START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
SEPTEMBER 22, 2009

REF: A. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019)

B. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-006.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 22, 2009
Time: 3:00 - 5:10 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

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SUMMARY
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3. (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working
Group focused on reviewing the recently-received Russian
draft on Section V to the Treaty Annex regarding Inspections,
Visits and Exhibitions (REF A). The Russian Delegation
presented similarities to and differences from the START
Treaty and the U.S.-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol
(REF B).


4. (S) The U.S. Delegation stressed the importance of having
a verification regime with enough precision and fidelity to
ensure treaty ratification in the United States Senate. The
U.S. Delegation also expressed concern over the Russian
Federation's approach to counting warheads on heavy bombers,
as well as its desire to delay agreement on many specific
inspection procedures until after ratification when they are
slated to be worked out within the Bilateral Consultative
Commission (BCC) prior to the initiation of the various
inspection activities.

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IF YOU WANT IT RATIFIED,
IT BETTER BE VERIFIABLE
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5. (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting by acknowledging that
the United States had only received the Russian draft of the
Annex that morning. Warner stressed how crucial the role of
verification was to the treaty and emphasized the level of
scrutiny that the United States Senate would put on the
Inspection Protocol coming out of the working group.


6. (S) General Orlov asked whether the Senate's interest was
motivated by the concept of "trust but verify" or by
budgetary concerns. Warner explained that Senator Nunn had
recently reminded several senior U.S. Administration
officials of how important verifiability was to Members of
the Senate in establishing the credibility of any arms
control treaty. Warner predicted that the strength of the
verification measures for this treaty could be a key factor
in winning the two-thirds majority required for United States
Senate ratification.

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SYNOPSIS OF SECTION V TO TO
THE DRAFT RUSSIAN TREATY ANNEX
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7. (S) Ilin proposed an exchange of views on the Russian-
and U.S.-proposed drafts of the Inspection Protocol. His
goal was to gain an understanding of the inspection
provisions proposed by each side by summarizing the key
similarities and differences between their respective
versions. He wanted to first identify the common approaches
and then locate the differences, while agreeing to move
forward despite them. Next, he proposed both sides work
together to develop proposed solutions for those differences.
Ilin acknowledged that some differences would stem from
major unresolved issues in the treaty and noted that these
would ultimately be settled by the Heads of delegation.
Warner stated that the United States was interested in such a
comparison of both the treaty and protocol texts as they
apply to the various inspection activities. Reminding Ilin
that the United States had only received the Russian-proposed
annex, which contained a number of sections, that morning,
Warner expressed an interest in hearing Russia's view of the
similarities between the two countries' approaches to
inspections and thus verification.


8. (S) Ilin provided an overview of Section V of the
Russian-proposed draft treaty annex, entitled "Inspections,
Visits and Exhibitions," which equates to the U.S. Inspection
Protocol. He noted that, in preparing their text, the
Russian side attempted to reduce the number of inspection
activities and procedures by leveraging the experience gained
during implementation of the START Treaty. They also sought
to make the inspection mechanism less cumbersome and more
cost-effective. He stressed the importance of establishing
clearly understandable rules. Ilin briefly summarized the
ten parts of Section V, noting that they had generally
followed the path laid out in START and, in many cases, had
come up with provisions that corresponded to sections in the
U.S.-proposed draft Inspection Protocol. The parts of the
Russian draft are:


I. General Obligations;

II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of
Inspectors and Aircrew Members;

III. Arrangements for Air Transportation;

IV. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point
of Entry;


V. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections,
Visits and Exhibitions;

VI. Inspections;

VII. Visits to Declared Facilities and Visits to New
Facilities;

VIII. Technical Characteristics and Distinguishability
Exhibitions;

IX. Cancellation of Inspections, Visits or Exhibitions;
and


X. Inspection, Visit or Exhibition Reports



9. (S) Ilin briefly described the types of sites and items
that would be subject to inspections and visits.
Inspections, he noted, are focused on deployed ICBMs, SLBMS
and heavy bombers, deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and on
the warheads deployed on these missiles and bombers. In
contrast, visits are focused on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and
heavy bombers as well as non-deployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers. Ilin stated that, by limiting inspections and
visits to no more than five per year for each type, the sides
would save money while ensuring confidence and transparency
between Parties. He confirmed that many of the specific
procedures to be used to conduct inspections, visits and
exhibitions would have to be agreed upon in the BCC prior to
the initiation of these activities.


10. (S) Predicting that few disagreements would arise
between the Parties regarding most of these parts, Ilin noted
key additions and deletions from the original START
provisions. Highlighting the removal of all ground
transportation provisions related to continuous portal
monitoring, he reminded the U.S. side that the Russian
position on discontinuing portal monitoring at Votkinsk had
been made very clear. He indicated that the Russian-proposed
draft provided 18 hours for delivering an inspection group to
an inspection or visit site. He also pointed out that, while
visits could last up to 36 hours, inspections were not
limited in duration as long as the time to complete the
procedures was reasonable.

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THE BOMBER PARADOX
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11. (S) Colonel Zaitsev noted that the Duma remained
skeptical of how warheads are being counted under the Moscow
Treaty and said that many Russian experts believed that the
new treaty should retain the START attribution-based counting
rules. Nevertheless, he indicated that the Russian side had
attempted to construct rules for counting deployed warheads
according to the U.S. approach and found that the task was
very difficult.


12. (S) Warner described the paradox in Russia's approach to
counting warheads associated with heavy bombers, which is
their proposal that bomber armaments, bombs or long-range
nuclear-armed ALCMs, count only when they are actually loaded
on a heavy bomber. He acknowledged that devising a method of
verifying warhead numbers in general was very difficult and
stated that doing so for heavy bombers was one of the most
challenging problems confronting the Inspection Protocol
Working Group. Indicating that the Russian method of only
counting those nuclear weapons actually loaded on bombers on
a day-to-day basis did not reflect current practices of the
United States or Russia, Warner expressed doubt that such a
method would be acceptable to the United States Senate. He
indicated that some would question the need for the bombers
in the first place if both sides simply declared that there
were no nuclear warheads associated with them. He reminded
Ilin that the United States had proposed a method for
inspecting the weapons storage areas associated with heavy
bomber air bases and reaffirmed that the bomber problem was a
crucial point of treaty warhead accounting and verification
that needed work.



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SPEAKING OF PARADOXES
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13. (S) Ilin stated that the sides would encounter other
paradoxes, such as the U.S. intent to equip existing ICBMs
and SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads and to develop new
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers solely for non-nuclear
use. He opined that the United States' desired to have such
delivery vehicles fall outside the scope of the new treaty.


14. (S) Warner provided a brief summary of inspections
proposed in each side's drafts and noted that it was
challenging to come up with a one-to-one comparison. He
asked what Russia meant by a non-deployed silo launcher.
Ilin stated that test launchers and training launchers for
silo-based ICBMs are examples of non-deployed silo launchers.

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STAY BETWEEN THE LINES
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15. (S) Warner noted the dependence of the Inspection
Protocol Working Group upon certain provisions in the treaty,
particularly Article XI. Recognizing that the review and
redrafting of all treaty articles falls under the Treaty Text
Working Group, he nevertheless suggested that the Inspection
Protocol Working Group make a comparison of the sides'
approaches to Article XI as a starting point for building
their understanding of how inspection activities would work.
Ilin stated that it would not be productive to discuss
Article XI since the responsibility for development of treaty
articles belongs to the other working group.

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LET THE BCC WORRY ABOUT
THE DETAILS
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16. (S) Expressing concern over the Russian-proposed draft's
repeated call to having specific inspection-related
procedures worked out in the BCC, Warner asserted that both
sides should take advantage of their Delegations' expertise
as well as their familiarity with the implementation of
existing START provisions. Believing that both sides should
draft the needed procedures wherever possible, he again
emphasized the importance of building verification procedures
that would support ratification and not just rely upon the
BCC to do so after the treaty was signed. Ilin argued that
Russian reliance on the BCC was based on the time constraints
set by the two Presidents for completing the new treaty and
the confidence the Russian side has in the future BCC. He
indicated that there was no reason for concern, since the
Russian version of the treaty requires that all the needed
procedures be agreed upon in the BCC before inspections and
visits began. By avoiding addressing the many procedures
that will be needed, Ilin continued, the treaty would be
reduced in size thus saving considerable negotiating time.

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PICK A NUMBER BETWEEN
FIVE AND TWELVE



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17. (S) Ilin and Warner discussed their respective
rationales for each side's proposed annual number of
inspections. Ilin stated that Russia's proposal for five
inspections per year was derived from the U.S.-proposed draft
treaty of October 2008. Warner reminded Ilin that the draft
text came from a previous administration and did not
represent the current administration's approach to a
follow-on treaty. As a former base commander, Orlov opined
that inspections were onerous on facilities and stated that
limiting their number had been one of Russia's primary goals.
Warner echoed Orlov's sentiment concerning the impact of
inspections on those facilities, having recently visited
several U.S. bases and discussed these matters with local
base personnel. Nevertheless, the U.S. side believes a
larger number of inspections of the various types are needed
each year, although he noted that the U.S.-proposed protocol
had reduced the maximum number of data update inspections
from 15 to 12 per year. Warner argued that the U.S. side
believes that at least 12 inspections are needed annually to
provide a sufficient sample of the number of sites subject to
inspection.


18. (U) Documents exchanged. None.


19. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Dr. Warner
Ms. Bosco
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Fortier
Maj Johnson
Ms. Pura
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
Mr. Smith
Ms. St. Julien
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Mr. Leontiev
Gen Orlov
Col S. Petrov
Mr. A. Petrov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS