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SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V):
RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT, SEPTEMBER 16, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-007.


2. (U) At paragraph 3 is the official translation of the
Russian-proposed treaty text.


3. (S) Begin text.

Official Translation

To be Turned Over to the U.S. Side

Document of the Russian Side
of September 16, 2009

TREATY

BETWEEN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Russian Federation and the United States of America,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Committed to the historic goal of freeing humanity from
the nuclear threat, and to consistent implementation of the
obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968;

Endeavoring to help reduce the role and significance of
nuclear arms in ensuring international security, and
expressing support for efforts being undertaken on a global
scale in the field of non-proliferation;

Continuing along the path of strengthening strategic
stability and of establishing new relations in the strategic
area, based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and
cooperation;

Considering it necessary to bring their nuclear posture
into alignment with the new relations in the post-Cold War
era-relations which are built on the basis that the Russian
Federation and the United States of America are no longer
enemies, that there is no prospect of a war starting between
them, and that they are cooperating in areas where it is
mutually beneficial;

Taking into account the stabilizing effect on the world
situation which has resulted from the radical, verifiable
reduction of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century;

Taking note of the existence of an indissoluble
interrelationship between the reduction of strategic
offensive arms and the deployment of missile defense systems;

In agreement that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear
configuration have an impact on strategic stability;

Considering that the Treaty between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July

31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, has
been implemented in full;

Taking note that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have completely fulfilled the
obligations they assumed in accordance with the Protocol of
May 23, 1992, to the Treaty between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to the cause
of general and complete nuclear disarmament and strengthening
international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states;

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new
impetus to, the process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms
while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear
arsenals, and with a view to multilateralization of this
process in the future;

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance
with the obligations under this Treaty, based on the
procedures that were elaborated in the START Treaty, and
supplemented by transparency and confidence-building measures;

Guided by the principle of equal security and believing
that global challenges and threats require continued use of
qualitatively new approaches to interaction on the whole
range of strategic relations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I


1. Each Party shall implement measures aimed at
strengthening trust, openness, and predictability of the
development of strategic relations, and shall reduce and
limit its strategic offensive arms and shall carry out the
other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annex.


2. The obligations under this Treaty shall be
assumedNOTE1 by the Parties in conditions where they have
strategic missile defense systems, hereinafter referred to as
MD systems, at the level existing at the time of Treaty
signature.


3. The terms and definitions adopted for purposes of
this Treaty are given in Section I of the Annex to this
Treaty.

Article II


1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM
launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, HBs, ICBM warheads, SLBM
warheads, and HB nuclear armaments, so that seven years after
entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate
numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this
Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed HBs;

(b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed

SLBMs, and deployed HBs;

(c) 600, (("for" missing in Russian - Trans.)) ICBM
and SLBM launchers.


2. Each Party shall determine for itself the composition
and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the
aggregate limits provided for in this Article.

Article III


1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (a) of Article II of
this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one unit;

(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one unit;

(c) Each deployed HB shall be counted as one unit.


2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (b) of Article II of
this Treaty:

(a) Each reentry vehicle on deployed ICBMs or SLBMs
shall be counted as one warhead;

(b) Each long-range nuclear ALCM and each other HB
nuclear armament, other than a long-range nuclear ALCM,
on deployed HBs shall be counted as one warhead.


3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate
limit provided for in subparagraph 1 (c) of Article II of
this Treaty, each deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs, as
well as each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs and SLBMs shall
be counted as one unit.


4. Strategic offensive arms shall be counted toward the
aggregate limits provided for in this Treaty as follows:

(a) ICBMs - from the time an ICBM is placed in (on)
an ICBM launcher, to the time the ICBM is removed from
(taken off) the ICBM launcher;

(b) SLBMs - from the time an SLBM is placed in an
SLBM launcher, to the time the SLBM is removed from the
SLBM launcher;

(c) HBs - from the time a heavy bomber equipped for
nuclear armaments first arrives at an air base for heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, to the time when
the HB conversion or elimination procedures have been
completed;

(d) warheads:

(i) on ICBMs - from the time each reentry
vehicle is placed on a deployed ICBM, to the time
each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed ICBM
or the deployed ICBM with the front section
containing
reentry vehicles is removed from (taken off) the
launcher;


(ii) on SLBMs - from the time each reentry
vehicle is placed on a deployed SLBM, to the time
each reentry vehicle is taken off the deployed
SLBM or the deployed SLBM with the front section
containing reentry vehicles is removed from the
launcher;

(iii) on HBs - from the time each long-range
nuclear ALCM or each other nuclear armament, other
than a long-range nuclear ALCM, is placed on a
deployed HB, to the time the enumerated nuclear
armaments are taken off the deployed HB;

(e) ICBM and SLBM launchers:

(i) silo launcher of ICBMs - from the time the
doorNOTE2 is first installed and closed, to the
time the door of the silo launcher of ICBMs is
dismantled;

(ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs - from the time
a mobile launcher of ICBMs arrives at an ICBM base,
to the time when the conversion or elimination
procedures for a mobile launcher of ICBMs have been
completed, or the time of its return to a production
facility;

(iii) SLBM launcher - when (sic) a submarine
coming from a production facility arrives at a base
for submarines with SLBM launchers, to the time when
the conversion or elimination procedures for an SLBM
launcher have been completed.

Article IV


1. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the types of
ICBMs designated by the Russian Federation as
RS-12M, RS-18, and RS-20, which are known to the
United States of America as SS-25, SS-19, and
SS-18, respectively;

(ii) for the United States of America, the
types of ICBMs designated by the United States of
America and known to the Russian Federation as
(BLANK). ;

(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the types of
SLBMs designated by the Russian Federation as
RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56, which are
known to the United States of America as SS-N-18,
SS-N-20, SS-N-23, and RSM-56, respectively;

(ii) for the United States of America, the
types of SLBMs designated by the United States of
America and known to the Russian Federation as
(BLANK). ;

(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the types of
bombers designated by the Russian Federation as
Tu-95MS and Tu-160, which are known to the United
States of America as Bear H and Blackjack,
respectively;

(ii) for the United States of America, the
types of bombers designated by the United States
of America and known to the Russian Federation as
(BLANK).


2. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall
begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this
Treaty as follows:

(a) ICBMs - when an ICBM or the first stage of an
ICBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported
in stages, first leaves the production facility;

(b) SLBMs - when an SLBM or the first stage of an
SLBM that are (sic) maintained, stored, and transported
in stages, first leaves the production facility;

(c) HBs: when an HB airframe is first brought out of
the shop, plant, or building where the entire airframe
is assembled from HB components;

(d) ICBM and SLBM launchers:

(i) silo launcher of ICBMs: when the door is
first installed and closed;

(ii) mobile launcher of ICBMs: when a mobile
launcher of ICBMs first leaves the production
facility;

(iii) SLBM launcher: when a submarine, on which
the aforesaid launcher is installed, is first
launched.


3. In those cases not provided for by the provisions of
this Treaty, strategic offensive arms shall begin to be
subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty in
accordance with procedures to be agreed by the Parties in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission.


4. Ballistic missiles that have been developed and
tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on
the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be
ballistic missiles to which the limitations provided for in
this Treaty apply. Such missiles shall not be given the
capabilities of ICBMs or SLBMs; these missiles and their
launchers shall have verifiable differences from the existing
types of ICBMs and SLBMs and their launchers.

The procedures for confirming the presence of the
above-mentioned differences shall be subject to agreement by
the Parties in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Article V


1. Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms

subject to this Treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases,
air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination
facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test
ranges.


2. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only
at test ranges. The construction or conversion of such
launchers at test ranges may be carried out only for purposes
of testing and training. The number of such launchers shall
not be increased above the requirements for testing and
training purposes.


3. Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located
only at ICBM bases and test ranges. Mobile training
launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or
elimination facilities. The construction or conversion of
such launchers may be carried out only for training purposes.
The number of such launchers shall not be increased above
the requirements for training purposes.


4. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty
shall not be based outside the national territory of each
Party.


5. In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy
bomber outside national territory in accordance with
subparagraph 3 (b) of Article VIII, notification shall be
provided.


6. HBs equipped or converted for non-nuclear armaments
shall be based separately from HBs equipped for nuclear
armaments.

Article VI


1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this
Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive
arms may be carried out.


2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs or SLBMs in
a non-nuclear configuration.


3. Each Party undertakes not to convert HBs equipped for
non-nuclear armaments into HBs equipped for nuclear
armaments. Nuclear armaments shall not be stored at air
bases of heavy bombers converted for non-nuclear armaments.
The crews of such bombers shall not undergo training to carry
out missions involving nuclear weapons.


4. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use ICBM or
SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors
therein.


5. Each Party undertakes not to convert or use launchers
of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and
SLBMs therein.


6. Each Party undertakes not to locate heavy bombers
with long-range nuclear ALCMs or other nuclear armaments
outside the continental portion of national territory.

Article VII


1. Conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms
and of the facilities where they are located shall be carried
out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with the
procedures provided for in Section III of the Annex to this
Treaty.


2. Strategic offensive arms and the facilities where
they are located shall be subject to the limitations provided
for in this Treaty until such time as they are:

(a) eliminated;

(b) removed from accountability as a result of
flight or static tests, accidental loss, disablement
beyond repair, or transfer to static display.


3. In fulfilling obligations under this Treaty, each
Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing
a payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the
upper atmosphere.


4. Conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM and
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall be carried out at
conversion or elimination facilities, on site or at other
stipulated sites. In this connection, the procedures employed
shall ensure that they are rendered inoperable, precluding
their use for their original purpose.


5. Notifications of conversion or elimination of
strategic offensive arms shall be provided in accordance with
Subsection IV of Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty.


6. Verification of the Parties' implementation of
procedures for conversion or elimination of strategic
offensive arms and the facilities where they are located
shall be carried out:

(a) by using national technical means of
verification;

(b) by providing notifications;

(c) by means of visits, which can be conducted
by the inspecting Party, to the sites specified
in paragraph 4 of this Article, upon completion
of the conversion or elimination procedures.

Article VIII


1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this
Treaty is set forth in Section II of the Annex to this
Treaty, in which data with respect to items subject to the
limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according
to categories of data.


2. In order to ensure fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the
other Party of changes in data, as provided for in
subparagraph 3 (a) of this Article, and shall provide the
other notifications provided for in paragraph 3 of this
Article in accordance with the procedure provided for in
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article and in Section IV of
the Annex to this Treaty.


3. Each Party shall provide notification to the other
Party regarding:

(a) data according to categories of data contained
in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty and other
agreed categories of data with respect to items
subject to the limitations of this Treaty, except for
data pertaining to warheads, which shall be exchanged
twice a year;

(b) movement of items subject to the limitations
provided for in this Treaty between declared facilities.
Any movement of items subject to the limitations
provided for in this Treaty between facilities shall be
completed not later than 30 days after it began;

(c) flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs;

(d) conversion or elimination of items subject to
the limitations of this Treaty, as well as elimination
of facilities;

(e) strategic offensive arms of new types;

(f) the conduct of inspections, visits, and
exhibitions.


4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a
voluntary basis, besides the notifications specified in
paragraph 3 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to
provide assurance of the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken under this Treaty.


5. In order to provide and receive notifications, unless
otherwise provided for in this Treaty, each Party shall use
the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in accordance
with the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States of America on the
Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September
15, 1987.


6. If a time is to be specified in a notification
provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be
expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be
specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as
the 24-hour time period that corresponds to the date in local
time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.


7. Neither Party shall release to the public data
specified in Section II of the Annex to this Treaty or the
photographs appended to it, unless otherwise agreed.

Article IX

In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of
this Treaty, and to enhance confidence, openness, and
predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms, each Party shall, on a voluntary
basis, in those cases where it believes ambiguous situations
might arise, take measures, including providing information
in advance, inter alia through diplomatic channels, on
activities being conducted with respect to strategic
offensive arms, which are associated with their deployment or
increasing their readiness, so as to preclude the possibility

of a misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party.

Article X

For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) to use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent
with the generally recognized principles of
international law;

(b) not to interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other Party operating
in accordance with this Article;

(c) not to use deliberate concealment measures
that impede verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty.

Article XI


1. For the purpose of ensuring verification or
confirming data on compliance with the provisions of this
Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct
inspections, visits, and exhibitions. Inspections, visits,
and exhibitions shall be conducted (BLANK) days (to be agreed
upon) after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter.


2. The procedures for conducting inspections, visits,
and exhibitions shall be governed by Section V of the Annex
to this Treaty.


3. Each inspection team conducting an inspection or
taking part in a visit or exhibition shall include the number
of inspectors specified in Section V of the Annex to this
Treaty.


4. In order to perform their functions effectively, for
the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their
personal benefit, inspectors and aircrew members shall be
accorded the privileges and immunities specified in Section V
of the Annex to this Treaty.


5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more
than one inspection or one visit or take part in one
exhibition in the territory of the inspected Party at any one
time.


6. Inspectors shall not disclose information obtained
during inspections, exhibitions, or visits, except with the
express consent of the inspected Party. They shall remain
bound by this obligation even after termination of their
activities as inspectors.


7. The purpose of inspections is to verify data on the
number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed HBs
and the number of warheads on them, as well as data on the
number of deployed launchers of ICBMs and deployed launchers
of SLBMs.

Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no
more than five such inspections each year, with no more than
one such inspection each year at the same facility.



Inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases.


8. The purpose of visits is to confirm data on the
number of non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed SLBMs, and
non-deployed HBs, on the number of non-deployed launchers of
ICBMs and SLBMs, data on new facilities provided during an
exchange of information, and technical characteristics of
strategic offensive arms provided during an exchange of
information or demonstrated at exhibitions of new items of
SOAs or in the course of confirming that items of SOAs have
been converted for new kinds of SOAs.

Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of no
more than five such visits each year, with no more than one
such visit each year to the same facility. Additional visits
beyond the established number may be conducted at the
invitation of the inspected Party.

Visits shall be conducted at ICBM bases, bases of
submarines equipped with SLBMs, and air bases, at storage
facilities, repair facilities, conversion or elimination
facilities, test ranges, and training facilities.


9. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions in order to
confirm the technical characteristics and differences of new
items of strategic offensive arms, and to confirm that
procedures for converting items of SOAs for new kinds of SOAs
have been completed.

Article XII

To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the
Bilateral Consultative Commission, procedures for the
operation of which are set forth in Section VI of the Annex
to this Treaty. The Parties agree that, if either Party so
requests, they shall hold sessions of the Bilateral
Consultative Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with
the obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be
necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness
of this Treaty; and

(c) resolve questions related to the application
of the provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of
strategic offensive arm.

Article XIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this
Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international
obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its
provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic
offensive arms subject to the limitations provided for in
this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold
consultations in accordance with Article XII of this Treaty
in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this
regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply
to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations in the

area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third state.

Article XIV


1. This Treaty, including its Annex, which is an
integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification and
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments of ratification.


2. This Treaty shall be concluded for 10 years, unless
prior to the expiration of that period it is superseded by a
subsequent treaty on the reduction and limitation of
strategic offensive arms.


3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.
Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with
the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.


4. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to
make changes in the provisions of the Annex to this Treaty
that do not affect substantive rights and obligations of the
Parties under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral
Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes,
without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that
is set forth in paragraph 3 of this Article.


5. Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to terminate this Treaty if, in
its view, further compliance with the Treaty will jeopardize
the Party's supreme interests, including in the event of a
quantitative and qualitative buildup in the capabilities of
strategic missile defense systems.


6. A Party that has decided to terminate this Treaty
shall inform the other Party of its decision through
diplomatic channels at least three months prior to
termination of this Treaty, specifying the extraordinary
events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme
interests.


7. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty
shall supersede the Treaty between the Russian Federation and
the United States of America on Strategic Offensive
Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that
date.

Article XV

This Treaty will be registered in accordance with
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at (BLANK) on (BLANK) in two copies in the Russian
and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Russian Federation For the United States of America

President of the President of the
Russian Federation United States of America

--------------
BEGIN TRANSLATER'S NOTES
:
1: The Russian verb translated here as "shall be assumed" in

accordance with standard treaty usage, may also be translated
as "are assumed."

2: The Russian term rendered here as "door" differs from the
term for "silo door" used in the START Treaty. Our
preliminary research indicates that the term used in this
text does in fact refer to the silo door although further
clarification is required.

END NOTES
--------------

End text.


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS