Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA812
2009-09-30 13:46:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1993
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0990
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6183
S E C R E T GENEVA 000812 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000812

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS WORKING
GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-008.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 23, 2009
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) The first meeting of the Conversion or Elimination
(CorE) and Notifications Working Group (WG) was held at the
Russian Mission on September 23, 2009. The Russian WG chair
explained the Russian approach used to draft the CorE section
of Russia's proposed annex, and made a verbal presentation on
key elements of the section (REF A). The Russian Head of
Delegation, Ambassador Antonov, came into the meeting shortly
after it started. He did not actively participate, but spoke
with several members of the Russian Delegation during breaks.


4. (S) The Russian Delegation explained its CorE proposal
relied heavily on national technical means for verification,
using "visits" should a Party wish to send an inspection team
to confirm elimination or conversion. The Russian WG chair
stressed that eliminations and conversions must be
irreversible. Russian CorE proposals would allow each Party
to independently determine its procedures for eliminations,
but included some mandatory steps, such as removal or
destruction of SLBM hatches. Conversion procedures would
also be determined independently, but would only be used for
conversion to another type or category of accountable item.


5. (S) The Russians briefly explained their concept for
notifications and proposed to delete notifications for
rail-mobile missiles, cooperative measures, portal

monitoring, post-exercise dispersal inspections, ballistic
missile throw-weights, and would not include telemetric
frequencies in flight-test notifications.

--------------
START C OR E PROCEDURES
UNFAIR TO RUSSIA
--------------


6. (S) After welcoming the U.S. Delegates to the first
meeting of the CorE and Notifications WG, Colonel Ryzhkov
explained that the Russian Federation's CorE proposals were
based on a study that concluded certain START CorE procedures
were either not cost-effective or were unfair to Russia.
Furthermore, extensive and detailed START CorE procedures
made long-term confrontation over compliance issues virtually
unavoidable.


7. (S) As examples, Ryzhkov highlighted the issue between
the United States and Russia that arose over the
self-contained dispensing mechanisms (SCDMs) during the
elimination of 109 SS-25 ICBMs, and the issue between the
United States and Ukraine over elimination procedures for


SS-24 solid-propellant motors. In the case of the SS-25
eliminations, he stated it was evident to the United States
that the missiles themselves were gone and the SCDMs were no
threat. As for the Ukrainian motors, Ryzhkov claimed that
any engineer would agree that drilling holes in the rocket
motors rendered them unusable as stages for ICBMs. Other
examples of confrontation also existed, such as with
Peacekeeper eliminations.

--------------
THE CHOICE IS YOURS,
BUT MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE
--------------


8. (S) According to Ryzhkov, Russia's proposal would allow
each Party to determine its own CorE procedures that would be
less expensive and easier to implement, yet would still
adhere to the "unshakable" principle of irreversibility; that
is, procedures that rendered the item incapable of being used
for its original purpose. Ryzhkov claimed that despite each
side determining its own procedures, the degree of
transparency would not be reduced, and Russia would retain
the notification regime for eliminations almost unchanged.


9. (S) While each Party was free to define its own
procedures, Ryzhkov noted that the Russian proposal
incorporated some key elimination procedures that would still
be mandatory. For example, it would still be necessary to
remove or destroy the hatches during SLBM launcher
eliminations and to remove or destroy basic structural
elements of a heavy bomber (HB) for eliminations. In
addition, Russia had tried to standardize the procedures for
similar categories of items, such as all solid-propellant
ICBMs.


10. (S) Regarding conversions, Ryzhkov explained that each
side could also define its own procedures that would result
in external or functional differences. These distinguishing
features and differences could then be exhibited to the other
side to confirm conversion. He reminded the WG that the
complex START procedures used to confirm the conversion of
U.S. heavy bombers to non-nuclear configurations and for the
conversion of an SS-27 mobile launcher to launch the
prototype RS-24 ICBM had resulted in serious issues for the
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Ryzhkov
stated that if we began negotiations by focusing on detailed
procedures, we would fail to reach our goal to complete a new
treaty.

--------------
NTM WILL SUFFICE
--------------


11. (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia did not understand why it
was necessary for the United States to observe the entire
elimination process when national technical means (NTM) could
be used to verify the elimination of liquid and
solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as silo, mobile,
and SLBM launchers, and facilities. To enhance the
effectiveness of NTM, Ryzhkov said Russia would provide a
notification to the United States of the completion of
elimination procedures for HBs, launchers, and
solid-propellant missiles, and then display the eliminated


item in the open for 30 days thereafter. The item would be
removed from accountability after receipt of the
notification, according to Ryzhkov. As an additional
measure, Ryzhkov said each Party could confirm the
elimination during visits to facilities where the
eliminations had taken place.

--------------
RUSSIAN C OR E
PROPOSAL BLOW-BY-BLOW
--------------


12. (S) Ryzhkov provided a short summary of each of the
Russian-proposed CorE sections, highlighted key elements, and
noted that the Russian approach allowed for elimination or
conversation at minimal cost, with minimal difficulty, and
removed the potential for confrontation. Colonel Zaytsev
added that the Russian approach was an attempt to make CorE
procedures easier to implement in light of the disputed U.S.
conversion of the B-1B HB in which both Parties still
believed their Treaty interpretation was correct.

-- Subsection I: CorE procedures for any ICBM launcher,
whether silo or mobile, would be determined by each side,
subject to verification by NTM and, if desired, an inspection
team could conduct a visit to confirm that the elimination
procedures were carried out in such a manner that rendered
the launcher incapable of launching an ICBM, or that the
conversion procedures were completed in such a manner that
the launcher could no longer contain an ICBM of the previous
type. Ryzhkov noted that the end result of CorE procedures
for silo or mobile launchers would be the same.

-- Subsection II: CorE procedures for SLBM launchers
would be the same in principle as for ICBM launchers with the
added requirement to remove or destroy the launch tube
hatches for eliminations.

-- Subsection III: For CorE procedures for HB, Ryzhkov
reiterated his earlier point that elimination procedures had
to provide for removal or destruction of basic structural
elements of the bomber.

-- Subsection IV: Ryzhkov noted that for elimination of
ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia did not see any difference between
the processes for Russian solid-propellant ICBMs and those
for the U.S. Minuteman III (MM-III) ICBM. He stated that
Russia intended to use "unified" procedures to eliminate the
same categories of missiles, whether mobile or silo-based,
and that the START experience of elimination of liquid
propellant missiles demonstrated how each side could
independently choose its own procedures.

-- Subsection V: Regarding declared facilities, Ryzhkov
said they would be considered eliminated once all strategic
offensive arms (SOAs) at the facility had been removed or
eliminated and a notification of that fact had been provided.

--------------
DIFFERING CONCEPTS FOR C OR E
--------------


13. (S) Ryzhkov negatively compared START with how facts


were confirmed in other treaties and stated that Russia
conducted over 70 inspections annually for the Vienna
Document without any comment. The text of the Vienna
Document was simple, with no detailed, agreed-upon procedures
-- hence, there were almost no problems. Ryzhkov admitted
that SOA treaties were more complex and difficult, but START
had been negotiated during the Cold War and the mission now
was to make the new treaty easier to implement.


14. (S) Zaytsev interjected to point out the START "paradox"
of the four U.S. ballistic missile submarines converted to
cruise missile carriers. According to the Treaty, these
boats were still considered to be Trident I ballistic missile
submarines despite the fact that the United States no longer
had such a missile in service.


15. (S) Elliott explained that this was due in part to
START's higher limits, under which the United States had no
need to completely remove these launchers from
accountability, therefore, the debate was not enjoined.
Elliott then requested clarification on the Russian position
on removal of hatches from launch tubes, asking whether the
intent was to make the submarine no longer useful as a
submarine, or to make the launcher incapable of launching a
missile of the type for which it is declared.


16. (S) Ryzhkov repeated that each side could determine its
own elimination procedures. However, where necessary, there
would need to be some specific procedures added. Ryzhkov
noted that confirmation of elimination procedures using NTM
for SLBM launchers was more difficult than for silo
launchers. Therefore, the Russian proposal included removal
or destruction of the hatches as one of the key elements, but
Ryzhkov reiterated that each side could determine procedures
for itself.


17. (S) Siemon asked about the Russian view of the
relationship between demonstrations and eliminations and
whether the Russians always planned to provide a
demonstration prior to eliminations. Ryzhkov replied that
demonstrations would only be conducted for conversions and
would not be used to show the conversion procedures, only the
final result of the conversion.


18. (S) Elliott indicated he heard a difference between the
START Treaty and the Russian START Follow-on approach, and
asked whether Russia viewed the conversion of submarine
launchers from nuclear to non-nuclear in the same way as
conversion of a nuclear HB to a non-nuclear HB. Ryzhkov said
no, START allowed only for conversion of ballistic missile
launchers from one type to another, as well as conversion of
HB. Ryzhkov stated that if the United States was asking
whether it was possible to convert nuclear ballistic missiles
to non-nuclear, the Russian position was that this was not
allowed.


19. (S) Elliott asked whether Russia would view a proposal
to convert a U.S. Trident II submarine in the same manner as
they would view conversion of Trident I submarines into
non-nuclear cruise missile carriers. In response, Ryzhkov
referred to Zaytsev's earlier example of the Trident I
conversion to point out that Russia did not consider this
conversion to be in compliance with applicable START


procedures. Ryzhkov said that, in the Russian approach to
START Follow-on, it was essential to convince the other side
that the item could not be used for its original purpose, but
that detailed procedures or excessive requirements were not
necessary.


20. (S) Siemon asked whether, under Russia's concept, the
Parties would provide descriptions of the elimination
procedures they had decided for themselves. Ryzhkov answered
that information on the elimination procedures would be
provided in the elimination notifications, just as was being
done already for liquid-fueled ICBMs under START. The
notification regime would be changed very little, and
notifications would indicate what each Party was doing.


21. (S) Elliott raised a theoretical issue on facility
elimination, asking whether the conversion of all U.S. B-1
bombers at a base to non-nuclear also meant that the base
itself would be considered eliminated, as there were no more
nuclear weapons at the base. Before Ryzhkov could respond,
both Colonel Novikov and Mr. Smirnov engaged him in a short
and intense side-bar conversation. Just as Ryzhkov was
beginning to answer, Smirnov cut him off, saying in Russian
"No, the bases stay." (Begin comment: This statement by
Smirnov was not translated by the Russian interpreter. End
comment.) Ryzhkov then asked for a short break to discuss
the matter with his group. The Russians made no further
comments to Elliott's question other than to suggest that the
question might be resolved when discussing notifications.


22. (S) Comeau questioned Ryzhkov about an earlier statement
made on the similarities between the elimination procedures
for the Russian SS-25 and the U.S. MM-III ICBM. Ryzhkov
replied he had made the statement only to illustrate that
methods used for the elimination of any solid-propellant
missile could be alike. For the removal of the fuel, Ryzhkov
noted that it could either be burned or one could drill holes
in the rocket motors.


23. (S) Comeau then asked about elimination of the launch
canisters, since this was a fundamental difference between
U.S. and Russian missiles. Ryzhkov dismissed the issue,
claiming that the launch canister had nothing to do with the
functioning of the missile. The approach to elimination of
missiles was what mattered, and if the Parties got bogged
down in specific procedures for every item, they would be in
Geneva until next winter.

--------------
SHORT NOTES ON NOTIFICATIONS
--------------


24. (S) Ryzhkov stated that the system of notifications was
one of the basic elements of verification and it would be
foolish to reject positive mechanisms from START. However,
the notification regime required some adaptation or
improvement due to changes in counting rules, inspection
procedures, as well as CorE procedures.


25. (S) Ryzhkov proposed to retain data exchanges, which
would also incorporate additional notifications on the
aggregate numbers of warheads per base, as well as the number
of ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs per base. The timing of data


exchanges could be the same as under START, with the first
exchange to occur no later than 30 days after entry into
force and every six months thereafter. He also proposed to
unify all notifications on changes to the status of SOA in
each category and transmit the changes no later than five
days after the change. Russia would also retain
notifications on flight-tests for SLBMs and ICBMs. Russia
would delete the remainder of the START Notification Protocol
Section I notifications, such as those on former and retired
types.


26. (S) Russia proposed to retain notifications on HB
movements between facilities, and for HB between any
location. Ryzhkov noted that both Parties had a verification
problem under START with HB visits to non-declared facilities
and that U.S. movement of HB outside national territory
needed to be fixed. To resolve the issue, Ryzhkov proposed
that both sides provide notifications for the movement of an
HB to any location no later than 24 hours prior to the
arrival for visits lasting more than 24 hours. This would be
easier for operational personnel to report than the 8-hour
timeline required under START provisions, would enhance
transparency, and allow for better tracking of the other's HB
assets, in Ryzhkov's opinion.


27. (S) The Russians proposed to delete notifications
pertaining specifically to mobile missiles--those for
rail-mobile missiles, cooperative measures, portal
monitoring, and post-dispersal exercises. Russia would
retain notifications on flight-tests for SLBMs and ICBMs.
However, Russia proposed to delete notifications for
throw-weight, as this parameter was not subject to
verification by the United States or Russia; notifications on
the reduction of the number of warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs;
and would not provide telemetric frequencies for
notifications of ballistic missile test launches. Ryzhkov
stated that Russia had no intention to provide telemetric
information via the notification protocol or otherwise.


28. (S) The Russians also proposed to add a few new sections
to the notifications: one pertaining to removal from
accountability; one for additional information; and one on
inspections, visits, and exhibitions, all with the purpose of
unifying these notifications in one section.


29. (S) Ryzhkov concluded his remarks by stating that many
of the notifications had been overcome by events, as U.S. and
Russian military cooperation had increased during the past 20
years. The Russians had removed and combined notification
elements that reflected our current relationship.


30. (S) Siemon advised Ryzhkov that the United States was
still working on its proposed Notification Protocol, but
warned that it would not be as brief as the Russian proposal
and would contain some issues the Russians would not like,
such as notifications on portal monitoring, cooperative
measures, and telemetry. Siemon explained that this was not
an expression of dissatisfaction with the Russian proposals,
simply a reflection of the U.S. approach to treaty provisions
we wanted to retain. Siemon noted that the CorE WG would
take its lead from the plenary and adjust as decisions are
made. Ryzhkov agreed with the imperative to resolve several
conceptual issues before some subsections of the annex could


be agreed, but asserted that the working groups could make
progress on many issues in the meantime. Siemon commented
that the United States shared Russia''s goal of reducing the
volume of the new treaty. Ryzhkov laughed and said that was
not noticeable to the Russians.


31. (U) Documents exchanged, None.


32. (U) Participants

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Mr. Siemon
LCDR Brons
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dwyer
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Hanchett
LTC Leyde
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Strauss
Ms. Gross(Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Amb Antonov
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


33. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS