Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09GENEVA741
2009-09-04 12:44:00
SECRET
Mission Geneva
Cable title:  

START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):

Tags:  KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START 
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DE RUEHGV #0741/01 2471244
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 041244Z SEP 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9225
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4708
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 1893
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0887
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6083
S E C R E T GENEVA 000741 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN
QUESTIONS ON U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT

REF: GENEVA 0735 (SFO-GVA-IV-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

S E C R E T GENEVA 000741

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-IV):
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, ADDITIONAL RUSSIAN
QUESTIONS ON U.S.-PROPOSED TREATY TEXT

REF: GENEVA 0735 (SFO-GVA-IV-001)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-IV-003.


2. (U) Meeting Date: September 1, 2009
Time: 3:30 - 5:20 p.m.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


3. (S) Ambassador Antonov stated his expectation that the
United States would provide answers to the Russian
Delegation's questions from the previous day and repeatedly
complained that the United States had not included in the
U.S.-proposed text of the treaty Russian proposals that had
been provided at previous sessions. He questioned whether
the United States was retreating from the Joint Understanding
that the Presidents had signed in July in Moscow. A/S
Gottemoeller stressed that it was Russia's responsibility to
provide their own positions. The United States was not
responsible for drafting Russian language for the draft
treaty. The United States had provided its proposal on
August 24, 2009, and had not yet received any response to
that proposal. Moreover, the United States was not
retreating from what was agreed in the Joint Understanding.


4. (S) Gottemoeller offered an update on the U.S. Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) review process. She said that the
review was nearing completion and that, once that process was
complete, Russia would be informed of the results of the
review. The process should be completed by late September or
early October of this year. Antonov said he did not
understand the U.S. reluctance to include language in the
draft treaty on the interrelationship between strategic

offense and strategic defense. He implored the U.S.
Delegation members from the Pentagon, Joint Staff and
Department of Energy for a rationale on why the United States
was reluctant to accept a provision in the new treaty.
Gottemoeller explained that the responsibility of this group
was to develop a treaty to replace the START Treaty. That
treaty would address strategic offensive arms. Strategic
defense would be addressed in another forum.

--------------
THE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT,
BUT SUBSTANCE IS CRUCIAL
--------------


5. (S) Gottemoeller clarified her previous comments on the
inclusion of Russian text in the U.S-proposed treaty text.
She stated that, after careful reading of the U.S-proposed
treaty text, there were several areas where Russian language
was explicitly included. Those areas, where the United
States had known where Russian text was to be placed in the
treaty, the United States had included it in its
U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT). She offered the
preamble as an example where text reflecting the Russian
position on the interrelationship between strategic offense


and strategic defense and ballistic missiles in a non-nuclear
configuration was included, in brackets. Furthermore, there
was specific bracketed Russian text in Article XV, Paragraph
5, concerning qualitative improvements in missile defense
systems. The U.S. Delegation had prepared two U.S.-proposed
JDTs, one on preambular language, and one on final articles
and provided them to the Russian Delegation at yesterday's
meeting. Gottemoeller further stated that, although the
Russians have provided other specific language, the United
States did not know where to place it in the U.S-proposed
treaty text. Again, she emphasized that the United States is
ready to create q JDT when the Russian Side indicates where
its proposed language should fit. Better yet, the United
States would like to review a Russian-proposed text for the
treaty and compare it with the U.S.-proposed text.


6. (S) Antonov followed with a dissertation on the many
instances of U.S. unwillingness to consider Russian matters
of principle. After a lengthy rant, Antonov finally agreed
that the task at hand is to create a joint draft text.
Gottemoeller underscored that it is not a matter of
reflecting both Sides' text in brackets, that is symbolic and
a procedural issue, but rather it is a matter of how to take
mutual views into account and reflect it in joint draft text.


7. (S) Antonov addressed translation issues. He said that
the specific Russian preamble proposals and additional
paragraphs that were included in the Joint Understanding were
not in the U.S-proposed treaty text. Specifically, the words
"impact on strategic stability" which were included in the
U.S.-proposed preamble in the section on strategic offensive
and defensive arms were not present in the Joint
Understanding. Antonov queried whether this was a
fundamental change in the U.S. position. Gottemoeller
confirmed that it was not a change in the U.S. position and
had nothing to do with the accuracy of the translation.

--------------
AND ON TO MISSILE DEFENSE
--------------


8. (S) Gottemoeller stated that she had spent time briefing
the U.S. Senate recently on why the language on the
interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic
defense was in the text of the Joint Understanding. She
noted that the signing of the Joint Understanding by
President Obama and President Medvedev was continuing a
long-standing position first recognized by U.S. President
Nixon in 1972 and, therefore, the Joint Understanding is not
breaking any new ground. Gottemoeller underscored that both
Presidents agreed that the new treaty would be about
strategic offensive arms; meanwhile, the United States and
Russia have begun a separate process to address defensive
systems with the Joint Threat Assessment.


9. (S) Gottemoeller reported that the Ballistic Missile
Defense Review is moving along a timeline that President
Obama mentioned to President Medvedev during the Moscow
Summit. The review will be completed very shortly and
President Obama plans to discuss in early Fall both the
process and results.


10. (S) Antonov again spoke at length on the


interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic
defense. He concluded his statement by reiterating that the
Russians could not agree to a treaty which did not include
this point, adding he could not understand the U.S. problem
with accepting the Russian proposal. The Russian Side
reacted with considerable surprise when Gottemoeller
explained that the Russian insistence on freezing missile
defense levels was interpreted by the United States as a
limit. The Russian Delegation remarked that it was meant
only as a statement of fact, not a limit. The Russian Side
pointed to their proposal for Treaty Article XV where either
Party could invoke the supreme withdrawal clause should there
be a qualitative or quantitative increase in missile defense
capability from the time of the signing of the treaty. Both
Sides agreed that they had interpreted the language
differently.


11. (U) Documents exchanged.

- U.S.:

-- U.S. Non-paper on Concepts Behind U.S.-Proposed
Treaty, dated August 31, 2009.


12. (U) Participants:

U.S.

A/S Gottemoeller
Amb Ries
Mr. Brown
Mr. Buttrick
LtCol Comeau
Mr. Dunn
Ms. Eccles
Mr. Elliott
Mrs. Friedt
Col Hartford
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Siemon
Mr. Taylor
Dr. Warner
Mrs Zdravecky
Ms. Gross (Int)
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int)

RUSSIA

Amb Antonov
Mr. Koshelev
Gen (Ret) Buzhinskiy
Col Ilin
Ms. Ivanova
Col Izrazov
Ms. Kotkova
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov
Mr. Leontiev
Mr. Luchaninov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Neshin
MGen Orlov
Col Pischulov
Mr. Rudenko


Mr. Semin
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Tarasov
Mr. Vasiliev
Gen Venevtsev
Mr. Vorontsov
Ms. Komshilova (Int)


13. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS