START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-013.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 24, 2009
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the September 24 plenary meeting, chaired by U.S
Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD
Ambassador Antonov, the sides presented updates on the
positive progress of the respective working groups. Working
group chairs, as well as HODs, were optimistic that progress
would be made through the difficult issues remaining and that
common ground would be found.


4. (S) The U.S. side clarified its approach to the draft
treaty in response to Russian assertions that the U.S. draft
contained "excessive" and "rigorous" verification measures.
Gottemoeller stressed that no measures in the U.S.-proposed
draft go beyond those provisions that were contained in
START. She stated that based on experience with START, the
United States believed that carefully defined procedures
offered the best chance of success in implementing the new
treaty. Furthermore, a degree of technical detail consistent
with previously agreed-upon text was essential to produce a
verifiable treaty.


5. (S) The U.S. side presented its approach in drafting the
proposed Elimination and Telemetry Protocols. The
Elimination Protocol presentation was well-received by the
Russian side. Following the presentation of the approach to
the Telemetry Protocol, the Russian Delegation provided no
response.

--------------
A PHILOSOPHICAL
QUESTION FROM ANTONOV
--------------


6. (S) Antonov opened the plenary meeting on September 24,
2009, and asked a philosophical question on the overall U.S.
approach. It was clear to the Russian Ddelegation that the
new U.S. Administration had proposed more rigorous
verification measures than the previous Administration.
Specifically, treaty material proposed by the Bush
Administration had emphasized openness and transparency,
while the current U.S.-proposed draft employed vigorous and
"excessive" verification measures. He emphasized that the
Cold War was over, both the United States and Russia had
existing patterns of cooperation from the START Treaty, and
the U.S.-Russian relationship was developing. Finally, he
observed that these aspects of the U.S.-proposed draft did
not seem consistent with the spirit of recent remarks by the
U.S. and Russian Presidents.


7. (S) Gottemoeller replied that the basis of all U.S. work
was the original START Treaty, and that no measures in the
U.S.-proposed drafts went beyond the precedents found in

START. She agreed with sentiments expressed by the Russian
side that START implementation had been a beneficial,
positive experience for each side, but that the difficulties
in implementing START yielded lessons relevant to the current
negotiations. Where there had been carefully defined
procedures, the United States and Russia have had the most
success; impromptu procedures could lead to difficulties.

--------------
HAIL PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS
--------------


8. (S) Both Antonov and Gottemoeller traded general remarks
regarding the improved state of the current U.S.-Russian
relationship, and each cited recent comments by the American
and Russian Presidents in New York. Antonov mentioned two of
the more difficult issues Russia believed were related to the
START Treaty, the relationship between strategic offensive
and defensive arms and the need to address the use of
strategic offensive arms in a non-nuclear configuration.
Gottemoeller acknowledged the challenge of these particular
issues, and suggested that the Treaty Text Working Group
chairs meet individually to discuss these items further. She
commented that there is pressure from Washington to reach an
agreement on the new treaty, and both HODs expressed
confidence that such an agreement would be reached by the end
of the year.

--------------
A SOLID START BY
THE WORKING GROUPS
--------------


9. (S) The working group Chairs from both sides summarized
progress made to date. All chairs joined their Russian
counterparts in praising the constructive, business-like and
positive atmosphere observed in the working group meetings,
and hailed the clarity of presentations made by the other
side.


10. (S) Mr. Koshelev noted that the Treaty Text Working
Group had had no differences in eight paragraphs of the
Preamble, but had not yet come to the "most tasty"
paragraphs, where there would definitely be brackets. He
opined that the final provisions of the treaty would be
agreed quickly. His co-chair, Ambassador Ries, highlighted
the positive atmosphere, and acknowledged the hard and
productive work done by each side. Ries agreed that
difficult issues lay ahead, but expressed confidence that
agreement would be reached.


11. (S) Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the Inspection Working
Group Chairs, both echoed the positive statements made by
their peers while acknowledging the significant gap between
the level of detail provided by the United States and the
level of detail provided in the Russian-proposed drafts.
Ilin noted that the two sides would have to decide on how to
reflect the different levels of detail in the treaty. In
addition, Ilin called attention to the differences between
the sides in the areas of mobile ICBMs and provisions for
continuous monitoring.


12. (S) Colonel Ryzhkov noted that the Elimination Protocol
Working Group had only met once so far, but he looked forward

to the upcoming U.S. presentation and would work to bring
both positions together. Mr. Elliott of the Elimination
Protocol Working Group thanked Ryzhkov for his coherent and
professional presentation to the U.S. side and his cordial
manner in session. Elliott observed that the U.S.-proposed
text was generally closer to the words in the existing START
Treaty than the Russian approach. However, he had noted
several elements in the Russian text that indicated their
position was close to that of the United States, and he was
hopeful that each side would reach common ground.


13. (S) Mr. Siemon thanked the Russian side for its
enlightening presentation regarding the Russian approach to
notifications, and highlighted several major areas of
agreement between the two sides. He commented that he looked
forward to a productive discussion with the Russian side in
this area.


14. (S) Mr. Trout, Chair of the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) Working Group, praised the productive nature of early
meetings with the opposite side and stated that the exchange
of questions to date had been very fruitful. General Orlov
opined that the MOU Working Group is the main one, because it
is discussing counting rules for the new treaty. He also
praised the good atmosphere.


15. (S) Antonov summarized the reports by the working group
chairs, emphasizing the friendly relations and mutual respect
between Delegation members despite the difficulties that
confronted them. He expressed reservations regarding the
level of technical detail in the U.S.-proposed Inspection
Protocol, stating that lawyers for the Russian State Duma
would not be able to understand it. This, in turn, would
make ratification by the Russian side difficult. He allowed
that while issues of Russian lawyers were not a U.S. problem,
he hoped the U.S. Delegation could see things from his point
of view. He opined that Russia had initially believed
everything in the U.S. proposal had been drawn from the
original START Treaty, but it turned out that many points
were new and had been incorporated from Joint Compliance and
Inspection Commission (JCIC) agreements. This made
translation and understanding more difficult for the Russian
linguists. He closed by thanking the U.S. interpreters for
their help and expressed a desire that cooperation between
the interpreters increase.


16. (S) Gottemoeller responded that U.S.-proposed technical
language using JCIC agreements were historical precedent and
did not represent significant differences, but simply
provided more detail. Since lawyers understood precedent,
she was confident that the U.S. proposal would not pose a
problem. Gottemoeller also reminded all present that
ratification in the Senate was never far from her mind.

--------------
U.S. APPROACH TO THE
ELIMINATION PROTOCOL
--------------


17. (S) Mr. Elliott presented the following concepts
fundamental to the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol.

Begin points:

The Russian-proposed Article VII in its Annex Section
pertaining to conversion and elimination provides a framework
much like that of the U.S. proposal.

- Strategic offensive arms shall be subject to the
limitations provided for in the treaty until they have been
eliminated, removed from accountability, or placed on static
display.

- The Russian proposal, similar to the U.S. proposal,
provides language specifying conversion procedures that
ensure that strategic offensive arms are rendered inoperable,
precluding their use for their original purpose.

- Finally, the Russians propose that verification of
elimination or conversion procedures shall be carried out by
national technical means, notifications and visits, which is
again similar to the U.S. proposal.

Elliott explained that the U.S. concept for the
Elimination Protocol draws on previous language from the
START Treaty as much as possible. START's Conversion or
Elimination Protocol has served as a solid foundation to
remove items from each Partie's force structure. Using
similar language and procedures from the Protocol, adapted
and simplified, where possible, reinforces the U.S.-Russian
relationship based on shared knowledge, understanding and
expectations.

Since the last session of negotiations, the United
States has amended its views on conversion or elimination.
The United States has proposed to retain the concept of
elimination in the Treaty as described below.

- The U.S. believes that "elimination" is a process by
which a Party alters an accountable item such that it is no
longer subject to the limitations of the treaty - numerical
limits and the broader treaty limits.

- Under START, conversion procedures applied primarily
to heavy bombers. There was no provision for a conversion
procedure to remove a heavy bomber from being subject to
START's limitations.

- The U.S. proposes the term "elimination" apply to a
procedure to physically alter an item and thereafter remove
that item from accountability under the treaty.

- Also, the United States recognizes that methods short
of physical destruction are equally advantageous to each
Party: 1) as a means of removing an item from accountability
under the treaty; 2) to retain use of the item for purposes
not inconsistent with the treaty; and 3) to save costs.

- In this connection, the United States proposes a range
of procedures to eliminate an item, any of which may be used
by a Party for elimination.

- Additionally, the United States acknowledges that in
the future a Party may develop a unique procedure that was
previously not considered during negotiations that may
leverage advanced technologies or save time and money. In
this instance, the United States proposes an option to use
these procedures provided there is a sufficient level of

transparency during the process.

Elliott discussed several items the U.S. proposes to
delete from the existing START Conversion or Elimination
Protocol:

- Procedures for Elimination of Silo Training Launchers
and Silo Test Launchers: These types of launchers are not
deployed launchers and are not accountable under the new
treaty and therefore do not require elimination procedures.

- Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers:
These types of launchers are also not deployed launchers and
are not accountable under the treaty. Therefore, they do not
require elimination procedures.

Elliott also addressed the retention of the following
elimination procedures in the new Protocol. These align with
the proposals Russia offered in Article VII:

- Procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for Mobile
Launchers of ICBMs and their Launch Canisters, Silo Launchers
of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training
launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile ICBMs.

- Procedures for the elimination of SLBM launchers and
heavy bombers in addition to procedures for removal from
accountability, due to flight tests or static tests.

End points.


18. (S) Elliott closed by stating we have a rare opportunity
to apply the lessons learned from START to an entirely new
treaty, one that offers increased transparency and openness,
reinforcing our mutual understanding that the Cold War was
truly behind us. These opportunities include the viewing of
exhibitions, notifications of actions we intended to take
(and have taken),and the use of national technical means of
verification.


19. (S) Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his presentation, and
asked whether the existing START procedures retained under
the U.S. proposal were included fully, or if the U.S.
proposal included new ideas. Elliott responded that the U.S.
proposal included some old procedures, added some new
procedures, and had one that permitted flexibility for future
development similar to the Russian proposal.


20. (S) Colonel Novikov asked Elliott whether the United
States intended to change existing conversion procedures.
Elliott answered that the United States hoped to retain
flexibility by using the term "elimination" but retaining the
concept of "conversion." For example, one method of
disposing of a mobile launcher would be to cut the launcher
into pieces. Another method would be to alter the launcher
physically so that it could be used in a manner not
inconsistent with the treaty.

--------------
U.S. APPROACH TO TELEMETRY
--------------


21. (S) Mr. Siemon presented the following concepts
supporting the U.S. Telemetry Protocol and Treaty Article:


Begin points:

The primary difference in the U.S.-proposed Treaty
Article on Telemetry and the associated Telemetry Protocol
and Annexes concerns limitations on encryption and
encapsulation. The U.S. proposes reducing the total number
of flight tests for which a Party may encrypt or encapsulate
data while increasing a Party's flexibility regarding
encryption. Specific changes associated with encryption and
encapsulation follow:

- Under Treaty Article X, the United States proposed
that encryption and encapsulation be permitted for 7 rather
than 11 flight tests each year.

- In the associated Section III, Paragraph 2(b) of the
Telemetry Protocol, the United States proposed that:
"Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs
or SLBMs of existing types that were deployed as of Treaty
signature but none of which are deployed at the time of the
flight test, as well as during no more than a total of two
flight tests each year for ICBMs of existing types that are
deployed and two flight tests each year for SLBMs of existing
types that are deployed by each Party."

In other respects, the U.S.-proposed Telemetry Protocol
and associated Annexes remain the same as under START with
the following changes:

- References from "tapes" to "recording media" have been
changed to more closely reflect current practices.

- In Section I, Paragraph 1(c)(i),the United States
added "as appropriate" after the reference to recording speed
in meters and inches per second of tapes.

- Only demonstrations of playback equipment that is
different than the equipment demonstrated under START are
required.

- In Section 3, Paragraph 2(a) of the Protocol, the
United States amended language to reflect increased
flexibility with regard to encryption, including the
provision that notification of any encrypted flight test will
be provided in advance versus the single notification for the
one type as provided under START.

The Annexes have the following changes:

- Throughout Annex 1, installation activities and
equipment exchanges need not be performed if they were
already performed for equipment provided under START.

- In Annex 1, Section III, equipment lists have been
updated to reflect the equipment that is required and is
currently in use.

- In Annex 2, reference to "attributed warheads" was
deleted since the concept no longer applies.

- Annex 5 was deleted.

- Paragraph references throughout also have been updated.


End points.


22. (S) There were no questions from the Russian side.
Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. approach to telemetry
illustrated the general approach that the U.S. side had taken
to drawing on language from the START Treaty. New language
was developed only if equipment or items were different than
they were under START; measures were retained only if they
were actually useful under START; and if an item, weapon, or
system has been replaced or retired, the associated
provisions were deleted, as had been the case with
rail-mobile missiles.


23. (U) Document exchanged. None.


24. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
LCDR Brons
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Colby
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Dean
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Fortier
Dr. Fraley
Mr. Johnston
Ms. Pura
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Col Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Gen Venevtsev
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


25. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS