Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA781
2009-09-24 16:58:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0289
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0781/01 2671658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241658Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9312
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4755
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1940
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0934
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6130
S E C R E T GENEVA 000781 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009,
MORNING SESSION

REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000781

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009,
MORNING SESSION

REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-002.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 21, 2009
Time: 11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) At the first plenary meeting of the session, the
Russian Delegation made verbal presentations on several
portions of their draft treaty text which had been provided
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A).
Russian Delegation members covered the central obligations,
central limits, and locations of strategic offense arms
(SOAs).


4. (S) The Russian Delegation described the Russian view of
the work schedule through the end of October; this session
would end on October 2 and the next session would begin on
October 19. In the interim, the Delegations would return to
capitals, but a small group from the U.S. Delegation would go
to Moscow to continue our work, both before and during the
ministerial in mid-October.

--------------
IMPORTANT CHANGES
THAT AFFECT OUR WORK
--------------


5. (S) Antonov summarized two developments he said would
positively contribute to the START Follow-on discussions:
the meeting of the two Presidents in New York on the margins
of the United Nations Security Council meeting and the
decision by President Obama on the configuration of U.S.
missile defense. On the latter, Antonov said Russian
President Medvedev had reacted positively. He said that
Russia had asked the U.S. to send missile defense experts to
Geneva to brief the Russian Delegation about the decision;

A/S Gottemoeller demurred that she would convey the request
to Washington but such a briefing would probably not be
possible this week in Geneva.

--------------
WORK SCHEDULE
--------------


6. (S) On the schedule of our work for the upcoming weeks,
Antonov stated that the Russian Delegation's assumption was
that the current session would last for two weeks, followed
by a two-week break in capitals during which a small group
from the U.S. Delegation would travel to Moscow just before
the mid-October ministerial meeting. Thereafter, Antonov
said, the Delegations would return to Geneva on October 19
for two more weeks of talks. At the end of October, he
explained, it would be possible to plan beyond November 1st,
based on: the progress of the negotiations thusfar,


prospects for settling key issues, the need to return to
capitals to study proposals, and the need to continue
convening working groups in Geneva. Gottemoeller reiterated
that the U.S. saw the need to meet in continuous session in
order to complete the treaty by December 5. She asked
Antonov to keep an open mind.

--------------
OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY
--------------


7. (S) Antonov gave an overview of the Russian approach to
preparing its draft treaty text (REF A): it was based on the
existing START Treaty, but also incorporated the U.S. concept
of a "hybrid" treaty. Moscow had deleted everything that was
not needed, assuming relations between the two countries had
changed drastically. He highlighted several aspects of the
July 6, 2009 Presidential Joint Understanding incorporated
into the treaty (legally-binding, reduction period, treaty
duration, levels lower than Moscow Treaty) and listed the
Russian-proposed central limits of 500 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs
and heavy bombers; and 1675 warheads. He pointed to elements
of special importance, such as each side determining its own
force structure, the relationship between strategic offensive
and strategic defensive capabilities, the Russian-proposed
ban on non-nuclear weapons on ICBMs or SLBMs, restrictions on
basing SOAs outside of national territory, allowance for
existing patterns of cooperation, and recognizing the
contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.


8. (S) Antonov noted Moscow wanted the START Follow-on
agreement to be a positive example for other states, both
nuclear and non-nuclear. Because both of our countries were
concerned about the proliferation of missile technology, the
United States should understand the tough Russian position on
non-nuclear ICBMs. Moscow wanted to be able to explain to
other countries with missile capabilities that they needed to
show restraint. The treaty should have a deterrent effect.
Also, he emphasized, the U.S. and Russia should show
leadership on the obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

--------------
MARCH THROUGH THE
RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY
--------------


9. (S) General Orlov began a presentation on Articles I and
II of the Russian draft. He noted the sides' agreement on
the concepts of confidence, predictability, and openness, and
then spent several minutes repeating the Russian position
about the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive systems. He added that even the new U.S.
Triad, which includes missile defenses, demonstrates the link
between offensive and defensive capabilities. The Russian
Delegation was sorry to see that the United States proposed
only referencing the linkage in the preamble; Russia wanted
the linkage to be in an operational paragraph of the new
treaty (Article I, paragraph 2) to make it legally-binding,
especially important with the "changed circumstances" of the
new MD decision.


10. (S) Orlov further stated if one party built up its
capability to intercept strategic missiles, the other side


should have the right to increase its numbers of SOAs, both
strategic delivery vehicles and warheads. Such a scenario,
he said, could be grounds to "denounce" the treaty.


11. (S) Orlov said the Russian position was unchangeable on
banning the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration. He then read key sentences of the central
limits of the Russian draft treaty (Article II, paragraph 1),
clarifying on subparagraph (c) that the number included
deployed and non-deployed launchers.

- (a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers;

- (b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

- (c) 600, ICBM and SLBM launchers.


12. (S) Orlov commented that the fact that one party had
extensive upload capability would allow that party to
secretly and quickly achieve a large-scale buildup of its
forces. This would impede real reductions and undermine the
viability of the treaty. Therefore, Russia had added a new
provision on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers.
The non-deployed number would exclude those launchers in
long-term repair or maintenance, but include test launchers,
and training launchers in the Russian aggregate limit of 600
ICBM and SLBM launchers. In response to a question, Orlov
noted these were only examples of non-deployed launchers.


13. (S) General Petrov reviewed Article V of the Russian
proposal on locations of SOAs. The Russian text was based on
lengthy experience under START, but had been simplified by
moving the numerical aspects for types and their respective
locations. The technical characteristics of SOAs would also
appear in the annex.

- Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms
subject to this treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases,
air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination
facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test
ranges.

- Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only
at test ranges.

- Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located
only at ICBM bases and test ranges. Mobile training
launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or
elimination facilities.


14. (S) Petrov pointed out the provision against basing SOA
outside national territory in Article V, paragraph 4 to
ensure that one Party could not achieve military advantage by
bringing SOA closer to the other Party. He then read two
additional provisions on heavy bombers:

- In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber
outside national territory in accordance with subparagraph
3(b) of Article VIII, notification shall be provided.


- Heavy bombers equipped or converted for non-nuclear
armaments shall be based separately from heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments.

--------------
A FEW U.S. QUESTIONS ON
THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY
--------------


15. (S) Gottemoeller asked Petrov about how ICBMs, SLBMs,
and heavy bombers undergoing long-term maintenance would be
treated in the memorandum of understanding. Would they be
removed from the database or remain listed. Petrov responded
that a notification would be provided and that details would
be discussed in the working group. (Begin comment: He
appeared unable to answer the question. End comment.)


16. (S) Siemon asked whether the Russian draft treaty
prohibited only nuclear-armed (that is, not non-nuclear)
heavy bombers outside national territory. Petrov clarified
he meant those actually carrying nuclear weapons, not just
nuclear-capable bombers. Warner asked whether the
notification requirement would also apply to heavy bombers
that had been converted to non-nuclear status. Petrov said
it would apply because national technical means could not
distinguish nuclear-capable from non-nuclear heavy bombers.
Warner observed that once all the B-1Bs had been converted in
about a year or two, this would no longer be an issue. Orlov
interjected to ask what guarantee there would be that
converted heavy bombers would not be able to carry nuclear
weapons. Warner offered that this, too, would be discussed
in the working group. The Delegations agreed to continue the
discussion at the afternoon meeting.


17. (U) Documents exchanged: None.


18. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Evans
Dr. Fraley
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
LTC Leyde
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Smith
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Trout
Dr. Warner
Mrs. Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Artemyev


Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Izrazov
Mr. Kamenskiy
Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Lysenko
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
Col Novikov
Gen Orlov
Gen Petrov
Mr. Pischulov
Gen Poznihir
Mr. Semin
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Tarasov
Mr. Vasiliev
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


19. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS