Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA820
2009-10-01 13:48:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #0820/01 2741348
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O 011348Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9433
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4840
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2025
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1024
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6219
S E C R E T GENEVA 000820 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING
GROUP, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020)

C. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021)

D. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022)

E. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023)

F. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

G. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000820

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING
GROUP, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

B. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020)

C. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021)

D. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022)

E. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023)

F. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

G. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-010.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 23, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The second meeting of the Inspection Protocol (IP)
Working Group (WG) was held at the Russian Mission on
September 23, 2009, to discuss similarities and differences
in the U.S. and Russian approaches to inspection procedures
provided for under the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty. The
Russian Delegation conveyed its vision of inspection
activities presented in the Russian-proposed draft of Section
V to the Treaty Annex regarding "Inspections, Visits, and
Exhibitions" (REF A). The U.S. Delegation expressed concern
regarding the Russian use of the word "visit," as well as on
the absence of detailed procedures in the Russian-provided
draft and how leaving such details to be agreed upon later
within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) was
unacceptable, especially considering that previously agreed
language on those details was already recorded in the START
Treaty and had been updated in the draft IP developed by the
U.S. side. Several differences between the U.S. and Russian
draft versions of the IP were identified and discussed, with
no decisions being made. Both sides agreed to study the

respective drafts to determine what could be added to the
Russian version, reduced from the U.S. version, or whether
some details could be relocated elsewhere, such as being
moved into a "third-tier" document below the level of the
U.S.-proposed protocol or the Russian-proposed annex similar
to the annexes to the IP developed for START.

--------------
COMPARING U.S. AND
RUSSIAN APPROACHES
--------------


4. (S) Dr. Warner opened the meeting by presenting
similarities and differences that had been identified between
the U.S. (REF B) and Russian approaches to inspection
procedures provided for under the SFO Treaty. He used a
chart to illustrate the correlation between the U.S. and
Russian approaches associated with specific inspection
activities to show how the two approaches mapped against one
another. According to the chart, what the United States
calls a "nuclear warhead inspection," used to confirm the
declared numbers of deployed ICBM and SLBM warheads and
deployed heavy bombers and their associated nuclear


armaments, is called an "inspection" under the Russian
approach. What the United States calls a "data update
inspection," used to confirm declared data on deployed ICBMs,
SLBMs, and their associated launchers, is also called an
"inspection" under the Russian approach. However, while the
United States refers to the activities carried out to confirm
declared data on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, non-deployed
heavy bombers, and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers as
"data update inspections," the Russian approach refers to
these activities as "visits." The U.S. side proposes to use
the initial data update inspection at a new facility to
confirm data on relevant items at that facility, while the
Russian approach calls this activity a "visit." A
"Conversion or Elimination Inspection" under the U.S.
approach, which is used to confirm completion of conversion
or elimination procedures on strategic offensive arms, was
called both a "visit" or "exhibition" in different sections
of the Russian draft Treaty. A "formerly declared facility
inspection" that has been used under START to confirm that
eliminated facilities were not being used for purposes
inconsistent with the treaty, continues to be called for in
the U.S. draft, but appears to have been omitted under the
Russian approach. Both approaches referred to the activity
to confirm the technical characteristics of new types of
strategic offensive arms as "exhibitions" and both sides
dropped the requirement for "close-out inspections" on
facilities no longer used for purposes related to SFO.

--------------
CLARIFICATION OF THE
RUSSIAN APPROACH
--------------


5. (S) Colonel Ilin explained that the Russian approach
envisions three types of inspection activities: 1)
inspections; 2) visits; and 3) exhibitions. "Inspections"
are to be the toughest and most stringent type of inspection
activity, since the purpose is to verify data on deployed
strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the
treaty. Inspections will be used to not only confirm the
number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, accountable heavy bombers,
and deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, but also to confirm the
number of deployed warheads installed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers. Ilin added that, while the U.S. approach
combined the launcher and delivery vehicle into a single
entity, the Russian approach counted the launchers
separately. Inspections would be conducted only at ICBM
bases, submarines bases, and air bases for heavy bombers.
The total number of inspections that could be conducted each
year would be five, which was said to be based on the results
of START inspections and from the previous U.S. draft SFO
Treaty given to the Russians in October 2008. Warner
reminded Ilin that the U.S. proposed to allow each side to
conduct up to 14 nuclear warhead inspections annually as well
as 12 data update and 2 formerly declared facility
inspections, many more than the five inspections and five
visits offered by the Russians.


6. (S) Ilin explained that "visits" are to be used for the
confirmation of the numbers of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs,
heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, as
well as for confirmation of data associated with new
facilities, and the technical characteristics of non-deployed


items. The Russian side proposes that each side may conduct
no more than five visits annually. The inspecting Party
would also have the option of using a visit to confirm the
completion of conversion or elimination procedures of
strategic offensive arms, but such a visit would be
considered one of the overall annual quotas of visits.
Visits would be less rigorous than inspections, since,
according to the Russians, all activities within this
category could also be verified by national technical means
of verification. While step-by-step procedures could be
developed for inspections, only a few procedures would be
necessary for visits. Visits to inventory non-deployed
strategic offensive arms would be conducted at ICBM bases,
submarines bases, air bases for heavy bombers, storage
facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination
facilities, test ranges, and training facilities.


7. (S) Similar to practices under START, "exhibitions" are
to be used to confirm the technical characteristics and
distinguishability of new ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, ICBM
and SLBM launchers, and converted strategic offensive arms.
They would be conducted at ICBM bases, submarines bases, air
bases for heavy bombers, storage facilities, repair
facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, test
ranges, training facilities, production facilities, and
flight test centers for heavy bombers. The difference in the
Russian approach from current START provisions is that the
inspected Party would set the schedule and details of how
such exhibitions would be conducted. When asked whether an
exhibition would be conducted before or after the conversion
procedures were completed, Ilin replied that the Russian
Delegation did not want to establish that procedure now, but
the option of conducting a demonstration of procedures after
the completion of the conversion would not be excluded. The
procedures associated with exhibitions would be much softer
than the present START requirements.

--------------
"VISITS" -- A NEGATIVE CONNOTATION
--------------


8. (S) Warner expressed concerns regarding the Russian use
of the word "visit" in their proposal, viewing it as a
troubling direction. START provided for various types of
inspections and exhibitions, but not visits. Admittedly, the
previous U.S. Administration had provided Russia with a
proposed version of the SFO Treaty that introduced the
concept of visits into the negotiations. Under that concept,
there were to be no inspections and visits were intended to
be far less regulated, voluntary in nature, preceded by
30-day advance notification (vice 24 hours of advance notice
for a START inspection),and the inspected Party had the
right to refuse a proposed visit. As such, the use of the
word "visit" in SFO implied that these types of activities
were much less stringent than START inspections and much less
important sources of information on treaty compliance. The
current U.S. Administration seeks to have a very rigorous
verification regime built on various types of inspections,
not visits. The inspection activities used to confirm data
exchanged on non-deployed systems should be just as rigorous
as those used for deployed systems, so there should be no
difference between inspections and visits, as defined by the
Russian approach. The U.S. Delegation believed that


inclusion of the word "visit" would pose significant problems
with the U.S. Administration's ability to achieve
ratification of the SFO Treaty in the Senate.

9 . (S) Ilin responded that, in principle, there had to be a
difference between inspections and visits. Differences in
the procedures for conducting inspections and visits were
essential from the treaty perspective since the verification
of treaty limits should be more regulated than the
confirmation of information provided voluntarily.

--------------
THE DETAILS MATTER
--------------


10. (S) Warner observed that there was a dramatic difference
in size and scope of the inspection activities and associated
procedures that have been proposed by the U.S. and Russian
sides. It is obvious, from simply looking at the documents,
that the U.S. proposal is much more extensive and detailed
than the Russian-proposed text. Moreover, the initial U.S.
review showed some of the substantive differences to be very
significant. The Russian version lacked specific details in
several areas while the U.S. version included detailed
procedures that had been worked out and agreed to previously
under START that the U.S. believed should continue since the
availability of those detailed procedures had been extremely
useful in the successful execution of the START verification
regime. Warner suggested that, if Russia did not want

detailed procedures included in the IP, perhaps those
procedures could be relocated into a "third level" annex.

--------------
ARE DETAILED PROCEDURES
REALLY THE PROBLEM?
--------------


11. (S) Mr. Rust, speaking from the perspective of both a
former inspector and escort of Russian inspectors, commented
on the importance of having detailed procedures and observed
that mutual respect and predictability was based on the
detailed knowledge and ability to implement the agreed
procedures that had been developed by both sides. Although
extensive, and sometimes complicated, the detailed procedures
have been a key element in the successful implementation of
START. Colonel Ryzhkov countered by asking how many
ambiguities and problems have arisen in the presence of those
detailed procedures for conducting inspections. Rust
admitted that many "ambiguities" (instances of perceived
non-compliance identified by the inspecting side) had been
documented during inspections, but the professionalism and
expertise of the inspectors and escorts allowed many problems
to be resolved during the inspections. Rust concluded by
suggesting that the Russian Selegation consider just how many
ambiguities there might have arisen in the absence of
detailed inspection procedures.


12. (S) Col Zaytsev claimed that the Russian Delegation had
attempted to take into account both U.S. and Russian concerns
while drafting their proposal. Inspections that lead to
ambiguities and problems are those that are more rigid and
regulated, while "softer" inspections would, in their view,
cause fewer problems.




13. (S) Ryzhkov cited the lack of problems that Russia had
encountered during implementation of Vienna Document
inspections as an example of why detailed procedures were
undesirable. He asserted that Russia has conducted about 70
inspections under that treaty and there were usually few
ambiguities. He opined that too many detailed procedures
tended to produce ambiguities and confrontation, but he
believed a solution could be found if the sides worked
together carefully. It would be difficult to agree on
detailed inspection procedures, he noted, since each side has
a specific operational approach to its own strategic weapon
systems and the differences in approach were very significant.


14. (S) Warner agreed that standards should be applied that
made practical sense and did not reveal classified national
security information, but there is no formula regarding the
conduct of inspection activities that could guarantee no
ambiguities will arise and be detected.

--------------
WORKING OUT INSPECTION DETAILS
IN THE BCC IS A BAD IDEA
--------------


15. (S) Warner reiterated that there were significant
differences in the philosophies reflected in the U.S. and
Russian IP proposals. He again expressed serious concern
regarding Russia's proposal to develop and agree upon the
details of specific inspection procedures within the
framework of the BCC after the treaty was signed. It will be
far preferable for all procedures to be agreed upon within
the SFO negotiations, well before the first inspections could
be conducted. It would be highly problematic to expect that
the two sides, acting through the BCC, could develop these
procedural details from scratch after conclusion and signing
of the SFO Treaty, and to commit the sides to follow such a
course would inevitably result in a lengthy delay in the
initiation of inspections under the new treaty. It will be
important to document specific procedures since new personnel
that come to work this issue over the next decade will need
to know how inspections are to be conducted. Recognizing
that there was very little negotiation time left before the
deadline set by our Presidents for completing the new treaty,
it is unclear why the specific procedures could not be
included when previously agreed language on those details is
presently available. While parts of the previously agreed
language may no longer be useful, we should not simply
disregard everything. Provisions on which there are no
outstanding problems, such as equipment lists and account
settlement procedures, are examples of where the previously
agreed language needs to be reintroduced. Warner asked Ilin
to clarify whether the removal of the detailed procedures
meant that Russia was unhappy with the previously agreed
language or that it was just too lengthy and burdensome, to
which he received no answer.


16. (S) Ilin thanked the U.S.Delegation for the effort it
put into preparing such a detailed protocol. While all
formulations should be carefully examined, it will be
important to progress step-by-step to determine what appears
excessive and what is lacking. For example, the U.S.
proposal contains many restrictions and inspection activities


regarding mobile missiles as well as other provisions that
are no longer topical and needed in the new treaty. However,
the Russian Dslegation understood the U.S. point that more
details were necessary.

--------------
DIFFERENCES IN ORGANIZATION
--------------


17. (S) On the provision of the legal status of inspectors
and aircrew members (Part II of Section V of the
Russian-proposed draft),Ilin stated that there was much
commonality in the U.S. and Russian proposals, but the
wording was different. Russian ideas were present at various
places within the U.S. draft. The differences were primarily
related to the drafting principle. The Russian draft
concentrated all of the ideas on this subject in one or two
places, while the U.S. draft had scattered them throughout
its draft. It was not necessarily a bad thing, just
different. Therefore, a common philosophy is needed as to
how to formulate the text. The philosophy should be
positive, build on common ideas, and incorporate what is good.


18. (S) Warner pointed out that, under the U.S. concept for
the treaty, the IP was by far the most extensive section of
the new treaty that the sides would need to deal with. As
such, it is important to decide whether to maintain a large
protocol that includes specific details or to try to work out
a leaner protocol with the details relocated into a series of
expanded annexes. In START, the annexes were more detailed
than the protocols. The U.S.-proposed draft inspection
annexes, which are still being translated into Russian, are
very extensive and contain detailed procedures. Therefore,
choices need to be made.

--------------
DETAILS, DETAILS, DETAILS
--------------


19. (S) Warner acknowledged that the U.S. Delegation had not
yet had time to fully evaluate the Russian-proposed draft of
the Section/Protocol on Inspections since it was only
recently received. However, one of the things found in the
initial U.S. review was that, in order to shorten its
proposed draft Section on Inspections, the Russians had
removed information on notifications from the
Russian-proposed Section on Inspections and relocated it to
the Notifications Section/Protocol. But, in some cases, the
elements moved did not necessarily relate to notifications.
For example, no references to visas remained in the
Russian-proposed draft, but provisions on visas were now
present in the Section on Notifications. We should be able
to track such things, but it will take time to do so. Other
differences that were identified in the initial review of
Part II of Section V of the Russian draft included: reducing
the number of individuals on the list of inspectors to 200
(U.S. proposal -- 400); increasing the period for making
amendments to the list of inspectors to no more than once in
three months (U.S. proposal-once every three weeks);
decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an inspection
to nine (U.S. proposal -- ten0); decreasing the number of
inspectors conducting a "visit" to seven (U.S. proposal --
ten); decreasing the number of inspectors conducting an


exhibition to 10 (U.S. proposal -- 10 to 20); each side has
the option to object to individual inspectors without reason;
and a reduction in the number of points of entry to two, a
point with which the U.S. could agree. Differences
identified in the initial review of Part III of Section V
included the removal of all details pertaining to inspection
aircraft procedures, such as flight plans and call signs.


20. (S) Ilin reiterated his belief that the U.S. and Russian
proposals had much in common. Regarding the numerical
reductions, it only made sense that the number of people
involved in the inspection process would be reduced since the
number of inspections would be dramatically decreased as
well. However, the final numbers of inspectors would be
settled once agreement was reached on the number of
activities that would be permitted.


21. (S) Warner asked whether there had actually been
problems with the list of inspectors. Ryzhkov responded that
an agreement was being worked by the Nuclear Risk Reduction
Centers on increasing the timing of the exchange of the list
of inspectors, but that agreement was not yet finalized.
However, from the practical perspective, Russia only changes
its list of inspectors once or twice a year.

--------------
HOMEWORK
--------------


22. (S) Ilin concluded by saying that it was clear that some
information the Russian Delegation initially deemed as being
excessive might need to be reexamined. Following this
reexamination, both sides could study the drafts to see what
could be added to the Russian version and reduced from the
U.S. version. Warner suggested also contemplating whether
some details could be relocated, such as into a third-tier
document below the level of the U.S.-proposed protocol or the
Russian-proposed annex. For the next meeting, both sides
were to focus on the provisions that were thought to have the
most commonality (legal status of inspectors) and would
ensure that each Delegation would have its respective lawyers
in attendance to provide legal advice.


23. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Ms. Bosco
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Fortier
Dr. Fraley
Maj Johnson
Mrs. Pura
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. St. Julien
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA


Col Ilin
Amb Antonov
Mr. Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Col Petrov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS