Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA744
2009-09-05 14:53:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
how-toVZCZCXYZ0023 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHGV #0744/01 2481453 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 051453Z SEP 09 FM USMISSION GENEVA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9243 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4726 RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1911 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0905 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6101
S E C R E T GENEVA 000744
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPIRATION OF THE
START TREATY
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
S E C R E T GENEVA 000744
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPIRATION OF THE
START TREATY
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-013.
2. (U) At Paragraph 3 is the text of the official
translation of the Russian-proposed Joint Statement on the
expiration of the START Treaty.
3. (S) Begin text:
Official Translation
To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side
Paper of the Russian Side
September 2, 2009
Draft
JOINT STATEMENT
by the Russian Federation and the United States of America
in Connection with the Expiration of the
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms
The Russian Federation and the United States of America
take note of the significant contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to
successful implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(the START Treaty). They highly appreciate the fact that
these states have completely fulfilled all the obligations
assumed in accordance with the Protocol to the START Treaty,
signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992.
The historic role of the START Treaty would have been
incomplete without the agreed removal of nuclear weapons from
the territory of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and without their accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT)
as non-nuclear-weapon states. This responsible choice
enhanced the NPT regime and had a beneficial impact on
international security and strategic stability, and also
created favorable conditions for further steps to reduce the
nuclear threat level. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine participated constructively in the
work of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The Russian Federation and the United States of America
welcome the commitment of the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to maintaining the status
of non-nuclear-weapon states.
The adoption of this status has enhanced the security of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. Their security must not decrease even when the
START Treaty expires. In this connection, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America state that the
assurances recorded in the Budapest Memoranda of December 5,
1994, when the Republic of Belarus, the Re
ublic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as
non-nuclear states, will remain in force after December 5,
2009.
End text.
4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT ON EXPIRATION OF THE
START TREATY
Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-013.
2. (U) At Paragraph 3 is the text of the official
translation of the Russian-proposed Joint Statement on the
expiration of the START Treaty.
3. (S) Begin text:
Official Translation
To be Turned over to the
U.S. Side
Paper of the Russian Side
September 2, 2009
Draft
JOINT STATEMENT
by the Russian Federation and the United States of America
in Connection with the Expiration of the
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms
The Russian Federation and the United States of America
take note of the significant contribution of the Republic of
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to
successful implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(the START Treaty). They highly appreciate the fact that
these states have completely fulfilled all the obligations
assumed in accordance with the Protocol to the START Treaty,
signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992.
The historic role of the START Treaty would have been
incomplete without the agreed removal of nuclear weapons from
the territory of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and without their accession to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT)
as non-nuclear-weapon states. This responsible choice
enhanced the NPT regime and had a beneficial impact on
international security and strategic stability, and also
created favorable conditions for further steps to reduce the
nuclear threat level. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine participated constructively in the
work of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
The Russian Federation and the United States of America
welcome the commitment of the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to maintaining the status
of non-nuclear-weapon states.
The adoption of this status has enhanced the security of
the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine. Their security must not decrease even when the
START Treaty expires. In this connection, the Russian
Federation and the United States of America state that the
assurances recorded in the Budapest Memoranda of December 5,
1994, when the Republic of Belarus, the Re
ublic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as
non-nuclear states, will remain in force after December 5,
2009.
End text.
4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS