Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA743
2009-09-05 14:35:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0743/01 2481435
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051435Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9233
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4716
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1901
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0895
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6091
S E C R E T GENEVA 000743 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) U.S. NON-PAPER ON READER'S GUIDE TO CHANGES IN THE
U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY PROTOCOL
ON INSPECTIONS, EXHIBITIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING
ACTIVITIES, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REF: GENEVA XXXX (SFO-GVA-IV-005)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000743

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) U.S. NON-PAPER ON READER'S GUIDE TO CHANGES IN THE
U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY PROTOCOL
ON INSPECTIONS, EXHIBITIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING
ACTIVITIES, SEPTEMBER 2, 2009

REF: GENEVA XXXX (SFO-GVA-IV-005)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-014.


2. (S) The U.S. Delegation provided the Russian Side a
document containing the guide to the U.S.-proposed draft of
the START Follow-on (SFO) Protocol on Inspections,
Exhibitions and Continuous Monitoring Activities during the
morning plenary session on September 2, 2009 (REFTEL). The
text of that guide follows in paragraph 3 below.


3. (S) Begin text:

SFO-IV
U.S. Non-Paper
September 2, 2009

Reader's Guide to Changes in the U.S.-Proposed Draft of the
START Follow-on Treaty Protocol on Inspections, Exhibitions
and Continuous Monitoring Activities

Introduction:

- In drafting the Protocol on Inspections, Exhibitions and
Continuous Monitoring Activities for the START Follow-on
Treaty, the United States has been guided by the general
rule that the Parties should strive to maintain as much
of the information contained in the Inspection Protocol
(IP) of the original START Treaty as seems appropriate.
This reflects the fact that the U.S. and Russian Parties
have been able to work very effectively in conducting
inspections, exhibitions and continuous monitoring
activities within the framework of the IP over the life
of the START Treaty.

- The United States has, however, made a series of changes

to the draft version of the IP to the START Follow-on
Treaty that reflect: 1) lessons learned during START
implementation; 2) the U.S. judgment regarding certain
types of inspections that it believes should be deleted
under START Follow-on; and 3) the formulation of new
procedures for START Follow-on necessitated by additions
in the content of the START Follow-on Treaty.

- The United States recommends the following types of
inspections be deleted from the START Follow-on Treaty
for the reasons cited with each:

-- Baseline Data Inspection - This type, in the U.S.
view, will not be required in light of the
carry-over of much of the relevant data from START.
New types of data can be confirmed at the initial
data update inspections, which propose will continue
to be conducted under the START Follow-on Treaty.

-- New Facility Inspection - These inspections were
very infrequently implemented under START and their
purpose can be accomplished using the initial data




update inspections at a newly notified facility.

-- Suspect-Site Inspection - These inspections as well
were infrequently used under START and, in our view,
can be deleted.

-- Post-Exercise Dispersal Inspection - This type of
inspection was never implemented during START and
believe that it can be deleted.

-- Close-Out Inspection - The United States believes
that these types of inspections can be deleted.
If either Party has concerns about the possible
conduct of activities for purposes believed
inconsistent with the new Treaty at a facility
which has been formally closed-out, that Party
can exercise its right to check on these activities
by conducting a Formerly Declared Facility
Inspection, which has been retained.

-- The Reentry Vehicle Inspection has been retained
for ICBMs and SLBMs, but renamed the "Nuclear
Warhead Inspection" to reflect its wider scope.
Under the START Follow-on Treaty it will also be
necessary to include confirming the number of
nuclear armaments associated with deployed heavy
bombers in addition to confirming the number of
RVs on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition,
in the U.S.-proposed draft Treaty and the IP,
the United States proposes to combine the Nuclear
Warhead Inspection and the Data Update Inspection
for air bases of deployed heavy bombers into a
single inspection which is entitled a "Nuclear
Warhead Inspection."

- In light of these recommended deletions, the United States
proposes to retain, and in one case rename and combine,
the following types of inspections, exhibitions and
continuous monitoring activities:

-- Data Update Inspection
-- Reentry Vehicle Inspection (renamed the Nuclear
Warhead Inspection)
-- Conversion or Elimination Inspection
-- Formerly Declared Facility Inspection
-- Technical Characteristics Exhibition
-- Distinguisability Exhibition
-- Continuous Monitoring Activities

Section I. General Obligations

- There are no changes.

Section II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of
Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members

- An early exchange of lists of inspectors is not needed.

Paragraph 1. The most recent list of inspectors and monitors
exchanged under START should roll over between the two
treaties, so an early exchange of these lists is not




necessary. The language calling for an early exchange of
lists, therefore, was deleted.

Section III. Notifications

- Makes minor changes to notifications to reflect current
START practices.

Paragraph 3. In START Follow-on, the notification of an
intention to conduct a short-notice inspection shall be
provided no less than 24 hours prior to the inspection, vice
16 hours under START. This puts the informal practice that
has evolved in START into formal SFO language.

Paragraph 4. Due to the reduction of the types of
inspections conducted, for short-notice inspections,
designation of inspection site and type of inspection will be
provided from 4 to 24 hours after arrival at the POE, rather
than several variants of times.

Paragraphs 5, 6, 7. Tracks changes with reduced types of
inspections.

Section IV. Arrangements for Transportation

-- Adds a section for the Ground Transportation
Agreement to support continuous monitoring
activities that was agreed within the JCIC
via an exchange of letters on this subject.

Title of Section. This was changed as a tracking change as
it covers more than air transportation in SFO.

Paragraph 1. Tracks changes; SFO is bilateral.

Paragraph 5. Deletes reference to operational dispersal as
this is no longer a type of inspection.

Paragraph 8. Deletes references to Belarus, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan as a tracking change that reflects a bilateral
treaty.

Paragraph 13. Tracking change from JCIC to BCC.

Section B. The paragraphs about the Ground Transportation
Agreement are connected with Perimeter Portal and Continuous
Monitoring (PPCM),an insertion from the JCIC Exchange of
Letters on this subject.

Section V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of
Entry

-- The "70 percent Rule" applies only to air bases for
heavy bombers.

-- Items of inspection have been updated to
include nuclear armaments for heavy bombers,
not just long-range nuclear ALCMs (LRNA).

Paragraphs 3, 4, 12, 15, 16. Tracking changes to reflect a
bilateral treaty and that the types of inspections have




changed.

Paragraph 17. This paragraph, known as the "70 percent
rule," has been edited so that it applies only to air bases
for deployed heavy bombers and is based on the number of
airplanes present at the time of designation, not at any time
during the first 20 hours.

Section VI. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections and
Continuous Monitoring Activities

-- The most significant change is that for nuclear
warhead inspections at heavy bomber air bases
where the focus is on the inspection of the
associated nuclear armaments weapons storage
area, and the item of inspection is the specified
nuclear armaments.

-- START Follow-on adds provisions for establishing
a reference cylinder for inspection of heavy
bomber nuclear armaments weapons storage areas
based on the diameters and lengths of the smallest
nuclear armament for heavy bombers.

-- There is a 24-hour limit on the nuclear warhead
inspection at air bases for deployed heavy bombers.

Paragraph 3. Updates regarding the site boundaries depicted
on site diagrams will be exchanged, which in SFO will be
accomplished in accordance with MOU Annex J, and not by means
of a separate agreement.

Paragraph 14, 17. There are tracking changes that reflect
changes in the types of inspections and the shift from JCIC
to BCC.

Paragraph 18. Allows for digital photography; Polaroid
cameras will soon be unavailable.

Paragraph 20. This paragraph updates the list of what are
understood to be items of inspection. The most significant
change is that for the inspection of the nuclear armaments
weapons storage area at or directly associated with heavy
bomber bases, the items of inspection are the specified
nuclear armaments and no longer just the smallest long-range
nuclear ALCM.

Paragraph 23. SFO adds provisions for establishing a
reference cylinder for the inspection of heavy bomber nuclear
armaments weapons storage areas that is based on diameter and
length of the smallest nuclear armament for heavy bombers.

Paragraph 28. This is a tracking change to reflect changes
in types of inspections to be conducted.

Paragraph 31. The most significant addition to this
paragraph, which concerns the duration of inspections, is to
place a 24-hour limit on the nuclear warhead inspection at
air bases for deployed heavy bombers. The paragraph is also
updated to reflect changes in types of inspections.




Paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37. These are tracking changes to
reflect the changes in the types of inspections to be
conducted.

Section VII. Data Update Inspections Conducted Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article XI of the Treaty

-- Air bases for deployed heavy bombers no
longer are subject to data update inspections;
the provisions checking on updated data are
included in the nuclear warhead inspections
conducted at air bases for heavy bombers.

-- At silo ICBM bases, all silos that are empty
but whose associated deployed ICBM is in the
maintenance facility shall be subject to an
empty launcher inspection.

-- The provisions of the Tenth Agreed Statement
have been incorporated into the Treaty,
allowing conditional inspection of conversion
or elimination facilities for heavy bombers.

Paragraph 1. The maximum number of data update inspections
to be conducted annually is reduced from 15 to 12. Since air
bases for heavy bombers will not be inspectable pursuant to
this Section, it would be appropriate to lower the allocation
of data update inspections.

Paragraphs 1, 2. This is a tracking change to reflect the
changes in types of inspections.

Previous Paragraph 2. This paragraph has been moved to the
discussion of nuclear warhead inspection for air bases for
heavy bombers due to the consolidation of the data update and
the nuclear weapons inspections.

Paragraph 3. Pre-inspection restrictions are updated to
apply to the updated list of types of inspections.

Paragraph 4. Provisions for baseline inspections have been
removed.

Paragraph 5. Provisions pursuant to limitations of
non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers at maintenance
facilities have been removed as they are no longer called for
in Treaty Article IV. The provisions on briefing
requirements regarding air bases for heavy bombers have been
removed as a tracking change. The concept that submarines
themselves are not subject to inspection, taken from Joint
Statement 16, has been added to subparagraph 5 (c).

Paragraph 8. While provisions pursuant to limitations of
non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers at maintenance
facilities have been removed since they are no longer
relevant in Treaty Article IV, an inspector now may simply
inspect each empty launcher that is "considered to contain"
and whose deployed missile is located in the maintenance
facility.

Paragraph 9. For road-mobile launchers that have not




returned to their re stricted area within 24 hours, it is now
the inspection team's right to inspect them, rather than an
option for the in-country escort to decide. Also, references
to baseline and new facility inspections have been removed as
a tracking change.

Previous Paragraph 13 from START. Data updates for air bases
for heavy bombers has been deleted; the relevant provisions
are now included within the nuclear warhead inspection at air
bases for heavy bombers.

Paragraph 11. The concept that submarines themselves are not
subject to inspection, taken from Joint Statement 16, has
been added.

Paragraph 12. While air bases for heavy bombers are no
longer subject to separate data update inspections, training
facilities for heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy
bombers and, in some instances, conversion or elimination
facilities for heavy bombers are still subject to data update
inspections. Provisions are included for inspections of
these facilities in this new paragraph. Provisions from the
Tenth Agreed Statement on the conditionally inspecting
conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers are
also included.

Former Section VIII from START - Suspect Site Inspections

-- This section has been deleted since this type
of inspection is not included in START Follow-on.

Section VIII. Nuclear Warhead Inspections of Deployed ICBMs
and SLBMs Conducted Pursuant to Subparagraph 3(a) of Article
XI of the Treaty

-- The full disclosure of the number of nuclear-
armed reentry vehicles loaded on each launcher
at the ICBM or SLBM base will be provided
during the pre-inspection briefing.

-- Two ICBMs or SLBMs may be selected during each
nuclear warhead inspection, provided that the
two missiles/launchers are located in the same
silo launch group, same re stricted area, or
same ballistic missile submarine.

Paragraph 1. This type of inspection is now called a
"nuclear warhead inspection" (NWI) rather than an RVOSI.
There is no inspection-free grace period as the SFO Treaty
enters into force; bases will be subject to an NWI
immediately upon entry into force of the new Treaty.

Paragraph 2. The purpose of the NWI is to confirm the number
of nuclear warheads declared for the selected missile, rather
than to confirm that the missile holds no more than an
attributed number.

Paragraph 3. One of the most significant changes is that two
ICBMs or SLBMs in their launchers instead of one, as
currently provided under START, may be selected for
inspection during an NWI.





Paragraph 8. Inspection teams will now receive full load-out
information for each individual launcher on the ICBM or SLBM
base during the pre-inspection briefing.

Paragraph 9. There is no separate provision regarding an
"empty launcher" inspection. With full load-out information
provided, the inspecting Party may choose an empty launcher
as one of its two launchers to inspect, if it so desires.

Paragraphs 10, 11, 12. In order to minimize disruption of
base operations, if the inspecting Party chooses to designate
two missiles in launchers for inspection, these two
missiles/launchers must be located within the same silo
launch group, the same re stricted area for mobile ICBMs, or
the same submarine.

Paragraph 17. If a launcher designated for inspection is
declared not to contain a missile, but upon arrival of
inspectors is found to actually contain a missile, the
inspection team shall have the right to perform an NWI
inspection. Unlike START, this event will trigger the
inclusion of an ambiguity in the official inspection report.

Section IX. Nuclear Warhead Inspections of Deployed Heavy
Bombers and Nuclear Armaments Weapons Storage Areas
Associated with Air Bases for Deployed Heavy Bombers
Conducted Pursuant to Subparagraph 3(b) of Article XI of the
Treaty

-- Section IX is a newly created section laying
out the activities involved in the conduct
of a Nuclear Warhead Inspection (NWI) of
deployed heavy bombers and nuclear armament
weapons storage areas associated with air
bases for deployed heavy bombers.

-- The section incorporates language from
Section VII of the START Inspection Protocol
relating to the inspection of heavy bombers
during a data update inspection.

Paragraph 1. This paragraph uses standard START language to
establish a limit of four NWI inspections at air bases for
deployed heavy bombers during a given year.

Paragraph 2. This paragraph uses unchanged language from
Section VII of the START Inspection Protocol to provide for
temporary exemptions from inspection for air bases during
specific circumstances.

Paragraph 3. This paragraph uses standard START language
from paragraph 5 of Section VII to the START Inspection
Protocol to state the updated purpose of NWI inspections at
air bases for deployed heavy bombers.

Paragraph 4. This paragraph uses standard START language to
limit the number of NWI inspections that can be conducted at
any one time to one.

Paragraph 5. This is a modified START paragraph describing




pre-inspection restrictions for air bases and nuclear
armaments weapons storage areas (NAWSA). The pre-inspection
restriction concept remains unchanged from START. This
paragraph applies such restrictions to the bombers as in
START data update inspection and introduces similar
restrictions regarding nuclear armaments for heavy bombers in
the NAWSAs.

Paragraph 6. This is a modified START paragraph describing
information that must be provided during the pre-inspection
brief. This information includes:

- Numbers and locations of deployed heavy bombers (similar
to data provided for START data update inspections at heavy
bomber air bases).

- Numbers and locations of the nuclear armaments loaded on
heavy bombers.

- Numbers and locations of the nuclear armaments in the
NAWSA.

Paragraph 7. This is a new paragraph using standard START
language to allow the use of subgroups by the inspection team.

Paragraph 8. This is a newly drafted paragraph employing
START language that establishes inspector rights during NWI
inspections at air bases. These include rights to:

- Confirm the number of deployed heavy bombers,

- Confirm the number of nuclear armaments loaded on such
bombers, and

- Confirm the number of nuclear armaments located in the
NAWSA.

As in START, this paragraph refers to Annex 4 of the
Inspection Protocol for specific inspection procedures to be
used during the NWI.

Former Section X from START Post Dispersal Inspections

-- No longer a type of inspection that will be
conducted under START Follow-on.

Section X Conversion or Elimination Inspections Conducted
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty

-- Tracking changes have been made to align with
changes in the updated Conversion or Elimination
Protocol. The Conversion or Elimination Protocol
will discussed at a later date.

Section XI. Formerly Declared Facility Inspection Conducted
Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

-- The list of formerly declared facilities
resets upon entry into force of the START
Follow-on Treaty.




Paragraph 1. There will be no grace period associated with
the possible conduct of formerly-declared facilities
inspections following entry into force of the SFO Treaty. A
Party may conduct this type of inspection immediately upon
entry into force of the START Follow-on Treaty. The list of
formerly-declared facilities will reset upon entry into force
of START Follow-on.

Former Section XII from START Close-Out Inspections

-- No longer a type of inspection that will
be conducted under START Follow-on.

Section XII. Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and
Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI
of the Treaty

-- ICBMs and SLBMs previously exhibited under
START will not need to be exhibited again
under the START Follow-on Treaty.

-- No provisions directed specifically for heavy
ICBMs in the START Follow-on Treaty.

Paragraph 1 (pg 48) ICBMs and SLBMs previously exhibited
under START will not have to be exhibited again under the new
treaty. Nuclear armaments for heavy bombers will be
exhibited.

Paragraph 3 (START) This paragraph has been deleted because
there will be no "early exhibitions" under START Follow-on.

Paragraph 11 (START) This paragraph has been deleted because
no limits on heavy ICBMs have been carried over to START
Follow-on.

Section XIII. Distinguishability Exhibitions and Inspections
Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty

-- Heavy bombers and ALCMs previously exhibited
under START will not have to be exhibited again.

-- Nuclear armaments for heavy bombers will be
exhibited.

Paragraph 1. Heavy bombers and ALCMs previously exhibited
under START will not have to be exhibited again. Nuclear
armaments for deployed heavy bombers will be exhibited.
Tracking changes have been made to reflect that former heavy
bombers will not be in SFO.

Paragraph 2 (START) Paragraph deleted because there will be
no baseline exhibitions; this is not a type of inspection in
START Follow-on.

Paragraph 5 (START) Paragraph deleted because there will be
no early exhibitions as there were under START since they
will not be needed.

Paragraph 7. Tracking changes have been made to reflect that
limits on former heavy bombers will not be included in SFO.





Section XIV. Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted
Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

-- Engineering site surveys will not need to be
conducted if previously conducted under START.

There are minor tracking changes throughout the Section.

Paragraph 9. Engineering site surveys will not need to be
conducted if previously done under START.

Section XV. Cancellation of Inspections

-- Minor tracking changes to reflect the types
of inspections included in START Follow-on.

Section XVI. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring
Reports

-- Minor tracking changes to reflect the types
of inspections included in START Follow-on.

End text.


4. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS