Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA742
2009-09-04 17:11:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0742/01 2471711
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041711Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9229
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4712
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1897
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0891
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6087
S E C R E T GENEVA 000742 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) TAYLOR/KOSHELEV DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE JCIC
SESSION BEFORE START TREATY EXPIRATION ON MARGINS OF SFO
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 3, 2009

REF: A. SECSTATE 87998

B. SECSTATE 91521

C. RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TEXT FOR A JCIC AGREEMENT
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION
OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT
THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK DATED
JANUARY 26 2009 AND ASSOCIATED LETTERS
ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND COST
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (E-MAILED TO
WASHINGTON -- NO REPORT CABLE.)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000742

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) TAYLOR/KOSHELEV DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE JCIC
SESSION BEFORE START TREATY EXPIRATION ON MARGINS OF SFO
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, SEPTEMBER 3, 2009

REF: A. SECSTATE 87998

B. SECSTATE 91521

C. RUSSIAN-PROPOSED TEXT FOR A JCIC AGREEMENT
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR COMPLETION
OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT
THE MONITORED FACILITY AT VOTKINSK DATED
JANUARY 26 2009 AND ASSOCIATED LETTERS
ON GROUND TRANSPORTATION AND COST
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (E-MAILED TO
WASHINGTON -- NO REPORT CABLE.)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-007.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 3, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 4:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
Participants:

U.S. Russia

Mr. Taylor Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Johnston Mr. Malyugin

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Russian Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
(JCIC) Representative Koshelev requested a meeting with U.S.
JCIC Representative Taylor on the margins of the Start
Follow-on (SFO) negotiations in Geneva on September 3, 2009.
Koshelev wanted to discuss the possibility for further work
in the JCIC prior to its expiration in December 2009.
Koshelev wanted to know whether it would be possible to
finish the work on the pending agreement on close-out
procedures for Votkinsk. Taylor used the opportunity to
raise two possible issues for resolution/consideration by the
Parties -- resolution on the MMIII RVOSI question and
possible agreement on a final, close-out Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) at Treaty expiration.


4. (S) Koshelev began the meeting in a frenzied state.
Taylor commented, saying he could appreciate Koshelev's
state, given the hectic pace of the week and the fact that
Koshelev had to endure a day of Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) discussions. Koshelev lamented that it was not so much
the CFE discussions as it was the pressures back in Moscow.
It was becoming more and more difficult to be away from
Moscow, especially at the same time as his boss, Antonov.
This was the reason he would not be coming back to Geneva for
the opening week of negotiations later in September. He
would be the only deputy in Antonov's directorate and,
therefore, he would have to stay in Moscow to keep everything
in order. He would be arriving on September 27.


5. (S) Turning to JCIC issues, Koshelev began by noting the
U.S. response (REF A) to Ukraine's non-paper on its position
in connection with the expiration of the START Treaty that
Ukraine had delivered at the previous JCIC session in July




2009. Moscow appreciated very much the U.S. approach and, in
fact, Koshelev believed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
would use many of the same points in their discussions with
Ukraine. Ukrainian JCIC Representative Nykonenko would be
arriving in Geneva on Friday, September 4, 2009, for
bilateral discussions on expiration of the START Treaty.
Koshelev said that he would like to get clarification on one
point in the U.S. paper. Koshelev was having a difficult
time explaining the phrase "the 'reset' of relations with
Russia would not come at Ukraine's expense." This phrase had
raised many questions within the MFA. It seemed as if the
United States was offering much more than a reaffirmation of
the security assurances contained in the Trilateral Statement
and in the Budapest Memorandum. Koshelev fully understood
that the United States and Ukraine had a bilateral
relationship and that Vice President Biden's remarks in Kyiv
were for political purposes. However, the questions Ukraine
had raised were within the context of the START Treaty and
Ukraine was a member of one side of the treaty with Russia.
Therefore, it seemed strange that the United States would be
approaching Ukraine differently from Russia in this context.
In Russia's view, there should be nothing more than a
reconfirmation of the Trilateral Statement and the Budapest
Memorandum. Malyugin offered that many in the MFA had
imagined a similar statement could be made for another state,
such as Poland. Did the U.S. statement mean there was more
to be offered?


6. (S) Taylor thanked Koshelev for sharing his concerns and
said that he would inform Washington of the concerns raised.
It was his personal view that because Ukraine had raised the
question of assurances, coupled with the fact that the United
States had been adamant that the follow-on negotiations with
Russia would be bilateral, the United States wanted to assure
Ukraine the U.S./Ukraine bilateral relationship would not
suffer.

--------------
RVOSI ISSUES
--------------


7. (S) Taylor turned to potential issues that could be
raised at a JCIC for resolution citing the upcoming MMIII
RVOSI demonstration. Taylor noted that the United States had
received the previous day the Russian notification listing
the observers from Russia and Ukraine that would be coming to
the demonstration at Malstrom Air Force Base September 9-11
(REF B). Koshelev agreed saying that, just the week prior,
Col Ryshkov had spoken with Koshelev saying that he had been
working very hard to address U.S. concerns with the SS-27
RVOSI and that he hoped there would be some new approaches to
this issue that could be demonstrated at the next SS-27 RVOSI.

--------------
VOTKINSK CLOSE-OUT AGREEMENT
--------------


8. (S) Koshelev raised the issue of the Votkinsk agreement
(REF C) asking if it would be possible to complete work on
that agreement as time was quickly passing to get everything
done prior to expiration of the Treaty. Taylor said that
once he had authority to bring the document to the table



again, he believed all that remained was to conform the
document and prepare it for signing. In his conversations
with the U.S. Delegation lawyer, Mr. Brown, it would take no
more than a couple of days to complete the conforming.
Koshelev said he appreciated this information and hoped that
the Parties could move forward on the document, perhaps as
soon as the first week of the next SFO session beginning
September 21. Taylor said that it would all depend on
whether Washington was ready to work on the document.

--------------
FINAL-CLOSEOUT MOU
--------------


9. (S) Taylor next addressed the issue of a final-closeout
MOU. Taylor explained that the Treaty did not provide for
such, noting that the Treaty expired before the next
six-month update would be submitted. Moreover, there was no
authority to provide such an update after December 5, 2009.
Taylor believed that it would be important to have a clear
understanding of each Side's data at expiration of the START
Treaty. The Parties could agree that MOU data, as of 0001
hours December 4, 2009, could be transmitted not later than
2400 hours on December 4, 2009. This would be important also
to our work in the START Follow-on negotiations as the data
would form the basis for our work on the SFO MOU. Koshelev
said that this was an interesting proposal and that he would
discuss this with his colleagues in Moscow.

--------------
TIMING FOR JCIC IS THE QUESTION
--------------


10. (S) Taylor asked Koshelev what his thoughts were on
timing for a JCIC session between now and December. Koshelev
said that it would depend on when his delegation would be in
Geneva for SFO negotiations. The Russian SFO Delegation
would be limited to two weeks in Geneva at a time and then
back to Moscow. Taylor offered that Koshelev had to be
kidding. It would be impossible to complete work on a START
Follow-on treaty with that kind of limited schedule. The
Parties had only a little more than three months before START
expired. Koshelev said that it was unfortunate but Antonov
could not devote all his time to negotiation of this treaty.
Koshelev had seen a transcript of the phone conversation
between President Obama and President Medvedev where Obama
said that the U.S. Negotiator would spend 100 percent of her
time on the negotiation of the new treaty and Medvedev had
offered the same commitment. Unfortunately, this had not
filtered down to Antonov. It was extremely difficult for
personnel in Antonov's department to be away. Either Antonov
or one of his deputies had to be present in Moscow to keep
things on track. This was why Koshelev would not be arriving
in Geneva until September 27.


11. (S) Koshelev offered September 28-30 as possible dates
for the JCIC. Taylor opined that his expectations for work
on the SFO treaty would be very intense during this period
and it would be difficult to focus attention on a JCIC
session. He offered that it might be possible during
mid-October during the ministerial. Koshelev said that he
was concerned that a mid-October date could present problems



with arranging to remove equipment and supplies from Votkinsk
in a timely manner. Koshelev was also concerned about giving
Ukraine a platform to stir things up with talk about joining
the negotiations. Taylor offered that Ukraine's insistence
on being a part of the negotiations should not be a surprise.
The United States had been very clear that the negotiations
for a START Follow-on treaty would be bilateral between the
United States and Russia. Koshelev agreed, saying that
Moscow was keen to end START on a positive note and did not
want Ukraine to create problems. His view was that with the
U.S. and Russian Representatives in Geneva, the Belarusian
and Kazakhstani representatives to the UN in Geneva could be
empowered to represent their governments in the meeting. He
felt certain that Nykonenko would want to travel to Geneva.
If the United States and Russia could conform the Votkinsk
agreement during the first week of the SFO negotiations
beginning September 21, the document could be ready for
signature quickly. The session would not need to be more
than a couple of days.

--------------
ANOTHER APPROACH ON
THE VOTKINSK AGREEMENT
--------------


12. (S) Taylor offered that the Votkinsk agreement did not
have to be concluded in the JCIC. He had briefly discussed
this with the Legal Advisor. The agreement could be
concluded as an Executive Agreement between the United States
and Russia. We would probably need to include Belarus in
some form as the plan for transporting the equipment and
supplies involved ground transportation through Belarus.
Koshelev said that this was an interesting idea and that he
would review this approach with his lawyers. It would be
helpful if this could be done without the possibility of
Ukraine's participation to prevent possible problems. This
might all be unnecessary as Ukraine had spoken about calling
for an extraordinary session of the JCIC and he expected he
would know more after the meeting with Nykonenko on September

4.


13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS