START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

B. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023)

C. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020)

D. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

E. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021)

F. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

G. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022)

H. STATE 088263 (SFO-DIP-09-002)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-004.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 22, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the September 22 plenary meeting chaired by U.S.
Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD
Ambassador Antonov, the U.S. Delegation posed some
big-picture questions about the Russian-proposed treaty text
which had been provided to officials at the United States
Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A). The U.S.
Delegation pointed out the difficulties Russia's proposed
text would cause in the areas of counting heavy bomber
warheads and effective verification. Antonov emphasized that
Russia was seeking a new approach different from START, which
he termed a treaty of the Cold War.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation provided a proposed omnibus
annex to the treaty, that the U.S. side noted would flesh out
our understanding of Russia's treaty concepts. The Russians
clarified several points: they did not envisage subjecting
facilities that they are using in Kazakhstan to treaty
restrictions; they would not permit a right of sequential
inspections or visits; and they did not support visiting
eliminated facilities.

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RUSSIA PROVIDES ITS
PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX
--------------


5. (S) Antonov presented Russia's proposed Annex to the
Treaty Between the United States and Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, a 34-page document in the original
Russian that included six sections on definitions (REF B),
the data base (REF C),conversion and elimination procedures
(REF D),notifications (REF E),
inspections/visits/exhibitions (REF F),and the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC) (REF G). The Russian
Delegation considered that this format (treaty text plus
single annex) would be easier for its legislature to ratify.
They could consider other options, however, and would listen
to U.S. views. Antonov commented, jokingly, that just as
the United States had devoted half its text to mobile
missiles, Russia had devoted half of its text to ballistic
missile defenses. Antonov noted that this was the final

document of Russia's treaty proposals. Russia was ready to
work cooperatively on the annex so that it would address both
sides' concerns. New ideas could also be incorporated in the
course of negotiations.


6. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the document and
noted that the U.S. negotiators needed the draft annex in
order to complete their understanding of Russia's proposed
treaty text. The focus of this meeting would be initial U.S.
questions on the rationales behQ Russia's treaty proposals.


7. (S) In response to Antonov's joke, Gottemoeller reassured
the Russian side about the potential for U.S. development of
a global missile defense (MD) capability. She reiterated
relevant points made by the President in his April 1 meeting
with Russian President Medvedev in London and his April 5
speech in Prague. The planned European MD deployments would
be focused on the Iranian threat. If the Iranian missile and
weapons of mass destruction threats went away, so too would
the need for future MD deployments in Europe.


8. (S) Antonov replied that he was familiar with these
Presidential statements. His Delegation had not said they
were concerned about global MD systems following the
September 16 U.S. announcement of new MD plans. That concern
had existed for years. The Delegation was simply inviting
Washington MD experts to come to Geneva and have a serious
discussion with Russian experts, outside the framework of the
START Follow-on Negotiations. Russia had many questions and
wanted to understand the new U.S. policy better.

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TREATY PHILOSOPHY 101
--------------


9. (S) Gottemoeller's first questions addressed some of the
basic concepts of Russia's proposed treaty. She asked
whether Russia's omission of many of the prohibitions
contained in START Article V, Paragraph 18, was based on an
assumption that such prohibitions were covered under other
international agreements that remained in force. For
example, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty contained a
prohibition on emplacing nuclear weapons launchers on the
seabed and the ocean floor, similar to a ban contained in
Subparagraph 18(b) of Article V of START. On the other hand,
if other countries perceived that the U.S. and Russia were
dropping long-standing constraints on their strategic arms,
it would seem as if our countries were backtracking on arms
control.


10. (S) Antonov professed to be unfamiliar with the specific
provisions of each article in the Russian draft, but assured
Gottemoeller that Russia's philosophy was always to further
the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It
was clearly necessary to convince opponents and skeptics of
the new treaty that the United States and Russia were not
undermining any previous agreements on nuclear disarmament
and nonproliferation. Russia had only deleted START
provisions that hampered operations. He conceded it was
possible that Russia had removed too much. The working
groups could discuss such questions. (Begin comment: During
a break, Antonov remarked that he had felt cornered by the
question, since the military had cut a lot of material out
that he had not paid attention to. End comment.)



11. (S) Gottemoeller noted that the United States wanted the
new treaty to preserve predictability as well as flexibility.
The U.S. side also wanted simplification. It was important
to ensure that there were no contradictions among those three
aspects of the treaty. Antonov agreed.

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MORE QUESTIONS ON
RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY
--------------


12. (S) Fraley asked why Russia had added a provision on
measures aimed at strengthening trust, openness, and
predictability to the other obligations in Paragraph 1 of
Article I. The United States had proposed simply to use the
original START formulation for this paragraph (REF H).
Antonov answered that Russia's proposed treaty was designed
to be new and to differ from START, which had been negotiated
under very different circumstances from the present. Russia
had recently, and with great difficulty, accepted that the
new treaty should be a "hybrid." While START should be the
foundation for the new treaty, Russia did not believe it was
simply a matter of taking START and crossing some text out.
Russia believed the new treaty should show the world the new
character of U.S.-Russian relations, and had highlighted this
in Article I. As for specific measures, the experts could
consider in the working groups what measures would be
possible. Zaytsev added that, in this treaty, Russia was not
just reducing numbers, but also wanted to include
confidence-building measures, such as notifications.


13. (S) Warner asked for additional clarification of how
heavy bomber armaments would count under Russia's approach.
The Parties had committed to reduce strategic offensive arms
(SOAs),including those for heavy bombers. According to
Russia's proposed Article III, heavy bomber nuclear armaments
would only count when they were actually deployed on a heavy
bomber. The fact was that neither Party keeps nuclear
armaments loaded on heavy bombers. Therefore, we would both
appear to have zero heavy bomber nuclear armaments. The
Russian Delegation acknowledged that this was correct.
Zaytsev said the problem had existed under START and still
existed for the new treaty -- heavy bomber warheads could not
be verified. It was too difficult to count warheads in
storage. Russia's logic was to account for heavy bomber
warheads in the same way as ICBM and SLBM warheads; i.e.,
only warheads deployed on heavy bombers would count. The
U.S.-proposed approach created problems in terms of what
portion would count and what would not, and which storage
facilities would be subject to the treaty.


14. (S) Warner acknowledged that defining heavy bomber
warheads was difficult, but heavy bombers were different from
ICBMs and SLBMs and did not lend themselves to being counted
in the same way. The U.S. side would discuss its proposed
approach in more detail in the working groups. Russia's
proposal would reduce nuclear arms by definition instead of
in reality. Our countries would look foolish if we declared
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments on both sides
but said they had no weapons. The United States certainly
did not want to load nuclear armaments on its heavy bombers
and put them on alert, as was done during the Cold War.


15. (S) Antonov said Warner's comments about heavy bombers
not being counted with warheads reminded him of Russia's
long-standing concerns about ICBM and SLBM front sections
that did not carry as many warheads as their maximum
capacity. Russia wanted to limit upload capability. The
case with heavy bombers would be similar: no warheads were
currently loaded, but they existed somewhere and would be
ready to load onto heavy bombers. Russia was not trying to
find out U.S. secrets, and was not interested in warheads
located in storage facilities. Warheads could not fly on
their own. The focus was on delivery vehicles, which Russia
wanted to reduce permanently.

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LAUNCHERS AND LIMITS
--------------


16. (S) Trout questioned Russia's Article III, Subparagraph
4.(e)(ii) provision, which states a mobile launcher is
removed from accountability by returning to the production
facility. Under the START Treaty, such movement did not
change the accountability of a mobile launcher. Antonov was
unable to address Trout's question. Orlov proposed
discussing the question in the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group, adding that, if a mobile launcher
returned to a production facility, it would not be deployed.
Orlov promised he would also have questions for the U.S. side
at the working group meeting.


17. (S) Fraley asked the Russian side to clarify the
difference between the proposed accountability rules in
Russia's Article IV, Paragraph 2 and Article III, Paragraph

4. What kinds of limits were being referred to in each case?
After much discussion among the Russian Delegation, Antonov
said Article IV, Paragraph 2 defined when items became
subject to the treaty in general. It was not about numbers.


18. (S) Purcell asked about Russia's Article V, Paragraph 2
proposed restrictions on test launchers. Since, in Article
II. Russia proposed a single limit on both deployed and
non-deployed launchers, why did Russia see a need to
distinguish test launchers from deployed launchers? The
U.S.-proposed treaty text included limits on test launchers
because the U.S. view was that such launchers would not count
under the central limits. Zaytsev attempted an answer,
saying that Russia had not proposed specific limits on test
launchers since they would fall under the proposed aggregate
launcher limit. Their location would determine whether the
launchers were test or training launchers. Test launchers
would be located at test ranges and would be considered
non-deployed. At the end of the meeting, Zaytsev added
privately that such non-deployed launchers would not differ
from deployed launchers. Purcell noted that was why she had
asked the question.

--------------
MANY QUESTIONS, FEWER ANSWERS
--------------


19. (S) DeNinno noted that Russia's Article VII, Paragraph 3
provided for use of ICBMs and SLBMs as space launch vehicles,
but Russia's treaty did not mention space launch facilities.
What was Russia's view regarding space launch facilities
under the new treaty? What was the status of the Leninsk

Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan? Finally, would ICBMs,
SLBMs, and their first stages used for space launch be
accountable in the new treaty in the same way as under START?


20. (S) Smirnov stated that Leninsk was located in
Kazakhstan, and the United States and Russia had agreed that
this treaty would not include third parties. Russia viewed
Paragraph 3 of Article VII as identifying one way in which
the Parties could eliminate missiles. Each missile would be
subject to the treaty until launched -- the same general
counting rule as under START. Petrov added that launchers at
Leninsk would remain accountable until eliminated.


21. (S) Warner commented that the U.S. side was trying to
correlate Russia's concept of inspections and visits with the
START inspection regime. Inspections and visits seemed to be
similar to START reentry vehicle inspections and data update
inspections. The biggest difference was the change in the
annual quota. Russia wanted no more than five inspections
and five visits, while the United States was proposing 12
data update inspections and 10 warhead inspections. Since
there were many more Russian ICBM bases than U.S. ICBM bases,
the United States considered Russia's annual quota too low.
Gottemoeller asked whether a single inspection team could
conduct a visit to a base and then a sequential inspection at
the same base. Petrov responded that Russia's concept did
not provide for a single team to conduct more than one
inspection, visit, or exhibiion. The Russians were willing,
however, to disuss this issue further in the working group
andto consider numbers and types of facilities.


22. (S) Warner asked whether Russia's concept include
anything like the U.S.-proposed formerly declard facility
(FDF) inspections. Petrov answered, gain, saying that
Russia was not providing for tat kind of inspection.
Eliminated facilities coul be monitored with national
technical means (NTM. Warner remared that NTM was indeed
the primay means of monitoring former facilities, but if
uestions arose on that basis, the United States wold want
the opportunity to follow up with an inspction. The United
States was dropping facility close-out inspections, bu
wanted to retain FDF inspections. Petrov counteed that, in
the entire START experience, there hd never been any
ambiguities regarding activitie at former facilities.
Russia proposed that, if uestions arose, it would be
possible to discuss hem in the BCC.


23. (S) Gottemoeller summed up hat both sides had agreed to
simplify treaty procedures and reduce costs, and also to make
verification more effective. The Delegations would continue
to develop concepts of predictability under more efficient
conditions. All of the measures must be sound. Antonov said
the exchange of questions was very useful, making the Russian
side think more about its rationales. He hoped that the
working group meetings that were about to commence would be
friendly and constructive, with no fighting. Acceptable
compromises must be found.


24. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:


-- Russian-proposed Annex to the Treaty, dated September
22, 2009.



25. (U) Participants.

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Maj Johnson
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Smith
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artemyev
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Col Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Lysenko
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Col Petrov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


26. (U) Gottemoeller sends,
GRIFFITHS