Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA784
2009-09-25 09:56:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9321
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4760
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1945
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0942
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6135
S E C R E T GENEVA 000784 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN PRESENTATION OF
PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000784

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, RUSSIAN PRESENTATION OF
PROPOSED TREATY ELEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-003.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 21, 2009
Time: 3:15 - 5:30 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) During the second plenary meeting conducted on
September 21, 2009, the U.S. and Russian Delegations
continued discussions of the Russian draft treaty (REFTEL).
The Russian Delegation explained why it was not in favor of
including telemetry provisions in its version of the treaty
and expressed concerns over mobile ICBM restrictions proposed
by the United States. The Russian legal advisor also
presented views on the principle of "equal security."


4. (S) The Russian Delegation outlined its approach to
counting rules, conversion or elimination (C or E) practices,
notification procedures, inspections, visits, and
exhibitions. They also explained that they do not want to
retain telemetry provisions because certain START limitations
that telemetry was meant to verify will not be retained in
the new treaty. Telemetry data was helpful to the United
States in building a global missile defense system, they
claimed. They also perceived an imbalance between the
treatment of road-mobile missile systems in the U.S. draft as
compared to other systems of concern from the Russian
perspective, particularly ballistic missile nuclear
submarines (SSBNs) and heavy bombers.

--------------
RUSSIAN VERSION
OF COUNTING RULES
--------------


5. (S) Col Novikov reviewed the limits contained within the

Russian draft START Follow-on Treaty. Specifically, there
were three central limits: a) deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and
heavy bombers; b) warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy
bombers; c) ICBM and SLBM launchers. For deployed systems,
each deployed system counted as one unit toward the aggregate
limit. For warheads, each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs was counted as one warhead and each long-range
nuclear ALCM or other nuclear armament deployed on a heavy
bomber was also counted as one warhead. For launchers, each
deployed and non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMS counted
as one unit toward the aggregate limit. He explained that,
for the first central limit, ICBMs and SLBMs would count from
the time they were placed on or in a launcher and would no
longer count once they were removed from a launcher. For
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments they would be
counted when the bomber first arrived at an air base and
would no longer be counted upon completion of conversion or
elimination procedures. Also, non-deployed heavy bombers in
storage or at C or E facilities would not be counted.




6. (S) Warheads would cout on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs when
each reentry ehicle (RV) was placed on the ICBM or SLBM and
wuld no longer count when RVs were removed from the
launcher. Warheads would count on deployed heav bombers
when a long-range nuclear ALCM or other uclear armament was
loaded onto the heavy bomberand would not count when those
nuclear armaments were removed from the bomber. He noted
that the Russian Federation had not included a category for
non-nuclear warheads as it proposed to ban them.


7. (S) Silo launchers for ICBMs would count against the
limit when the silo door was first installed and closed and
would no longer count once the silo door was dismantled.
Mobile launchers of ICBMs would count when they first arrived
at an ICBM base and would no longer count after C or E
procedures were complete. An SLBM launcher would count when
a submarine is first launched, and would no longer count
after conversion or elimination procedures were complete.


8. (S) Mr. Elliott asked Novikov if he would clarify whether
or not warheads would count toward treaty limits if nuclear
weapons were not loaded onto a heavy bomber. Novikov stated
if they were not loaded, they would not count but that the
heavy bomber would count against the delivery vehicle limits.
Dr. Warner pointed out that heavy bombers' nuclear weapons
were a large component of the warheads for both sides and it
would not be well received by the U.S. Senate that they were
not being accounted for.

--------------
RUSSIAN VIEWS ON
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION
--------------


9. (S) Mr. Smirnov explained that the Russian Federation
took into account ways to simplify C or E procedures as well
as to make them less expensive. He noted that each Party
would define its own procedures with the goal that the
procedures would be irreversible and that verification would
be accomplished via national technical means (NTM) in concert
with the appropriate notification. The procedures would also
render the strategic offensive arms (SOA) inoperable and no
longer usable for its intended purpose. He assured the U.S.
Delegation that the Russian Federation would agree to display
eliminated items in the open to ensure visibility by NTM. He
explained that further confirmation would be obtained through
a visit to look at the eliminated SOA.


10. (S) A/S Gottemoeller asked if these visits would be
exhibitions after C or E was accomplished and whether it was
correct that under the Russian proposal there would be no
demonstration in advance of the C or E. Smirnov clarified
that exhibitions would demonstrate the distinguishing
features of new SOA, whereas a visit would be conducted to
confirm the completion of C or E. Elliott noted that, under
START, conversion was only addressed in relation to heavy
bombers and asked if the Russian concept would allow the
conversion of SLBM launchers. Smirnov stated that the
Russian concept would not allow for the conversion of SLBM
launchers. (Begin comment: Smirnov's initial answer led to
considerable discussion among the Russian Delegation. This
issue remains to be clarified. End comment.) Gottemoeller


queried Smirnov regarding his earlier statement that each
Party would determine its own procedures and that those
procedures would be irreversible. She asked if the other
side would be able to check to see whether the process was
indeed irreversible, to which the Russian Delegation
responded that this issue would be discussed at the working
group level. Elliott noted that the United States had looked
at the history of C or E in START and had envisioned more
stringent requirements than the Russian side.

--------------
NOTIFICATIONS ACCORDING TO MOSCOW
--------------


11. (S) Col Petrov opined that notifications were one of the
most important elements of the new treaty and remarked upon
the success of the process under START, but noted that a
considerable number of notifications were never used under
START. The Russian Federation proceeded from that premise
and recommended using notifications for the following
categories: a) categories of data as agreed during
negotiations; b) movement of SOA between facilities to
include the movement of heavy bombers; c) flight tests of
ICBMs or SLBMs; d) C or E of SOA to include the elimination
of facilities; e) new types of SOA; and, f) the conduct of
visits, inspections, and exhibitions. Mr. Trout asked if
movement notifications applied to non-deployed missiles, to
which Petrov responded that the movement of any SOA would be
notified just as it is currently in START.

--------------
IS IT A VISIT OR AN INSPECTION?
--------------


12. (S) Petrov emphasized that on-site inspections were as
important as notifications but were inconvenient and
expensive to conduct so the Russian Federation had adjusted
the procedures. He explained that the Russian proposal
envisaged three categories -- inspections, visits, and
exhibitions. An inspection would be conducted to verify the
number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMS and heavy bombers, as well as
to confirm the number of warheads loaded onto them. Also, an
inspection would be conducted to confirm the number of
deployed SLBM and ICBM launchers. No more than five
inspections would be conducted each year and only one at any
one facility. He underscored that the Russian Federation did
not envision any activities related to continuous monitoring.
Visits, on the other hand, would be conducted to confirm the
number of non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, as
well as the numbers of non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and
SLBMs. Data on new facilities as well as technical
characteristics of SOAs and confirming the conversion process
would be included in visits. No more than five such visits
would be conducted each year with no more than one at any one
facility. Exhibitions would be conducted to confirm the
technical characteristics and differences of new SOA as well
as to confirm that the procedures for conversion had been
accomplished. He concluded by stating that the legal status
of inspectors, as well as their rules for transportation and
the rules governing points of entry (POEs),would be retained
as they are in START. Warner asked if the objectives of
inspections and visits were similar and were conducted by
inspectors, why the Russian Federation chose to differentiate


between the two. Petrov stated that it was in order to draw
the distinction between the activities carried out at various
facilities. For reentry vehicles at their deployment sites,
inspections are appropriate, but for storage facilities or
test ranges, visits are appropriate.

--------------
NO TELEMETRY
--------------


13. (S) Novikov provided a statement on telemetry. He noted
that it was useful in START for determining throw-weight and
maximum numbers of warheads, as well as characteristics and
reliability of ICBMs and SLBMs. This was important as START
used attribution rules versus the actual number of deployed
RVs, hence the need for telemetry to provide confirmation.
However, the Russian Federation did not see telemetry as
useful for the new treaty because it would be an "independent
element" not related to the limited items. He drew a
connection to the United States withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty and alleged that the United States had made use of
telemetry from Russian systems to continue to develop a
global ABM system. He also observed that the U.S.
relationship with the United Kingdom in the field of
development of Trident systems allowed for the circumvention
of START provisions since telemetry on those flight tests was
not provided to the Russian Federation. Therefore, it was
not consistent with Russia's interests to keep a telemetry
provision. Novikov also noted that telemetry, as practiced
under START, was deficient in the exchange of information.
Finally, he noted that some U.S. telemetry data was not
playable on the U.S.-provided telemetry playback systems. He
opined that it would not be possible to adequately address
these issues and develop a suitable fix in the time remaining
to negotiate a new treaty. He noted that, since these issues
were not resolved under START, it would be inappropriate to
incorporate telemetry into a new treaty and at the same time
incorporate the old problems that went with it.


14. (S) Gottemoeller thanked Novikov for his remarks. On
the subject of U.S.-UK collaboration, she reminded the
Russian Delegation that this activity fell under a pattern of
existing cooperation that is and has been permissible under
START. She also observed that the UK systems had differences
from U.S. systems that would not facilitate a U.S.
modernization plan. She noted that the United States had no
desire to transfer old issues from START to the new treaty.
Noting the recent Minuteman III demonstration, she commended
the U.S. and Russian JCIC members for moving toward resolving
a difficult issue that had long hampered implementation of
the START Treaty.


15. (S) Siemon agreed that it was fair to say that there
were questions from both sides concerning telemetry
practices. He explained that the interest in telemetry went
back to SALT I and stemmed from a provision regarding
non-interference with NTM since NTM then was the primary
means of verification. In Salt II, the noninterference with
the NTM concept was expanded to specifically include
noninterference with telemetry. Under START, the
noninterference with telemetry provisions were retained and
significantly expanded to include the exchange of electronic
media and interpretative data to enhance treaty verification.


The United States still saw value in retaining the exchange
of telemetry in the current treaty to enhance confidence and
predictability about the development and deployment of SOA.
Perhaps the sides should look at the value telemetry as a
provision related to non-interference with NTM.


16. (S) Antonov thanked all for their remarks. He noted how
the discussions had progressed to the point where the sides
could be sincere in voicing their deepest concerns. At the
same time, he advised all that the sides needed to remember
the principles of trust and confidence-building measures.
Going back to Novikov's list of issues, he focused on ABM.
While he felt the recent U.S. decision to 'change the
architecture of global ABM' was a positive step, it did not
change the underlying Russian concerns. Referring to the
link between telemetry and the use of its data to develop an
ABM system, he was resolute in stating "we will never help or
enable efforts to develop a new global ABM system," and this
was only one of the Russian concerns over telemetry.
Switching to English, he stated that the Russian side could
not agree to telemetry provisions until its concerns were
"assuaged and allayed." Again, noting the new stage in
discussions where both sides were more open about their
concerns, he asked the U.S. side to think about the
questions. He was willing to wait however long it took, but
if the U.S. side did not address the issues already noted, it
would be a sign that the Russian side was right all along in
its concerns. Gottemoeller thanked Antonov, and observed
that the proposed telemetry provisions were not unilateral in
nature but reciprocal rights for both sides.

--------------
ALL THINGS MOBILE
SHOULD BE RE STRICTED
--------------


17. (S) General Poznihir discussed concerns with
restrictions placed upon mobile missiles in the U.S.-proposed
draft treaty provisions. He opined that some of the
provisions of the U.S. text were useful and could be
incorporated into an agreement. He noted that the right for
each side to determine for itself the size and composition of
its strategic offensive arms should not be infringed by text
provisions. He complained that Article V of the
U.S.-proposed text was centered on limiting mobile ICBMs.
Mobile ICBMs have many similar characteristics as submarines
and heavy bombers in that they have the ability to hide yet
there are no limitations on these types of SOA. In his view,
SLBMs posed more of a threat from a military point of view
yet only mobile ICBMs were re stricted to geographic areas.
Provisions for not basing SOA outside national territory
already accomplished this geographic restriction and NTM
provided adequate verification. SLBMs can move outside of
national waters and are difficult to detect. The same
situation was true with bombers since they can fly great
distances, carry large quantities of nuclear weapons and
cannot be verified via NTM. He could not understand the U.S.
desire to limit mobile ICBMs.


18. (S) Gottemoeller commented that the United States had
done its best to retain measures meant to assist with
verification and not meant to constrain operations.
Historically, there had been concerns regarding mobile ICBMs.


Bombers and submarines are large platforms and the sides
understand how many they have, whereas mobile ICBMs have a
special ability to hide and not be detected. Thus, the
United States considers it to be important to verify
non-deployed mobile ICBMs in particular. The United States
is trying to find a balance between predictability and
flexibility.

--------------
WAXING PROPHETIC
ON EQUAL SECURITY
--------------


19. (S) Kotkova presented a legal viewpoint of the principle
of equal security. The text of the official translation
follows.

Begin text:

Official Translation

Negotiations between Russia and the
U.S. to Work out a New Agreement to
Replace the START Treaty - Round VI
(Geneva, September 21, 2009)

On the Principle of Equal Security

(Talking Points for the Presentation of the
Russian Draft of the New Treaty on SOAs)

In our view, the new treaty on SOAs must serve to
enhance the security of each of the Treaty Parties and to
strengthen strategic stability in general.

There exist generally recognized principles of
international law, which are firmly established, in
particular, in the UN Charter. These include, for example,
the principles of non-interference in internal affairs,
fulfillment in good faith of international obligations, and
the sovereign equality of states. These principles reflect a
fundamental property of international law as the rights of
equal subjects (of international law - Trans.)(par in parem
non habet imperium).

The special principles of the law of international
security are based on these generally recognized principles.
Among them, the Russian doctrine of international law
distinguishes the principle of undiminished security of other
states, which derives from the principles of sovereign
equality and non-interference in internal affairs. It
assumes that a state conducts a foreign policy that takes
into account, to the maximum extent, both its own security
and the security of the entire global community. The
principle of equal security develops and gives concrete
expression to this approach. It is understood to mean that
while ensuring its own security, a state should ensure the
proportionality of its actions to the capabilities of other
states to ensure their security.

Thus, this involves a sort of security parity, where
neither Party obtains advantages over the other Party in
terms of ensuring security. In this connection, what is


meant is actual, rather than arithmetical equality in the
military-strategic area.

End text.


20. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Delegation paper On the Principle of Equal Security,
September 21, 2009.


21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Evans
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Sims
Mr. Smith
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gesse (Int)
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Mr. Koshelev
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Lysenko
Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
MGen Orlov
Col Petrov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Rudenko
Mr. Semin
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vasiliev
MGen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)


22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.


GRIFFITHS