paragraph retained a more substantive comment
involving multilateralization. He reported how last year's
disarmament conference concluded with a statement that "other
(nuclear) nations should seamlessly join in the process of
nuclear disarmament." He asked what was meant by the use of
the word "expanding" (the process). While he thought it
probably alluded to more bilateral activities, he wanted the
next stage of the process to involve other nations as well.
He returned to Article VI of the NPT and pointed out the
obligation of all nuclear nations to involve other nuclear
nations in the nuclear disarmament process.



14. (S) Ries pointed out that there were a number of paths
the process could go in the future, and multilateralization
was one of them. In her opinion, the key thing was not only
to continue but to do more. She offered to modify the
wording of the language to recognize that the process for the
future could also include multilateralization.



--------------------------


ABOUT OUR FORMER
START TREATY PARTNERS


--------------------------





15. (S) As the last portion of the preamble to be discussed
for this meeting, Ries turned attention to the various
proposed passages that noted the contributions of Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. She offered language which captured
the essence of the various proposals in a succinct passage.
Koshelev opined that the three countries deserved "larger
recognition" for contributing to disarmament, as well as
contributing to global security as non-nuclear states. While
agreeing with the basic U.S. proposal, he wanted "more
beautiful words" to emphasize the contributions of the other
START Parties. He tasked Kotkova to write a proposal and
promised to provide it at the next session.



16. (U) Documents exchanged. None.



17. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Connell
Mr. Evans
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Taylor


Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Gen Venevtsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)



18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS